




Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons
Internal Security 
Management in Nigeria
“This collection of essays spread over twenty nine chapters plus the Introduction 
and Conclusion, by known and emerging scholars brings out in a highly illuminat-
ing and coherent style a nuanced understanding of the causes, nature and dynam-
ics of insecurity in a fledging democratic environment. Its multidisciplinary 
approach expands both the theoretical and empirical or programmatic lens through 
which to view and analyse the pathogenic impacts of insecurity in Nigeria. The 
book remains readable and engaging, and serves as a useful companion to all those 
who are genuinely interested in the critical or dispassionate analysis of Nigeria’s 
security conundrum and the various options for mitigation, prevention, manage-
ment, and resolution. The book is worth having as a useful resource for theoretical 
inquiry and policy development about serious risks and threats to Africa’s demo-
cratic gains and human security.”
—Professor Ernest Uwazie, Chair, Division of Criminal Justice; Director,  
Center for African Peace & Conflict Resolution, California 
State University, Sacramento, USA
“The centrality of the security dialogue in the context of the African Renaissance 
requires multiple learning spaces. This book takes up an important learning space 
to transform not only the discourse in Nigeria, but disseminates critical knowledge 
into the global space where scholars and practitioners are mobile, sharing their 
knowledge across boundaries and disciplines. This book contains an important 
collection about internal security management in Nigeria. The discussions about 
security management in one of the super powers of Africa are well grounded in 
intellectual thought of African scholars. The book opens up thinking about the 
possibilities for lasting peace in Nigeria and the countries where the country 
potentially projects power. The several case studies are not only relevant to the 
security situation in Nigeria, but is founded on a wealth of theory, making it a criti-
cal body of knowledge on security management in Africa and the world. This book 
contains something for every scholar and specialists in security management. 
Moreover, it contributes an important body of knowledge that promotes demo-
cratic governance and social cohesion in Africa, with potential to inform legal and 
policy frameworks in Nigeria and other African countries to promote peace within 
the ambit of the African Renaissance philosophy. This cutting-edge scholarship, in 
one condensation, is an essential read.”
—Professor Andreas Velthuizen, Head of the Institute for African 
Renaissance Studies, University of South Africa
Internal Security Management in Nigeria
“The complexity of contemporary security challenges facing the Nigerian state and 
the weakness in effectively addressing them remain one of the engaging subjects of 
concern in African affairs. The collection of scholarly articles in this book excel-
lently simplify and break down the component parts of this complex subject into a 
readily digestible form for scholars, experts and practitioners. The publication is a 
major contribution to knowledge.”
—Professor Isaac Olawale Albert, Former Director, Institute for Peace and 
Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
Oshita O. Oshita 
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A striking provision in Chap. 2 of the Nigerian Constitution provides 
that “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of 
government.” Given the expectations from this constitutional provision, 
the episodic but recurring spate of violent conflicts in Nigeria, particu-
larly during the past one and half decades, continue to amplify the breach 
of this important statement. As a matter of fact, Nigeria is replete with 
evidences of growing insecurity that constitute early warning signs of 
possible implosion, owing to the inability of statutory internal security 
agencies to secure the public as a primary purpose of government. Since 
the return to civilian rule in 1999, the six geopolitical zones of the coun-
try have been experiencing varying degrees of unprecedented security 
challenges. At different times, violence in parts of the country has been 
attributed to activities of the Niger Delta Militants, the Oodua People’s 
Congress, Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, Movement for Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Yandaba, Yankaleri, Indigenous 
People of Biafra (IPOB), cultism associations and various other localized 
groups of street urchins. In 2009, the activities of the Boko Haram 
insurgents marked a new level in the expanding nature of the insecurity 
confronting Nigeria.
In 2018, the killings attributed to the herders-farmers crisis were 
said to have exceeded those caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. 
These indicators sum up to epitomize the incapacity of internal security 
management apparatuses to fulfil the constitutional mandate assigned 
to them by the government and people of Nigeria. Against the backdrop 
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of the increasing rate of unemployment, absence of domestic industrial 
capacity for job creation, lack of basic infrastructural facilities, and the 
perception that Nigeria is an unsafe destination for foreign direct 
investment continues to hold sway, thereby worsening the already 
tragic conditions facing the youth- dominated population of Nigeria. 
Based on these troubling statistics, Internal Security Management in 
Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons was conceptualized to pro-
vide perspectives to the expanding conundrum of insecurity in the 
country and how to explore pathways for effectively resolving the 
country’s security crisis.
Undoubtedly, the pervasive insecurity in Nigeria today may not be 
unconnected with the history of prolonged military dictatorship foisted 
on the country and its people after independence, coupled with the sys-
tematic underfunding of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as the foremost 
agency in internal security management.
Internal Security Management in Nigeria represents a multidisci-
plinary effort by Nigerian academics to explore the issues around the 
(mis)management of internal security in the country with a view to 
providing a pragmatic frame for analysing the sources and triggers of 
insecurity for the understanding of stakeholders with a view to address-
ing the root causes of insecurity. The authors deliberately provide his-
torical, theoretical, and practical perspectives to the crisis of internal 
security management in Nigeria as opposed to the dominant sanitized 
and somewhat deodorized explanations often provided in the public 
space. Some of the contributors dare to implicate the state, govern-
ment, and the statutory security management institutions in the near 
comatose level of the internal security architecture, which has left 
armed non-state actors with the control of chunks of territorial space 
than is tolerable in any well-ordered society. The issues of funding, lack 
of inter-agency cooperation, and collaboration, inter-agency turf wars, 
and corruption, among others, have been discussed from multidisci-
plinary perspectives as they affect the internal security management 
architecture in Nigeria. The authors hope that by igniting the frank 
discourse on the important and sensitive issues of internal security 
management in Nigeria, they would have contributed to sensitizing 
stakeholders on the need to build synergistic efforts that would prevent 
the implosion that could arise from the emerging phenomenon of 
ix PREFACE 
privatizing the instrument of force by armed non-state actors using 
warlord political tactics. The book should be a delight for academics, 
subject- matter experts, security operatives, policymakers, students, and 
general interest readers.
Abuja, Nigeria Oshita O. Oshita
Igbariam, Nigeria  Ikenna Mike Alumona
Nsukka, Nigeria  Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Understanding the Crisis 




Internal security management has taken a centre stage in political and 
academic discourses, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States. It was the 
9/11 attacks in the United States, together with similar attacks such as the 
one in Istanbul on November 15, 2001 and the Madrid train bombing in 
Spain on March 11, 2004 that brought to fore the need for states to rein-
force their internal security mechanisms to meet up with the challenge of 
protecting citizens and other nationals living within their territorial 
boundaries. The resultant effect of these global indices of insecurity is that 
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in contemporary international politics, the ability of a state to ensure ade-
quate security has become a principal variable in measuring the success or 
failure of the state. Thus, state failure is associated with countries that have 
lost control over the instruments of security maintenance.
On the other hand, states have begun to redesign the architecture of 
their internal security network in order to forestall occurrence of threats of 
global dimensions. For example, the United States passed into law the 
Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002. The act which now com-
bined the efforts, authorities and powers of 22 different federal depart-
ments and agencies into a single and unified entity called the US 
Department of Homeland Security, also created the position of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (U.S Department of State Archive 2002).
In the African context, the nature of insecurity has been worrisome. 
According to the 2017 report of the State of Peace and Security in Africa, 
in 2016, a total of 17,539 violent events took place in the continent. A 
total of 8050 conflict-related fatalities and 5098 migrant deaths were also 
recorded. The continent has also recorded progress in the use of African- 
centred solutions in managing armed conflict and insecurity (Institute for 
Peace and Security Studies 2017). The insecurity situation in Africa as 
argued by Nnoli (2006) points to the collapsed character of the state 
which is caused by the factors of political exclusion, economic marginalisa-
tion and social discrimination as the most serious impediment to security. 
As a result of this, much has not been achieved in terms of redesigning the 
security architecture of most African states because most of them are 
engrossed in the struggle for survival.
Nigeria exemplifies the insecurity situation in the African continent. 
Admittedly, the rising concern about insecurity cannot be explained out-
side the numerous terrorist attacks by the Boko Haram and other similar 
sects, the litany of kidnappings, increasing crime rate, the emerging cul-
ture of violence perpetuated by legal and illegal revenue collectors, youth 
militancy and cultism, the herdsmen-farmers conflict and other factors of 
insecurity that have been a regular feature of life in the country. Against 
the reoccurring incidents of these factors of insecurity and the continued 
reassurance of the Nigerian government to control the situation, there is 
widespread doubt about the capability of the Nigerian government to pro-
vide adequate security for her citizens and others living within its territo-
rial boundaries. The implications of this include loss of confidence in the 
state, decline in foreign direct investment and the “privatisation” of secu-
rity as increasing number of people and corporate organisations are now 
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relying more on nongovernmental security operatives for their safety 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2006; Adesegun and Olumide 2015).
At the heart of the internal insecurity crisis in Nigeria are two critical 
issues. First, is the seeming inability of the state to meet up with the chal-
lenges of internal security management. Since the return of democracy in 
1999, Nigerians have witnessed, on a daily basis, an upsurge of factors of 
insecurity that threaten their peaceful coexistence despite the assurances of 
the government to ensure their safety and bring to justice the perpetrators of 
various heinous crimes. Equally linked to this problem is that while there 
appears to be enough agencies that are meant to take care of the country’s 
security, there is still clamour for the creation of new ones such as the Nigerian 
Peace Corps whose enabling law the President has refused to assent to.
Secondly and as a corollary of the above, is the increasing participation 
of armed non-state actors such as vigilante groups, hunters, private secu-
rity companies and ethnic militias in the provision of security. This has 
become so pervasive and is gradually eroding the monopoly of the coer-
cive powers of the state. Fraught with its own challenges, the involvement 
of armed non-state actors has itself been identified as a trigger of insecu-
rity. Evidences abound of situations where these non-state actors have 
used their arms against ordinary citizens. The seeming inability of the state 
to provide adequate regulation and supervision of the activities of these 
armed non-state actors is equally disturbing. These developments have 
cast some doubts on the veracity of the long-held view that the state is the 
sole guarantor of peace and security. In fact, to the discerning mind, the 
architecture of internal security and its management in Nigeria is bedev-
illed with a lot of disturbing questions that are in need of urgent answers.
It is against this background that this book focuses on a critical examina-
tion of the issues, perspectives and challenges in the management of Nigeria’s 
internal security architecture. The book basically seeks to examine the 
causes, nature and dynamics of insecurity in a fledging democratic environ-
ment. This has become necessary because across various epochs, the contin-
ued existence of the Nigerian state has been more threatened by internal 
security challenges than external ones. More importantly, the hope that 
attended the restoration of democratic governance in May 1999 after 26 
years of military rule appears to have placed the burden of solving Nigeria’s 
internal security crisis on the dynamics of democratic governance and prac-
tice. Unfortunately, the expectations have been dashed as the increasing 
nature of insecurity of lives and property has remained the greatest threat to 
democracy in Nigeria. Okoye and Alumona (2014) have tried to underscore 
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the nexus between the practice of democracy and the challenges of internal 
security in Nigeria. They rightly assert that “despite the restoration of civil 
rule in Nigeria more than a decade ago, the Nigerian people have not been 
provided security of life and property as part of the dividends of democracy 
that the leaders often flaunt” (Okoye and Alumona 2014, p. 195). In many 
ways, the character and dynamics of democratic politics appear to be fuelling 
the insecurity problem. The level of violence that has manifested in the 
interplay of power and forces since 1999 leaves much to be desired. The 
struggle for power among the political elites has remained a “do or die” 
affair as a good number of the elites have lost their lives in the struggle for 
power and control. The conduct of the political parties and the key political 
actors involved in the political process has not contributed to the process of 
democratic consolidation (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).
The worrisome character of internal insecurity and the dynamics of its 
management have for some time commanded the attention and tasked the 
energies of various scholars. The research efforts of these scholars have 
been exposed in the different publications that seek to examine the nature, 
character and dynamics of internal security management in Nigeria. 
Among such scholarly works are Dapo Adelugba and Phillip Ogo Ujomu, 
Rethinking Security in Nigeria: Conceptual issues in the quest for social 
order and national integration, 2008; Ozoemenam Mbachu and Umar 
M. Bature, Internal security management in Nigeria: A study in terrorism 
and counter terrorism, 2013; Ozoemenam Mbachu and Chukwudi Mayor 
Eze, Democracy and National security in Nigeria: Issues, challenges and 
prospects, 2009; John Adewale Abolurin, Nigeria’s National Security: Issues 
and Challenges, 2011; Isaac Olawale Albert, Willie Aziegbe Eselebor and 
Nathaniel Danjibo, Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, 2012; 
Okwudiba Nnoli, Democracy and National security in Nigeria, 2013; and 
Nwolise, O.B.C., Is physical security alone enough for the survival, progress 
and happiness of man, 2013.
This present volume complements the existing scholarly works on the 
subject matter. However, it moves beyond them to offer a comprehensive 
discussion of the theoretical foundations of internal security, the threats to 
internal security, the role of formal and informal agencies in internal secu-
rity management and the challenges of internal security management 
in Nigeria.
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5
StRuctuRe of the Book and oveRview of chapteRS
This book, Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, chal-
lenges and lessons, was initiated as a modest contribution of the editors and 
contributors towards solving the crisis of internal security in Nigeria. 
Specifically, the book critically explores some salient issues, perspectives 
and challenges that have tended to challenge the foundations of the inter-
nal security management paradigm in Nigeria. In addressing these con-
cerns, the book has 30 chapters spread across four parts. In the introduction, 
the editors, Oshita O.  Oshita, Ikenna Alumona and Freedom Onuoha 
basically set the tone of the analyses, justified the focus of the study and 
briefly highlighted the discourses about the internal security management 
in Nigeria.
The first part of the book sets out to examine the theoretical and practi-
cal nexus between the state and security management. The part contains 
three chapters. The first, by Oshita O. Oshita and Augustine Ikelegbe, 
interrogates internal security management as a legitimate human interest 
and an aspect of the broad concept of security governance. Drawing from 
the theoretical framing of issues in internal security management in 
Nigeria, the authors basically explore how the mix of historical and struc-
tural factors, together with governance, legislation, actors, drivers, dynam-
ics and capabilities of stakeholders, has impacted on the efficacy or 
otherwise of the internal security sub-sector. The chapter provides a his-
torical insight into the many challenges of internal security management 
and argues that outside the nature of management of internal security by 
the security agencies and the conduct of security personnel, which have 
alienated them from the ordinary citizens, interference by the political 
class in the management processes in the security sector has remained the 
greatest challenge to ensuring adequate security provisioning.
In the second chapter of the part, Ikenna Mike Alumona reflects on the 
theoretical nexus between the state and security management. He begins 
by contextualising the essence of the state which many authorities have 
acknowledged to be the provision of security and welfare for the citizens. 
He makes the point that since the state is an abstract entity that cannot be 
seen nor touched, the responsibilities of the state are exercised by the gov-
ernment. Thus, the government in the final analysis through the processes 
of governance takes responsibility of providing security and welfare. As he 
argued, “since it is in the processes of governance that state structures or 
institutions do perform the essential function of security maintenance, the 
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relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored”. In the 
final substantive part of the chapter, Alumona critically engages with the 
debate about the state of internal security and offers explanations for 
understanding the crisis of internal security in Nigeria. The chapter is pre-
mised on the thesis that the dysfunctionality of Nigeria’s federal system, 
which is a product of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, has 
resulted in the politicisation of security structures and governance pro-
cesses involved in security management. This in turn has negatively aggra-
vated and sustained insecurity in the country. In the last chapter of Part 1, 
Rosemary Okolie-Osemene provides a historical discourse of internal 
security challenges in Nigeria since 1999 when the country returned to 
democratic governance. The author outlines the various factors of internal 
insecurity since 1999 and argues that the democratic dispensation has not 
abated internal security threats because most security agencies have either 
become victims of insecurity or faced criticism from the masses because of 
the capacity of non-state actors to overrun some communities and towns.
The second part of the book, which features 13 chapters, outlines and 
critically discusses the many dimensions of internal security threats in 
Nigeria. There is no doubt that Nigeria is in the throes of a major internal 
security crisis. On a daily basis, the national dailies are awash with reports 
of the horrifying incidents of internal threats to lives and property. The 
internal insecurity crisis is denoted by two major features, namely the 
increasing frequency of factors of insecurity and the changing character 
and dynamics of their manifestations. While some of the manifestations of 
the insecurity have a national character, different geopolitical zones have 
been plagued by a specific form of insecurity or another. On the whole, 
the rising level of insecurity has much left to be desired. Nigerians have 
lost count of the number of attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram and other 
similar sects and the value of life and property involved. On the other 
hand, the havoc caused by the Fulani herdsmen in many cases appears to 
have outweighed the impact of the Boko Haram menace. In another 
dimension, while the phenomenon of the kidnapping appears to be going 
down, the emerging culture of violence perpetuated by legal and illegal 
revenue collectors in many urban cities is becoming a serious matter 
of concern.
Francis Chigozie Chilaka and Ikechukwu Idika open the part with an 
examination of the menace of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. They 
trace the origin of the formation of the Boko Haram sect and argue that in 
order to downgrade the sect considerably and recapture outstanding 
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 territories from the group, efforts should be made to deepen intelligence 
sharing with other regional military forces because evidence abound that 
Boko Haram operate more effectively along borders in Northern Nigeria. 
This is followed by Jude Odigbo, who looks at the security implications of 
the conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and rural farmers in the differ-
ent parts of the country. From another dimension, Al Chukwuma Okoli 
and Onyekachi Ernest Nnabuihe, using the central region as a focal point 
of analysis, re-examine the phenomenon of communal conflicts in Nigeria. 
They contend that the existing knowledge about communal conflicts 
which generally attributes its cause to the dialectics of identity politics and 
ethno-religious convolutions is not completely correct. Within the con-
text of the political ecology perspective, the authors basically try to explain 
how in reality primordial social and cultural factors serve as veritable fault 
lines for harbouring communal conflicts. This is particularly true when 
these communal conflicts are accorded strategic partisan attention through 
the political manipulation of the elites who are basically after their 
own interest.
The Niger Delta region is another hotspot in the crisis of insecurity in 
Nigeria. The nature and character of oil politics in the region has resulted 
in a legion of problems such as environmental degradation, kidnapping, 
destruction of oil facilities, oil theft, youth militancy and so on. Of all the 
problems created by the politics of oil exploitation and the distribution of 
oil wealth, none has threatened the stability of Nigerian economy as the 
phenomenon of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. In this regard, Ernest 
Tooch Aniche examines the phenomenon of youth militancy in Niger 
Delta. He provides a historical sketch of youth militancy in the region and 
also looks at the nature, methods and drivers of youth militancy. He argues 
that years of environmental degradation and total neglect in the Niger 
Delta region led to the emergence of many youth organisations that sub-
sequently took to militancy as a bargaining tool to get a fair share in the 
distribution of oil revenue. He concludes that unless attention is paid to 
constitutional reforms that will ensure adequate distribution of oil reve-
nue, the problem of youth militancy will continue to be a feature of poli-
tics in the region.
In a related vein, Cornelius Ozeh and Chukwuemeka Ohajionu explore 
the link between unemployment, migration and cyber criminality. They 
argue that the alarming rate of unemployment and underemployment has 
significantly contributed to cyber-criminality in Nigeria despite the exis-
tence of extant laws to address cybercrimes in the country. Relying on the 
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analytical framework of McClelland’s Needs theory, they further reveal 
that the motivation to satisfy needs for achievement, affiliation and power, 
which could not be satisfied due to unemployment or underemployment, 
remains the propelling force for the intimidating level of cyber-criminality 
in Nigeria. Thus, they recommend value reorientation, job creation and 
the implementation of the letters and spirits of the laws against cyber- 
criminality as the solutions to the problem which already has battered the 
image of Nigeria in the international scene. Ikenna Mike Alumona and 
Kingsley Onwuanabile shift attention to the close and complex connection 
between the environment and human security. They explore the nature 
and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria. They further high-
light the efforts of government towards ensuring a safe and clean environ-
ment starting with the promulgation of the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency FEPA Act of 1998. The basic contention of the authors 
is that the weak institutional capacity of the state institutions responsible 
for environmental management and protection accounts for the challenge 
of environmental insecurity in Nigeria. To this end, they recommended 
the strengthening of agencies involved with environmental management 
and attitudinal change among Nigerians as a panacea to the problem.
Olabisi James Ayodele looks at the concept of crime, its manifestations 
and the nexus between crime and internal security in Nigeria. He outlines 
the various dimensions and manifestations of crime. He further locates the 
link between incessant crimes and internal insecurity in the brazen viola-
tion of extant laws that are meant to prevent crime by the government and 
the governed. According to him, Nigeria cannot be secured internally in a 
situation where acts of criminality by both the citizens and the state are 
treated with levity. To guarantee public order and forestall insecurity in 
Nigeria, the author recommends that criminal violations should be 
addressed decisively by the government by strengthening and overhauling 
the relevant institutions involved in crime management.
The phenomenon of kidnapping has manifested in an alarming propor-
tion in Nigeria since the return of democracy and has remained a constant 
feature of the landscape of criminal victimisation. Freedom Onuoha and 
James Okolie-Osemene explored the nature of kidnapping with particular 
attention to kidnapping for ransom which has remained a major source of 
security concern because of the growth in frequency, geographical spread 
and operational audacity. The authors develop a typological construct of 
kidnapping for ransom (K4R) which is based on insights gleaned from the 
character and modus operandi of kidnapping gangs. Utilising a theoretical 
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bridging framework that combines the lifestyle theory, routine activity 
theory and economic theory of crime, they argue that the escalation of K4R 
derives from, and reflects, the crisis of the Nigerian political economy. They 
further discuss the factors that underpinned the escalation of K4R.  The 
chapter concludes that the upsurge in K4R seems to be overwhelming the 
Nigerian Police, necessitating the adoption of extra measures by the Nigerian 
government such as the registration of mobile phone users, adoption or 
amendment of anti-kidnapping legislation by some states to provide harsh 
punishment (death penalty), the deployment of military taskforce, and 
demolition of structures or buildings owned or used by kidnappers for their 
operations, among others. These and other measures have proven largely 
ineffective in addressing the menace. To this end, the authors recommend, 
among others, government’s implementation of measures to drastically 
reduce poverty, create employment for the teeming youth and curb 
widespread corruption, evolve a reliable national identification system and 
the capacitation of security and law enforcement agencies through proper 
training and equipment.
From the well-known threat of kidnapping for ransom, the part diverts 
our attention to the havoc caused in most urban cities in Nigeria by those 
who legally and illegally are involved in the all-important task of revenue 
generation for the different state governments. An emerging feature of 
revenue generation across most states in Nigeria is the involvement of 
contractors who collect revenue on behalf of the government to avoid the 
leakages and diversion allegedly perpetuated by the career civil servants. A 
disturbing character of this system of revenue collection is the culture of 
violence adopted by the legal and illegal contractors involved in the pro-
cess. This ugly situation appears not to have attracted systematic academic 
inquiry. It is therefore interesting that Stephen Azom and Chukwuma 
Okoli decided to focus attention on the subject matter. They examine the 
effects of the emerging culture of (un)armed violence by legal/illegal rev-
enue collectors in Nigeria using Enugu metropolis as a focal point of anal-
ysis. They observe that states and local governments experience fiscal 
challenges due to the lopsided federal structure of the post-colonial 
Nigerian state which concentrates major sources of revenue at the centre. 
This is despite the constitutional provision that empowers all the three 
tiers of government to collect specified rates and taxes concurrently. 
However, they note that states and local governments against the back-
drop of rapid reduction in oil revenue, increasing cost of governance and 
growth of neoliberal ideology, which emphasise the need to increase tax 
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rates while reducing government spending, have continued to adopt the 
strategies that translate to the use of armed and unarmed agents to enforce 
rates and taxes. In this light, Enugu, like most other metropolis, has gained 
notoriety for the activities of armed and unarmed revenue collectors of 
state ministries, departments and agencies and local government who are 
turning the state into the Hobbesian state of nature by the crude and vio-
lent revenue collection strategies. As they have observed, the major vic-
tims of this violence are the helpless operators in the informal economy 
such as commercial drivers, owners of small and medium businesses, ordi-
nary citizens who visit markets, inter- and intra-state travellers and tenants 
in residential apartments in the state.
Willie Eselebor interrogates the issue of human trafficking and its link-
age with porous borders in Nigeria. The author examines the causative 
factors behind human trafficking in Nigeria and finds out that the causes 
are complex and interwoven and deeply rooted in poverty, unemployment, 
inequality and discrimination. He further explores the issue of security gov-
ernance of borderlands and the capacity of border security agencies to con-
tain identified challenges. He recommends effective border security which 
will transmit into the provision of improved technological equipment at 
the borders, training and retraining of border security operatives as solu-
tions to challenge of human trafficking. Waziri Adisa looks at arms prolif-
eration, Boko Haram extremism and insecurity in Nigeria. He argues that 
while the problem of Boko Haram insurgency is caused by multiplicity of 
factors, illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons is largely responsible 
for the widespread and lethality of the sect’s activities. Adisa further traces 
the origin and the political economy of arms proliferation in Africa to the 
1970s and 1980s, when many African leaders began to seek for military 
assistance of foreign nations to end armed insurrections in their countries. 
The author observes that the neglect of illicit arms transfer, coupled with 
the inability of the Nigerian government to effectively control its borders, 
aided the radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram to exploit the existing criminal 
networks by conniving with other radical Islamist sects in the Islamic 
Magreb to get cache of arms and ammunition used in its eight- year insur-
rection against the Nigerian state. Adisa makes a similar recommendation 
with Willie Eselebor that an effective border control system is inevitable in 
Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts. This will ensure that the government 
is able to cut off the sources of arms supply to armed groups in the country.
Across the globe, the police have been identified as the primary institu-
tion that is responsible for internal security management. In the Nigerian 
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context, they are constitutionally charged with the responsibility of main-
taining peace, law and order. But the extent the police has been able to 
fulfil this responsibility has been a subject of debate in many circles. David 
Enweremadu in his chapter contributes to this debate by examining the 
relationship between corruption in the Nigeria Police Force and the chal-
lenges of internal security in Nigeria. Of particular interest to the author is 
how factors such as extrajudicial killings, arrest and illegal detention of 
citizens orchestrated by policemen aggravate the internal security problem 
in the country. The author argues that the problem of internal security 
management by the Nigerian Police is further compounded by the unwill-
ingness of the citizens to report suspected cases of crime to the police, 
thereby making crime control a very difficult challenge. The citizens have 
been so alienated by the corrupt practices that bedevil the police. The 
panacea according to the author lies in independent and community polic-
ing and good welfare package for police officers.
Osisioma Nwolise closes the part by delving into the relatively new area 
of spiritual security. His thought-provoking chapter focuses on the dimen-
sions and manifestations of spiritual threats and insecurity in contempo-
rary Nigeria. The chapter advances the idea of human security further by 
focusing on the spiritual dimension of human and national security. He 
argues that the focus on physical security does not give the total picture of 
the security architecture of a person or nation. He further identifies and 
discusses with empirical evidence and examples the dimensions and mani-
festations of spiritual threats to human and national security in contempo-
rary Nigeria. These, according to him, include ritual rape, ritual murder, 
yahoo-plus, cultism, curses, dream manipulations, violent ghosts, familiar 
spirits and controlled prostitution. On the strength of his findings, he 
makes recommendations to ensure that the state and its security agents are 
able to checkmate these new species of threats. These include new laws, 
upgrading of training of security personnel and public security education 
in schools, churches, mosques, radio and television.
A disturbing aspect of the Nigerian internal security problem is that 
there appears to be enough agencies that are meant to take care of the 
country’s security challenges. On the one hand, available evidence tends 
to point to the fact that the government has tried to provide resources to 
cater for the requirements for managing Nigeria’s internal security. On the 
other hand, it would appear that the agencies charged with the duty of 
maintaining internal security are facing serious setbacks in the course of 
discharging their constitutional duties. In this volume, this intractable 
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problem also attracted the scholarly attention of some contributors. 
Accordingly, Sec. 3 which is made up of six chapters devotes attention to 
the role of formal and informal agencies in the management of internal 
security in Nigeria. This has become necessary against the backdrop of the 
increasing level of the threats to internal security and the seeming inability 
of these actors to curtain the threats.
Jude Abdulkareem Momodu opens the part with an examination of the 
role of the Nigerian Army in internal security operations (ISOs) in the 
Fourth Republic. He observes that the deployment of the army in ISOs 
has dramatically increased since the return to democratic governance on 
May 29, 1999. This, he argues, is due to the liberalisation of the political 
space which came as a result of the demystification of the 33  years of 
military dictatorship that suppressed popular dissent and agitations from 
interest groups. Another factor that is responsible for the excessive 
deployment of army on ISOs is the fact that the Nigeria Police Force that 
is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of tackling internal 
security challenges is largely poorly funded, ill-equipped and ill-trained to 
handle them. These factors have often made civilian authorities to heavily 
rely on the expertise of army and its sisters’ forces, the navy and air force 
to manage internal security challenges. In effect, the regular engagements 
of its personnel have made the organisation to assume the position of the 
first line of internal security defence which ordinarily is the role of the 
police. The author found out that the Nigerian Army has so far successfully 
played the role of managing the country’s internal security effectively and 
efficiently to the extent that it has been able to prevent the democratic 
Fourth Republic from collapsing like the previous republics that were cut 
short by military officers with inordinate political ambitions. The army 
remains the bastion of Nigeria’s unity as its men and women have 
continued to keep the disparate entities within the country together as a 
corporate entity. However, the regular engagements of the army in 
ISOs have exposed its shortcomings, which include inadequate funding, 
personnel and training deficit, equipment and logistics deficit, human 
rights abuses and corruption within the institution. In order to address 
these challenges, the chapter recommends that the federal government 
and the National Assembly should ensure increased budgetary funding to 
the army which is very critical towards equipping the institution for better 
performance of ISOs. The army authorities should introduce human 
rights education in the army training modules as well as set up human 
rights desks in theatres of ISOs. These efforts will help to professionalise 
its men and women in conducting effective and efficient ISOs. More 
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importantly, the federal government needs to empower the police and 
other traditional agencies of internal security management through 
increased funding so that these agencies can adequately equip their 
capacities in order to effectively and efficiently carry out the function of 
internal security management.
A central message from Jude Momodu’s chapter is that the Nigerian 
Police which is constitutionally empowered with the responsibility of tack-
ling internal security challenges is largely poorly funded, ill-equipped and 
ill-trained to handle them. To make up with the inability of the Nigerian 
Police to effectively manage the internal security threats, the Nigerian 
government has appreciated the need for collaboration among the security 
agencies. To this end, Joint Task Forces are usually set up for specific pur-
poses and assignments to resolve different security concerns. Against this 
background, Mathias Daji Yake examines the challenges of Joint Task 
Force Operations but with particular focus on its ISOs in Plateau State, 
Nigeria. He posits that maintenance of security in Plateau State is beyond 
the presence of the Military Joint Task Force alone but also includes the 
need for collective responsibility and sincerity of purpose by politicians in 
the state. He concludes that even though the Nigerian 1999 constitution 
(as amended) backs the role of the military in ISOs, a robust policy 
framework for joint operations would help strengthen the operations, 
especially in providing the needed funds to procure and efficiently carry 
out its mandates.
In a related vein, Adebola Rafiu Bakare and Gabriel Temitope Aderinola 
look at the role of the Nigerian Police in internal security management. The 
authors observe that although the Nigerian Police could be commended for 
discharging their constitutional responsibility of providing security of life 
and property in the country, recent events have shown that Nigeria is no 
longer safe as it used to be in the past. Further, the authors provide an 
appraisal of the performance level of the Nigeria Police in the management 
of internal security. The authors conclude that despite its shortcomings, the 
Nigerian Police still possess the potential to be effective if the identified 
challenges such as manpower shortage and elite policing; poor public per-
ception; public alienation and corruption; and overly centralised and non-
meritocratic leadership among others are mitigated. Still concerned with 
the role of formal agencies in internal security management, Johnson Idowu 
critically examines the extent to which the Nigerian Security and Civil 
Defence Corps has lived up to its statutory responsibility of providing assis-
tance in the maintenance of peace and order and in the protection and 
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rescuing of the civil population during the periods of emergency. He 
observes that Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has been 
faced with numerous challenges such as poor funding and inter-agency 
rivalry which has affected its performance. He concludes that the NSCDC 
has through dialogue, negotiation, debate and public enlightenment con-
tributed positively to the management of internal security in Nigeria.
On the other hand, Saheed Owonikoko and Kelvin Ashindorbe also 
examine the role of the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) in internal security 
management. The main argument of the chapter is that NPS is yet to per-
form its role effectively due to challenges such as inadequate funds; problem 
of poor rehabilitation programmes; mixture of minor offenders with hard-
ened criminals; problem of persons awaiting trial and the philosophy of 
operating Nigerian prisons as punitive rather than reformative system. As a 
result, they opine that Nigerian prisons have become avenues for criminali-
sation of inmates rather than reformation centres, thus complicating 
Nigeria’s national security. They recommended addressing deteriorating 
conditions of Nigerian prisons through adequate funding; de-emphasising 
imprisonment as a form of punishment except where it is absolutely neces-
sary; addressing the problem of awaiting trial persons (ATPs) through judi-
cial reform and separation of minor and major offenders during imprisonment 
as the means through which the Nigerian prisons can help positively in the 
task of maintaining internal security. The part closes with an examination of 
the role of vigilante groups in internal security management. Vigilante 
groups are part of what in the literature is referred to as non-state security 
actors (Risse and Ursula 2006; Merz 2010). Generally, vigilantes and other 
non-state security actors such as private security companies and ethnic mili-
tias have received greater attention because of their prominent involvement 
in providing security in developing and weak states. According to Omeje 
(2007, p.73), “as in many sub-Sahara African countries, vigilantism plays a 
prominent role as a concept and practice of security provision in Nigeria, 
having existed as local security arrangements for centuries”. As a result of 
the violent activities of vigilantism, not only in Nigeria but in other parts of 
Africa, the dominant view in the literature has come to see vigilantism as a 
“reversion to the violent indigenous institutions of law and order based on 
secret societies and occultist practices or as a product of the contemporary 
institutional environment of clientelism and corruption in which youth 
struggle for their share of patronage resources” (Kate 2007, p. 124). Arising 
from the existing perspective, Iloh and Nwokedi observe that the changing 
character of criminality has made it more difficult for the state security agen-
cies alone to manage the problem of insecurity; hence, the involvement of 
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vigilante groups which itself is fraught with legion of challenges. They, 
therefore, argue that despite arguments to the contrary, vigilante groups 
should be seen as complementing the work of state security agencies instead 
of being seen as an indictment that the state security actors have failed in 
their constitutional responsibilities of securing lives and property in 
the country.
In the final part of the book which is made up of seven chapters, we 
devote attention to an examination of some of the challenges of internal 
security management in Nigeria. Although faced with numerous internal 
security challenges, Nigeria has always aspired to be a major player at the 
regional and global levels (Omotola 2010, 2015). Freedom Onuoha opens 
the part with a conceptual interrogation of the idea of the Nigerian project 
within the context of the quest for sustainable national security. He 
observes that the Nigerian project is about the national effort to resolve 
contradictions underpinned by the multi-ethnic nature of post-colonial 
Nigerian state in order to forge a peaceful, united and prosperous nation 
out of the diverse nationalities wielded into a geographic entity by a com-
mon colonial experience. His basic contention is that the increasing inabil-
ity of the Nigerian state to handle the evolving factors of insecurity is 
largely tied to the perverse nature of the state. As he puts it, “the character 
of the Nigerian state itself undermines not only the quest for national secu-
rity but also the very basis of the Nigerian project”. In conclusion, he 
opines that for the Nigerian project to be successfully pursued and conse-
quently realised, there is the need for the total overhaul or restructuring of 
the character and posture of the Nigerian state through a process of 
national dialogue. “Failure to do this”, as he warns, “will only ensure a 
future where the Nigerian project will continue to falter, making the attain-
ment of sustainable national security elusive”. Similarly, Agaptus Nwozor 
examines the changing character of security matrix and how it affects the 
management of insecurity in Nigeria. He links the seeming longitudinal 
ubiquity of insecurity in the country to the structural contradictions and 
superior economic payoff arising from institutional incapacity of its secu-
rity apparatuses. According to him, the multi-ethnic, multicultural and 
multireligious nature of Nigeria motorise the centrifugal forces that give 
impetus to insecurity in the polity, and this is because of the unsatisfactory 
resolution of the national question. He further contends that the seeming 
upsurge in the spate of insecurity in Nigeria signposts the gradual erosion 
and delegitimisation of the state. Arising from this position, he recom-
mends that the Nigerian state must decisively recover its supremacy by 
articulating a holistic, people-driven security reforms that will mainstream 
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the national question in the insecurity equation. Saheed Owonikoko 
explores how the twin issue of transparency and accountability in the utili-
sation of security funds affects internal security management in Nigeria. 
He notes that the whole idea of budgeting and utilisation of security funds 
in the country is shrouded in secrecy all in the name of national security. 
This is promoting fraud and corruption in the security sector. As a result, 
Nigeria has not attained a level of security commensurate to the funds dis-
bursed in that respect. A particular area where the issue of lack of transpar-
ency and accountability in the utilisation of funds for security management 
in Nigeria has manifested strongly is the issue of security vote allocated to 
the executive arm of government at all levels. Rather than promote internal 
security, security votes have been used to foment violence and insecurity.
Daniel Ikuomola approaches the matter from a different dimension by 
looking at the seemingly neglected issue of social insecurity and how it 
affects internal security. The author notes that Nigeria needs a social secu-
rity policy that will impact positively on the redistribution effects of eco-
nomic policy and the protection of the people from the vagaries of the 
market. The absence of a social security policy has significantly contributed 
to the country being ranked among the poorest countries in the world, 
and this has directly and indirectly contributed to the security challenges 
that have bedevilled the country. Aituaje Irene Pogoson and Moses 
Ugbobi Saleh in Chap. 28 engage with the role of gender in internal secu-
rity management. The authors extend the perception of security beyond 
its ordinary understanding as primarily a state concern to examine the 
dynamics of gender in the internal security management. They observe 
that gender is not just “about women”—but it is about men and women 
and the different roles, characteristics and behaviour expected or assumed 
of them in a society. They point out that “gender plays a critical role in 
determining the types of crimes that women, girls, men and boys tend to 
commit, and to be victims of. Gender factors such as age, disability, gen-
der, ethnicity and class—are central to our understanding of security. 
Therefore, taking into consideration gender issues in internal security 
management is crucial to maintain peace and security”. After an examina-
tion of the gender implications of unrest in the Niger Delta Region, the 
growth of militant Islamism primarily in Northern Nigeria, the hazard of 
raiding armed Fulani herdsmen and the Zaki Ibiam invasion among oth-
ers, the chapter concludes that gender sensitivity to internal security man-
agement is crucial to the overall objectives of any security measure or 
decision to restore normalcy and that the management of internal security 
can no longer be understood in one-dimensional terms—as protection 
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from external enemies. The other aspect of national security that is tradi-
tionally recognised as vital to any nation, the protection from the internal 
enemies of neglect, ignorance and despair, especially as it concerns women 
in particular, must be enriched.
Moses Duruji, Faith Olanrewaju and Favour Duruji-Moses explore the 
role of the youth in internal security management in Chap. 29. According 
to the authors, the army of unemployed and idle youth population in the 
country is a serious factor in the analysis of the increasing state of insecu-
rity in the country. It is in realisation of this fact that the option of youth 
empowerment is believed to possess the capacity of not only keeping the 
youths busy but putting food in their table and thereby making incentive 
to engage in actions that promote insecurity unattractive. Further, they 
outline and discuss some of the youth empowerment programmes such as 
the amnesty programme You win and N-Power. Using documentary and 
descriptive analysis, they also examine the sociopolitical and economic 
impact of these youth empowerment programmes.
concluding RemaRkS
Overall, careful reading of the various chapters in this book leads to some 
inevitable conclusions about the Nigerian state and internal security man-
agement. The Nigerian state is daily threatened by many factors of insecu-
rity that have not been properly managed by the state. In its present form 
and character, the Nigerian state does not appear to have a clear and defi-
nite internal security policy to deal with the challenges of internal insecu-
rity. This in so many ways is affecting the capacity of the security agencies 
to effectively discharge their responsibilities to its citizenry.
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Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa with an estimated 
190  million people spread across more than 300 ethnic and linguistic 
groups. Apart from her huge diversity in culture, ethnicity, religion and 
language, the sheer size of Nigeria’s population presents issues for internal 
security management. Internal security management is an aspect of the 
broad concept of security management. Security management involves 
planning, operational and tactical actions undertaken to prevent, contain 
or respond to a security condition with a view to strengthening the existing 
security regime, neutralise perceived threats and normalise the situation. 
As a human interest, security management, at the micro-, meso- or macro- 
levels, often involves certain internal as well as external dimensions. 
Internal security management, therefore, refers to the management of the 
O. O. Oshita (*) 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria 
A. O. Ikelegbe 
Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria
22
dynamics of security within a determinable unit of existence, which may be 
a community, town or country. On the other hand, external security 
 management comprises those dynamics of security that, though external 
to a given context under examination, may affect it one way or another.
Nigeria is in the throes of a major internal security crisis. Perhaps, the 
last ten years or so has witnessed the greatest threats to internal order and 
national cohesion. Never since the civil war (1960–1970) has insecurity 
become so extensive, with fear, anxiety and suspense so high among citi-
zens, and mass killings, destructions and collateral damage so extensive 
across the country, amidst sophisticated, organised and horrendous vio-
lence and criminality. Never before has the entire country been held cap-
tive by terrorists, militants and armed brigands, as has occurred with the 
Boko Haram terrorists, armed local and foreign herder militants, and dis-
parate organised bandits, kidnappers and armed robbery gangs. Expectedly, 
the entire internal security architecture has come under severe scrutiny 
and open criticisms, with questions and doubts being raised in public dis-
courses about the quality, effectiveness and performance of the security 
agencies (SAs) and their nature of personnel, equipment holding, com-
mand, deployment, management and political leadership.
This chapter presents an overview of some theoretical issues in internal 
security management in Nigeria by examining how a combination of 
structural factors, governance, legislation and institutions on the one 
hand, and actors, drivers, dynamics and capacities on the other hand, 
impact the efficacy, or otherwise, of the internal security management. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a broad-brush analysis that mir-
rors the internal security management efforts and to identify challenges 
and lessons learned as well as prospects for improving the internal security 
architecture in Nigeria, including responses to new and emerging internal 
security threats, such as the Boko Haram insurgency, kidnapping, sectarian 
violence, youth radicalisation, violent extremism, militancy, pastoralists’ 
and sedentary farmers’ conflicts, and separatist agitations. The questions 
for reflection include, whether the existing internal security infrastructure 
in Nigeria can proactively deal with emerging threats like youth radicalisa-
tion and violent extremism. The responses take into account section 14 
(2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as 
amended), which stipulates that “The security and welfare of the people 
shall be a primary purpose of government”. The social contract upon 
which the transition from the state of nature to civil society is founded 
implies that the essence of every government is the guarantee of the basic 
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internal and external security requirements—protection of life and limbs 
of all members of society. Internal insecurity in Nigeria has reached very 
disturbing levels for both the government and the citizens.
conceptual and theoretIcal consIderatIons 
In Internal securIty ManageMent
Though security involves theory and practice, in this chapter, we shall 
focus more on the theoretical aspects. By focusing on theoretical issues in 
internal security management, this chapter concentrates on the analytical 
framing that often informs the practical and operational aspects of internal 
security management using Nigeria as the unit of scrutiny. In doing this, 
however, we recognise that global interconnectedness and advances in 
technology have continually narrowed the line between internal and exter-
nal elements in the management of security as well as other contexts. 
Advances in internet technology and other platforms of instantaneous 
communication have shrunk the size of the world and cheated time and 
distance significantly. Ake (1995, p. 23) explains this as culminating into
growing structural differentiation and functional integration in the world 
economy; it is growing interdependence across the globe; it is about the 
nation state coming under pressure from the surge of transnational phe-
nomena; it is about the emergence of a global mass culture driven by mass 
advertising and technical advances in mass communication.
Security and conflict are inextricably interwoven human interests in the 
same way that insecurity and violent conflict are mutually reinforcing 
within and across “vanishing” and increasingly “fluid” boundaries. To 
appreciate the determinants of security, it is important to recognise the 
nexus of security with a host of other human interests. This linkage is aptly 
captured by Robert McNamara, when he says:
Security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not 
traditional military activity, though it encompasses it, security is not military 
hardware, though it may include it. Security is development and without 
development, there can be no security.
Security involves both tangible and intangible properties and does not 
necessarily mean the absence of ostensible violence. Like security, it can be 
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said that peace is not the mere absence of war, though it may involve it, 
peace is not the absence of conflict though it may include it; peace is not 
about the dissolution of identities, nor neutralisation of diversities. Peace 
is the harmonious coexistence of contending perspectives, views and 
empathic understanding and mutual management of essential differences 
for human progress and sustainable development. Peace involves trust and 
is a precondition for security and attainment of mental and physical 
development.
There are certain theoretical and analytical conceptions that are central 
to the understanding of the issues of internal security management.
The national security system could be divided, though not neatly, into 
the internal and external security. External security is concerned with 
detecting, confronting and managing external threats to the territorial 
integrity and survival of the nation, and is dominantly the terrain of the 
Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Agency. Internal security is 
essentially concerned with guaranteeing the protection and preservation 
of lives, property, vital institutions, economy and vital interests, ensuring a 
conducive atmosphere for citizen freedom and pursuit of their livelihoods 
and legitimate concerns, and a secure domestic environment for produc-
tion, development and national progress. It is about maintaining civil and 
public order, social cohesion and national stability, preventing and con-
taining violence, conflicts, crime and breakdown of law and order and 
preventing and managing domestic threats to citizens and the state 
(Nabhon 2013).
There have been some changes in the conceptions and management of 
internal security in Nigeria. From the preoccupation with crime, violence 
and threats to law and order, and stability, and mechanisms and actions for 
reacting to physical security threats such as security deployments, arma-
ments and physical force, there are now more broad and inclusive engage-
ments of issues such as natural disasters, economic crisis, human and 
environmental vulnerabilities and even governance crisis. Second, internal 
security management now engages issues that generate threats to stability 
and order such as poor citizen well-being, unemployment, poverty, ineq-
uity and injustice, and the management of diversity. Third is increasing 
concerns for providing the conditions that enable security to thrive, the 
environment that is more fertile for national security management and 
that facilitates sustainable internal security and peace.
The focus on theoretical perspectives for understanding internal security 
management is justifiable because the understanding, analysis, conclusions 
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and prescriptions of internal security challenges have been major problems 
in the looming internal security imbroglio that the country faces. This 
difficulty of sufficient knowledge and understanding of national security 
threats was raised by Ikelegbe et al. (2015):
Have the issues of causality, grievance narratives and the trajectories of 
evolution and actions; the driving forces for expansion, tenacity and capacity; 
the variegation of actors, foot soldiers, social basis, elite and community 
support; and the dynamics of operations, strategy and resources of insur-
gents, terrorists and bandits, and organised criminal networks been clearly 
studied, analysed, understood and explained?
The point has to be made that the country has often groped in the dark 
while forces driving internal insecurity consolidated and thrived. There 
was initial confusion and non-clarity of perceptions and actions concern-
ing the Boko Haram insurgency. There were several theses that painted it 
as mere puritan Islamist practice, regional protest and intra- and inter- 
party political differences, all of which underpinned initial hesitation, inac-
tion and caution while the terrorists blossomed. The failure of precise 
understanding and speedy actions is also plaguing the reaction to the very 
seemingly organised, armed and purpose-driven militant attacks against 
communities in North-Central, North-East, South-South, South-West 
and South-Eastern parts of Nigeria. Again, there is confusion even at the 
highest levels as to whether it is a herders-farmers conflict that is induced 
by blockage of grazing routes, anti-grazing laws and climate change, or a 
somewhat external aggression driven by ex-militants from the Sahel.
The first place to begin the presentation of theoretical perspectives is 
the issue of conception of security. The point has been severally made that 
the post-Cold War era conceptions of security was a major paradigmatic 
shift from state-centric and physical dimension that focused on warfare, 
armaments and extensive deployments to the security of citizens and soci-
ety, to a focus on human security and development and the enabling envi-
ronment for sustainable development, security and peace. However, 
state- and regime-centred security which was quite dominant during the 
periods of colonial and military rule still drives security management in 
Nigeria. It is hinged on state and regime survival, security of the ruling 
class and elite, extensive securitisation and physical security deployments 
against recurrent security threats, and reactive engagements characterised 
by excessive force, repression and rights abuse.
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This is fairly contradistinctive from human-security-driven management 
that integrates people-friendly approaches and human development—
human welfare and well-being, citizen rights and vulnerabilities, social sta-
bility, and individual and collective safety and peace into the internal 
security calculus. While the former fuels counter-violence, proliferation of 
small arms and militarisation of society while only creating fragile, negative 
and unsustainable security, the latter eliminates the conditions for insecu-
rity, focuses on proactive security engagements and creates social and 
national stability, sustainable peace and security (Ikelegbe 2014, p. 115).
This very narrow conception and engagement with security is perhaps 
at the root of sustained insecurity in the country. According to Nwolise 
(2015, p. 171), the Nigerian ruling elite
have not seen the relationship between poverty, unemployment, hunger, 
injustice on the one hand and security on the other hand….There can be no 
real security without any meaningful job creation efforts, without the pay-
ment of workers’ salaries as and when due, without the payment of living 
wages, without paying pensioners and without micro-credit facilities. This is 
the beginning of Nigeria’s security or insecurity problems. The thinking 
behind the (security) agencies and policies is jaundiced.
The dominance of state and regime security has meant that the “assurance 
of the security of the people”, “obligations to the security of citizens” and 
the “access of citizens to security” have been subsidiary (Nabhon 2013, 
p.  233). The security of individuals in government and elite has taken 
priority in terms of deployments of personnel, operational responses and 
personnel motivation, while leaving out the communities, neighbour-
hoods and ordinary citizens to scanty security attention. A major fallout of 
this is the sustained detachment of the security delivery system from the 
people and its associated support and local knowledge.
Quite related to the issue of conception of security is the approach to 
internal security management, which, as Nabhon (2013, p.230) notes, is 
diversely conceptualised as military/coercive response versus the progres-
sive; operational versus strategic; responsive versus preventive; and reactive 
versus proactive (Ekoko and Vogt 1990; Safir 2003; Bassey 2004; Okeke 
2006; Arase and Iwuofor 2007). The coercive, operational or reactive strat-
egies are focused on combating existing domestic security threats, and 
reacting to emergent security threat situations through large mobilisation 
of personnel, logistics, arms and communication systems, and deployments, 
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with a view to containment and subduing and punishing of offenders. 
Nabhon (2013, pp.  232–235) avers that the dominance of the reactive 
security perspective in Nigeria has been associated with high tendencies of 
excessive force, escalation of violence, extensive collateral damages, high 
personnel risks, high cost of security delivery, waste in security delivery 
system, proliferation of arms and, indeed, an arms race between criminals 
and state forces, militarisation of society, and unrestricted use of arms that 
has normalised and socialised arms power as right. Other consequences are 
the alienation of the public from internal security agencies and, more 
importantly, the failure of the internal security delivery system in attaining 
the goals of domestic order and security.
The reactive system of internal security management is further associated 
with extensive securitisation of the public sphere. What becomes a security 
concern and is responded to is dependent on what is regarded as an 
existential threat to society and the state (Buzan and Wilde 1998). It is the 
perception of what is a threat or causes threats that places such subjects 
outside the normal sphere of societal behaviour and within the sphere of 
“threat-defence sequence” (Nabhon 2013, p. 225). The securitisation of 
a subject justifies subsequent plethora of security measures and deploy-
ment of security forces and resources to confront the same. Conversely, 
de-securitisation means the removal of a matter in the public sphere from 
the existential threat-security action narrative into the realm of normal 
behaviour and actions (Nabhon 2013, pp. 225–226).
However, the success of narratives and legitimisation of securitisation 
or de-securitisation is not automatic, but dependent on the perceptions 
and acceptance of the political community and particularly what society 
regards as normal procedures, rules and behaviours (Buzan and Wilde 
1998; Nabhon 2013). Placed in the Nigerian context, there has been an 
extensive securitisation of agitations, protest actions and other dynamics 
of political behaviour and participation in relation to the expressions of 
needs, problems, grievances, injustices, inequity and unfairness in the pub-
lic sphere. Subsequent extensive security measures and deployments in the 
Reactive Approach to internal security management have tended to over-
stretch the internal security delivery system and the military while milita-
rising society.
A major feature of the operations of the reactive system is the 
commodification of internal security. Extensive security threats have 
warranted proliferation of security operations, extensive deployments and 
the  purchase and maintenance of sophisticated equipment and arms. In the 
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circumstance, security expenditures have become huge and much beyond 
the capacity of the federal government in a centralised federation. State 
governments, local governments and even government institutions have 
thus forayed into providing equipment, logistic support and incentives to 
security agencies and to indulge in huge budgetary allocations of monies 
to security. State officials and the political class have taken advantage of 
speculative and actual threats to security, the high cost of security infra-
structure and the specialised security operations to hoodwink citizens and 
their representatives with presumed extensive security expenditures that 
are unaccounted for, being sometimes discreet, clandestine, discretionary 
and subterranean.
Consequently, the security vote has become a major instrument of official 
corruption that has made available loose funds to chief executives that are 
laundered, used for settlement of adversaries, inducement of supporters and 
patronage politics. The security votes of governors, for example, run into 
hundreds of millions of naira per month, which are spent “outside the norms 
of public accountability and probity”, and scrutiny, and most of which are 
“misused and misapplied” away from security, thus denying the security 
sector of much desired funding (Egwu 2016, pp. 153–161).
The Concentric Circles Theory of national security management is 
another perspective approach. The theory assumes that security concerns 
and actions exist at different levels of an environment, in relation to a cen-
tre, which can be regarded as “security communities” (Vogt 1990; Hullse 
2006). This presupposes that the security of each circle or security com-
munity should preoccupy security concerns and operations in a sort of 
hierarchy, going on from the individual, community, region or nation to 
the international community. Though these security communities overlap 
in many ways, it is important that security at lower-level security commu-
nities be effectively focused on and tackled before progressing to higher 
levels, such that security vacuums are not created at such lower levels 
(Nabhon 2013, pp.  226–227). In the Nigerian context, it is clear that 
security vacuums exist at community levels and the rural areas, and that 
the failure to federalise internal security delivery systems has created a 
conceptual, focus, knowledge, experience and action vacuum, particularly 
at the local government and state levels.
Beyond conceptions, perspectives and strategies, there is need for 
comprehensive and holistic analysis of the relationship between the security 
institutions or internal security architecture as a major constituent of the 
state and the society which it secures. The systems theory presents a good 
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framework for such analysis, as it interrogates the relationship between the 
political system and its environment (Almond 1960; Easton 1965; Beer 
and Ulam 1968; Ikelegbe 2016). The political system is a set of structures, 
interactions and activities that perform functions crucial to society’s direc-
tion and progress, including security, and has binding authority, while 
society comprises the environment and its social, economic, ecological and 
demographic characteristics, social forces, resources, values and attitudes. 
The political system is able to direct and steer society, modify and ensure 
an environment conducive for its maintenance, persistence and survival, 
through sustained interactions, reception of stimuli (input) and responses 
(output). To enable survival and avoid system stress, the political system 
must have effective strategies for input reception and effective perfor-
mance of output as responses to challenges from the environment.
The system theory highlights the interdependence of sub-systems 
within the political system and between the political system as a sub- system 
of the larger social system or environment, thus, ensuring that both mutu-
ally affect and shape each other. Consequently, the environmental inputs 
of demand and support orientations, emanating from society’s pressures, 
forces and dynamics affect the workings and dynamics of the political sys-
tem just as its internal dynamics, operations and outputs could modify and 
shape the environment. The political system’s responsiveness, self- 
regulation through self-correction and change, capacity to produce effec-
tive output that assuages society’s pressures, capacity to adapt to change 
and manage stress from the environment through internal and external 
adjustments, and the strength of its institutions, leadership and workings 
determine societal stability and order, and the achievement of the goals of 
progress, development and security.
The systems perspective to the analysis of the state and state-society 
relations is relevant to understanding the dynamics of challenges faced and 
managerial issues in internal security management. It enables us to situate 
our analysis on the character of the state and its ruling elite, interactions 
between sub-systems within the state, the nature of public institutions, the 
dynamics of interactions and struggles between state and society, nature of 
effectiveness or otherwise of state responses, policy performance and out-
comes, and how all these have impacted on security, stability, development 
and progress. The Nigerian security architecture has been very strategic to 
the state because it drove military rule for several decades and remains 
central to the consolidation of political power and the enforcement of the 
will of the state and its officials. The character of the state and its ruling 
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class impinges heavily on the character and behaviour of the security archi-
tecture and the conduct of internal security. There are several ways in 
which the crisis inherent in the nature of the post-colonial state manifests 
in the challenges of internal security management. The first is in the strug-
gle between state security and regime security, or more precisely the recur-
ring inability of state security architecture to maintain a delicate balance 
between state and regime security. The second is the dominance of secu-
rity of state officials and the elite over the security of the citizens. The third 
is the instrumentality of the state security architecture in the struggles for 
power, the consolidation of power and, more specifically, in the decima-
tion of the opposition parties, civil society, critics and activists. The fourth 
manifestation is the predominance of coercion, violence and excessive 
force in the maintenance of internal security.
The failure of the state to respond effectively by way of policy that produce 
performing outcomes that effectively manage, modify and assuage pressures 
and destabilising stimuli from society could be linked to the internal 
weaknesses of the state such as self-interested and decadent ruling class; the 
interference of primordial interests and loyalties; corruption, selfish motiva-
tions, nepotism and rent-seeking behaviour; and poor governance, particu-
larly the lack of equity, fairness and justice among several others. These are at 
the root of the crisis of multiple conflict generation and the failure of man-
agement, as well as the weaknesses of the political and security institutions 
and overall management of development, security and order (Oshita 2007; 
Francis 2017). The distortions in the political system and in the relations 
with society are evident in the lack of security, stability and order.
The nature of political and administrative governance is at the bottom 
of most of the security challenges being experienced and the poor out-
comes of internal security management efforts. The poor state of develop-
ment, the economy and socio-economic well-being have huge implications 
for internal security management. The challenges of internal security and 
internal security management are further complicated by the crisis of 
nation-building, the challenges of the national question and issues of iden-
tity, and how they impact on and are affected by the nature of security 
institutions, management of internal security challenges and the emergent 
perceptions and reality of treatment.
Within the systems theory framework, the analysis of institutions as 
framework and process for internal security management can also be 
engaged for better understanding of internal security management. The 
institution is the mechanism for governance and management of public 
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and social affairs and order, and it comprises rules, procedures, regulations 
and processes that are established, routinised, standardised, stable and 
durable to constitute “guiding framework for actions”, interactions and 
the achievement of goals in both the public and private realms (Hodgson 
2006; Leftwich 2006). Institutions have a character of their own, evolve 
and adapt in relation to pressures and nature of interactions, and reflect 
experiences and nature of society.
Strong institutions provide codes of conduct and governing behaviour; 
establish and abide by rules of the game and engagement; constitute sys-
tems of effective collaboration and cooperation; set, manage and enforce 
rules and regulations, and the prescribed ways and means of how things 
are done; achieve high levels of adherence and compliance with rules; and 
are effective as frameworks for the “production or distribution of public or 
private goods, or the mobilisation of prized values or resources” (Ikelegbe 
2016). Strong institutions institute good governance systems—systems of 
high productivity, performance and morale; systems of merit, discipline, 
efficiency, integrity, fairness and equity; and are fairly insulated from politi-
cal interference and primordial values.
Quite unfortunately, there is prevalence of institutional failure and 
breakdown in Nigeria’s public and private sectors. This manifests in disre-
gard for standard ways of doing things; impropriety of behaviour and con-
duct; dominance of private and primordial interests and personalised 
contacting; lack of fairness, equity and justice; disregard for laws, rules and 
procedures; excesses such as impunity and indiscipline; and excessive polit-
ical interference. These have denied public institutions of competent and 
effective staffing; organisational capacity and productivity; motivated 
workforce; competent and effective management and political leadership; 
institutional integrity and legitimacy; public confidence and trust; positive 
impacts and performance; and desired outcomes in terms of national secu-
rity, peace, order and social cohesion. At societal level, weak institutions 
manifest in the failures of social compact, cohesion and capital; rupture of 
social values and disregard for rules, laws and due processes; indiscipline, 
lawlessness, impunity and malpractices; breakdown in the standards of 
merit, fairness, justice, integrity, ethics, honour and responsibility; rising 
levels of socio-political rascality and vagrancy; and gradual loss of respect 
for life and humanity (Ikelegbe 2016), all of which thicken the levels of 
criminality, conflicts and violence, and weaken the very social basis and 
capacity for managing security and order.
2 AN OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES IN INTERNAL… 
32
Background to Internal securIty ManageMent 
In nIgerIa
Internal security management in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial 
period where various nation-states had their internal security management 
infrastructure for the maintenance of peace and stability. Some of these 
were managed by specific age grades, title holders and hunters or some 
other designated class of persons. Indeed, the pre-colonial non- professional 
“armies” that were found across what later became Nigeria consisted 
mainly of able-bodied men from communities that were called upon to 
defend their villages as the need arose.
There are certain things to note in the management of internal security 
in the pre-colonial political systems. First is that security agencies were 
drawn from the local communities and people, and their lineage groups, 
age grades, associations and social classes. Second was that security was a 
communal and popular concern, in which all engaged in terms of informa-
tion, intelligence and action. Everyone watched the other and the com-
munity and all were expected to act to secure the community as a social 
and community obligation. According to Nwolise (2015, pp. 166–167):
Security in traditional or pre-colonial societies was every body’s business as 
a matter of duty and obligation, as every person worked for the safety and 
welfare of all. Each person was a strong pillar and useful contributor in the 
security framework of the society even though specific groups such as age 
grades, palace guards, masquerade groups or even secret societies existed for 
security and law enforcement.
Third was that the internal security institutions and management were 
supported by a strong system of social institutions, value systems, customs 
and traditions which constructed a strong framework of rules, ethics, 
acceptable behaviour and sanctions. These characteristics created a strong 
system of internal security management which contained security chal-
lenges, and enabled stability and order in many of the states until they 
were deceived into submission to colonialist authorities by dubious trea-
ties or defeated by the colonialist armies.
However, with the incursion of colonialism, internal security became 
the responsibility of Her Majesty—the Queen, through the colonial gov-
ernment. The West African Frontier Force (WAFF), which served as the 
colonial military to ensure the success of colonial rule in Nigeria, was the 
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forerunner to the internal security management institutions in the coun-
try. The activities of the Royal Niger Company in 1900 and the subse-
quent amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in the 
year 1914 provided the basis for understanding the historical evolution of 
the internal security management structures in Nigeria. In more specific 
terms, the various security constructs by the colonial authorities between 
1862 and 1909, involving northern and southern regiments under the 
West African Frontier Force (WAFF), formed the basis for future security 
architecture. The first commanders of these regiments were Lt CHP 
Carter (1899–1901) and Col J Wilcox (1900–1909), respectively.
To meet the objectives of the colonial government, the military were 
used extensively to subjugate the people and facilitate in-country penetra-
tion for more effective resource exploitation in both the coastal areas and 
hinterlands. The major preoccupation of the colonial military was there-
fore internal security, focusing on securing the interest of the colonial 
administration and protecting the economic interest of the British Empire. 
The loyalty that “indigenous soldiers” had to their towns was replaced 
with a loyalty to the Crown. The British officers in the Nigerian Regiment 
who commanded the army were instructed to secure the Crown’s terri-
tory and suppress any ethnic political uprising (Ukpabi 1976).
Consequently, even after the Crown had consolidated its control over 
the disputed regions in Nigeria, some British commanders in the army 
were retained as political officers. Indeed, the colonial government delib-
erately selected political officers from the military because they possessed 
skills that made them effective at controlling the populace (Ukpabi 1976). 
Lord Lugard, as the first Commissioner and Commandant of Northern 
Nigeria was one of those officers. Beginning with the North, Lugard 
introduced indirect rule, arguing that it would be easier to control the 
local populace if it was done through their local leadership. However, in 
the South, the system excluded a newly emerged crop of educated elite 
from government and gave too much power to the Obas. In the republi-
can East, there were no paramount chiefs, so the colonial administration 
had to “enthrone” paramount chiefs to implement the policy (Falola 
1999). The challenge here remained the alienation of the educated elite, 
the people and their traditions in the selection of these chiefs. The 
 appointments were more or less arbitrary and the people had no powers to 
dethrone erring chiefs. To the extent that these negated aspects of the 
philosophy of the colonial government, there were implications for the 
enforcement of internal security in Nigeria. However, some of the dynam-
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ics began to alter at the inception of the independence struggles, when 
leaders from both North and South organised to press for independence 
for the country.
The colonial internal security management system left a variety of 
negative legacies which were not only inherited but have continued to 
dictate conduct, strategies and outcomes. Security focus and management 
was state-centric and regime-centred, driven by state security agencies, 
rather than the security of the people, and their livelihoods, social welfare 
and well-being. Daura (2016, p. 105) has noted that the colonial security 
institutions were pro-imperialist, coercive and anti-people, and were 
“reactionary instruments of conquest and repression with the aim of 
achieving the imperial objectives of resource extraction and political domi-
nation”. Thus, security management was dominated by excessive coercion 
and force, high handedness and repression. The security agencies were 
detached from the people, alien to them and deployed to enforce security 
by intimidation and force. Quite associated is a narrow conception of 
security centred on public order, maintenance of law and order, and physi-
cal use of force.
Internal securIty ManageMent after Independence
This may be further divided into the eras of military dictatorships and civil 
rule. The first period of civil democratic rule (1960–1966) was character-
ised by low levels of criminal violence. Criminality was more limited to 
petty crimes, and there was a system of fairly effective enforcement of laws 
and management of criminal justice administration. The greater problems 
were those of civil protests, political violence and electoral violence. There 
were riots against perceived political, governance and electoral issues in 
the Middle Belt of the Northern Region and the Western Region, which 
among others contributed to the demise of the First Republic through a 
military coup in 1966. The Second Republic however witnessed increased 
violent criminality, political violence and electoral violence. Criminal vio-
lence, particularly armed robbery, became more commonplace, while 
there were incidents of political violence. The 1983 general election was 
particularly plagued by electoral violence and abusive and excessive force 
by the security agencies. There were violent protests in several states of the 
South-West following massive rigging of the 1983 general election.
The prolonged period of military rule changed the face of and character 
of internal security challenges and management. Armed criminal violence 
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escalated, including the emergence of armed robbery just as there was 
more brazen and excessive force in the management of internal security 
such as public executions of armed robbers. The emphasis was on subjuga-
tion of criminal elements and dissidents. This eventually led to the replica-
tion and escalation of violence in social life, militarisation of society, the 
socialisation of the use of arms and violence, and an armed race between 
criminals and state security forces. The military set up special courts and 
tribunals, thus, interfering in the judiciary and management of the crimi-
nal justice administration.
The military privileged regime security and took extreme exceptions to 
dissidence, dissent and criticism, which led to repression of the opposition 
and extensive abuse of human rights. The period of military rule witnessed 
the proliferation of the offshoots of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) with 
attendant duplications of security agencies. The Federal Road Safety 
Corps, National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency, and State Security 
Service, among others, were established. The later period of military rule 
witnessed the emergence of militant challenges of the state. In the Niger 
Delta, militants and militias emerged that resisted military force and agi-
tated for resource benefits between 1997 and 1999. Militant resistance 
also emerged with the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in 1994 in the 
South-West. Quite surprisingly, military rule witnessed the neglect of the 
internal security agencies and even the military with decline in the rate of 
recruitment, equipment holding and security infrastructure, thus weaken-
ing the capacity of the agencies to confront security challenges.
Civil democratic rule emerged in the midst of the experience of massive 
civil and anti-military protests between 1988 and 1999, and resistant mili-
tant movements in the Niger Delta and South-West between 1994 and 
1999. Armed criminal violence and particularly armed robbery was at its 
crescendo. There were extensive internal security challenges associated 
with the militancy in the Niger Delta, the violent conflicts between the 
OPC and the police, and other ethnic groups in the South-West and the 
emergence of ethnic militias and militant youth movements across the 
country, particularly in the South-East and Niger Delta. Self-determination 
groups proliferated in the South-West and South-East, while secessionist 
groups such as the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of 
Biafra also emerged.  In the same vein, the Indigenous People of Biafra 
(IPOB) was to emerge years later.
Violent communal, ethno-religious, religious and neighbourhood 
conflicts have since risen to unprecedented levels. Similarly, violent 
criminality such as armed robbery, bank robberies, kidnapping and ritual 
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killings have risen to unprecedented levels. Violent criminality and violent 
protests have become more brazen and daring. Insecurity has since risen 
to fearsome levels. Collateral damages have been quite extensive in terms 
of the loss of lives and property. Along with the increased security 
challenges there has been extensive proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons. Quite unfortunately, the capacity of the security agencies to 
confront and contain the security challenges has been disappointingly poor.
Civil democratic rule was associated with extensive security sector 
reform in the military, police and other security agencies. These included 
efforts to re-professionalise the agencies, reduce arbitrariness and rights 
abuses, introduce good governance measures, demilitarise security per-
sonnel and institutional conduct, and strengthen democratic control. 
There have been efforts to recruit more security personnel, increase incen-
tives, improve skill sets and equipment holding, and improve performance 
of the agencies. Along with increased security challenges there has been 
the deployment of the military in joint or singular operations and the con-
stitution of numerous special task forces and operations. To further con-
front these challenges, new security agencies in the civil defence and 
anti-corruption sectors have been established. However, there have been 
challenges of political interference in the management and deployment of 
the security agencies.
character, trends and patterns of Internal securIty 
challenges
Certain characteristics, patterns and trends can be deduced from the 
contemporary challenges of internal security in Nigeria. Needless to say 
that the country has been on the throes of the most extensive and 
deepening insecurity, and violent crimes such as kidnapping, ritual killings, 
armed robberies, bank robberies, Internet fraud, pipeline vandalism, cult 
violence, killings and attacks on communities, homes, markets and public 
parks have become commonplace. There is pervasive sense of insecurity 
and uncertainty of lives and property because of increasing attacks on the 
streets, roads, banks, ATM cash points, markets, buses, farmlands and 
public parks.
There have been three major developments in the pattern of insecurity 
since the Fourth Republic. These are the increased span of political and 
electoral violence, the extensive engagements of non-state institutions of 
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violence in violence and criminality and the emergence of Boko Haram 
Islamist terrorists. Political and electoral violence has been on the rise 
since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Perhaps, the greatest threat to 
national security in the past ten years has been terrorism, driven by the 
Boko Haram Islamist insurgents. The extensive herders’ attacks on com-
munities, churches, farmlands, homes and highways in Benue, Kaduna, 
Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa and Kogi States and across the country is rais-
ing suspicions about the involvement of foreign armed bands, herders’ 
militant groups and Boko Haram terrorist cells. The sheer scale of killings 
and destructions, the ferocity of attacks, the sophistication of arms and the 
recurring failure of the security forces to deal with the phenomenon may 
be pointing to more organised, funded and armed participants than 
mere herders.
These crimes and criminal violence are associated with increasing 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sophistication of arms 
holding of criminals and criminal bands. Drug abuse has become extensive 
in all parts of the country among the youth even with common drugs such 
as codeine, cough syrup and all kinds of ingenious local substances. There 
is an extensive youth frustration, rebelliousness and predisposition to 
criminal violence because of increasing unemployment, poverty, hunger 
and hopelessness. Cultism among the youth which used to be a campus 
phenomenon has extended to the secondary schools and urban streets, 
and has become a major driver of urban and neighbourhood violence, 
street fighting, drug abuse, arms proliferation, assassinations, kidnapping, 
robberies and killings.
The strength of criminal bands has been such that engagements in bank 
robberies, kidnapping and herders’ attacks have severe destructive out-
comes. There has emerged an increased emulation and mobility of violent 
and criminal methods of conduct and engagements across the country. 
Kidnapping and ransom-taking which, for example, was an instrument of 
engagement by militants in the Niger Delta, to enforce their demands for 
the exit of foreign oil workers and raise funds for the struggle, has so 
quickly spread from the South-South, first to the South-East, then South- 
West and North-Central and now across the entire nation. Similarly, 
 pipeline vandalism has spread from the South-South to the South-East 
and South-West.
The state of insecurity has been beyond the Nigeria Police Force, which 
is primarily in charge of internal security management. Alongside the 
police are numerous other security agencies including the Department of 
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State Services (DSS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC) and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). 
In response to the emergent scale of internal security agencies, the military 
has been extensively deployed in most of the states of the federation singly, 
or in joint task or special forces alongside the police, DSS and 
NSCDC. There are numerous operations involving cooperation between 
security agencies and the military to contain insecurity, in virtually all the 
geopolitical zones but more intensely in the Niger Delta, North-Central 
and North-East. These joint operations have entailed severe corrupting 
influence on the military that hitherto was not visible on the streets and 
highways in Nigeria.
conteMporary challenges of Internal securIty 
ManageMent In nIgerIa
The extensive insecurity and, some would say, a near-collapse of national 
security management, attests to numerous challenges in the management 
of internal security in Nigeria. There are both systemic and organisational 
challenges as well as conceptual and management challenges.
The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the lead agency in internal security 
management. Its functions of preventing and detecting crime, apprehending 
offenders, enforcing laws, protecting life and property, and maintaining pub-
lic order and safety are central to the core themes of internal security which 
are security, stability and order. However, the NPF has lacked the personnel 
quality, discipline, material and equipment holding, funding, motivation and 
welfare, operational management, responsiveness, and fair and equitable 
treatment required for optimal performance in the management of internal 
security and enthronement of a fair level of law, order, security and stability. 
The NPF has not shed substantially of a coercive and anti-people force, hav-
ing remained a largely oppressive, intimidating and distant force from the 
people. It has not been used to and has not actually operated as an agency 
that identifies with the interests, dignity and rights of citizens.
The country is grossly under-policed. Many of the rural communities 
and large swathes of urban neighbourhoods have no police presence; 
hence, the length of time taken to respond to crime incidents and security 
threats is appallingly long, most often after the incidents. The manpower of 
the NPF remains inadequate despite promises of extensive recruitment by 
several administrations since the Fourth Republic. Partly because of the 
colonial legacy, the NPF has mainstreamed the maintenance of law and 
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order, but scant attention is paid to the prevention, detection and control 
of crime. As a result, the NPF has neglected the technology and informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) frameworks for the latter and 
what exists are either grossly inadequate or totally obsolete.
The security agencies (SAs) have neither been autonomous nor 
apolitical. The dominant drive has been loyalty to the regime and the 
federal executive. There is a deliberate confusion of the state as a neutral 
entity with perpetual existence that serves everyone and government or 
regime as a time-bound and transient entity. Imobighe (2003) notes that 
most regimes have in most cases used the police and the country’s security 
enforcement agencies more as instruments for coercion and terrorising the 
people than for protecting and promoting the good benefit of all. The 
government has tended to see and use the NPF as its agent rather than as 
an autonomous agent of the law. Thus, the NPF has not principally func-
tioned as an “agent of the law but as tool for the oppression and suppres-
sion of opposing views” (Igbini 2018).
Imobighe (2003, p. 7) rightly notes that governments in Nigeria have 
done little “to make the police truly independent of the executive or to 
develop an independent vision of its role in the society”. Thus, the police 
has largely remained as an instrument of the executive, used as the execu-
tive pleases, serving the interests of the governments, governing elite and 
favoured ruling class. Thus, almost all SAs while applying legitimate force 
are sometimes biased, partisan and deliberately ineffective or even unre-
sponsive because of the dynamics of political control and opposition poli-
tics. The most extensive platform for federal executive deployment for 
partisan and pro-government purposes has been national elections. In the 
general elections in 1983, and to a large extent, since the Fourth Republic, 
the SAs have been deployed and engaged in actions or inactions in favour 
of the federal administration, the latter through turning their eyes away 
while atrocities and irregularities were being perpetrated.
The legitimacy of the SAs is poor, with being generally conceived as 
anti-people, arbitrary, abusive, punitive, ill-equipped and ill-motivated, 
and they have very poor positive orientations and confidence. The NPF, 
the largest SA which has the most extensive contact with the population, 
has very poor public image, reputation, trust and confidence. 
Professionalism in the SAs has also been poor. For the NPF, carrying out 
their tasks within a framework of professionalism and best practices has 
been a most daunting task due to a combination of factors.
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The unitary and over-centralised internal security management structure 
has been a major challenge. The security infrastructure is managed from 
Abuja and is not decentralised in autonomous command system and per-
sonnel drawn from the geo-political zones and states. The security architec-
ture is, therefore, not rooted in the indigenous people and is thus detached, 
if not alienated, from those that they are supposed to secure. In the circum-
stance, internal security management is devoid of the knowledge, lan-
guage, culture, information and dynamics of the local people’s existence 
and life, and is unable to act and resolve security issues quickly and effec-
tively. The fact that command is from a distant Federal Capital, Abuja, and 
that other dynamics of politics and governance may interfere further com-
plicates the nearness and effectiveness of security solutions. Though the 
state governors are theoretically chief security officers of their states, they 
have no command or regulatory and supervisory powers over the security 
architecture, which only waits for and responds to directives from Abuja.
The unitarist structure is also linked to the issue of funding and 
equipment holding. The federal government alone is unable to adequately 
fund the NPF and other internal security agencies. Beyond personnel 
costs, these agencies lack basic infrastructure, equipment and technology 
for security management, such as vehicles, stationery and communication 
equipment. It has become obligatory for the state and local governments 
to supplement funding, provide logistic support and facilitate essential ser-
vices of these agencies because of the crucial need to maintain security, law 
and order. There is thus an extensive outlay of material support even with-
out their direct control over the agencies.
The state of well-being of the security architecture is a major issue. 
Beyond emoluments which are poor, running and operational costs are 
poor; personnel are inadequate; weapon holding, equipment, communi-
cation tools and security technology are obsolete and inadequate; office 
infrastructure are poor and inadequate; and accommodation for opera-
tional personnel are lacking or inadequate. The modern technology of 
data bank, fingerprint technology, forensic analysis laboratories and 
 centres, DNA testing facilities and ICT for security management are poor. 
In the circumstance, the motivation, incentive systems, morale and job 
satisfaction are very poor, particularly among the rank and file. The man-
agement of criminal administration is thus very daunting, and is particu-
larly slow, inefficient and poor in outcomes.
The nature of management of internal security by the security agencies 
and the nature of conduct of security personnel have alienated them from 
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the citizens and locals. The public perception of the security agencies is 
still centred on fear, lack of confidence, suspicion and lack of trust. There 
are fears that security personnel may make dubious demands, may require 
payment for services, may betray them when they give information, and 
that they may collude with the very criminals that they were supposed to 
prosecute. The security personnel still treat ordinary citizens with conde-
scension, as subjects to be intimidated and harassed, and handled with 
brutalised and excessive force, thereby alienating them. As a result, local 
support, contributions and commitment to the security agencies are poor.
The security agencies are also elite-driven in the sense that they are very 
disproportionately committed to elite and ruling class security, as com-
pared to citizen and community security. A large proportion of the NPF, 
for example, are deployed to secure political office holders, politicians, 
businessmen, traditional leaders and expatriates, leaving the communities, 
neighbourhoods and streets unguarded.
There are issues of institutional integrity and capacity. There is the 
challenge of quota system and federal character which compromises the 
quality of personnel, merit and performance as basis for career progression, 
and distorts institutional effectiveness because those who make career 
progress and hold leadership positions may not command the confidence 
of their colleagues and subordinates. These generate ill-feelings, dissatis-
faction and frustration and cause poor performance and even sabotage. 
Besides, there are ethnic, religious, regional and other identity-based 
influences on promotions, postings and leadership which undermine lead-
ership legitimacy, organisational effectiveness and job performance.
The synergy, synchrony, communication and cooperation among the 
security agencies is still poor, though has considerably improved in the past 
few years. The level of communication, integration, exchanges and sharing 
of intelligence, initiatives of joint actions and coordination of actions is still 
poor. The issues of overlapping responsibilities even in the legislative frame-
works setting up the agencies; multiple actions and duplications; conten-
tions, disputes and conflicts over who does what or should have done what; 
rivalry, mutual suspicion and distrust; and competitive tendencies such as 
some agencies seeking to outshine others or be loud in achievements, and 
even violent confrontations or threats of confrontations among the agen-
cies are quite rife. Fortunately, the huge security threats emanating from 
terrorism and violent criminality are compelling some levels of cooperation 
and coordination which is strengthening synergy.
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What can thus be generally asserted is that capacity in terms of 
manpower, funding, equipment, logistics, technology and motivation and 
morale of the internal security architecture to engage the extensive secu-
rity challenges in Nigeria is poor and over-stretched. This is the reason for 
the extensive military engagement in internal security management. 
Though, within the internal security policy, the military is engaged when 
the NPF and associated agencies are overwhelmed, the extensive deploy-
ments in almost all the states of the federation is over-stretching the mili-
tary and exposing them unnecessarily to the everyday challenges of citizens 
and nationhood. There are issues of command structure where the mili-
tary is involved, as in the many task forces and ad hoc operational struc-
tures across the country.
The conception of security and security challenges is out-modelled, 
being narrow and centred on direct threats to law and order rather than 
broad issues of economic, food and health security, environmental security, 
insecurities rooted in livelihood and social vulnerabilities, material existen-
tial conditions, poverty, community and individual resilience challenges, 
climate-change-induced insecurity, deficiencies in infrastructure and social 
service deliveries, all of which threaten internal security and generate a 
proclivity towards crime and violence. Security management has also been 
reactive rather than proactive. Thus, the security agencies are often caught 
napping, being generally unprepared for incidents. Being essentially reac-
tive has meant that intelligence-driven security management has been poor.
Politics has been a major negative influence on the management of 
internal security and the security architecture. Political interference occurs 
at the level of security responses and nature of actions, deployment and 
strategies of engagement and protection and release of suspects. There are 
also interferences in appointments, promotions, postings, job security and 
discipline of the staff of security agencies. The responses to security intel-
ligence, propositions of strategies and plans, and security interventions 
and actions are sometimes politicised, leading to stalled actions, failure to 
act on intelligence reports, inactions in situations of security threats and 
release of suspects. There is, furthermore, the issue of symmetry or asym-
metry of political perspectives in the management of internal security chal-
lenges. There are intense differences between the perceptions, perspectives 
and understanding of state government and federal government leaders, 
ruling party and opposition party leaders, and government and civil soci-
ety leaders. These diversities generate divisions and accusations and 
counter- accusations, thereby leading to confusion and inaction.
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reconfIgurIng the Internal securIty delIvery systeM 
for effectIve ManageMent of securIty, order 
and peace: lessons and future prospects
It is imperative to reconfigure the Nigerian security architecture if security, 
order and peace are to be maintained and effectively managed, particularly 
in the context of Nigeria’s robust diversity. Such rejigging has to be at the 
philosophical, structural, organisational development and operational 
management levels.
There has been the question of whether a national internal security 
policy exists or not, just as there is a National Defence Policy. Perhaps, if 
such a policy exists, there would be a well-articulated structure, stream-
lined relations and clear paths and regulations of inter-agency collabora-
tions and synergy. Part of the problem is that the Nigerian state and the 
ruling elite have not privileged SAs and internal security as a strategic 
baseline national security infrastructure, worthy of extensive investments 
in policy, reforms, technology, equipment and professionalisation.
At the philosophical level, there is need for the design of a clear national 
security philosophy, vision and goals. Such should be hinged on redirect-
ing securitisation away from regime security, political competition and 
opposition politics; power consolidation and political rivalry; and legiti-
mate socio-political agitations of groups, identity interests and rivalry. 
Security has to be specifically redefined to focus more on crime prevention 
and control, law enforcement, human security and direct threats to inter-
nal security. Such re-orientation has to be hinged on managing security 
through the people, underlined by people’s rights and driven by respect 
for citizens and their lives and property. This would mean that the security 
of citizens is primary, and that they are treated well, fairly, equitably, justly 
and respectfully as contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
The issue of reforms of the security architecture has been on the table 
since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. There was considerable 
international support at the initial years of the Fourth Republic for reforms 
targeted at strengthening the SAs within the framework of democratic 
governance. Most of the reforms targeted the issues of civil control, human 
rights, professionalism, operational efficiency and technology. The overall 
effects of the trainings and re-orientations on the conduct of the SAs may 
not have been extensive, sustained and enduring. However, reforms must 
be on the agenda, if the SAs are to be constructed in professional, efficient 
and competent mode.
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Community policing has to be at the centre plank of NPF’s operational 
management. It has often been recommended for strengthening effective-
ness within a framework of more linkages and communication, partner-
ship and collaboration between the NPF and the communities and 
neighbourhoods. It involves police and community partnership in detect-
ing and addressing crime in a sustained and proactive manner, in such 
ways that community knowledge and intelligence are harnessed in solving 
security challenges. While community policing has been introduced for 
more than ten years, its broad implementation, effectiveness and contribu-
tions to security are not yet sustained and broadly impacting. There is 
need for more innovative and extensive community policing in which 
communities and citizens are actual partners. In line with community 
policing is the need to integrate traditional leadership into national secu-
rity management. As community leaders, traditional leaders are at the cen-
tre of local information and intelligence, and command the loyalty, 
commitment and respect of their subjects. These could be put to good use 
in the management of security in the communities.
The institution of state police is an imperative for the effective management 
of internal security challenges. There has been frequent allusion to the 
partisan recruitment, deployment against opposition elements and use for 
oppressive and harassment purposes of the native authority and regional 
police in the First Republic. Alemika (2000, p. 4) notes that regional or 
local police forces were ill-qualified, poorly trained and behaved, and abusive 
of the rights of opposition. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that 
local police force would be more effective in maintaining law and order, 
being drawn from the environment and therefore capable of harnessing 
local knowledge, intelligence and social capital. Besides, as we have noted, 
the federal police force and other SAs are more or less instruments of the 
federal executive and are deployed and utilised sometimes in their interests 
and against opposition elements and perceived enemies. The much-
centralised operational deployments and management of the SAs has meant 
that it is possible that the leadership, officers and men in a particular state 
could be alien forces, deployed in the interests of domination and suppression 
from the centre. The point being made is that a state police cannot 
significantly be anything else that the current SAs are not.
The legitimacy of the SAs has to be strengthened. Apart from the issue 
of building cordiality, friendliness, respect, politeness and courtesy with 
citizens, and reversing the current situation of extensive mutual suspicion, 
prejudice and dislike between them and the public, the SAs have to be 
completely insulated from partisan politics. The SAs should never be part 
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of a political warfare or seen to be deployed against political enemies and 
opposition elements. The leadership of the SAs has to be based on merit, 
excellence and competence so as to command the loyalty, respect and 
commitment of officers and men, and build institutional integrity.
conclusIon
This chapter has highlighted the immense challenges of internal security 
and internal security management in Nigeria. Some conceptual and theo-
retical perspectives were provided for understanding and managing the 
challenges. This is important because part of the current sluggishness in 
comprehending, responding and effectively managing internal security 
threats can be attributed to poor and, in fact, confusing interpretations of 
emergent security challenges. The challenge of internal security is likely to 
increase given the deepening poverty, mass unemployment, poor wages, 
underemployment, loss of farmlands and fishing waters, deepening 
inequality between rich and poor and the ensuing rising disenchantment, 
discontent, frustration, youth restiveness and aggression among the citi-
zens. In practice, the national planning and governance priorities still fail 
to encompass the essentials of the socio-economic and political ingredi-
ents that promote social justice, stable social order and security.
Therefore, political leaders should mainstream the management of 
internal security while leaders of the SAs must be more adroit at managing 
institutions and effectively and proactively confronting internal security 
challenges. Several recommendations were made including streamlining 
national security policy, philosophy and structure; instituting reforms; 
designing a more innovative and effectively managed community policing; 
integrating traditional leaders into the national security management sys-
tem; and instituting state police formations with access to local knowledge 
and culture. The point has to be made that managing internal security 
must not only be more innovative but has to be depoliticised.
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CHAPTER 3




Security is one of the most fundamental conditions required for human 
existence in the modern state. In fact, the modern state itself is principally 
a product of the realisation of the need for security by the different indi-
viduals inhabiting the state. This point has been ably demonstrated by 
political theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes who in their 
different treatises argued that security is the reason for the coming into 
existence of the state. This implies that the state through the agency of the 
government is the principal addressee of security challenges in any given 
political entity. Any state that cannot ensure the security of her citizens is 
therefore not worth existing. Hence the old maxim, salus populi est 
suprema lex—the safety of the people is the supreme law, the supreme duty 
of the state. Contemporary scholars have also upheld this position in dif-
ferent ways. As Bislev (2004, p. 13) succinctly argues, “the maintenance 
of security is a necessary function of the state, something without which it 
cannot exist … without the state to ensure basic security, there would be 
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no civilisation, no civil society”. In a related vein, Loader and Walker 
(2007, p. 10) write that “the protection of its people from internal and 
external threats stands consequently as the first and defining priority of 
government”.
In contemporary international politics, the provision of security by the 
state has been an issue of great importance that it has become the principal 
variable in determining the success or failure of any state. In fact, the loss 
of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force which essentially 
has to do with security maintenance is among the basic indicators of a 
failed state. However, despite the fact that the concept of failed state has 
become one of the “most used and abused concepts in the last two 
decades” (Vannoni 2011, p. 3), the dynamics of international politics has 
placed great value on the maintenance of security at either the national or 
the international level.
The security challenges facing every given state—whether strong and 
weak ones—are, according to Yusuf (2012, p. 60), “understood and pro-
tected from two dimensions: internal and external”. While the internal 
security challenges have to do with threats that affect peace and order 
within the territorial borders of a sovereign state, the external security 
challenges deal with threats that affect the territorial integrity of the state 
from forces outside the state. It is in order to deal with both the internal 
and external security challenges of the state that the state’s claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory is 
assumed and exercised by the government through its coercive institu-
tions such as the police, military and paramilitary forces.
Ordinarily, in most countries, while the maintenance of the internal 
security is the primary responsibility of the police, Prisons and Immigration, 
the maintenance of external security is the responsibility of the armed 
forces. However, Imobighe (2003) rightly states that the overlapping 
nature of the security functions of the state requires that the army can also 
be of assistance in maintaining internal security, especially in emergency 
situations. In a similar vein, Lutterbeck (2004) also argues that the divid-
ing line between internal and external security in the post-Cold War era 
has increasingly become blurred as a result of the emergence of a growing 
number of transnational risks and challenges.
The ability of a state to effectively ensure the maintenance of internal 
security is conditioned by the nature of certain fundamental doctrines 
governing internal security management and the linkages that surround 
the state. Imobighe (1990, p. 14) has identified two basic principles that 
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affect the doctrines of internal security management adopted by different 
states. First is the military perspective. From a military and coercive 
 perspective, it is believed that military might and hardware is very critical 
in ensuring peace and stability. Secondly, the progressive perspective 
argues that since the essence of society has to do with the general welfare 
of citizens, internal security therefore, guarantees the safety of life and 
general welfare of the people so that they can realise their genuine goals 
and aspirations.
Since the post-Cold War era, there has been a steady decline in the rate 
of external security challenges. But at the same time, states, especially the 
new ones, most of which are in Africa, came to be faced with the rising 
incidence of internal security challenges. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 6), 
security has become a big issue in Africa today because of the various 
forms of carnage, brutality, pogroms and even genocide associated with 
incessant civil wars and other forms of violent conflicts on the continent.
Despite the steady decline in the rate of external security challenges, 
new threats to the internal security have continued to manifest in the dif-
ferent states across the globe. Ranging from issues such as terrorism, kid-
napping, hostage taking, bombing, cybercrime, climate change, ozone 
layer depletion, and so on; the increasing internal insecurity profile has 
also resulted in the deepening and broadening of the scope of internal 
security. Thus, the architecture of internal security has expanded to cover 
many new areas which hitherto were non-existent.
the ProblematIque
The history of challenges to internal security in Nigeria dates back to the 
period of colonialism. Internal conflicts such as the Aba women riots, the 
Abeokuta rebellion and the general strike of 1945 were all manifestations 
of the character of insecurity during the period of colonial occupation. 
From the era of independence to the return of democracy in 1999, the 
country also has witnessed several internal security challenges. Nigerians 
are not in a hurry to forget the numerous internal conflicts that culmi-
nated in a civil war in 1967 and the numerous conflicts that erupted in 
different parts of the country during the era of military rule. Since the 
advent of democracy in 1999, the situation has not changed.
Although the Nigerian state has experienced several internal security 
challenges in the past, the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorist group 
together with the phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, pipeline 
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vandalism and militant herdsmen have added a new dimension to the 
country’s internal insecurity profile. The details of the impact of the 
 phenomenon of kidnapping, youth militancy, Boko Haram and lately mili-
tant herdsmen on the security of lives are well known and captured in the 
literature. Yet, the capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively manage her 
internal security problem is seriously in doubt. The internal security archi-
tecture in Nigeria characterised as it were by the increasing number of 
checkpoints mounted by the security agencies—Police, Army, Navy, 
Immigration, Civil Defence corps and Customs—across all parts of the 
country points to the simple fact that one of the most sensitive realities of 
life in contemporary Nigeria is the challenge of internal insecurity.
Nevertheless, to manage the internal insecurity problem, special military 
operations and police squads have also been set up in different parts of the 
country to take care of the threats to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. 
Going with scary and frightful names such as Operation Crocodile Smile, 
Operation Lafiya Dole, Operation Python Dance, Safer Highways Squad, 
Anti-Terrorist Squad, these special squads have come to be part of the fea-
tures of Nigerian cities and highways. While these special operations and 
squads with their checkpoints might have recorded some successes in terms 
of preventing threats to the internal security of the country, the agony and 
trauma their operations have caused for the ordinary and helpless citizens 
deserves urgent attention. The untold hardship motorists and travellers 
alike have suffered in terms of inhuman treatment, molestation, loss of 
manpower hours and extortions of different kinds cannot be overempha-
sised. On a daily basis the activities of these special squads and other security 
agencies appear to aggravate the suffering of the ordinary Nigerian citizen.
Paradoxically, Nigerians have continued to witness on a daily basis, seri-
ous and increasing threats to the security of their lives and properties 
despite the strong military and police presence across the country. Across 
the country, different security threats abound. The phenomenon of kid-
napping in different parts of the country has continued unabated. In many 
cases, high-profile citizens or their relatives have been involved in these 
kidnaps. Recently, the fall out of the constant clash between rural farmers 
and Fulani herdsmen across communities in different parts of the country 
has come to aggravate the insecurity situation in the country. In another 
dimension, the constant attack on oil pipelines and installations by the 
Niger Delta Avengers and other similar groups in the south has continued 
to affect the revenue base of the federal government. In the north, the 
issue of Boko Haram is still raging despite all the assurances by the federal 
government that they have been defeated.
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The strong military and police presence across the country when juxta-
posed with the insecurity situation in the country has opened a serious 
lacuna about the whole idea and essence of internal security. A lot of ques-
tions such as these have been raised about the internal security situation: 
is internal security all about the uncountable military and police check-
points manned by fierce-looking and unfriendly military and policemen 
who harass ordinary citizens that they are meant to protect? Or is it about 
the fact that the police and military personnel have practically turned these 
checkpoints into toll gates? Or is it about the procurement of military 
hardware and recruitment of more security personnel? On the other hand, 
is internal security about the large retinue of security personnel attached 
to government officials and the elites in Nigeria? Is it about the security of 
the ordinary citizens or that of the state? And who is actually responsible 
for the maintenance of internal security? Is it the state or the ordi-
nary citizens?
The above questions and other such related ones have continued to 
raise disturbing concern that revolves around the Nigerian state and the 
management of internal security. A crucial aspect of the problem is the 
peculiar nature of Nigerian federalism that denies the constituent states 
the constitutional right to organise and provide security within their 
boundaries. With a Police Force and other security agencies that are cen-
trally organised and controlled by the federal government, the prevailing 
security governance structure seems to be a partnership arrangement 
where the constituent states have become passive partners with the federal 
government in the management of internal security. The states periodi-
cally provide support to the security agencies, particularly the police, yet 
they make no form of input in the organisation and management of the 
security agencies.
The primary concern of this chapter is to provide the theoretical foun-
dations for the empirical issues raised by the different chapters in this 
book. Though our main interest lies in the theoretical discourses about 
the state and the provision and maintenance of security, the chapter is also 
particularly interested in understanding the experience of the Nigerian 
state. In this regard, the central argument of this chapter is that the dys-
functionality of Nigeria’s federal system, which is a product of the post- 
colonial character of the Nigerian state, has resulted in the politicisation of 
security structures and governance processes involved in security manage-
ment. This, in turn, has negatively aggravated and sustained internal secu-
rity in the country.
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Why the State matterS In SecurIty management
The concept of the state has several contentious definitions because scholars 
have defined it from different ideological, historical, normative and 
descriptive perspectives. Despite the disagreement among scholars over the 
meaning and origin of the state, the concept of the state has continued to 
occupy a prominent place in political discourse. The concept of the state has 
also experienced varying status in political analysis as a result of the dominant 
approach adopted in the study of political science as a discipline and certain 
historical developments such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the emergence of a new world order, the emergence of a 
unipolar world led by the United States and globalisation (Onyeoziri 2005). 
Yet, the centrality of the state in the daily existence of individuals in modern 
times cannot be ignored nor overemphasised. Miliband (1969, p. 59) has 
captured this in the following words:
…more than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they 
want to achieve individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state’s 
sanction and support. It is possible not to be interested in what the state 
does but it is not possible to be unaffected by it.
The link between the state and the provision and management of security 
is in varying degrees deeply rooted in the different conceptions of the 
origin of the state. Political thinkers and scholars have in different ways 
espoused that the state is principally responsible for the provision and 
management of security. The Weberian conception of the state posits that 
it is the traditional responsibility of the state to provide security. In other 
words, the state is designed primarily to maintain order and security 
(Raphael 1976). According to Raphael (1976, p. 53), “the state is an asso-
ciation designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising uni-
versal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of laws backed by 
force and recognised as having sovereign authority”. It is the security pro-
vided by the state that ensures that a conducive environment exists for the 
citizens to pursue their legitimate needs. In a similar vein, Bislev (2004) 
opines that Max Weber’s classical definition of the state as holding a 
monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence rests upon the notion that 
social order is crucial to the state. It is therefore in order to ensure social 
order that the state must provide security. Bislev captures this issue thus: 
“the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state something 
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without which it cannot exist … without the state to ensure basic security, 
there would be no civilization, no civil society” (Bislev 2004, p. 48).
Social contact theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in 
their different treaties have also captured the essence of the state in secu-
rity maintenance. Despite the differences in their postulations about man 
and the state of nature, the social contract theorists all agree that the 
movement of society from the original state of nature where according to 
Thomas Hobbes, life was short, nasty and brutish, to the modern state 
system, was basically propelled by the desire for security. Along this view-
point, Nnoli (2003, p. 28) also argues that states are formed solely for the 
sake of obtaining security, especially against the aggressiveness of other 
men since men are essentially selfish and seek only their own good. Using 
the social contract theory, Nnoli (2003) further explains that the modern 
state emerged at the point where people, in order to preserve humanity, 
decided to give up their rights and liberties to the state and agreed to obey 
the laws prescribed by the government set up by the state. The state in 
return was required to ensure the maintenance of law and order and also 
the security of the subjects of the state. Nnoli concluded that if it could be 
shown that the state can no longer guarantee security and prosperity, then 
it has lost the justification for existence.
Gamble (1981) holds a similar view with Nnoli about the state and the 
provision of security. He succinctly argues that:
The state emerged as a result of the contract between the citizens and itself. 
It is established to serve the interests of the citizenry so long as the state 
preserves security; individuals have a moral obligation to obey the com-
mands and laws of the state. But if the state ceases to maintain the security 
of its subjects, they have the right to resist the state by force of arms if neces-
sary. (Gamble 1981)
An emerging view in the literature on security sector governance and 
reforms points to the fact that despite the traditional role of the state in 
providing security, the processes of globalisation and privatisation, together 
with the weakness of some states, especially in developing countries, have 
necessitated the intrusion of the private sector in the provision of security. 
To that end, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 6) assert that “bringing 
the private sector into the business of security is crucial to a comprehensive 
understanding of the security situation in most countries and any attempt 
to ensure better security for all must take account of the activities and 
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operations of private security providers”. In the context of sub-Saharan 
Africa, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 7) argue that this assertion 
comes to fore in the face of “the declining ability and/or willingness of the 
state to provide adequate protection of life and property”.
In practical terms, the state is an abstract entity that cannot be seen nor 
touched. It is “an artificial social construction” (Onyeoziri 2005, p. 56). 
Hence, the responsibilities of the state including that of security mainte-
nance are exercised by the government which is an agent of the state. 
According to Onyeoziri (2005, p.  56), “the government is the most 
important agent of the state”. Appadorai (1968, p. 12) similarly states that 
the government is saddled with the responsibility of maintaining security 
because, “essentially it is the agency or machinery through which the will 
of the state is formulated, expressed and realised”. Government acts and 
speaks on behalf of the state, and is formally vested with state power 
(Miliband 1969). Government is represented by the executive, legislature 
and judiciary functionaries who take charge of the everyday running of the 
affairs of government. Since the state cannot be seen, and is represented 
by the government, it also implies that it is the government that fulfils the 
obligations of the state. It is in the process or set of activities through 
which the government fulfils the obligations of the state to the citizens 
that governance takes place. Governance according to Fukuyama (2013, 
p. 3) is defined as “government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to 
deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or 
not”. Similarly, Omodia (2013, p. 36) also asserts that “governance entails 
the proper management of state institutions and structures to enhance 
socio-economic and political transformation of society”. It is in the pro-
cesses of governance that state structures or institutions do perform the 
essential function of security maintenance.
The relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored. 
According to Oyebode (2011, p. 27), “security has become the touch-
stone of governance in modern society”. Vohra (2008, p. 8) also captures 
the nexus between governance and internal security thus:
If internal security is not maintained, governance cannot be delivered and 
there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. 
Likewise, internal security cannot be safeguarded if governance is delivered 
by an inefficient and corrupt administration.
Anah (2014) has tried to examine the nexus between governance and 
security within the context of Africa. According to him, the apparent 
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intractability of governance and security problems in Africa has resulted in 
insecurity and poor governance which also have provided the basis for the 
interventionist efforts of international donor agencies and non- 
governmental organisations. Anah (2014) also debunks the mainstream 
view that poor institutions and the instrumentalisation of disorder are 
responsible for insecurity and poor governance in Africa. Using a political 
economy approach, he links poor governance and insecurity in Africa to 
external factors such as the declining terms of trade between Africa and 
the industrialised economies of the world. He further highlights the fol-
lowing three major historical facts which to a large extent have shaped 
security and governance in Africa:
 1. the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries,
 2. the scope and nature of international politics that characterise the 
Cold War era and
 3. the institutional structures put in place at the end of the era 
of empires.
Since Nigeria is seen as the giant of Africa, we believe that Anah’s 
observations particularly present the Nigerian experience. For instance, 
the insecurity experienced in the Niger Delta, which is a fallout of the 
exploitative activities of the multinational corporations, is rightly linked to 
the quest for raw materials by the industrialised developed countries as 
opined by Anah. From another dimension, the seeming connivance of 
successive Nigerian governments could also be seen as part of the institu-
tional structures put in place by the colonialists to ensure a conducive 
environment for the exploitation of oil wealth.
In the wider Nigerian context, the insecurity problem that has contin-
ued to threaten the stability of the Fourth Republic has been linked by 
several scholars to the failure of governance. According to Omilusi (2013), 
the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria can only be understood within the con-
text of governance failure. He argues that the inability of the Nigerian 
state to ensure the security of its citizens stems from the fact that the state 
has not been able to meet the minimum requirements of the social con-
tract it entered with the citizens because of the forces of bad governance. 
The resultant effect of this, as he puts it, is that “there is thus a disconnec-
tion between the governed and the government” (Omilusi 2013, p. 374). 
Omilusi also listed the following factors as some of the manifestations of 
the crisis of governance that are behind the problem of insecurity: inability 
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of the government to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that is 
in accord with human dignity, lingering conditions of political instability, 
repression and violence, widespread petty and grand corruption, eco-
nomic decline resulting in capacity underutilisation, structural distortion 
and huge debt burden, very high unemployment rate especially among 
young people, deterioration of socio-economic infrastructure and widen-
ing inequality among individuals.
The nexus between governance and security is further seen in the fact 
that the absence of good governance adversely affects the security of the 
state. It is along this line of thought that good governance became a rever-
berating variable in the discussions of the neorealist conception of security. 
In fact, the existence of human security is largely tied to good governance.
Why Internal InSecurIty In nIgerIa?
Events since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent state point to the 
fact the territorial integrity of Nigerian state has suffered more internal 
challenges than external ones. Since the return of democracy in 1999, 
events have also shown that the greatest threat to the current democratic 
dispensation is internal insecurity. The 2016 World Internal Security and 
Police Index showed that Nigeria (0.2554) ranked 127th out of 127 
countries in internal security levels, while Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (0.2720), Kenya (0.2982) and Uganda (0.3119) were ranked 
126th, 125th and 124th, respectively. The different chapters in this vol-
ume have critically discussed the incidence, character and implications of 
insecurity in Nigeria. Yet, it is important to note that the incidence of 
insecurity in Nigeria has led to the situation where there is a growing pub-
lic resentment against the Nigerian state and its management of the inter-
nal insecurity problem. This resentment is further driven by the fact that 
insecurity is becoming more complex and widespread despite all the assur-
ances by the government that they are in control of the situation. The 
fallout from this situation is that Nigerians have lost confidence in the 
ability of the state to provide security. People now rely more on non-state 
actors for their security. The increasing participation of non-state actors 
such as private security organisations and vigilantes of all sorts in the main-
tenance of security without adequate supervision by the government 
attests to this fact.
Our concern here is to theoretically offer some explanation why inter-
nal insecurity has continued to subsist in Nigeria. The debates about the 
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character and incidence of insecurity have been long standing. A survey of 
the extant literature will suffice before our own understanding is high-
lighted. Mijah (2007) argues that the state of insecurity in Nigeria can be 
traced to two main factors, namely the character of the Nigerian state and 
the context of democratic politics. With regard to the character of the 
Nigerian state, he argues that the problem of internal security in Nigeria is 
derived from, and is aggravated by, the inclusion and/or exclusion of cer-
tain groups from access to opportunities and resources of the state, as a 
result of the structural imbalance inherent in the Nigerian federation. 
According to Mijah, the structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious and 
regional composition of the Nigerian state and the manipulation of such 
identities are responsible for the various ethno-religious and even com-
munal conflicts in Nigeria. Also related to this issue is the desperation for 
political offices and the unrestrained access to state resources which 
accompanies the occupation of these political offices.
Secondly, Mijah (2007, p. 4) also argues that there is evidence of a cor-
relation between the context of democratic governance and the state of 
insecurity in Nigeria. This is derived from the fact that “since 1999, demo-
cratic governance has not instituted sufficient policies and programmes to 
alter the structures of imbalance and inequity imposed on the character of 
the state by the forces of colonialism and prolonged military rule”.
Locating the problem of insecurity in Nigeria within the context of the 
politics of security decision-making, Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 13) 
state that what constitutes security for the Nigerian state and political elites 
is traditionally rooted in the state’s monopoly and control of all legitimate 
instruments of coercion, and its ability to contain both internal insurgency 
and external aggression. They also argue that the crisis of insecurity in 
Nigeria arises from the character of the state and the character of the state 
security agencies. According to Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 15), the 
sincerity of the Nigerian state to respond to insecurity has repeatedly 
appeared to be questioned by the citizens because the state has spent more 
time on nation-building and far less on state-building. They further noted 
that the character of the state security agencies threatens the security of 
lives and property because of the politicisation of security. In their words:
State security agencies constitute a veritable threat to the security of the citi-
zens of Nigeria. More often, rather than restore peace and order, they 
 exacerbate crises, ramping up social and political tensions. (Ibeanu and 
Momoh 2008, p. 14)
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Nnoli (2006), in his discourse on national security in Africa, points to the 
collapsed character of the state as a serious aspect of the problem of African 
security. According to Nnoli (2006, p. 9), political exclusion, economic 
marginalisation and social discrimination, which are at the heart of the 
crises of the state in Africa, have so much threatened the security of the 
citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat 
to their survival. In this context, Nnoli further asserts that physical safety 
has become the preeminent concern of most Africans, since the state is no 
longer able to generate the fundamental conditions for the protec-
tion of life.
Isima (2007) shares a similar view with Nnoli (2006) on the relation-
ship between the character of the state and the problem of insecurity. He 
asserts that the outsourcing of noncore security functions of the state to 
private military and security companies is not an African phenomenon, but 
rather a global development that is propelled by globalisation and privati-
sation. Isima further argues that the fragility of the states in Africa together 
with their weak institutional capacity is responsible for the expanding 
scope of the private sector into the core security functions of the state. As 
he succinctly puts it:
It is the low institutional capacity of the African state to deliver the public 
good of physical security for citizens efficiently and effectively that creates 
the security vacuum, which is increasingly being filled by the private sector 
in response to genuine demands of citizens for protection. (Isima 
2007, p. 23)
In another work, Nnoli (2012) shares the same view with Mijah (2007) 
as he points to the undemocratic character of the Nigerian state as a seri-
ous aspect of the problem of national security. According to Nnoli (2012, 
p. 6), state violence and internal conflicts are at the heart of the security 
crisis in Nigeria. After a critical evaluation of the numerous violent inter-
nal conflicts which include the Boko Haram insurgency, he argues that 
“violent conflicts have persisted and even intensified in various parts of 
the country because democracy has remained elusive” (Nnoli 2012, 
p. 14). He further argues that the undemocratic character of the state 
also stands in the way of resolving the security crisis. This is because the 
alienation of the masses creates a problem for intelligence gathering 
which is a very important tool in maintaining security. As he suc-
cinctly puts it:
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Since the central issue of national security in Nigeria concerns internal secu-
rity, the need for good intelligence gathering in the country is critical. The 
consequence of the alienation of the masses from the undemocratic state is 
their unwillingness to provide the necessary intelligence as they need to. In 
fact, they tend to provide intelligence to those opposed to the state or they 
feign ignorance of what is going on. (Nnoli 2012, p. 22)
Olorode (2011) similarly shares the views of Nnoli (2006) and Isima (2007) 
on the relationship between the character of the Nigerian state and the 
problem of insecurity, only that he adds a cultural dimension to the debate. 
For Olorode (2011, p. 9), it is necessary to situate the Nigerian security 
crisis in a global context, “since insecurity cuts across national and interna-
tional boundaries and has implications on the global economy and political 
stability”. To this end, the ideological struggle to entrench capitalism in 
developing countries and colonialism, which helped to ensure the propaga-
tion of the capitalist ideology, are important factors which he believes 
should not be ignored in trying to understand the security crisis. Olorode 
further asserts that “to understand the issue of insecurity and the attendant 
crisis in Nigeria, one must take cognizance of the involvement of the state 
(i.e governments at different levels), the state agencies (i.e the courts, police 
and similar agencies) and the cultural institutions (i.e religion, the media, 
educational institutions, etc)”. The cultural dimension that Olorode (2011) 
added to the debate on insecurity in Nigeria is informed by the fact that 
religious fundamentalism has been so manipulated by the political elites 
that it has also contributed to the problem of insecurity.
Achumba et al. (2013, p. 88) have also examined the character of insecu-
rity in Nigeria. According to them, the remote and immediate sources of 
insecurity in Nigeria include lack of institutional capacity resulting in govern-
ment failure, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness, ethno- religious 
conflicts, conflict of perception between the public and government, weak 
state security system, loss of sociocultural and communal value system, 
porous borders, unemployment, rural/urban migration and terrorism.
In another contribution, Imobighe (2013) argues that the cause of 
insecurity in Nigeria is closely tied to the attitude of Nigerian leaders to 
threat assessment. According to him, threat, which is part of the main 
determinants of defence and national security planning, has not been 
properly managed in Nigeria and some other African countries. To this 
end, he further argues that the misplacement of defence and national secu-
rity efforts and the haphazard treatment of threats which focus solely on 
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regime perpetuation and how to silence opposition elements are crucial 
factors responsible for the increasing incidence of insecurity in the country.
Finally, Oarhe and Aghedo (2010) argue that the increasing internal 
insecurity in Nigeria is a result of the culture of corruption that has over-
taken the security agencies charged with the responsibility of providing 
security. They also strongly believe that since the principles and ethical 
values such as integrity, precision, impartiality, courage, competence, 
teamwork, leadership, efficiency in the use of public funds, respect, trust, 
professionalism, patriotism, credibility, loyalty, reputation, responsibility, 
compliance with obligations under the law, diligence, discipline, fairness, 
accountability, commitment, transparency, innovation and objectivity that 
are paramount in the effective performance of security functions are lack-
ing in the Nigerian security sector, the security sector cannot promote 
internal security. According to them, the prevailing images of corruption 
in the security sector have resulted to the following problems: poor quality 
of services by the internal security agencies, the proliferation of small and 
light weapons, the perpetration of crime, the manipulation of criminal 
records, the dented image and credibility of security agencies and the crisis 
of economic development. All these problems for them account for the 
reason why Nigeria is the “open sore” of the African continent.
The explanations offered by these scholars, when taken together, do 
not adequately explain the persistence of internal security threats in 
Nigeria. As good and incisive as they appear, they have failed to adequately 
capture the nexus between the character of the Nigerian state and problem 
of internal security. But we argue that the crisis of internal insecurity in 
Nigeria borders mainly on the post-colonial character of the Nigerian 
state. It is the dynamics of the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state 
that is responsible for the dysfunctional nature of federalism in the coun-
try. The dysfunctional character of federalism has resulted in the politicisa-
tion of security structures and governance processes involved in the 
management of security. This in a way has negatively aggravated and sus-
tained insecurity in the country.
PoSt-colonIalISm, FederalISm and the PolItIcISatIon 
oF SecurIty In nIgerIa
Undoubtedly, the Nigerian federalism is riddled with contradictions and 
crises. The immanent contradictions in the Nigerian federation have 
resulted in what is commonly referred to as the national question 
 I. M. ALUMONA
63
(Nwabueze 2016), which has often degenerated to varying degrees of 
protestations over resource control/revenue allocation and outright sepa-
ratist agitations by cross sections of the country. In the face of the numer-
ous crises and the frequent violent outbursts it has engendered, Nigeria’s 
security sector appears to have been politicised and the security appara-
tuses compromised as a result.
A proper understanding of these tensions, contradictions and crises of 
the Nigerian federation requires a return to Nigeria’s post-colonial foun-
dations. Scholars such as Alavi (1973), Ake (1985), Ekekwe (1985) and 
Ibeanu (1998), among others, had developed the classical Marxist theory 
of the state and employed it in the elucidation and understanding of the 
peculiarity of the neocolonial state. The major contention of these scholars 
is that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism and, as such, has 
followed a developmental strategy dictated by the interest of imperialism 
and its local allies rather than that of the majority of the indigenous popu-
lation. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post-colonial state rests on the 
foundation of the colonial state whose major preoccupation was to create 
conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie 
in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation 
of local human and other natural resources. Therefore, the post-colonial 
state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, 
was no less a creation of imperialism than the colonial state (Ekekwe 1985).
One basic character of the post-colonial state, as articulated by Ake 
(1985), is that it has very limited autonomy. This means that the state is 
institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited indepen-
dence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and, 
so, is immersed in the class struggles that go on in the society. The post- 
colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and mainly 
caters for a narrow range of interests: the interests of the rapacious politi-
cal elite in comprador and subordinate relationship with foreign capital. 
For Ake, therefore, “the political conditions in Africa are the greatest 
impediment to development” (Ake 2003, p. 1). He traced these political 
conditions to the political legacy colonialism bequeathed on Africa, and 
which manifested in the absolutism and arbitrariness of the post- 
colonial states.
Buttressing this point, Ibeanu (1998) conceived of the state as “the 
totality of the materiality of political class domination in a society”. He 
surmised that since the post-colonial state is all-powerful and there are few 
safeguards on how its tremendous power is to be used in a moderate and 
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civil manner, groups and individuals take a great stock in controlling the 
power of the state. So it is characteristic of the post-colonial state that its 
members put a premium on politics. Politics is everything and everything 
is politics, including life and death (Ibeanu 1998, p. 11).
In applying the theory of the post-colonial state to the elucidation of 
the crisis of the Nigerian federation, it needs to be understood that at the 
time a federal system was being adopted in 1946–1954, the colonial state 
had become a battleground for three rival pluralities: the plurality of eco-
nomic and geographic regions, the plurality of ethnic nationalities and the 
plurality of colonial administrative traditions. The first two pluralities make 
up what Afigbo (1991) described as the primordial federal features of 
indigenous Nigerian society. Meanwhile, these two pluralities have since 
intruded into the post-colonial state, shaping in a very decisive manner the 
structure and evolution of that state.
Arising from the plurality of ethnic groups and colonial administrative 
traditions, the struggle for power in Nigeria has been intense and which-
ever ethnic group that gets hold of power maximises it to the benefit of 
the group. The fallout of the desire to maximise the powers of the state is 
what is seen as the over-centralisation of the federal system. Of the numer-
ous pathologies arising from the over-centralisation of the federal system 
in Nigeria, none threatens the stability of the constituent states such as the 
maintenance of security.
In Nigeria, the powers of security governance lie solely with the federal 
government, which exercises supreme control over all the security agen-
cies. The high degree of centralisation of the security sector has adversely 
affected the governance structures, resulting in its politicisation. This 
anomaly has become so glaring in the use and control of the police. As 
regards the maintenance of public order and safety, the 1999 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) makes it the concurrent 
responsibility of both the federal and state governments. Yet, the coercive 
institution responsible for the job which is the police is solely controlled 
by the federal government. The controversy over the use and control of 
the police has been a source of tension and confrontations between the 
federal government and the states. The clamour for state police, which 
began before independence in 1960 has also met with stiff opposition by 
the federal government with the tacit support of a section of the feder-
ating units.
The politicisation of the security governance structures has resulted in 
a situation where state governors as chief security officers of their respec-
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tive states have minimal or no control over the security infrastructure in 
their state because they cannot control any of the security agencies. This 
clearly undermines security. The abduction and forced resignation of a sit-
ting governor in Anambra State several years ago and the seeming silence 
of the Nigerian Police in the face of wanton destruction of lives and prop-
erty in Nimbo-Uzo Uwani in Enugu State and across Benue State during 
the crises between rural farmers and Fulani herdsmen speaks volumes 
about the challenges of centralised control of the police. During the crises, 
the respective governors were helpless as they could not effectively take 
charge of the situation. Also, in the face of the crisis, the way and manner 
the police directed vigilante groups and militias to return all the arms in 
their possession appeared suspect, given that nothing was said about the 
Fulani herdsmen who have been carrying sophisticated arms and terroris-
ing rural farmers across the country.
The sectionalism and nepotism exhibited in recent strategic appoint-
ments in the security sector by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led 
administration is another example of the politicisation of the security gov-
ernance structure. In a state like Nigeria where there are sharp ethnic and 
religious divisions, the appointment of key security chiefs such as the 
Inspector–General of Police, Director of Department of State Security, 
Controller-Generals of Nigerian Custom Service and Nigerian Immigration 
Service, Director-General of National Intelligence Agency, Chairman of 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as well as the National 
Security Adviser, from one geopolitical zone of the country has not only 
dampened the morale of the men and officers of the security agencies con-
cerned, but has exacerbated insecurity. The resurgence of secessionist 
threats and the vociferous demands for the immediate restructuring of the 
Nigerian federation are clear pointers to the disaffection and ill-will that the 
politicisation of the security architecture has engendered within the polity.
The politicisation of the security sector has also resulted to the prevail-
ing situation where the Nigerian state appears to be only interested in the 
security of those in power. The large retinue of security personnel that is 
attached to elected political office holders, their appointed allies and the 
financial oligarchs together with elitist orientation of these security per-
sonnel leaves much to be desired. More worrisome is the fact that the 
security personnel are increasingly alienated from the public they are 
meant to protect. In most cases, the lawlessness exhibited by the security 
personnel has also exacerbated insecurity. There are several cases of police 
brutality across the country.
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concludIng remarkS
This chapter has critically explored the theoretical nexus between the state 
and security management. It then focused on the Nigerian experience. The 
nature and character of internal security management in Nigeria have not 
only raised doubts about the role of the Nigerian state, but have also 
exposed how the contradictions of the post-colonial character of the state 
have undermined federal practice which turns around to affect the mainte-
nance of internal security. What readily comes to mind from the analyses of 
the role of the Nigerian state in the management of internal security is that 
there is urgent need to reinvent federalism for it to meet the changing 
demands of the political society. One of such demands centres on restruc-
turing of the security sector. This has become necessary considering the 
fact that security threats vary across the different states, and it requires 
some degree of self-rule, which is part of the dictates of federalism to 
respond to local security issues. Following Livingston’s (1952) sociological 
thesis of federalism, there is urgent need for the operators of Nigeria’s fed-
eral system to develop instrumentalities that will respond to the numerous 
demands of the different ethnic nationalities. As postulated by Livingston 
(1952), federal instrumentalities are expected to change and respond to 
the demands from the political society. When there is a gap between the 
demands from the political society and the state of the federal system, it 
basically leads to tension and crises. This is part of the problem of federal-
ism in Nigeria which is creating the problems in security management.
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CHAPTER 4




Nigeria is a nation that is richly blessed with both human and natural 
resources but has recently become growingly unsafe due to its mounting 
cases of internal security crisis, especially since 1999. Security is an impor-
tant component of a state which naturally determines its pace of develop-
ment and progress. Security is an important requirement in the existence 
or sustenance of every modern state in the international political system. 
This is based on the need for states recognised as independent to maintain 
their territorial integrity without the control of their territories by other 
states. In fact, security remains one of the most critical aspects of a nation’s 
existence that ensure social order in the society and should never be over-
looked. This is because the development and survival of any nation is 
hinged on it. In essence, a country that cannot secure its territory from 
both internal and external threats in modern times is bound to fail. Internal 
security is one of the criteria for the survival of modern democracy, espe-
cially among the current African countries. It is based on the foregoing 
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that Onodugo et  al. (2015, p.  27) described national security as “the 
podium upon which democracy stands and its values for the people.” It 
then means that such security guarantees stability, which determines the 
success of politics and all sectors of the economy.
Although Nigeria’s national security goal since attaining independence 
has been focused on deterring external aggression and containment of 
internal security threats (Pogoson 2013), the country started becoming 
insecure after the Nigerian-Biafran War in 1970 when the proliferation of 
arms became the order of the day (Fourchard 2003). Nigeria continued to 
witness increased rate of crime and insecurity, which unfortunately offered 
people the opportunity to learn how to kill themselves after the war 
(Onibokun 2003). Most youths have become experts in murdering people 
to the extent that some are now being used to assassinate political oppo-
nents, or even engage in bank robberies among others.
The year 1999 is remarkable in the history of Nigeria democratically. 
Specifically, it represented the end of military authoritarian rule and also 
the re-establishment of democratic rule under the Fourth Republic. The 
return to democratic rule in Nigeria was greeted by much hope for speedy 
development, which would avert the growing nature of poverty among its 
populace and promote internal peace and security. But this great hope 
which initially characterised the minds of the Nigerian populace in 1999 is 
rapidly disappearing owing to several developments that have contributed 
to the intensification of internal security problems. In essence, the Nigerian 
state has recently been characterised by mounting cases of internal security 
crisis, which has escalated the economic and security challenges in the 
country, that has threatened the peace and unity of the nation at different 
points in time since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Such internal 
security crises range from the Niger Delta crisis, insurgencies, militancy, 
kidnapping, political assassinations, armed robbery, ritual killings, com-
munal conflicts to terrorism, to mention but a few, and have since become 
part of the daily life issue within the country since this period.
Furthermore, Nwagboso (2016) argued that the internal security prob-
lems affecting most areas in Nigeria can be grouped into violent and non- 
violent internal security challenges. The latter include the outbreak of 
diseases like Ebola, HIV/AIDS, and yellow fever. As such, the country has 
continually experienced several security challenges in its different geopo-
litical zones which overstretched the security agencies due to govern-
ment’s oversight, delayed action and even corruption. For instance, 
Nwogwugwu and Oluranti (2015, p. 47), argued that “militant activities 
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generated to the extent of it affecting the nation’s economy, before the 
adoption of amnesty policy.” Likewise, kidnapping in the southeast was 
allowed to escalate to the level of secondary school children as well as 
members of the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ) being kidnapped in 
Abia state, before the situation was managed by military intervention that 
resulted in raids across various communities in some local governments 
within Abia south.
The lopsided federalism witnessed in the country manifests in the cen-
tralisation of the police which limits oversight of state governments 
(Matfess 2016). This has made it difficult for the police to swiftly respond 
to internal security threats as required by current realities. Boko Haram 
has been carrying out insurgency activities since 2009 unabated. The rea-
son for this increase in internal security is due to failed government and 
mounting poverty amongst the populace in the face of endemic corrup-
tion within the political class. Therefore, the chapter argues that the wide-
spread nature of corruption amongst the elite and even the security agents 
in Nigeria accounts for the increasing nature of internal security crisis in 
the country since 1999. This study is basically qualitative in nature. It 
combines the historical methodology with trend analysis in analysing 
major events within the period in other established cogent facts. The 
method has been helpful in tracking major efforts by the state in enhanc-
ing national security.
conceptual clarIfIcatIon
Security is a term that brings to the fore the need for survival of the state 
and the protection of individual and group rights within a state (Albert 
2003). For Nwolise (2014, p. 47), “security connotes protection, mean-
ing the safety of men, groups, nationals and the entire world from harm. 
In other words, when people are not threatened by any danger or disaster, 
they are said to be safe, while they are unsafe in vulnerable conditions.” In 
his attempt to categorise security, Okodoloh (2011, p.  319) maintains 
that “active security means the practical measures taken in security opera-
tions involving the use of visible objects such as weapons, security acces-
sories, security equipment most of which are usually capital intensive, 
while passive security is social, psychological and economic measures taken 
to protect lives and property.”
According to Tsuwa and Okoh (2016), we talk about national security 
when the issue of protecting the people and political conditions are given 
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priority. This protection is aimed at saving the state and citizens from 
threats. In essence, a state that lacks the capacity to prevent danger to its 
territorial integrity can hardly guarantee the well-being of her people. 
Nwolise (2009) posits that the relevance of national security explains why 
the government puts measures to make the security sector effective to 
prevent people from losing confidence in the ability of the state from pro-
tecting them. In the context of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, the nation is 
expected to maintain a standing army, air force, navy, as well as other para-
military forces and the police, with the aim of defending against any form 
of aggression to maintain the nation’s territorial integrity (see 
Pogoson 2013).
HIstorIcIsIng Internal securIty In nIgerIa sInce 1999
Historically, internal security has remained a primary duty of the state. In 
Nigeria, it dates back to the colonial period when the colonial agents 
mobilised all the machinery of cohesion (police and army) in their bid to 
suppress the indigenous people into total submission to the colonial state 
and also maintain order for the swift running of their regime. According 
to Malasowe (2016, p. 46), most people in the country were in need of 
adequate security, despite the indirect rule introduced by colonial admin-
istrators, and indigenous people became threatened by the security lapses 
during that period (Malasowe 2016). The chiefs became agents of law 
enforcement instead of protecting their own people. Being a colonial cre-
ation, the Nigerian state at independence inherited the state-centric nature 
of colonial internal security measures.
Internal security has remained an important area of concern in Nigeria 
prior to 1999 owing to its place in the enhancement of peace and develop-
ment. The intra-party political crisis that erupted within the Action Group 
(AG), as well as the ethno-religious crisis which invited the military into 
politics where series of critical internal crisis within the nation’s first repub-
lic that not only shook the unity of the country but contributed in drag-
ging the newly independent nation into a deadly civil war which lasted for 
about 30 months. Decades of dictatorship, especially from the 1970s, wit-
nessed mass suppression and violation of human rights under the various 
military governments. This, among other things, instigated series of inter-
nal security challenges in Nigeria, which made violent conflicts to become 
a little much rampart within the nation’s environs. For instance, the series 
 R. I. OKOLIE-OSEMENE
73
of coups propelled more coups from 1966 when the first coup was exe-
cuted and promoted some form of political killings and instabilities. Other 
crises included the Maitatsine crisis of 1980s, Zango Kataf crisis of 1992 
and June 12 crisis, to mention only a few. In fact, Elaigwu (2005; cited in 
Alumona 2016) noted that between 1980 and 2005, there were 145 cases 
of violent conflicts in Nigeria.
However, it is important to state here that during the Nigerian Civil 
War, there was a mass mobilisation of the security agencies particularly the 
army in the war against the Biafran forces. At the end of the war, which 
ended in 1970, the majority of the Nigerian peace enforcement agencies 
particularly the military were redeployed and relocated to the barracks, 
and so they became relatively underused internally except in extreme cases 
or on foreign missions due to the scanty nature of internal crisis before 
1999. Since the end of the war, most of the internal crises that occurred in 
the country before 1999 were very minimal and limited in both scope 
and effects.
Moreover, the rebirth of democracy in 1999 was supposedly thought 
to guarantee peace, security and development, which would ensure the 
fundamental rights of the Nigerian nationals. But the unfolding develop-
ments since 1999 in Nigeria have proven this popular expectation to be 
very wrong. This is due to the fact that there has been a multiplicity of 
internal tensions within the country from the Fourth Republic. The 
nascent democracy has not translated to the safety of people, as the capa-
bility of the state to sustain the maintenance of law and order remains 
questionable, considering the disturbances across the country (Malasowe 
2016). The disappointments faced by Nigerians from the governing cir-
cles as a result of gross corruption and political neglect, coupled with rapid 
increase in poverty and unemployment among the majority of the citizens 
since the dawn of the Fourth Republic also worsened the problem.
The foregoing has contributed to an increase in internal security chal-
lenges in the country, which, in most cases, the security agencies like the 
police and other sister security agencies fail to handle. The prevalence of 
such internal crisis is rapidly overstretching the army. Rapid increase of 
intolerance and violence characterised the early years of democratic dis-
pensation in the late 1990s (Hazen and Horner 2008). The transforma-
tion of Nigeria into democratic rule created new challenges, particularly 
internal tension within the country. Internal security challenges in recent 
times can be classified under the following: militancy; Boko Haram 
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insurgency; Fulani herdsmen-farmers crisis; Shiites-Army crisis; humani-
tarian crisis; food insecurity; and crimes such as kidnapping, cultism and 
ritual killing.
Militancy is one of the intractable internal security crises that have 
become a common phenomenon since 1999. The emergence of militancy 
in the Niger Delta created new sources of security challenges, which gave 
a new dimension to internal security challenges facing the nation. The 
manifestations of its effects have been far too detrimental on the nation’s 
economy and internal security. The appearance of militancy reveals long 
periods of political marginalisation, economic exploitation/victimisation 
they had suffered in the region over the years due to oil exploration since 
1956. Government’s lack of political will needed for ensuring equitable 
resource allocation, coupled with political corruption, marginalisation and 
the sense of neglect and alienation on the part of Niger Delta people cul-
minated into high levels of militancy in the Fourth Republic (Akpan 
2010). It is noteworthy that demands by the people of Niger Delta are 
people-oriented, focusing on the well-being of the communities that have 
suffered government neglect for years.
The failure of the government to respond promptly motivated prolif-
eration groups that became restive. This group of youth not only adopted 
the violent processes such as pipeline vandalisation, they also engaged in 
bombing of oil facilities and kidnapping of oil expatriates so as to scare 
away the workers. In spite of military task force that was sent into the area, 
militancy continued to wax stronger by the day as new militants continued 
to emerge on daily basis. The prevalence of this situation thereby made the 
region very unsafe for both the inhabitants and also foreign officials. In 
fact many countries had to recall back their citizens for safety reasons.
The incessant attacks on oil facilities caused the country’s oil produc-
tion to drop drastically. The attack on Atlas Cove Jetty/Depot, a major 
petroleum distribution on July 12, 2009, which was highly securitised on 
a 24-hour basis, resulted in the suspension of oil operation activities by the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the time being. 
Atlas Cove jetty supplies products through pipeline network to NNPC’s 
depots in some parts of the country (Lawal et al. 2009). As a result of such 
activities, petroleum reception was transferred to Apapa depot. The mili-
tant attack on this facility made it difficult for foreign vessels to easily bring 
in imported fuel through NNPC and other companies with great implica-
tions for domestic supply. This incident equally prompted the former US 
President Barak Obama’s decision to visit Ghana instead of Nigeria during 
his African countries’ tour for security reasons.
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The attack on Atlas Cove came with a shocking surprise on the Nigerian 
government. In fact it was the last straw that forced the Nigerian 
 government under President Yar’Adua to extend the presidential amnesty 
programme, which involves a free vocational training and a monthly cash 
payment of about 30,000 militants to douse the militant anger. Several 
ex-militant commanders such as Asari Dokubo, Government Ekpumopolo 
and others were rewarded with the contract of guarding pipelines against 
vandals (Onuoha 2016). However, the issue of militancy, which was 
already a time bomb waiting to explode, resurfaced when the present gov-
ernment in an inaugural speech in 2015 revealed an intention to terminate 
the amnesty programme. This has probably resulted in resurgence of more 
deadly restive gangs within the region who had since resumed bombing 
pipelines since January 2016 till date. As a matter of fact, oil militancy has 
also spread the militant’s activities into other states like Lagos and Ogun, 
where there have been reported cases of pipeline vandalisation and other 
nefarious activities of the groups. It is important to mention here that the 
proliferation of militant groups made it difficult for the state to provide 
adequate security for the citizens for past two decades. As a result, such 
crimes, armed robbery, rape, kidnapping and cultism have recently become 
a daily occurrence.
Kidnapping for ransom remains one of the most dangerous internal 
security crimes that are spreading rapidly across the whole country. The 
rate of kidnapping incidence in both the rural and urban areas in Nigeria 
has become very alarming to the point that she ranks a third position in 
the rating of high-risk areas of kidnapping globally (This Day Live 2013). 
A recent Freedom House report indicates that Nigeria recorded kidnap-
pings, which heightened insecurity (Ogunbiyi 2017). Moreover, it can be 
argued that the recent manifestation of kidnappings remains a spillover of 
the Niger Delta crisis. The militant groups had adopted the strategy of 
kidnapping expatriate workers in the petroleum industry and government 
functionaries as a way of attracting global attention and pressing their 
demands on the Nigerian government through the restriction of further 
oil exploration within the Niger Delta (Nwobueze et al. 2016). The scope 
of kidnappings has since been expanded from the Niger Delta creeks to 
other geographical areas in the country by some unscrupulous youth for 
the monetary gains attached to it. In essence, this menace is no longer 
limited to targeting oil workers alone, as the scope of its victims now 
includes school children, monarchs, community leaders, market women 
and even farmers.
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This new development has increased the fear and suspicions amongst 
Nigerian citizens as no one knows who the next victim might be. For 
instance, the incessant attacks of kidnappers and armed robbers in Aba in 
2010 compelled most of the existing financial institutions within the 
metropolis to stop operations (Nwagboso 2016, pp. 55–56). The high rate 
of insecurity occasioned by kidnapping also made certain manufacturing 
companies like the Nigerian Breweries Plc, Guinness Nigerian Plc Seven-Up 
Bottling Ltd and PZ PLC, to mention just a few, to relocate to other nearby 
states with less security tension like Enugu, while Guinness Nigeria Plc was 
relocated to Edo (Nwagboso 2016). Likewise, about five workers of a farm 
and two Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) members employed as security 
personnel on the facility at Igbodu community in Epe were abducted on 
February 17, 2017 (Ogunbiyi 2017). A more recent case was the abduction 
of the staff and six students of the Nigerian Turkish International College, 
Isheri by unknown gunmen, who demanded for a total of about ₦1.2 billion 
as ransom on January 16, 2017 (Rockcity Fm 101.9).
Another critical source of internal security which has remained a thorn 
in the flesh of the nation is the outbreak of insurgency since 2009. Boko 
Haram has continually launched very brutal and disastrous attacks on both 
government security agencies’ buildings, such as barracks, and police sta-
tions, markets, farms, villages and so on since 2009 (Omodia and Aliu 
2013). According to Matfess (2016), the heavy-handed state response to 
the insurgency led to more than 50,000 deaths since 2009, with more 
than 2.8 million people already displaced from their homes. The unrelent-
ing brutal attacks of this dangerous group have created an atmosphere of 
fear and chaos. This has reduced life expectancy in the region. The trend 
of Boko Haram’s insurgency attained a more sophisticated, dangerous and 
international dimension when the UN compound in Abuja was bombed in 
August 2011, killing about 23 people and wounding scores (Nwogwugwu 
and Oluranti 2015). In fact, it was in a bid to curb the excesses of this 
dreaded group within the northeastern states that prompted Goodluck 
Jonathan administration to deploy troops to volatile areas (Sodipo 2013).
Arguably, the Boko Haram insurgency is the most lethal internal secu-
rity challenge facing the nation’s northeast, which has multiplied the secu-
rity problems combating the nation at large. It has led to rapid conscription, 
particularly into the army and other military agencies in recent years, in 
order to keep up with maintaining internal peace. The violent attacks of 
this insurgent group across the northeastern states have not only created 
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humanitarian challenges through its widespread displacement of innocent 
citizens but also created negative peace and forced some businesses to shut 
down. The record of the International Organization for Migration reveals 
that by April 9, 2015, the number of people affected by the attacks in the 
north is in millions (Winsor 2015). It has also brought about food security 
challenges and crippled the economy within the area as well as the south-
ern region, which depends on this geographical area for certain supplies 
like onions, tomatoes, beans and cattle, to mention but a few. It was 
reported in 2014 that Boko Haram’s crisis and the outbreak of Ebola virus 
disease had adversely affected business and economic activities, slashing 
the nation’s projected economic growth rate for the year from 7 to 6.5 per 
cent (Nigerian Bulletin 2014).
The northeastern crisis has been further compounded by the violence 
caused by herdsmen attacks which has spread even to the southern part of 
the country. The mounting security challenge in the country has resulted 
in the establishment of joint task forces with the aim of restoring law and 
order. This has further overstretched the security sector as most security 
operatives have been sent on counterterrorism trainings. Similarly, 
Bamidele (2012, p.  33) noted that “concerns with Boko Haram cata-
strophic terrorism and related challenges have led to the proliferation of 
security management policies, laws and programmes.” These policies are 
initiated to regulate the activities of non-state actors and to discourage 
people from sponsoring terrorism or militancy.
tHe ManageMent of Internal securIty In  
tHe fourtH republIc
Events have shown that insecurity affects all citizens, and that securing the 
state is everybody’s business. It should be noted that both the elites and 
ordinary citizens have been affected by security threats. The Fourth 
Republic has recorded numerous threats like insurgency, militancy, kid-
napping, cult clashes, political assassinations and other violent crimes. 
Since 1999, the government has responded to the problems of internal 
security in different ways. The need to promote internal security and foster 
the protection of lives and property led to the formation of joint task 
forces as a response to insecurity. This is characterised by deployment of 
security forces to volatile areas either before or after declaration of state of 
emergency.
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For instance, militarism has remained one of the ways of managing 
internal security threats in the Fourth Republic. Militarism is the deploy-
ment of coercive instruments of a state to restore law and order through 
the Ministry of Defence with implications for human rights (Okolie- 
Osemene 2015). Through militarism, state violence becomes a necessity 
and approved act of violence to forestall breakdown of law and order. 
Since then, joint security patrols and mounting of road blocks have char-
acterised internal security. With the military option, the state makes vio-
lence a legitimate response to insecurity aimed at routing non-state actors, 
and this led to the formation of the joint task force to prevent internal 
aggression and protect Nigeria’s territory from being divided by non-state 
actors (Okolie-Osemene 2016). Most of the members of the military task 
force based in the northeast are members of the security sector among 
other stakeholders.
It is noteworthy that while the Niger Delta militancy was attributed to 
the politics of oil revenues, that of Boko Haram insurgency which esca-
lated during former President Jonathan’s administration was attributed to 
politics and religion, considering how some political elites demonstrated 
their lack of will to confront the security challenge to avoid losing political 
patronage. The foregoing may have contributed to the escalation of the 
insurgency with attendant humanitarian crisis and fatalities recorded 
(Abolurin 2012). Most militants have accused both the government and 
security forces of being responsible for their restiveness, particularly in the 
mismanagement of the oil revenues and abuse of human rights, respec-
tively. Also, the delay in taming the Boko Haram insurgency at the begin-
ning stage made it possible for the group to gain and control some parts 
of Nigeria’s territory. In order to counter actors that threatened the state’s 
monopoly of violence, the government established joint security outfits to 
curb the activities of ethnic militias and thugs who became agents of inse-
curity in most parts of the country (Matfess 2016). Managing such threats 
began with the police and the military and later expanded to accommo-
date other security agencies due to the activities of criminals and drug 
traffickers, whose access to small arms and light weapons usually equips 
them to challenge security agencies.
It should be recalled that the need to promote national security led to 
the establishment of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC) in 2002, based on various security lapses. Since then, the 
NSCDC has demonstrated its capacity to complement the role of other 
security agencies in protecting lives and critical infrastructure, including 
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oil and gas installations. The security agency has also played significant 
roles in intelligence gathering during times of crisis like the fuel subsidy 
imbroglio in 2012 when there were threats to public order. In addition, 
the NSCDC has also been actively involved in various joint security opera-
tions with the police and the army, especially along various highways across 
the country to curb the menace of armed robberies.
According to NSCDC progress report, it provides vital information for 
the government using its grassroots intelligence-gathering apparatus. 
Such initiative contributes to the eradication of crime in the country. The 
NSCDC has become an active player in the security sector since officers of 
the Corps began carrying arms.
Due to the escalation of insurgency and suicide bombings recorded 
across the northeast, containing the Boko Haram insurgency demands 
that government considers curtailing and managing the consequence of 
violence as well as exploring the option of dialogue (Ani and Onyebukwa 
2016). Also, timely management of internal security challenges demands 
response to some of the concerns raised by Ani and Onyebukwa (2016, 
p. 431) thus: there is need for the “eradication of corruption in the police, 
prevention of nepotism and ethnicity in the security sector, timely promo-
tion of officers, professional restructuring of the military and other secu-
rity agencies, motivation adequate funding of security operations.” If the 
policymakers are able to address some of these problems, the security sec-
tor will be more equipped to counter all threats to national security. Given 
that security is for all—the rich, poor, civilians and security operatives—it 
then means that the society will be a safer place when poor management 
of internal security is addressed.
conclusIon
Insecurity has manifested in various ways since 1999. Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic has been characterised by increasing cases of internal crisis which 
no doubt to a great extent have strained the capability of the various secu-
rity agencies in the country since the return to civil rule in 1999. However, 
democratic dispensation has not abated internal security threats as most 
security agencies have either become victims of insecurity or faced criti-
cisms from the masses over the capacity of non-state actors to overrun 
some communities and towns during attacks. This manifested in 2011 
during post-election violence when restive youths unleashed terror in peo-
ple in many northern states with late response by security agencies.
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As far as reducing internal security challenges is concerned, an area that 
demands consideration is the issue of brutality and clashes between differ-
ent security agencies. The earlier security agencies begin to work in har-
mony without occasional clashes, the better for the entire country. For 
instances, if they avoid the clashes between the military and police, or 
police with the civil defence, the public will take them seriously and 
develop high confidence in them. With such confidence in place, the secu-
rity agencies would enjoy inter-agency-public relations, particularly in the 
area of information sharing, as far as curbing crime is concerned.
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CHAPTER 5




In this twenty-first century, mankind has become more accustomed to a 
new wave of violence, in the form of terrorism, which uses the latest tech-
nology to unleash mayhem and violence on helpless individuals. In Africa, 
this trend has become so endemic due to the inability of the political lead-
ership to provide robust counter-terrorism and insurgency measures to 
reduce the incidence of terrorism. More worrisomely, Nigeria, especially 
the northeast of the country, which is the focus of this chapter, has faced 
serious security challenges in the form of kidnapping, armed robbery, 
ethno-religious conflict, farmers-herdsmen conflict and terrorism. Of all 
these security challenges, terrorism orchestrated by an Islamic fundamen-
talist group known as Boko Haram appears to be the major security chal-
lenge of northeast Nigeria. In security terms, Nigeria is facing the most 
difficult time in her history as a result of the increasing rate of terrorism, 
which has kept all and sundry on the edge.
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Boko Haram is a religious terrorist group that became well known 
under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf (1970–2002). The terrorist 
group is based in Borno State. The origin of the of the group is shrouded 
in controversy, as the ideology has passed from the Maitasine sect of the 
1980s to “Ahlulsunna Wal’ jama ‘ah jijra, under Abubakar Lawan who 
later left for further studies in Medina Saudi Arabia in 1995” (Onuoha 
2012a, p. 135). The ideology further flourished under Muhajirun, Yusufi 
Yyah and the Nigerian Taliban (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013). Meanwhile, 
the trajectory of the deadly sect under Yusuf started with the establish-
ment of an Islamic religious group called Markaz, following his expulsion 
from two mosques in Maiduguri, by Muslim clerics, for advocating and 
fostering radical views. The composite he created which included a mosque 
and an Islamic school attracted many poor children from both within and 
neighbouring countries of Chad and Niger. Within the first few years of its 
existence, their activities were relatively peaceful, as they only proselytized 
and criticized the northern Muslims for participating in what the group 
called an illegitimate state—a non-Islamic state. The group’s official name 
is Jama’atu Ahlul Sunna lidda’a Wati Wal Jihad, which simply means, 
“People committed to the propagation of Prophet’s teaching and jihad” 
(Onuoha 2012b, p. 2), which is derogatively called Boko Haram, mean-
ing Western education is a sin.
Members of the group live in isolation from other members of the 
community and are estimated to have a membership of about 7000 peo-
ple. The group is stubbornly and violently opposed to the erosion of 
Islamic values as a result of the incursion of Western values, ethics and 
norms among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. Members of the 
group are usually youths, based or living in northeastern Nigeria, primarily 
drawn from Kanuri and Hausa Fulani tribes (Agbiboa 2013). The cross- 
border tribal relationship and intertwined communities could be said to 
be one of the factors undergirding the weapon trafficking and granting of 
safe haven for the group members in case of onslaught.
The sect is governed by a Shura council of 30 members; which over-
sees the activities of different cells that make up the group. Members of 
this council do not meet in person but via telecommunication. This 
enables them to communicate and not be exposed at the event of the 
arrest of any of the council member. The initial ideology of this group 
was predicated on Sharia laws and principled on Islamic fundamentalism, 
extreme opposition to all man-made laws, Western education and beliefs. 
Boko Haram is akin to the Maitasine movement; many of the people 
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who are attracted to Boko Haram usually do so as a result of socio-eco-
nomic and political challenges in the country.
The demise of the founder of the group in 2009, and consequent 
assumption of authority by Abubakar Shekau, saw the graduation of the 
group from a proselytization group to a full-blown terrorist group, from 
shooting sporadically at people to selective assassination. The dimension 
moved to the era of planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads 
and churches and ramming the same into government buildings. The first 
vehicle-borne IED incident occurred in June 2011, at the police force 
headquarters, Abuja, killing about six people. Another deadly attack at the 
centre of Abuja was the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja; the 
attack claimed the lives of 11 UN staff and 12 others with many severely 
injured. They also used rocket launchers, high-grade weapons, Armoured 
Personnel Carrier (APC)—seized from the military and purchased through 
black market—to attack police stations, military posts, financial institu-
tions and markets. Media houses and churches were not left out in the rain 
of attacks; the deaths arising from Boko Haram attacks were unprece-
dented as many others were maimed for life, not counting the psychologi-
cal trauma it left on the residents of the area.
Suicide bombing came to bare as young men and women, strapped 
with explosives, detonated some in public places, not considering the 
ethnic, religious or economic affiliation or status of the affected people. 
The group graduated to a secessionist group with the declaration of the 
Islamic caliphate in some villages and local government areas (LGAs), 
including Gwoza, popularly known for the location of the mobile police 
training school. In a similar development, Bama, a town that is 700 km 
from the capital of Borno State, was captured by the sect on September 
2, 2015 (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013), with surviving residents fleeing to 
Maiduguri. Mubi in Adamawa State fell on October 30, 2014, with over 
200,000 residents killed, maimed or displaced by militants. BBC news of 
November 14, 2014, revealed that a total of 20 towns and villages were 
seized by Boko Haram, including Chibok. The Boko Haram modus 
operandi is alien to Nigeria but closely akin to the method used by the 
Al-Shabab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, that of Al-Qaeda. This 
chapter is designed to explain the phenomenon of Boko Haram in 
Northern Nigeria. To achieve this, it attempts a theoretical explanation 
of the emergence of the sect, its philosophy and modus operandi as it 
affects Northern Nigeria.
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theoretIcal explanatIon of Boko haram’s 
emergence and actIvItIes
How can we explain the incidence of Boko Haram terrorist attacks in 
Northern Nigeria? There is no doubt that Boko Haram extremism may be 
an outcome of injustice, poverty and corruption in the country. However, 
many Muslims who live in developed countries and are sympathetic to the 
cause of terrorism do not do so because they are poor and corrupt. What 
then accounts for the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria? In this chapter, the 
incidence of Boko Haram could be better understood within the contest 
of Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations. According to this theory, 
conflicts all over the world in the post-Cold War era will not be as a result 
of ideology or economic reasons but religious and cultural (Huntington 
1993). As aptly noted by Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, p. 44):
Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world is 
now faced with cultural conflict rooted in civilizations. He is of the view that 
conflict, essentially, will revolve around cultural and religious lines in years 
to come. As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civiliza-
tions, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful 
in analyzing the potential for conflict. (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013, p. 44)
The theory argues vehemently that conflict in the post-Cold War era will 
be driven by nations who try to defend their civilization as a result of their 
cultural uniqueness. It is the effort to secure one’s civilization that conflict 
will be inevitable. And this will be a recurring issue in world politics. By 
civilization, Huntington meant
a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious 
groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity 
… A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distin-
guishes humans from others. (Huntington 1993, pp. 23–24)
Very importantly, various civilizations give individuals contending answers 
on ways to live their lives, view their social norms, examine their relation-
ship with others and allow them to pursue aspirations to realize the reason 
for their existence. Civilizations are markedly differentiated by language, 
tradition, culture and most fundamentally religion. The world is struc-
tured this way and makes conflict ineluctable (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013).
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Huntington is of the view that civilizational conflicts will be more ram-
pant between Muslims and non-Muslims especially Christians. The reason 
why Islam and Christianity are key to this conflict is because, as cited in 
Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, pp. 44–45), both are
• missionary, seeking conversion of others;
• universal, “all-or-nothing” religions, in the sense that it is believed 
by both sides that only their faith is the correct one; and
• teleological, that is, their values and beliefs represent the goals of 
existence and purpose in human existence.
• Irreligious people who violate the base principles of those religions 
are perceived to be furthering their own pointless aims, which leads 
to violent interactions. (Ezeani and Chilaka 2013, pp. 44–45)
Hence, our central argument is that part of the reason why terrorism 
is rampant in Northern Nigeria is the feeling that Western civilization, 
with its inherent values, dominates or erodes Islamic civilization. Thus, 
Mansbach and Rhodes (2006), observed that after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks on the US, many in the West were of the view 
that the values of the Western world and of Islam were on a collision 
course. Again, the former president of the US George Bush (Jnr.) 
explained this point when he addressed the joint session of the US 
Congress after the September 11 terrorist attack. According to him, 
terrorists kill not merely to take lives, but to also disrupt and terminate 
a way of life (Onuoha 2008).
It is on this premise that we argue that terrorism in Nigeria is essentially 
but not exclusively a clash between Islamic civilization and Western civili-
zation. Even though the causes of violence are many, complex and closely 
related, it is our duty as social scientists to provide a valid basis for the 
analysis of social issues. It is a well-known fact that Boko Haram is stoutly 
against Western education and its values in Nigeria. This arises from the 
erroneous view that Western civilization has usurped Islamic values and 
rendered them comatose. As a movement driven by Islamic principles, this 
also explains why it is entrenched in Northern Nigeria. More fundamen-
tally, their ideology is akin to the principles driving any other violent 
extremist groups in the world which are united by Islamic principles, 
which they seek to secure and shield from termination by other civiliza-
tions, essentially Western civilization.
5 THE PHENOMENON OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
90
Boko haram: evolutIon, phIlosophy  
and structural organIzatIon
The origin of Boko Haram is usually traced to 2002, the year that late 
Mohammed Yusuf assumed the leadership of the group. Nevertheless, the 
origin dates back to the establishment of Muslim Youth Organization in 
1995 by Abubakar Lawan. During this period, it was non-violent in its 
operation but assumed a violent posture in 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf 
became the leader of the sect (Onuoha 2013). This explains why the late 
Mohammed Yusuf has become the rallying name for the sect. In its trajec-
tory and evolution, the sect has answered various names ranging from 
Nigerian Taliban, Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Shabaab, Jama’atu Allissunnah 
Lidda’awatiwal Jihad and later to Boko Haram.
The group prefers to be known as and addressed as the Jama’atu 
Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, that is, “People Committed to the 
Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”, instead of Boko 
Haram. Despite the various nomenclatures ascribed to the sect, its phi-
losophy and ideological goal has remained unchanged, namely, to destroy 
the secular and Western-prone Nigerian state and enthrone strict Islamic 
Sharia law in the entire country.
The ideology of the group is steeped in orthodox Islamic teaching akin 
to that of Taliban in Afghanistan, which views anything Western as being 
evil and un-Islamic. It is essentially driven by the erroneous belief that 
Western influence has occasioned the weakness of Islam. Hence, all 
Western institutions and ways of life must be avoided by Muslims because 
it causes nothing but evil to a Muslim. This is the reason the sect is popu-
larly known as Boko Haram, which literally means “Western education is 
evil”. They are driven by the fact that the Nigerian state is nothing but 
corrupt and evil and the best thing for a devout Muslim to do is to extri-
cate himself from this morally deficit state to a place of tranquillity devoid 
of moral and political corruption. As aptly noted by Onuoha (2013, p. 409):
Boko Haram’s ideology is part of a global Salafist Islamic ideological move-
ment that seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic law. 
Salafism, for instance, seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives 
for a return to the Islam practiced by the “pious ancestors”, that is 
Muhammad and the early Islamic community. It stresses adherence to a 
rigorous interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming 
the personal behaviour of every Muslim. It also involves the duty to advise 
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other believers to change their ways of life in the same sense. Salafi thinkers 
insist on the right of believers to interpret the fundamental texts for them-
selves through independent reasoning. Only one specific interpretation of 
Salafism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change 
and is commonly known as Salafist Jihadism. (Onuoha 2013, p. 409)
Hence those who do not ascribe to such a belief system are seen as disbe-
lievers because they deny the truth or wrongdoers. According to Idika, the 
antipathy to a Western way of life can further be traced to the Hausa tra-
ditional rhyme which discourages the quest for Western education; this is 




Sai yawo zagin Mallam.
The above is literally translated as:
Pupils with western education,
They do not recite Koran,
And do not observe prayers,
Always wondering and abusing their teachers.
This rhythm was used in mocking and dissuading children from going to 
conventional schools; it also endangered the permeation of Western cul-
ture and education in the northern states. Consequently, the origin of 
Boko Haram cannot be traced in isolation of its ideological derivation. 
Generally, they are averse to Western values, but ironically all the techno-
logical innovations of the Western world which have aided their violent 
extremism such as handphones, cars, motorcycles and guns are well 
used by them.
Before Muhammed Yusuf died in July 2009, he was the Commander in 
Chief (Amir ul-Aam) or leader of Boko Haram. He was assisted by two 
deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). They also have leaders or com-
manders in all the states and local governments they operate. The sect 
operates in cells due to its weakness to have a precise structure. The cells, 
though they constitute the smallest elements of Boko Haram as a terrorist 
group, serve as the building blocks of the group. This makes it difficult for 
the security agencies to fight the group. As aptly observed by Onuoha et al. 
(2012), those in a particular cell are unaware of the existence of other cells, 
this enables the group to ensure that information is adequately guided.
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After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, one of his deputies, Abubakar 
Shekau, who is currently the Commander in Chief of Boko Haram, 
became the spiritual leader of the sect. Under Shekau, the operational 
organization of the sect was strengthened. “Under Shekau, the sect 
maintains a loose command-and-control structure, which allows it to 
operate autonomously. It now operates in some sort of cells and units 
that are interlinked, but generally, take directives from one com-
mander” (Onuoha 2013, p. 410). At inception, the operational base of 
the sect was Borno and Yobe States, but its activities have also spread 
to Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Kano States. There is a growing fear 
that the sect is anticipating moving into the southern part of the 
Nigerian state.
the proBlem of Boko haram In northern nIgerIa
The attacks on the towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Yobe State on 
December 24, 2003, signal the intention of Boko Haram as a terrorist 
group. The affected areas were occupied by the sect for two weeks where 
they hoisted the flag of Afghanistan Taliban movement. From this 
moment, the sect maintained occasional hit-and-run attacks on security 
posts in Borno and Yobe States until July 2009 when it engaged Nigerian 
security forces in a major fight that lasted from July 26, 2009 to July 30, 
2009, across five states, namely, Kano, Katsina, Yobe, Borno and Bauchi. 
This particular incident signified the intention of the group to over-
throw the Nigerian state which it sees as evil, one that has eroded Islamic 
culture. Their intention was to eradicate the Nigerian state with its 
Western values. As aptly noted by Ezeani and Chilaka (2013, p.  48), 
Boko Haram
abhors the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, invariably described as 
dagut (“evil”) and unworthy of allegiance, and wishes to wage war against 
it in an effort to replace it with a “purified” Islamic regime. It is not just in 
Nigeria that the clash between Islamic civilization and Western civilization is 
raging. The Islamic fundamentalists have declared war against America and 
its Western principles. This explains why America has been attacked and 
continues to be attacked by Islamic and Arab sponsored terrorists organiza-
tions. A violent attack that does not espouse economic issues as reasons for 
it but the overthrow of Western values is a conflict of civilizations. (Ezeani 
and Chilaka 2013, p. 48)
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The July 2009 revolt led to the capture of and extra-judicial execution of 
the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf, although the Nigerian Police 
claimed he was killed when he attempted to escape. Following the death 
of Yusuf, the sect retreated and re-strategized by redefining its tactics 
which moved from their traditional hit and run to the use of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombing, assassination and open-armed 
confrontation. This change in tactics has led to devastating effects on the 
security of Northern Nigeria. The socio-economic and political effects of 
Boko Haram extremism in Northern Nigeria, especially the northeast, 
cannot be over-emphasized.
The activities of Boko Haram have had devastating and adverse effects 
on the socio-economic fortune of the country and the northeast in gen-
eral. Goods and properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed 
due to the increasing attacks being carried out by Boko Haram. These 
have caused the drifting of investors from the northeast region to other 
more peaceful states in the country. The frequent attacks between the 
security forces and the insurgents have caused enormous loss of lives and 
destruction of properties in the northeast, and these have caused those 
from other parts of the country, especially the southeast, to flee from the 
region. Banks no longer operate on a 24-hour basis for fear of being 
attacked by members of this group. Mr Inuwa Bwala, Borno State 
Commissioner for Information, noted that it will take the state over 20 
years to recover from the devastating effects of the Boko Haram insur-
gency (Ome and Ibietan 2012).
The activities of the sect have also impacted adversely on the educa-
tional sector of the northeast. This is also not helped by the fact that the 
sect frowns at Western education. Based on the UNICEF report of 
2015, over 10.5 million children of primary school age were not in 
school and over 60 per cent of these out-of-schoolchildren were found 
in the north (UNICEF Nigeria 2015). These children constitute the 
Almajiris children, separated from their family and under the guardian-
ship of Islamic teachers. These children, denied of parental care, form 
the bulk of Boko Haram members. Recruitment of these children is 
most times forcefully done. In a video on YouTube which was released 
in July 2013, the group leader Shekau was captured warning thus: “we 
are going to burn down the schools, if they are not Islamic religious 
schools for Allah” (Faul 2013, p. 1). This was not an empty threat and 
subsequent actions of the insurgents proved him right, because evidence 
abound that Boko Haram’s tactics of harassing teachers and students 
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and issuing threats and instilling fear in parents became more severe. The 
Boko Haram insurgents began unleashing mayhem by destroying school 
buildings and even burning other properties at both school and non-
school hours; this went further by impacting negatively on the educa-
tional system in the north. This came to its head when the entire world 
was shocked with the abduction of 276 girls in their dormitories from a 
government secondary school in Borno State in the town of Chibok. 
The kidnap was justified by the sect on the grounds that they need to 
learn of true Islamic education instead of Western education.
A Human Rights Watch report indicates that a good number of the 
abducted schoolgirls who were formerly Christians have now been force-
fully converted to Islam by their captors. Boko Haram believes that the 
abduction of the Chibok girls is a major achievement because it dealt a 
big blow on Western education the girls are accustomed to. Over time, 
the attacks on schools including institutions of higher learning have 
become more severe. In February 2012 over 12 schools in Maiduguri 
were set ablaze by the insurgents within a span of two weeks (Human 
Rights Watch 2015b). On September 28, 2013, over 100 insurgents 
attacked Yobe State College of Agriculture, Gujba, and left over 42 stu-
dents and a lecturer dead. One staff who was with the security when they 
arrived, as reported by Human Rights Watch (2015a, p.  36), 
recounted thus:
I was awakened by the sound of gunshots when I peeped out of a crack in 
the door, I saw many students streaming out of the hotel in panic towards 
the exit gate. A young insurgent, who could hardly hold up his gun, began 
shooting at them. The others came behind him in Hilux trucks on one of 
which was mounted a huge light beam powered by a generator. Each of the 
about 20 motorbikes I saw had at least three fighters. They were dressed in 
black t-shirts, with their heads and half of their faces covered in checkered 
scarves. They headed straight for the male hostel near the gate. A female 
hostel was next door but they ignored it as students fled from the building. 
That was when I dived into the bushy shrubs behind the school. I laid there 
until the insurgents left. (Human Rights Watch 2015a, p. 36)
The truth is that the activities of Boko Haram in some parts of the north-
east have induced fear in the minds of parents, who have had cause to 
withdraw their children from school for fear of being killed by the insur-
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gents. The Yobe State education authorities noted that a good percentage 
of schools located in the state have been destroyed by Boko Haram. All 
these have caused the state in particular and nation at large to reinvest 
huge sums of money to rebuild the affected schools.
The phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is also a dis-
turbing consequence of the Boko Haram insurgents in the northeast. 
According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), in their 2015 
report, 1,188,018 IDPs were identified in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba 
and Gombe States, another 47, 276 IDPs were also identified in Nasarawa, 
Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano States, although it must be noted that 
some of these IDPs were as a result of communal clashes. Nevertheless, a 
large number of them are as a result of Boko Haram insurgency. An over-
whelming percentage of residents in the states in the northeast have fled 
their homes, residential areas, business establishments and comfort zones 
to escape the devastating effect of the insurgents. Borno, Yobe and 
Adamawa States have the highest number of IDPs. The worst aspect of 
this is that the IDPs are also not safe in their various camps designated by 
the government. For instance, on September 11, 2015, an IDP camp 
known as Maikohi Camp, in Yola, Adamawa State, was attacked by Boko 
Haram, leaving seven people dead and several others injured. Similarly, on 
February 10, 2016, an IDP camp in Dikwa, Borno State, was attacked by 
a suicide bomber, killing about 58 people and injuring 78 others. Perhaps 
nothing could be more worrisome and ironic than to have a supposedly 
safe place being attacked by insurgents.
Agriculturally, the northern part of Nigeria is known as the food basket 
of the Nigerian state. And no state can survive without adequately feeding 
its population. However, due to the mindless killings by Boko Haram in 
the northeast, farmers have been forced to flee the area for fear of death. 
Also, the loss of lives has also caused a great shift in farming activities and 
other related businesses. The output or farm produce has been greatly 
hampered, and it has increased the fear of hunger not just in the region 
worst hit by Boko Haram, but in the entire country as the prices of com-
modities that are majorly produced in commercial quantities from the 
region have increased. Residents of the most hit areas were also forced to 
leave these areas, for other peaceful parts of the country with little or no 
business activity.
The security dilemma being posed by Boko Haram in the northern part 
of Nigeria cannot be underestimated. The rate at which the Boko Haram 
insurgency has killed many in the region calls for corner. However, it must 
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be acknowledged that government, though belated, has downgraded the 
sect in recent times. In March 2015, the head of the US Africa Command, 
General David M. Rodriguez, acknowledged that the Nigerian govern-
ment has tried to push back the sect to the extent that it has lost some vital 
territories that it hitherto occupied. This achievement was made possible 
through intelligence sharing with other regional military forces. It is 
expected that the Nigerian security agencies should put in more effort to 
decimate the group. However, one way to achieve this is to deepen intel-
ligence sharing with other regional military forces because evidences 
abound that Boko Haram operates more effectively along borders in 
Northern Nigeria.
conclusIon
This chapter examined the Boko Haram problem in Northern Nigeria. It 
noted that Boko Haram is an offshoot of Islamic civilization’s effort to 
clamp down on the internationalization of Western civilization, which has 
vitiated Islamic values. All over the world and especially in Nigeria, Islam 
is ferociously confronting Western universalism, that is, the view that all 
civilizations should adopt Western values.
The chapter notes that the violent activities of Boko Haram have led to 
wanton destruction of lives and property in Northern Nigeria. However, 
it must be acknowledged that the Nigerian government, though belated, 
has downgraded the sect in recent times. Nevertheless, to recapture out-
standing territories from the group, efforts should be made to deepen 
intelligence sharing with other regional military forces because Boko 
Haram operates more effectively along borders in Northern Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 6
Grazing Conundrum: Herdsmen-Farmers 




Generally, many states in Africa in the aftermath of decolonisation have 
remained grossly unstable and crisis prone. As is evident, the scale of 
underdevelopment ravaging the continent cannot be unconnected with 
the deepening instability in Africa. In many cases, internal or domestic 
violence posed severe threat to state survival. In fact, in many African 
states, security of lives and property appears to be a scarce commodity. 
This is in spite of the fact that Africa has abundant natural resources that 
should assist the states to provide necessary security equipment and, 
indeed, fund the entire security architecture to be capable of responding 
to security needs of people. Thus, utilising these resources by individual 
states for the benefit of the populace remains one of the greatest undoing 
of many states in Africa.
Thus, Nigeria’s security crisis has degenerated from a brush fire to an 
all-consuming conflagration. As Nwolise (2017) succinctly puts it, in 
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Nigeria, we are all restless and living in fear because of the combined 
 devastating effects of a very sick economy and ravaging insecurity patho-
gens that are walking in the streets, some with impunity, as the state seems 
helpless, and with great negative effects on the economy and subsequently, 
the lives of Nigerians. As the Nigerian state flounders, its capacity to regu-
late or prevent the emergence of these insecurity pathogens also dimin-
ishes. The implication is the ever growing security lapses and emergence of 
several ethnic militias like Fulani herders, threatening the state and, indeed, 
inflicting monumental damages to the state and the people.
With the return to democratic governance in 1999, expectations seem 
to be upbeat that through the utilisation of democratic principles, the 
state will fashion out resourceful strategies to contain several symptoms 
constituting insecurity. But whether this optimism is well founded defi-
nitely has remained to be seen. In more than one decade since her return 
to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed more internal conflicts ever 
in her history. For instance, communal and ethno-religious violence such 
as the Ife-Modakeke crisis, perennial Jos crisis, Kaduna communal vio-
lence, Jukun/Tiv ethnic violence, Wukari crisis and Aguleri/Umuleri 
communal violence; separatist agitations such as the Independent People 
of Biafra (IPOB) separatist agitations in the southeast; militancy in the 
south-south; and terrorism such as the Boko Haram terrorism and the 
prevailing and rampaging terrorism of the Fulani herdsmen; the ever high-
rising cases of kidnapping; and some highly induced state massacres such 
as the Odi massacre and the Zaki- Biam massacre are tendencies and patho-
gens of insecurity in Nigeria.
Thus, while the Nigerian state grapples with these crises, the rising inci-
dences of the Fulani herdsmen attacks tend to have spiralled out of state 
control. Evidently, the protracted farmers-nomadic herders’ violence in 
Nigeria has constituted a major source of insecurity. In the last few years, 
the intensification and rising cases of the herders-farmers crisis raised issues 
of conspiracy, poor state attitude and the extent of state preparedness to 
providing security to the Nigerian people. Nigeria has been constantly 
racked by civil strife, particularly across the religious divide, and this has 
reconfigured the herder-farmer conflict in new and striking ways (Blench 
and Dendo 2003).
Incidentally, Kwaja and Ademola (2018) noted that more than 6000 
people have been killed and over 62,000 people have been displaced in the 
Middle Belt States of Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau alone. They further 
stated that despite the escalating and expanding violence, there have been 
no systematic consolidations or assessments of what has been done to this 
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point to address farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria (Kwaja and Ademola 
2018). Specifically, Duru (2017) explained that from 2013 to 2016, over 
500 persons are still missing while over 500,000 people were displaced 
and the future of almost a million youths truncated. He also stated that 
over 9000 households were affected and over 2000 killed in various attacks 
carried out by herdsmen while properties worth over ₦95  billion were 
destroyed in 2014 alone.
Indeed, Fasona and Omojola (2005) contended that out of all the con-
flicts and other forms of unrest reported in the Northern region of Nigeria 
between 1991 and 2005, farmers-pastoralists conflicts accounted for 35%. 
For instance, between 2007 and 2015, the Nigeria Watch database 
recorded 615 violent deaths related to cattle grazing, out of a total of over 
61,000 violent fatalities in Nigeria (cited in Olayoku 2016). Also, in 2016, 
an estimated death toll of approximately 2500 people was recorded and 
these clashes are becoming potentially as dangerous as the Boko Haram 
violence in the northeast (International Crisis Group 2017).
Considering the magnitude of destruction, complex strategies of attacks 
and perhaps more importantly, the government’s failure to apprehend and 
prosecute any of the architects of this crisis, interrogating herders-farmers 
violence and security crisis in Nigeria becomes essential. This chapter 
examines the subject matter and panoramically x-rays the activities of the 
herdsmen in Nigeria. It also looks at the historical antecedent of herders- 
farmers violence in Nigeria and changing patterns of the attacks especially 
between 2011 and 2018 to determine the extent of its impacts and pro-
vide solutions on how the state can nip from the bud the prevailing 
herders- farmers conflicts and security crisis in Nigeria.
theoretIcal underpInnIngs
There are several theoretical standpoints explaining the farmers-herders 
violence, especially within the context of the causes of conflict, manage-
ment of conflict and state-people relationship during and after a conflict 
situation. Among these theoretical viewpoints are Karl Marx’s conflict 
theory and the eco-violence theory. Karl Marx’s conflict theory is essen-
tially important for the understanding of the problem of herder-farmer 
conflicts because it provides a well-articulated approach to the general 
perception of conflict situations. Crucially, reasons for escalation can be 
located by examining the sequence of interactions to explain why some 
conflicts escalate and others do not (Kriesberg 2007). Conflict theory, 
6 GRAZING CONUNDRUM: HERDSMEN-FARMERS CONFLICT… 
102
therefore, looks at the societal inequality as an underlining factor that 
engenders competition which paves way for subsequent emergence 
of conflict.
On the other hand, eco-violence theory as developed by Homer-Dixon 
and Blitt (1998), Homer-Dixon (1999) and Soysa (2002), among others, 
hinged on the assumption that scarcity of environmental resources such as 
fresh water, crop land and forests, which are very essential to agricultural 
production, has the tendency to trigger conflicts. The issue of environ-
mental pressure as a source of conflict revolves largely around resource 
degradation and resource scarcity (Soysa 2002).
While we are not oblivious of the analytical diligence and utilities of the 
abovementioned theories, it is our view that these theories have fallen 
short of providing major analytical ingredients that can unveil the under-
lining conjectures sustaining herders-farmers violence in the North in par-
ticular and Nigeria in general and indeed the dynamic changes in the 
killing spree. The above theories are also weak in explaining how poor 
herders and farmers appear to have unhindered access to weapons and 
persistent availability of expensive and sophisticated weapons for the vio-
lence. The theories seem unable to interrogate or rather explain the capac-
ity of low-income herders and farmers in terms of sponsorship and 
sustenance of the violence. This is important especially when they are vir-
tually categorised among the majority of people who lack the basic neces-
sities of life and indeed do not have the wherewithal to invest in violence.
Following from the above, this study adopts conspiracy theory. We are 
guided by the fact that the extent to which a political system responds to 
domestic challenges and other related security issues remains vital in its 
ability to maintain peace and stability. Thus, disconnect between the 
Nigerian elites and the people, girded with socio-economic, religious and 
ethnic conspiracy, has prompted a myriad of conflicts. Only recently 
Nigeria has seen the Niger-Delta crisis, separatist agitations, kidnappings, 
political instability, the ongoing Boko Haram onslaught and devastating 
herdsmen violence, and economic and financial crises, which can also be 
associated with various conspiracy assumptions.
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event 
(or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small 
group of persons—the conspirators acting in secret (Keeley 1999). More 
specifically, conspiracy theory can generally be counted as such if it is an 
effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations 
of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until their 
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aims are accomplished) (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009 cited in Bjerg and 
Presskorn-Thygesen 2016). It explains the underlining connectivity of 
everything and principally demonstrates that nothing happens by accident 
as many incidences of violence are pre-meditated. In fact, conspiracy theo-
ries appear to provide broad, internally consistent explanations that allow 
people to preserve beliefs in the face of uncertainty and contradiction 
(Douglas et al. 2017). Thus, conspiracy theories are stronger when the 
motivation to find patterns in the environment is experimentally height-
ened (Whitson and Galinsky 2008 cited in Douglas et al. 2017).
Consequently, the conspiracy theory explains the underlining dynamics 
that sustains herders’ violence and the increasing tempo in the last few years. 
In this study, the conspiracy theory explains herdsmen conflicts in two folds, 
the elites’ conspiracy and the state conspiracy. Elitist conspiracy is seen from 
the angle of the role played by the owners of the cattle in the conflict. It 
should be noted that herders are not the real owners of the cattle; they are 
only servants or apprentices who rear the animals for their masters. The 
masters are the traditional rulers, a large number of the elites, both ruling 
and non-ruling elites, in Nigeria. It is also important to note that the herd-
ers do not have access or capacity to purchase sophisticated weapons like AK 
47. However, the owners of the cattle have and indeed are the people who 
sanction the manifestation of any deadly attack. In times of misunderstand-
ing with the host community, the herders report to the owners of the cattle. 
Experiences in the last few years have shown that if the owners of the cattle 
(the elites) decide to attack such host, it is them who provide the weapons, 
hire the mercenaries and provide other logistics including settling the secu-
rity agencies to stay off such areas during the period.
On the other hand, state conspiracy is seen from the failure of the state 
to prevent, foil, arrest, and prosecute the perpetrators of the conflicts. 
There seem to be several incidences where state security agencies ignore 
calls to assist distressed communities to avert further attacks by the herds-
men. For instance, the Governor of Enugu State in 2016 decried negli-
gence of security agencies after informing them of impending attack in 
Nimbo. According to him:
I got security information from Uzo-Uwani Local Government Transition 
Chairman, that such an incident was likely to take place in the state. I imme-
diately summoned a meeting of the State Security Council. After receiving 
assurances of deployments to Nimbo, I felt quite confident that we had 
done everything possible to forestall an attack on Nimbo. Sadly, in the early 
hours of Monday, reports of this carnage reached me. (Uzodinma 2016)
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The implication of the above is that the elites in high places of authority 
who own the cattle heap pressure on the state, hence government leniency 
is on the crisis. In fact, the majority of the political leaders are the owners 
of the cattle and surreptitiously sponsor the violence. President Buhari 
argued in an official visit to the USA in April 2018 that Nigerian herders 
do not carry guns. Unfortunately he was unable to explain how those with 
guns were involved in the same issues between those without guns and 
their host community. Thus, it is simple; the elites who own cattle are the 
“hirer and provider” of weapons. One can hardly subscribe to the uncon-
nected conclusion that the murderous herders are from Libya. In fact, 
how many herders have been apprehended by security forces or even 
arrested and were found to be Libyans? For several years Nigerians are 
under herders’ terror and no concrete efforts have been made by the lead-
ers or the government to arrest the trend. Surprisingly, some elites, espe-
cially the owners of the cattle, question the disappearance of one cow than 
the death of an entire community. The conspiracy theory is essential if not 
the bedrock of this study as it enables one to understand the secret behind 
the rising herders’ violence in Nigeria and the failure of the state to stamp 
out the tide of herders’ conflicts in Nigeria.
hIstorIcIsIng herders-Farmers conFlIcts 
and InsecurIty In nIgerIa
Traditionally, grazing in Nigeria is as old as the society. Open grazing pre-
cedes colonialism in most of African states and Nigeria in particular. 
Grazing reserves in Nigeria started during the pre-colonial era (Bako and 
Ingawa 1988), although in the traditional society, disturbances arising 
from grazing lands or routes were minimal. These may be attributed to 
two prevailing conditions of the time. First, lands seemed to be more 
available as compared to the contemporary Nigerian society. Secondly and 
perhaps more importantly is the fact that the level of division, animosity 
and ethnic bias among Nigerians, as mainly caused by the elitist conscious 
politicisation of issues of national importance, was at the lowest ebb in the 
traditional society. In that period, grazing still had its peculiar challenges 
but incidences of mass killing and destruction rarely occurred.
As Nigeria grows, same way numerous problems develop. The prob-
lems confronting the state (grazing challenges inclusive) tend to be either 
not adequately attended to or ignored for obvious interests or political 
reasons. Most of these problems and specifically the grazing in Nigeria 
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appeared to have developed resistance elements to curative measures. As 
can be seen, the genesis of grazing reserves and efforts at preventing 
herders- farmers violence in Nigeria could be traced to the colonial period. 
Although formally introduced by the British, grazing reserves were demar-
cated by the Fulani who conquered and ruled Northern Nigeria (Iro 
2014). The attempt by the British in 1940 to separate the grazing land 
from the farmland, however, faltered because the Europeans imposed land 
use controls divorced from economic and demographic dynamics in the 
pastoral system (Frantz 1981 cited in Iro 2014). In spite of the failure to 
demarcate grazing land from farmland, the 1940 attempt formally initi-
ated the process of rule codification with regard to grazing in Nigeria. It 
heralded the consciousness towards establishing rules guiding grazing 
activities. Thus, Iro (2014, p. 3) further enumerated:
Formal grazing reserves in Nigeria started accidentally in the 1950s when 
Hamisu Kano, working with pastoralists on livestock vaccination, foresaw 
the shortages of grazing land in Northern Nigeria. Supported by the gov-
ernment, he initiated the grazing reserve scheme from the abandoned gov-
ernment resettlement schemes (Fulani Settlement Scheme). The resettlement 
schemes collapsed because the government had neither the financial nor the 
managerial ability to continue with the financially burdensome scheme, and 
the best alternative use of the land, the government thought, was to convert 
it into grazing reserves that were less financially committed. Grazing reserve 
hatched in 1954 after a study of the Fulani production system contained in 
the “Fulani Amenities Proposal.” The proposal suggested the creation of 
grazing reserves, the improvement of Fulani welfare, and the transformation 
of the herd management system. By 1964, the government had gazetted 
about 6.4 million hectares of the forest reserve, ninety-eight percent in the 
savanna. Sokoto Province had twenty-one percent of the land, followed by 
Kabba, Bauchi, Zaria, Ilorin, and Katsina, with 11–15 percent each. The 
Wase, Zamfara, and Udubo reserves followed in succession.
For the cattle owners, the enactment of the Northern Region Grazing 
Reserves Law of 1965 was essential because it aims at providing and secur-
ing a good portion of land for purposes of grazing. According to Kwaja 
and Ademola (2018), the Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law of 
1965 created corridors for the passage of migrating livestock and 415 
grazing reserves throughout the country. They further explained that the 
reserves were envisioned to map out large swathes of land to be exclusively 
used by herders to graze their livestock. While initially considered a 
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legislative solution, population growth, urbanisation and migration 
encroached on these designated areas, reducing herders’ access and usage 
of the reserves (Kwaja and Ademola 2018). Unfortunately, the federal and 
state governments have been derelict in the upkeep of these reserves to 
meet these concerns of farmers and herders, and amidst the absence of a 
concrete response plan to label and enforce the law on cattle routes by 
governments at all levels, existing reserves are being distorted (Kwaja and 
Ademola 2018).
Thus, the tendency of discontinuity of policy implementation appears 
to be responsible for the deteriorating conditions and total abandonment 
of cattle routes and reserves in Nigeria. For instance, such policies were 
not targeted at developing cattle routes alone but there were also efforts 
towards developing the nomads through education and enlightenment. 
As a result, the government established National Commission for Nomadic 
Education (NCNE) in 1989 to ensure reductions, if not complete eradica-
tion of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty; to provide education to the 
majority of the citizens; to enlighten as well as stimulate and accelerate 
national development. The Commission is saddled with the responsibility 
of formulating policies concerning nomadic education in Nigeria. The 
objectives of the Commission are to
 1. formulate policy and issue guidelines in all matters relating to 
nomadic education in Nigeria;
 2. provide funds for
 (a) the research and personnel development for the improvement 
of nomadic education in Nigeria;
 (b) the development of programmes on nomadic education;
 (c) equipment, other instructional materials (including teaching 
aids and amenities), construction of classrooms and other facili-
ties relating to nomadic education;
 3. arrange effective monitoring and evaluation of the activities of agen-
cies concerned with nomadic education; and
 4. establish, manage and maintain primary schools for nomadic chil-
dren (NCNE, ACT 1989, pp. 4–5).
However, decades after the existence of the NCNE in Nigeria, it appears 
the agency has done little towards achieving the above mandate. The 
nomads tend to be grossly underdeveloped in many respects and appear to 
have constituted a higher number of illiterate Nigerians. Beyond this 
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aspect of education, there were also previous efforts by the government to 
secure land for grazing purposes. For instance, at the close of 1992, the 
government identified over 300 areas with 28 million hectares for grazing 
reserve development, and about 45 of these areas, covering some 600,000 
hectares, have been gazetted (Iro 2014). In fact Iro (2014) further 
explained that 8 of these reserves, totalling 225,000 hectares, are fully 
established, and already 350 of the projected 950 pastoral families and 
11,600 of the planned 46,000 cattle are using these reserves.
Incidentally, the increasing violent confrontations between the herders 
and the farmers, especially from 2015 to 2018, tend to have re-ignited the 
need for rules to regulate the activities of both parties. The argument is 
anchored on the need to fashion out a legal framework that will engender 
a cordial relationship between herders and farmers to end the loss of lives 
and growing insecurity. As a result, some federal lawmakers in 2016 intro-
duced the National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016. The aim 
of the bill was to put to rest the intermittent violence among the two 
groups. In fact, Amusan et al. (2017) stated that as a strategy for prevent-
ing such recurrent conflicts; the sponsors of the bill suggest that the fed-
eral government designates grazing routes and reserves across the 36 
states of the federation regardless of the cultural and agro-cultural charac-
teristics of the localities. For them, by implication, they seek rights for 
Fulani herdsmen to have access and possession of lands found suitable in 
any part thereof within Nigeria, including those situated in non-Fulani 
communities for the purpose of cattle grazing (Amusan et  al. 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, the bill was killed. Kwaja and Ademola (2018) attributed 
this largely to the fact that the Land Use Act of 1978 vests all powers 
related to the regulation of ownership, alienation, acquisition, administra-
tion and management of Nigerian land with the state governors. As a 
result, such legislation may create more political dispute, hence its viola-
tion of the Land Use Act of 1978 and usurpation of the powers of the 
state governors.
The failure of the National Assembly to enact a new law on old chal-
lenges (herders-farmers squabbles) motivated state assemblies to assume 
their legitimate responsibilities of making laws in this regard. States like 
Ekiti, Benue and Taraba have enacted laws on Open Grazing Prohibition. 
Apart from the latter, other two states have begun implementation of the 
law. Unfortunately, the implementation seems to be counter-productive in 
Benue while Ekiti has enjoyed reasonable tranquillity.
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The Benue State government on May 22, 2017 enacted an Open 
Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law which came into 
force on November 1, 2017. The main objectives of this law are the 
following:
 1. Prevent the destruction of crops, farms, community ponds, settle-
ments and property by open rearing and grazing of livestock.
 2. Prevent clashes between nomadic livestock herders and crop farmers.
 3. Protect the environment from degradation and pollution caused by 
open rearing and over grazing of livestock.
 4. Optimise the use of land resources in the face of overstretched land 
and increasing population.
 5. Prevent, control and manage the spread of diseases as well as ease 
the implementation of policies that enhance the production of high- 
quality and healthy livestock for local and international markets.
 6. Create a conducive environment for large-scale crop production 
(Benue State Anti-open Grazing Law 2017, p. 3).
Section 19(1) of the law stipulates that no individual or group shall 
after the commencement of this law engage in open nomadic livestock 
herding or grazing in the state outside the permitted ranches. It further 
stated in Section 19(2) that any person or group of persons who contra-
venes Sub-section (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, 
be liable to five years of imprisonment or one million naira (₦1,000,000) 
fine or both. Section 19(3) stipulates that in the event of damage to farm, 
crops or property of any person, the owner or manager of such livestock 
shall, after evaluation of the damage by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, pay the prevailing value of monetary compensation of 
the farm, crops or property so damaged to the owner. In accordance with 
Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the law, the establishment of ranches remains the 
only option for cattle rearing in the state.
As can be seen, it could be stated that in spite of the numerous laws and 
attempts to gag the monstrous herders-farmers violence, the wanton kill-
ings of innocent citizens have continued unabated. The gory pictures of 
the dead and indeed the vestiges of war make one’s mind frigid and cold. 
The violence knows no bounds. Children, women and the elderly are not 
just caught in the web of the crisis but are the major targets by the invad-
ers. Generally, Nigeria has evolved several laws, acts and legislations, yet all 
the efforts produced only one result—more violence, more blood.
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catalogues oF herders-Farmers conFlIcts In nIgerIa
The increasing Fulani herders-farmers violence in Nigeria has endangered 
the lives and property of many Nigerians in affected states. Ending the 
violence in the nearest future appears not visible, especially given the fact 
that security agencies tend to have compromised their onerous responsi-
bility of protecting defenceless people. For instance, the former Minister 
of Defence, General Theophulus Danjuma (Rtd), recently alleged in a 
public lecture that the Nigerian military is colluding with the murderous 
herdsmen. According to Danjuma, “you must rise to protect yourselves 
from these people; if you depend on the armed forces to protect you, you 
will all die” (Mkom 2018, p. 7).
It is therefore clear why this crisis has become a daily routine. The act 
of slaughtering innocent Nigerians by Fulani herders is irresistibly deepen-
ing the existing resentment and disillusionment among Nigerians. In fact, 
the persistent spread of this crisis also questions the utility and vision of 
Nigeria’s democracy. The beauty of dialogue and negotiation in a demo-
cratic society is vital in containing and averting violence of this magnitude. 
Between 2011 and 2018, hundreds of Nigerians have been cruelly mur-
dered for reasons many of the victims are unacquainted with.
Unfortunately, determining the exact number of victims in most con-
flict situations in Nigeria is virtually impossible. In fact, while the commu-
nity where crisis occurs provides a certain number of loved ones lost, 
security agencies provide different and sometimes conflicting figures. So, 
in most circumstances, what seems to be the official figure contradicts 
community claims and the position of the people involved. Incidentally, 
conflicts in remote areas are sometimes either not attended to by security 
agencies because of the terrain or intentionally averted for unexplained 
reasons. All of these have remained major obstacles for data generation 
vis-à-vis conflict situations in Nigeria. Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 
show some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in six states in Nigeria 
between 2011 and May 2018.
Following from the above, it can be arithmetically stated that herdsmen 
attacks in Nigeria have resulted in the death of over 2, 454 people within 
the period under review. Table 6.7 and Fig. 6.1 show that 2011 recorded 
the lowest incidences of attacks and also the lowest death occurrences aris-
ing from Fulani herdsmen activities in Nigeria. Thus, the increasing mani-
festations and incidences of these attacks since 2011 cannot be unconnected 
to the fact that the Nigerian state has not devised any effective contain-
6 GRAZING CONUNDRUM: HERDSMEN-FARMERS CONFLICT… 
110
Table 6.1 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Nasarawa State between 
2011 and May 2018
S/N Month/Day Year Place in Nasarawa State Number of 
people killed





2011 Akpanaja, Ondon 
Rukubi in Doma local 
government area (LGA)
4 Not stated
2 February 8 2011 Udeni-Gida, Nasarawa 
LGA
1 Not stated
3 April 2 2011 Boarder communities 
between Nasarawa and 
Guma LGA in Benue
30 Not stated
4 January 16 2012 Doka, Kwara and 
Ungwan Mada in Keana 
and Doma LGA
10 Not stated
5 March 1 2012 Yelaw in Ekye, Doma 
LGA
10 Not stated
6 July 13 2012 Kotsona in Tunga Awe 
LGA
35 Not stated
7 February 3 2013 Eggon 30 Not stated
8 January 15 2013 Agbashi, Ekya 
development area
10 Not stated
9 January 5 2013 Agbashi town in Doma 
LGA
5 Not stated
10 January 6 2013 Agbashi town in Doma 
LGA
16 Not stated
11 March16 2013 Ambane-Egga Ladi 
Ende
5 Not stated
12 August 10 2013 Kuduku, Ajo villages in 
Keane LGA
20 Not stated
13 October 9 2014 Kompany and Bakun 
Allu, Lafia, Nasarawa
19 Not stated
14 November 8 2014 Arikya-Soni, Nasarawa 25 Not stated
15 April 6 2014 Giza town in Keana 
LGA
30 Not stated
16 September 7 2014 Eggo community of 
Gidan Gambo in Lafia 
east development area
10 Not stated
17 May 22 2014 Bature village in Giza 
development area of 
Keana LGA
1 Not stated
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ment strategy. This has not only availed the invaders (Fulani herdsmen) the 
temerity to continue to commit crime with impunity but has also elevated 
herdsmen crisis to assume more complex dimensions. In fact, with the level 
of indulgent dispositions of the Nigerian state, the crisis is gradually over-
whelming peoples’ tolerance and undermining legitimacy of the state.
From Table 6.7, it can be observed that years preceding general elec-
tions in Nigeria tend to record more violence than other years. Herdsmen 
attacks are not exceptions as regards this trend. For instance, there are 346 
deaths recorded in 2014, prior to the 2015 general elections, and the 
highest death incidence is between 2011 and 2014. There is also reduction 
in 2015. However, the rising trend started in 2016, with a total of 457 
death incidences. By the first quarter of 2018, it skyrocketed to 600 death 
Table 6.1 (continued)
S/N Month/Day Year Place in Nasarawa State Number of 
people killed
Number of people 
displaced and 
injured
19 July 1 2015 Kofar Gwari, Kokona 
LGA
2 Not stated
20 May 25 2016 Adayi and Loko areas of 
Nasarawa
20 Not stated
21 July 3 2016 Obi 1 Not stated
22 November 
14
2017 Jangaru, Awe LGA 1 Not stated
23 March 8 2017 Uloko development area 1 Not stated
24 January 7 2018 Awe, Keana and Doma 
LGA
25 Not stated
25 January 31 2018 Keana LGA 12 Over 300 people 
displaced
26 February 11 2018 Kadarko, Keana LGA 12 30 people 
hospitalised
27 February 19 2018 Obi LGA 50 Not stated
28 April 17 2018 Awe, Keana, Obi and 
Doma LGA
39 Not stated
29 April 10 2018 Jimin Nyaku 6 Not stated
30 April 6 2018 Awe, Keana and Doma 
LGAs
25 Not stated
31 April 19 2018 Obi 17 Not stated
Source: Compiled by the author (Sun, February 8, 2011; Daily Post, March 1, 2012; Punch, July 13, 
2012; Sun, February 3, 2013; Vanguard, May 22, 2014; The Nation, April 10, 2015; Vanguard, February 
19, 2018; The Nation, November 14, 2017; Premium Times, August 21, 2016; This Day, July 11, 2016; 
Vanguard, July 26, 2016; Punch, June 19, 2016; Daily Post, February 23, 2016)
6 GRAZING CONUNDRUM: HERDSMEN-FARMERS CONFLICT… 
112
Table 6.2 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Benue State between 2011 
and May 2018






1 November 6 2011 Border communities of Guma
in Benue
52 Not stated
2 March 1 2012 Gwer west local government 
area (LGA) of Benue State
30 Not stated
3 May 18 2012 Gwer west LGA of Benue State 5 Not stated
4 July 21 2013 Border area of Guma in Benue 40 Not stated
5 May 17 2013 Border area of Benue 20 Not stated
6 March 5 2016 Logo LGA of Benue State 2 30 persons 
displaced
7 February 16 2016 Agatu LGA of Benue State 50
8 February 19 2016 Ikpele and Okpopolo 
communities of Benue State
7 6000 persons 
displaced
9 February 10 2016 Agatu and Buruku LGAs of 
Benue State
36 300 persons 
displaced
10 July 2 2016 Logo and Ukum LGAs of 
Benue State
81 Not stated
11 June 3 2016 Uzaar in Tombo, Anyii in logo 
LGA and vase in Ukum LGA of 
Benue State
26 Over 1000 
persons 
displaced
12 June 10 2016 Ugondo community in logo 
LGA of Benue State
15 Not stated
13 July 7 2016 Gaambe-Tiev community in 
logo LGA of Benue State
14 Not stated
14 June 10 2016 Logo LGA and Ukum LGAs of 
Benue State
13 Not stated
15 July 8 2016 Nenzev ward in logo LGA of 
Benue State
6 Not stated
16 July 12 201 6 Chambe and Anawah 
settlements in logo LGA of 
Benue State
5 Not stated
17 June 14 2016 Turan council ward in Benue 
State
59 Not stated
18 January 24 2017 Ipiga Village in Ohimini LGA 15 Not stated
19 March 2 2017 Mbahimin, Gwer east LGA 10 Not stated
20 March 11 2017 Mkgovur Village, Buruku LGA 7 Not stated
21 May 8 2017 Tse-Akaa Village, Ugondo 
Mbamar District of logo LGA
3 Not stated
(continued)
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Table 6.2 (continued)






22 May 13 2017 Three communities of logo 
LGA
8 Not stated
23 January 1 2018 Guma and logo LGA 73 Not stated
24 March 5 2018 Omosu village in Ojigo, 
Okpokwu LGA
10 Not stated
25 March 5 2018 Omenge village in Guma LGA 5 Not stated
26 April 21 2018 Uzughul, Tse Ginde in Guma 
LGA
15 Not stated
27 April 8 2018 Okoklo in Agatu LGA 2 Not stated
28 March 6 2018 Omutu, in Okpokwu LGA 16 Not stated
29 May 18 2018 Mbakyondo, Mbakpa and 
Sengaev in Gwer west LGA
10 Not stated
30 April 24 2018 Ayar Mbalom in Gwer east LGA 18 Not stated
31 March 7 2018 Omosu village in Okpokwu 
LGA
27 Not stated
Source: Compiled by the authors (Vanguard, November 6, 2011; Daily Post, March 1, 2012; Sun, May 
17, 2013; This Day, June 14, 2016; This Day, July 12, 2016; Vanguard, May 13, 2017; Punch, April 21, 
2018; Daily Post, March 7, 2018)
Table 6.3 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Enugu State between 2011 
and May 2018
S/N Month/Day Year Place in Enugu State Number of 
people killed
Number of people 
displaced and 
injured
1 January 6 2015 Nkpologu community 
in Uzo-Uwani LGA
1 Not stated
2 March 15 2015 Eke community in Udi 
LGA
1 Not stated
3 February 11 2016 Abbi community in 
Uzo-Uwani LGA
2 Not stated
4 April 25 2016 Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani 
LGA
48 60 injured
5 August 25 2016 Ndiagu Attakwu 
community in Nkanu 
west LGA
1 Not stated
Source: Compiled by the authors (Daily Post, March 15, 2015; Sun, January 6, 2015; This Day, April 25, 
2016; This Day, August 25, 2016)
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Table 6.4 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Taraba State between 2011 
and May 2018
S/N Month/Day Year Place in Taraba State Number 
of people 
killed
Number of people 
displaced and 
injured
1 June 11 2012 Karim Lamido local 
government area (LGA)
13 Not stated
2 March 23 2014 Buwa village in Ibi LGA 7 Not stated
3 May 14 2014 Kugwana in Bali iLGA 7 Not stated
4 April 16 2014 Nwokyo village in Wukari 
LGA
9 Not stated
5 March 24 2015 Ananum village in Donga 
LGA
5 Not stated
6 December 23 2015 Aungwan Agbadorough 
in Bali LGA
2 Not stated
7 April 20 2015 Tse-Gbaun and Gaza 
villages in Donga LGA
7 Not stated
8 January 31 2015 Nwonko village in Wukari 
LGA
30 Not stated
9 April 12 2016 Dori and Mesuma villages 
in Gashaka LGA
15 Not stated
10 April 13 2016 Gashaka and Bali LGA 44 Over 100 people
11 May 8 2016 Coromo in Gassol LGA 12 18 injured
12 December 30 2017 Minda in Lua LGA 4 Not stated
13 May 17 2017 Bali LGA 12 Over 15, 000 
displaced
14 May 7 2017 Konkaen village in Ussa 
LGA and Tati village in 
Takun LGA
18 Not stated
15 June 22 2017 Mambilla Plateau in 
Sardauna LGA
Over 200 Over 200 people
16 January 20 2018 Gishiri, Dooshima and 
Danwaza villages
28 Not stated
17 January 20 2018 Jandeikyula village in 
Wukari LGA
32 Not stated
18 January 10 2018 Lau LGA 55 Not stated
19 March 8 2018 Takun LGA 2 Not stated
20 April 6 2018 Utile in Donga LGA 5 Not stated
Source: Compiled by the author (The Nation, January 20, 2018; Vanguard, June 11, 2012; Daily Post, 
April 16, 2014; Sun, January 31, 2015; This Day, January 31, 2015; This Day, April 13, 2016; Vanguard, 
May 8, 2016; Punch, May 7, 2017; Daily Post, March 8, 2018)
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Table 6.5 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Plateau State between 
2011 and May 2018
S/N Month/Day Year Place in Plateau State Number 
of people 
killed





2011 Barkin Ladi local government 
area (LGA)
7 20 injured
2 July 8 2012 Gashis District, Jos 105 Not stated
3 June 29 2013 Langtang 28 Not stated
4 May 2 2015 Foron town, Barkin Ladi LGA 27 Not stated
5 October 27 2017 Irigwe kingdom in Bassa LGA 75 13,726 displaced
6 October 16 2017 Nkiedonwhro Village in Irigwe 
kingdom in Bassa LGA
29 Not stated
7 September 9 2017 Ancha Village in Bassa LGA 19 Five people 
injured
8 November 8 2017 Rim Village in Riyom LGA 11 Not stated
9 January 27 2018 Huke Village, Miango in Bassa 
LGA
3 Not stated
10 February 5 2018 Miango in Bassa LGA 75 Not stated
11 March 15 2018 Dong Village 2 Not stated
12 February 14 2018 Jebu, Miango in Bassa LGA 3 Not stated
13 May 19 2018 Ancha Village in Bassa LGA 15 Not stated
14 January 25 2018 Josho Village, Daffo Chiefdom, 
Bokkos LGA
4 10 injured
Source: Compiled by the authors (Sun, November 22, 2011; Premium Times, July 8, 2012; Punch, June 
29, 2013; Sun, October 16, 2017; Vanguard, February 5, 2018; The Nation, February 14, 2018)
incidences. Thus, this study does not suggest that herdsmen activities have 
political connotations, as it noted that in an intense political environment, 
sentiments can induce acts of violence.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it should be noted that varia-
tions in terms of the occurrence of attacks in the six states listed above can 
also be attributed to a variety of causes of the attacks. However general 
consensus is that lack of access to water, due to drought and desert 
encroachment in the far north, has caused herdsmen and their cattle to 
move towards the south in search of grazing fields, and consequently clash 
with farm owners. Thus, it is the position of this chapter that criminality 
and flourishing cattle rustling activities in some of these states, especially 
Benue State, contributed to the upsurge and devastating dimension of the 
violence. For instance, the president of the Benue State chapter of the 
Myetii Allah Breeders Association, Gololo, decried that members of the 
association frequently lose their cattle. According to Gololo:
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Table 6.6 Some reported Fulani herdsmen attacks in Kaduna State between 
2011 and May 2018
S/N Month/
Day
Year Place in Kaduna State Number 
of people 
killed
Number of people 
displaced and 
injured
1 April 2 2013 Kaura District 19 Over 4500 people
2 March 16 2014 Sankwai, Tekum and 
Unguwarr Gata inhabited by 
Moroa people in Kaura LGA
200 Not stated
3 June 14 2014 Kabamu in Fadan District and 
Ankpon in Nandu District
38 Not stated
4 July 18 2017 Banono Village, Kajuru LGA 37 Not stated
5 July 21 2017 Northern Kaduna 33 Not stated
6 July 16 
and 17
2017 Kajuru, Kajuru LGA 29 Not stated
7 January 14 2018 Birnin-Gwari LGA 10 
people
Not stated
Source: Compiled by the author (Daily Post, April 2, 2013; Sun, March 16, 2014; This Day, July 18, 
2017; Vanguard, July 16, 2017; Punch, January 14, 2018)
While we were trying to relocate to Taraba State, through Nassarawa State to 
the border town of Nengere, some rustlers came and stole about 1000 cows 
from us and we have (SIC) to fight back. The communities affected by the 
fight include Gaambe-Tiv, Ayilamo, Turan. Umenger, Tse-Akor and 
Tomaater, near Tse-Aabi in Logo and Guma local government areas. The 
attacks by the herdsmen, were in self-defense against cattle rustlers, who stole 
into their camp in the night to steal their cows. (Cited in Oluwalana 2018, p. 3)











Table 6.7 Years and number of 
deaths recorded
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Unfortunately, state security failures tend to have been implicated in this 
rustling act. But more shocking is the horrendous murder of innocent citi-
zens who perhaps did not know the rustlers and are not rustlers. The 
tendency of disrespecting the inviolability of human life underlies the drive 
to kill in retaliation for rustled cattle. Also, the fact that only few of these 
murderous herdsmen have been apprehended and none has been made to 
face severe sanctions according to the law seems to make killing a worth-
while venture for the herdsmen.
state responses to herders-Farmers VIolence
The Nigerian state has over the years demonstrated disappointing disposi-
tions as regards the tackling of Fulani herdsmen violence. In spite of the 
huge number of deaths recorded, no herder has been convicted for crimes 
committed. Although the elites tend to have divergent positions on the 
security situation in Nigeria, their disparate views are mainly guided by 
primordial interests. Unfortunately, the challenge of the Nigerian state 
centres on the fact that the state expresses itself through the elites rather 
Fig. 6.1 A bar chart showing years and number of death recorded. Source: 
Author’s compilation
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than behave and act through institutions. Lack of strong institutions 
availed the emergence of strong personalities. Consequently, the expres-
sions of these strong personalities are state thoughts and expressions. For 
instance, the Minister of Defence, Mansur Dan-Ali, recently blamed the 
massacre of innocent Nigerians by Fulani herdsmen on anti-open grazing 
laws in Benue and Taraba States. According to him, the blockage of cattle 
routes across the country is the remote cause of the killings by herdsmen, 
and the implementation of anti-open grazing laws in some states was the 
immediate cause of the killings (Nwachukwu 2018). Contrary to this 
assumption, the state governments are constitutionally empowered to 
make laws for good governance and peaceful coexistence in their states. 
Secondly, the killings were there before the laws were made. So, it presup-
poses that the laws are geared towards ending the killings.
It is important to also note that while rustling of cattle or blockage of 
routes, enactment of laws and any other sentiments that drive and indeed 
sustain the violence is condemnable, the state assumptions that tend to 
justify wanton killing of innocent citizens based on the aforementioned 
causes are most undignified. In fact, such claims signal the deteriorating 
level of state insensitivity and unfortunate abandonment of her primary 
responsibility of protecting lives and property. As Soyinka succinctly argues:
[T]he present national outrage is over impunity. It rejects the right of any 
set of people, for whatever reason, to take arms against their fellow men and 
women, to acknowledge their exploits in boastful and justifying accents and, 
in effect, promise more of the same as long as their terms and demands are 
not met. In plain language, they have declared war against the nation, and 
their weapon is undiluted terror. Why have they been permitted to become 
a menace to the rest of us? (Cited in Ibekwe 2018, p. 2)
In all, the contradictions that tangled the widespread herdsmen violence 
are incredible. But most unthinkable is the current effort by the incum-
bent government and many officials of the state to tender reasons why 
herdsmen kill people rather than the government policy framework 
towards apprehending and prosecuting the invaders so as to deter others 
from taking laws into their hands, or at least stop further killings. Most 
ridiculous are some state governments’ decision to pay compensation to 
herdsmen for the cattle lost and appeal to families to forgive for their loved 
ones lost in the crisis. The implication is that we appear to place more 
importance on cattle than on human beings.
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conclusIon
From the analysis, it is clear that the protracted herders-farmers violence in 
Nigeria has constituted a deepening form of insecurity. In the last few 
years, the intensification and rising cases of the herders-farmers crisis from 
brush fire to an all-consuming conflagration raised issues of conspiracy of 
the state, poor attitude and inadequate preparation to providing security to 
the Nigerian people. With the increasing attacks, especially since the emer-
gence of state laws to contain the violence, elitist conspiracy efforts became 
manifest. The intention and drive to escalate the violence is only to under-
mine the importance of the law, hence the agitation for its removal. This 
study is of the view that these laws are worthwhile and have the capacity to 
address the prevailing crisis if governments at all levels will ensure their 
implementation. It is based on the above that this chapter, therefore, rec-
ommends that the state should rise and perform her responsibility and 
refrain from the present trend of justifying impunity. Both the killers and 
sponsors of the conflict should be brought to book irrespective of their 
status or position. It is also the position of this chapter that there is a need 
for the gradual process of establishing ranches and the government’s pro-
active response to herdsmen attacks by ensuring decisive punishment of 
those implicated in the violence in a bid to end the prevailing crisis.
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CHAPTER 7




Communal conflict is a veritable instance of non-state collective violence. It 
is a dimension of conflicts whereby hostilities follow primordial or temporal 
communal identity lines. Scholarship on communal conflicts has been 
vibrant and rapidly bourgeoning. Hence the field has over the years evolved 
a body of knowledge that is progressively undergoing theoretical systemati-
sation. The extant literature on communal conflict has been characterised 
by two fundamental epistemological pitfalls: (1) terminological chaos aris-
ing from unsystematic definition, clarification, and operationalisation of 
basic concepts, and (2) paradigmatic obfuscation resulting from the con-
flicting theoretical perspectives on the subject matter (Brosche 2015).
With reference to Nigeria, the phenomenon of communal conflict has 
been largely associated with the dialectics of identity politics, with dispro-
portionate emphasis on the ethno-religious convolutions (Ngare 2012; 
A. C. Okoli (*) 
Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, Lafia, Nigeria 
O. E. Nnabuihe 
Department of Criminology, Security, Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Caleb University, Imota, Lagos, Nigeria
124
Ayokhai 2013). The prevailing anecdotal and scholarly narratives on 
 communal conflict in Nigeria have, to a large extent, mirrored the essen-
tial deficiencies of the extant corpus of knowledge as indicated above. 
There is, therefore, a pressing need to re-interrogate the existing concep-
tual and theoretical perspectives on communal conflicts in Nigeria vis-à-vis 
their analytical utility with a view to advancing scholarly knowledge in that 
respect. It is this need that has informed this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is organised under the following themes: 
situating the locus and focus of the study, analytical point of departure, 
theoretical framework, conceptualising communal conflict, overview of 
communal conflict in Nigeria, political ecology of communal conflict in 
Central Nigeria: the Nasarawa and Plateau examples, and conclusion.
SItuatIng the LocuS and FocuS oF the Study
The wider locus of the study is the central region of Nigeria. This com-
prises six states, namely, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and 
Plateau. For convenience of investigation, the study concentrated on the 
two focal states—States of Nasarawa and Plateau. These two states are 
typically characteristic of Nigeria’s peculiar social-cultural diversity and 
heterogeneity. They embody a multiplicity of primordial cleavages and 
identities which make them highly susceptible to communal crises (Alubo 
2009; Ngare 2012; Okoli 2016a).
There have been high incidence and prevalence of communal conflicts 
in the focal states. For instance, Plateau State has been prominently noto-
rious for inter-communal disturbances, while Nasarawa State is ranked 
highly in terms of rural violence associated with inter-communal contesta-
tions (Okoli and Ayokhai 2015). Similar patterns of communal conflict 
have evolved in these states, namely, Christian-Muslim violence, indigene- 
settler crises, farmer-herder conflicts, and ethno-communal disturbances 
(Okoli 2016b).
Trajectories of communal conflicts in both states indicate a pattern of 
occurrence that implicates an intersection of political, ecological, eco-
nomic, and social forces. There has also been the tendency for such con-
flicts to explore and exploit the existing social-cultural cleavages to assume 
ethno-religious complications. These shall constitute our focus of analysis 
as we reflect on the Nasarawa and Plateau States cases.
In choosing the focal study areas, the authors are not oblivious of the 
fact that the cases may not be representative enough to provide ample 
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grounds for legitimate and valid extrapolations or generalisations. Suffice 
it to note that the essence of the current study is to advance a new approach 
in the way the subject of communal conflicts in Nigeria is being under-
stood. If this objective is met, no matter how scarcely, then the purpose of 
the study would have been sufficiently justified.
anaLytIcaL PoInt oF deParture
The existing thinking on communal conflicts in Nigeria has privileged the 
viewpoint that communal conflicts are essentially social-cultural and, in 
effect, identity based. Our contention is that such a viewpoint is fundamen-
tally reductionist and obscurantist. Although communal conflicts in Nigeria 
have, more often than not, been symptomatic of antagonistic ethnic, reli-
gious, sectional, or clannish relations, the root causes of such conflicts have 
been well beyond these social-cultural categories. To be sure, ethnic or reli-
gious consciousness, or any differences to that effect, can hardly be salient 
enough to bring about communal conflicts. Same goes for all dimensions of 
primordial identity. What happens in reality is that primordial social-cultural 
factors serve as veritable ‘faultlines’ for catalysing communal conflicts.
“Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines between group members 
based on various social attributes (familial, communal, ethnic, religious, 
etc) that can potentially split the overall group into sub-groups” (Tian 
et al. 2016, p. 69). At faultlines, social categories can split and twist. So, 
when ecological, economic, or political contestations between social cat-
egories feed into existing socio-cultural faultlines, communal conflict 
becomes inevitable. Same goes for a situation when structural attributes of 
society present pretexts for deep-seated inter-group antagonisms.
As we are inclined to argue in this study, communal conflicts are not 
necessarily primordial. They are not innately ethno-religious as most extant 
literature in Nigeria would tend to suggest. Essentially, communal conflict 
results variously from political, economic, ecological, and structural fac-
tors, with socio-cultural factors serving as the faultiness. This argument can 
be illustrated with the aid of a diagram as indicated in Fig. 7.1.
The crux of our argument in this study is that communal conflict in 
Nigeria has been largely driven by political, economic, and socio- ecological 
factors rather than primordial concerns. In effect, such conflict has been 
more of a socio-political question than an identity issue. It is the political 
instrumentalisation of identity in the context of elite opportunism, 
 electioneering, and distributive federalism that has privileged the prevail-
ing identity-centric perspective to communal conflicts in Nigeria.













Livelihood struggles, resource contestations (e.g.: farmland/ rangeland disputes)
Political
Power struggles, chieftaincy tussles, election disputes 
Socio-cultural
Ethnicity, religion, sectionalism, other primordial identities 
Ecological
Climate change-induced and demographically related contestations
Structural
Constitutional lacunae, policy gaps; e.g.: indigeneship question in Nigeria
Fig. 7.1 An illustrative ecology of communal conflict. Source: Authors’ original 
concept, 2017
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theoretIcaL Framework: PoLItIcaL ecoLogy aPProach
This study appropriates the political ecology approach as its theoretical 
framework. Political ecology developed from the epistemological founda-
tions of political economy and social ecology (Okoli and Ogayi 2016). 
According to Greenberg and Park (1994, p.  1), political ecology “is a 
historical outgrowth of the central questions asked by the social sciences 
about the relations between human society, viewed in its bio-cultural- 
political complexity, and a significantly humanised nature”. As an analyti-
cal framework, political ecology seeks to bridge the economic determinism 
and human-centricism of political economy and the ecological reduction-
ism of social ecology (Okoli and Ogayi 2016). By so doing, “political 
ecology expands ecological concepts to respond to (the) inclusion of cul-
tural and political activity within an analysis of ecosystems that are signifi-
cantly but not always entirely socially constructed” (Greenberg and Park 
1994, p. 1).
By ‘politicising’ the orthodox ecological discourse, political ecology 
provides an eclectic approach to the understanding of society by emphasis-
ing how the intersection between forces of ecology, economy, politics, and 
culture determines social occurrences. Hence, a political ecology of con-
flict would embody the following basic assumptions.
 1. Conflict occurs in a dynamic and often dialectical socio- 
existential context.
 2. Conflicts are fundamentally multi-dimensional and multi-causal 
phenomena; there is no single cause to conflict.
 3. Conflicts result from struggles over scarce and mutually contested 
values/ends.
 4. Conflict is a dialectical process that reflects both the structural and 
circumstantial attributes of society.
 5. Every instance of conflict is pertinently particularistic and unique, 
reflecting the peculiarity in the conflict context (cf. Saferword 
2012, pp. 2–5).
Applied to the subject of communal conflict, political ecology enables 
the analysts to come to terms with the roots, contours, dialectics, and 
dynamics of such conflict within its socio-ecological context. This makes 
for a rigorous and robust interrogation of the subject matter within an 
eclectic and dynamic analytical purview.
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concePtuaLISIng communaL conFLIct
Communal conflict simply refers to conflict perpetrated along communal 
lines, wherein conflicting parties feel solidarity for their respective commu-
nal groups and victims are targeted based on communal group membership 
(MUNA 2015). More precisely, it is a “conflict between non-state groups 
that are organised along a shared communal identity” (Brosche 2015, p. 4).
Communal conflict can be characterised based on certain essential attri-
butes, that is:
 1. It is often a violent conflict.
 2. It is waged along communal lines.
 3. It involves non-state actors, although the state might be involved as 
a supporting third-party actor.
 4. None of the conflicting parties enjoy monopolistic access and con-
trol of the organised force (national army).
 5. The conflicting parties are less organised in terms of standing capaci-
ties; they only occasionally organise and mobilise for violence (cf. 
Brosche 2015).
Communal conflict differs from civil war or organised rebellion. To be 
sure, civil wars and rebellions necessarily entail state involvement as a 
direct ‘co-aggressor’. They both also involve a great deal of military organ-
isation, sophistication, and mobilisation. This is practically unlike com-
munal conflict that involves non-state actors who lack the capacity of a 
standing army.
Communal conflict can be categorised based on the patterns of com-
munal identification and alignment that typify it. Prominent categories are 
included in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Typology of communal conflict
Type Example(s)
Ethnic Habe-Fulbe conflict: Hausa-Igbo conflict
Religious Christian-Muslim conflict; Hindu-Buddhist conflict
Livelihood Farmer-herder conflict; Farmer-miner conflict
Sectarian Catholic-Protestant conflict; Sunni-Shiite conflict
Indigeneship Indigene-settler conflict: Native-migrant conflict
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017
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overvIew oF nature and PatternS oF communaL 
conFLIct In nIgerIa
Nigeria, over the years, has witnessed sundry dimensions of communal 
conflict. Most of the instances of communal conflict recorded in Nigeria 
have been associated with the contradictions of ethno-religious relations 
(Nigeria, 2012). The phenomena of identity politics and religious fanati-
cism are assumed to have played a dominant role in engendering such 
conflicts (Ayokhai 2013; Uduma 2013).
Conflicts between the adherents of Islam and Christianity have been 
pervasive and perennial in many parts of northern Nigeria. This pattern of 
communal conflict has not been motivated by religious identities per se; 
they have been largely orchestrated by self-interested political opportun-
ists who exploit existing primitive religious differences to serve their parti-
san or egoistic interests (Soyinka 1991; Kukah 2007; Okoli and 
Uhembe 2014).
Land-resource-based hostilities constitute another critical dimension of 
communal conflict in Nigeria. The question of control and ownership of 
land and landed resources has often pitted communities against each 
other, resulting in dire communal conflagrations (Alimba 2014). This is 
also true of un-tempered competition between communities over access 
to, or ownership of, land-based endowments such as freshwater sources. 
Land and/or border (boundary) disputes have been a veritable pattern of 
communal conflict in contemporary Nigeria (Ajodo-Adebanjoko et  al. 
2015). Land-use contestations between competitive livelihood groups 
have also provoked communal conflict in Nigeria. This has been promi-
nently exemplified in the phenomenon of farmer-herder hostility which 
has been prevalent in North-Central Nigeria (Okoli 2016a, b). Farmer- 
herder conflict is characteristically dicey and dynamic. This is because it 
can, over time, assume the complexion of ethno-religious violence in 
keeping with the nature of group dynamics that underlie it. The fact that 
most of the herders are Fulani and Muslims while the farmers are mostly 
autochthons and Christians implies that livelihood struggles between 
them can also be framed in ethnic or religious terms (cf. Okoli and 
Atelhe 2014).
The indigeneship question has provided another veritable pretext for 
communal conflict in Nigeria. Within the politicised indigene-settler 
divide in some of Nigeria’s urban centres, those who are reckoned to be 
non-indigenes are often denied of certain civic entitlements such as the 
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right to stand for election, employment and scholarship benefits, and the 
like (Alubo 2009; Hatfess 2016). Apart from vitiating the prospect of 
inclusive social citizenship, the indigene-settler syndrome has often pre-
cipitated bitter inter-communal tension and violence in Nigeria. The orgy 
of internecine violence in Jos (Plateau State) has vividly demonstrated the 
destabilising import of this dimension of communal conflict.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the manifestation of communal 
conflict in Nigeria has been varied and multi-dimensional. Table 7.2 high-
lights the various instances of communal conflict in contemporary Nigeria.
Concerning the nature and causes of communal conflicts in Nigeria, it 
is pertinent to note that the conflicts have seldom been essentially primor-
dial or innately ethnic based. Even the so-called ethno-religious incidents 
in northern Nigeria have mostly had their origins in  local and national 
power contestations in the context of urban elite political mobilisation and 
electioneering.
PoLItIcaL ecoLogy oF communaL conFLIct In centraL 
nIgerIa: naSarawa and PLateau caSeS
To begin with, let it be reiterated that conflict is a dynamic process that 
occurs within a dialectical socio-existential context. Every instance of con-
flict has its own history, trends, dynamics, and dialectics (Okoli 2013). 
These characteristics define the process of conflict as a social phenomenon. 
Conflict context encompasses the structural and circumstantial social 
forces that underlie the occurrence of conflict. This embodies variables 
such as ambience, causes, actors, interests, and faultiness associated with 
the occurrence of conflict. Understanding the organic and dialectical rela-
tions between the process and context of conflict constitutes the crux of 
the political ecology of communal conflict being proposed herewith. 
Table 7.3 sheds vital insights into the foregoing perspective.
To what extent have the communal conflict scenarios in Nasarawa and 
Plateau States been amenable to the analytical schema being advanced in 
the foregoing? This question forms our major concern in the subsequent 
subsection.
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the naSarawa examPLe
Communal conflict has been a dominant feature of Nasarawa State since 
its creation in 1996. The foremost and most primitive pattern of commu-
nal conflict in the state is the phenomenon of ethno-communal crisis. 
Cases in point include the Bassa-Egbura conflict of the late 1990s, the Tiv 
Table 7.2 A chronicle of important communal conflicts in Nigeria
SN Conflict State Nature Status
1 Ife-Modakeke Osun Land ownership dispute Resolved
2 Tiv-Jukun Benue/Taraba Indigene-settler schism Attenuated
3 Zango-Kataf Kaduna Ethno-religious disturbances/
traditional rulership issues
Attenuated
4 Habe-Fulbe Zamfara Ethno-primordial tension Inchoate
5 Aguleri-Umuleri- 
Umuoba Anam
Anambra Land ownership dispute Resolved
6 Ezza-Ezilo Ebonyi Land/boundary dispute Ongoing
7 Agila-Mgbo Benue/Ebonyi Land/boundary dispute Ongoing
8 Chamba-Kuteb Taraba Chieftaincy tussle Resolved
9 Eggon-Alago Nasarawa Land ownership dispute Attenuated
10 Yoruba-Hausa and 
Fulani
Lagos Ethno-communal dispute Resolved
11 Birom-Hausa 
(Jasawa) and Fulani
Plateau Indigene-settler contestations Ongoing
12 Ijaw-Itsekiri/
Urhobo
Delta Land ownership dispute Resolved
13 Eggon-Kambari Nasarawa Ethno-hegemonic struggle Attenuated
14 Bassa-Egbura Nasarawa Land ownership dispute Attenuated
15 Christian-Muslim Kaduna, Kano, 
Bauchi Plateau
Ethno-religious disturbances Attenuated
16 Sunni-Shiite Kaduna Sectarian schism Inchoate





18 Eleme-Okirika Rivers Land-resource-based conflict Attenuated
19 Ijaw-Ilaye Ondo Ethno-communal tension Attenuated
20 Ogoni-Adoni Rivers Land-resource-based struggle Attenuated
21 Hausa/
Fulani-Sawaya
Bauchi Ethno-communal tension Resolved
22 Biakpan-Etono Cross river Land ownership dispute Attenuated
23 Eyo Abasi-Idua Akwa Ibom Land/boundary dispute Attenuated
24 Onitsha-Obosi Anambra Land/boundary dispute Resolved
25 Native-Nomad Various Livelihood struggles Ongoing
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017
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versus allied ‘native commons’ crisis of early 2000s, the perennial Tiv- 
Fulani conflicts, the Eggon-Fulani conflicts, the Eggon-Alago distur-
bances, the Ombatse crisis, and so on.
The aforementioned crises have been naively described as ethnic based 
on their manifest appearances and ostensibilities. But beneath their appar-
ent ethnic manifestation lie deeper political, economic, and ecological 
stakes and interests. The material foundations of the crises have had to do 
with ownership of land, entitlement to landed resources (rangeland, farm-
land, freshwater), local power struggles, and civic entitlements (employ-
ment, scholarship, standing for election, etc.).
The struggles for competitive advantage within a highly circumscribed 
political, economic, and ecological space have been one of the most criti-
cal objective drivers of the crises (Okoli and Atelhe 2014). For instance, 
the anti-Tiv violence of the early 2000s was not unconnected with the bid 
towards checking the rising dominance of the Tivs in the state’s public 
service. On the other hand, the virulent conflict between the Eggons and 
the Alagos was hinged on land ownership and land-holding contestations. 
Land in this context is not to be understood merely as a means of produc-
tion. It is to be understood, as well, as a stake of ancestral heritage.
Another important dimension of communal crisis in Nasarawa State is 
the farmer-herder conflict. This has been between the nomadic Fulani and 
the native farming communities. The conflict has its essence in land-use- 
cum-livelihood struggles within an ever-shrinking ecological space—an 
ecological space that has been endangered by the untoward impact of cli-
mate change and urbanisation (Okoli 2016b).
Contemporary trajectories of the conflict indicate that it is fast degen-
erating into ethno-religious complications. Almost all the herders are 
Fulani. Also, most of the herders are Muslim, or at least non-Christians, 
while most of the native farmers are Christian or non-Muslim. This sce-
Table 7.3 A profile of conflict context
Which? What?
Ambience Ecological, social, economic, political
Causes Structural predicators, proximate causes, triggers
Actor Parties, victims, handlers
Interests Power, resources, values: issues at stake
Faultiness Religion, ethnicity, primordial identities
Source: Compiled by authors, 2017
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nario presents ample pretext for the framing of hitherto ecological/eco-
nomic struggles in ethno-religious terms. Consequently, any aggression 
carried out by the herders on a native farming community is pertinently 
interpreted as either ethnic or religious violence. The reverse is also the 
case. This tendency has provided impetus for the complication of farmer- 
herder clashes in Nasarawa State in recent years (cf. Adamu and Ben 2016).
The indigene-settler conflict is also one of the crucial dimensions of 
communal crisis in Nasarawa State. This arises from claims and counter- 
claims of indigeneity (Alubo 2009). Elements of this can be found in 
many cases of communal conflicts in the state. For instance, the anti-Tiv 
violence of early 2000s was predicated on the fact that the Tivs are not 
indigenous to the state. Similarly, the conflicts between the Eggons and 
other ethnic entities in the state (Alago, Kambari, Hausa/Fulani) have 
been, to a significant extent, occasioned by the hegemonic claim to indi-
geneity by the Eggon people (Okoli and Uhembe 2014).
On the surface of the communal crisis in Nasarawa State lies the issue 
of ethno-religious identity. But what has made each instance of such con-
flict salient are the underlying material foundations: struggle for power, 
resources, livelihood opportunities, civic entitlements, and so on. The 
socio-cultural attributes of the state (its ethnic, religious, and primordial 
composition and diversities) have provided ready faultlines for the preva-
lence of communal conflict.
The situation has been complicated by the sundry structural and func-
tional deficiencies of the Nigerian governance system, exemplified in the 
indigeneship question, ambiguous land tenure/holding regime, resource 
and security governance failure, and lack of an efficient conflict manage-
ment mechanism.
a dIScurSIve InSIght From the PLateau examPLe
Communal conflict has characterised the political history of Plateau State, 
particularly since the 1990s. The conflicts have often been attributed to 
ethno-religious factors (Best 2007; Higazi 2011; Krause 2011), cultural 
factors (Fwatshak 2006; Best 2007; Best and Hoomlong 2011), or land- 
based struggles (Alubo 2009) which predate colonialism. While the exist-
ing studies help us see how these factors are isolatedly implicated in the 
Plateau conflict, they have not explained why and/or how the combina-
tion of these factors has created a circle of inter-communal conflicts. 
Besides, despite the preponderance of studies on communal hostilities in 
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Plateau State, there is a missing link in terms of understanding the dynam-
ics of the conflict in utmost totality. Establishing this missing link requires 
an eclectic interrogation of the conflict situation in a manner that compre-
hends its social, political, economic, ecological, and cultural dialectics. 
Here, what has been observed concerning the Nasarawa experience with 
communal conflict succinctly applies, almost totally. The point of depar-
ture, nonetheless, is the fact that the Plateau case has historically borne 
trappings of land-based contestations. This viewpoint is discursively 
engaged at a very general level in this section.
Plateau State is a product of boundary adjustments arising, on the one 
hand, from the ambition of the British colonial administration to create a 
province which consisted largely of non-Muslims in order to, among other 
things, guarantee the sustenance of tin mining activities, which began in 
the area in 1902. On the other hand, it was a consequence of the strong 
desire of the peoples in this area for political self-determination (Ostien 
2010). The colonial conquest of northern Nigeria was completed in 1903 
by the British, who brought all communities in the region under the con-
trol of the substantive established emirate system. Then, Jos, Pankshin, 
and Shendam Divisions (which later became Plateau Province and later 
Plateau State) were placed under the Emir of Bauchi (Albert 2003). In 
1926, Plateau Province was created, exercising Jos and Pankshin Divisions 
from Bauchi Province.
The mining industry attracted several people to Plateau State. With the 
introduction of railway lines linking Jos city with Port Harcourt and 
Lagos, the area was brought into the orbit of the world economy. The 
development of the tin mining industry generated both positive and nega-
tive impacts on Plateau State. With the influx of migrants, Jos-Plateau in 
particular became cosmopolitan, thus playing host to more migrant labour 
in the tin industry (Nnoli 1978). The processes of urbanisation and devel-
opment in the area created communal tension and pitted groups against 
each other. The locus of the conflict, in the main, is the significance of land 
and land-based entitlements to the different parties involved in the conflict.
Of crucial importance is the relationship between land and living spaces. 
There are limits to the number of persons who can effectively dwell in a 
given geographical area. Lord Lugard, the first Governor General of 
Nigeria, in his famous Political Memoranda, outlined in the Township 
Ordinance how people should live in particular spaces and the limits to the 
number (Lugard 1970). In Plateau and Jos in particular, the increasing 
population amidst shrinking socio-ecological opportunities led residents 
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to worry about livelihood prospects. Although there is no conclusive 
argument about the shortage of living spaces in Plateau State, the fact that 
over 70 per cent of the population work on land has implications for com-
munal conflict in the state. It suffices to contend that competition for 
available spaces is a strong driving force in the conflict.
The struggle for competitive space is predicated on the living that can 
be made from land. Since majority of the population of Plateau State live 
and work on land for subsistence, the continued importance of land for 
the prevalence of communal conflict in the state cannot be understated. 
The right to use such spaces and extract produce from them have been 
passed from generation to generation. Thus, it is a crucial factor for con-
flict. The import of land as a source of communal subsistence and heritage 
bears significantly on cultural identity, and that underscores the impor-
tance of land in explaining the Plateau conflict.
Another reason why land is important in the context of the conflict in 
Plateau is its strategic utility in terms of natural defence. Natural barriers—
mountains, rivers, and cactus plants—have played a defensive role to native 
communities and settlements. Historically, these barriers have played a strate-
gic role in protecting the inhabitants from invasion. The vast number of 
mountains and cactus plants had made the area largely inaccessible in the past 
to invaders (Ames 1934). Ullman (1991) had discussed how natural barriers 
defended the Russians against the aggression of Napoleon and Hitler. Most 
times, the natural landscape is fraught with cultural meanings and groups 
attach symbolic importance to such meanings. In different climes, land fre-
quently is a key issue for indigenous groups seeking to preserve cultural 
autonomy (Friedman 1994; Occhipinti 2003). Yet, the connections between 
land and cultural identity in Plateau State have often been neglected in the 
literature. Some actors in the Plateau conflicts see land as part of their own 
history and as a way of guaranteeing the future or perpetuating their culture. 
Specifically, land has served as the central element in a political struggle that 
has spurred various communities to engage in violent conflicts.
These issues underlying communal conflict in Plateau State are dynamic 
and interconnected. Most often, whether the conflict assumes the nature 
of ethno-religious identity, farmer-herder clashes, indigene-settler distur-
bances, and the like, the core of the struggle is land and entitlements 
thereof. To say the least, the underlying roots of the struggle are often far 
from what is presented in prominent literature and anecdotal narratives: 
religion, ethnicity, indigeneity, and so on. Essentially, they are rather 
defined by economic and political motivations.
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concLuSIon
Political ecology of communal conflict is an attempt to inquire into the 
organic socio-existential context in which such conflict occurs. In effect, it 
probes the socio-structural, ecological, economic, and political bases- 
cum- dynamics of communal conflict with the understanding that such 
conflict is essentially far less socio-cultural than it is widely acclaimed.
From the standpoint of the focal States, the study observed that, in all 
instances, what are at stake are deep-seated, socio-economic, ecological, 
and political interests. The fact that these interests are vested in groups 
with shared primordial interests presupposes that conflicts arising there-
from can readily assume identity-based (socio-cultural) complexion. 
Hence, ecological, economic, or political contestations among communal 
groupings have more often than not exploited the existing faultlines of 
ethnicity, religion, clan, and sect to assume socio-cultural complications. 
This tendency has been complicated by the extant structural anomalies of 
the Nigerian polity which make communal conflict not only possible but 
inventible.
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CHAPTER 8
Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta Region
Ernest Toochi Aniche
IntroductIon
The Niger Delta remains a trouble spot in contemporary Nigerian politics 
and a hotspot of youth militant activities (Oronto et  al. 2004). This is 
because the nature of oil exploitation and the politics of sharing of oil 
revenues have created disempowerment, frustration and deprivation that 
underpinned outbreak of violence and conflicts in the form of youth mili-
tancy (Oromareghake et al. 2013). It suffices to say that the literature on 
the militarisation of the region by the Nigerian state is well documented 
(Osaghae 1995; Oronto and Okonta 2003; Ikelegbe 2005a; Okaba and 
Nte 2008; Okafor 2010; Aminu 2013).
Not surprisingly, the Niger Delta has assumed the notoriety of a crisis- 
ridden region in Nigeria. But perhaps our contribution to the narratives 
entails interrogating critically the drivers that underpinned the recent 
post-amnesty resurgence of youth militancy in the region spearheaded by 
Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) since 2016. Thus, this chapter sets out to 
comprehensively discuss the causes and consequences of youth aggressive-
ness in the Niger Delta, particularly the recent post-amnesty youth mili-
tancy in the Niger Delta as spearheaded by the NDA.
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To do this, we divide the chapter into seven main sections. The first 
section is the introduction which provides the background, overview and 
outline of the chapter. The second section tries to conceptualise and delin-
eate the Niger Delta region. The third section is the advent and evolution 
of youth militancy in the Niger Delta which traces the historical origin and 
evolution of youth militancy in the Niger Delta. The fourth section 
attempts to identify and describe the nature, methods, cases and instances 
of Niger Delta youth militancy. The fifth section identifies and explains 
various causes of violence in the region, whilst the sixth section is the con-
sequence of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta which enumerates the 
numerous effects of Niger Delta youth militancy. Finally, the seventh sec-
tion is the conclusion, which summarises the chapter by highlighting the 
salient points.
conceptualIsIng and delIneatIng the nIger delta
The Niger Delta can be geographically conceived and delineated in two 
major ways: the narrower Niger Delta and the broader Niger Delta. In 
other words, there are narrow and broad definitions of the Niger Delta 
region. The narrower Niger Delta is considered as the core Niger Delta. 
For Ibeanu (2000) and Osaghae et  al. (2011), geographically, the nar-
rower or core Niger Delta region in Nigeria is the littoral low lands and 
waters, wetlands, rivulets, tributaries and lagoons of the Atlantic Ocean in 
the southernmost ends of Nigeria currently comprising the area covered 
by the delta of the Niger River, including the coastal states of Bayelsa, 
Delta and Rivers. Thus, defined purely geographically, the oil- and gas- 
rich Niger Delta constitutes the ethnic homelands of the Andonis, Ijaws, 
Ikwerres, Isokos, Itsekiris, Kalabaris, Ndokwas, Ogonis, Okrikas, Urhobos 
and so on.
On the other hand, the broader Niger Delta is regarded geo-politi-
cally and geo-economically as the larger Niger Delta, which includes the 
core and periphery of the Niger Delta. For Aminu (2013) and Ugwuanyi 
et al. (2014), geo-politically and geo-economically or even administra-
tively, the broader Niger Delta region includes all oil-producing areas 
covering 75,000 km2 of land. This includes all the South-South, part of 
the southeast and part of the southwest. Based on this definition, the 
region currently comprises nine states such as Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers and 185 local govern-
ment areas. According to a report of the National Bureau of Statistics 
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(NBS) published in 2016, the estimated population of the Niger Delta 
region is 37 million people, about 23% of the total estimated 180 mil-
lion Nigerians in 2015.
The broader Niger Delta region of Nigeria lies between latitudes 4o and 
6o north of the Equator and 4o and 8o east of the Greenwich stretching over 
20,000 km2 of marsh land. The whole area is criss-crossed by a large num-
ber of rivers, streams, canals and creeks (Badmus 2010; Emmanuel and 
Duru 2010). The region is heterogeneous, multicultural and ethnically 
diverse. The region is homeland to a large number of natives, who live in 
about 13,400 communities (mainly farmers and coastal fishermen) belong-
ing to over 40 ethnic groups—some of which include the Anangs, Andonis, 
Bekwaras, Efiks, Ejaghams, Ekpeyes, Ibibios, Igbos, Ijaws, Ikwerres, Ilajes, 
Isokos, Itsekiris, Kalabari, Ndokwas, Ogonis, Okrikas, Orons, Urhobos, 
Yoruba and so on (Ikelegbe 2005a; Osaghae et al. 2011; Aminu 2013).
In this region also lies Nigeria’s over 35 billion barrels and 600 trillion 
cubic feet of proven oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is sitting 
on gas reserves. About 95% of Nigerian revenue is generated from oil and 
gas exploration in the region. Oil and gas constitute approximately 99% of 
Nigerian exports and more than 90% of her earnings (Ibeanu 1997; 
Olusola 2013). Expectedly, most of the upstream oil and gas production 
in Nigeria is carried out in the Niger Delta (Watts 2007; Ifesinachi and 
Aniche 2014).
the advent and evolutIon of Youth MIlItancY 
In the nIger delta
For convenience, we shall divide the historical evolution of Niger Delta 
youth militancy into two main phases, namely the pre-independence era 
and the post-independence era.
The Pre-independence Era of Niger Delta Youth Militancy
Perhaps it is important to state at this junction that under the pre- 
independence phase, the youths were not in the front burner and there-
fore were yet to take the centre stage of the Niger Delta agitations. Under 
this era, the elites still held sway. The youths were yet to be in the main-
stream of the struggle for Niger Delta emancipation (Ukeje 2001; Osaghae 
et  al. 2011). This era can further be sub-divided into two periods, the 
pre-colonial and the colonial periods.
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The struggle in the pre-colonial period began prior to the 1914 
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates (the so-called 
mistake of 1914). Thus, the movements, struggles and agitations for self- 
determination in the Niger Delta pre-dated oil prospecting, exploration 
and exploitation in Nigeria. In the late nineteenth century, various eman-
cipative resistance movements mobilised against external penetration, 
conquest, annexation, occupation, domination, repression, subjugation, 
enslavement, suppression and exploitation of the region. These move-
ments were spearheaded by local kings against the incursion of British and 
other European traders (Obi and Rustad 2011).
The agitation in the colonial period spanned between 1914 and 1960. 
For instance, the 1950s heralded renewed resistance movements against 
the marginalisation of the Niger Delta. The movements include the Mid- 
West State Movement (MWSM), the Calabar Ogoja Rivers State 
Movement (CORM) and the Conference of Rivers Chiefs and Peoples. 
These movements like the predecessors were also elitist (Obi and Rustad 
2011). With the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in the 
region in 1956, the Niger Deltans incessantly engaged oil multinationals 
and the federal government in various demonstrations (Tekena 1970; 
Obi 1997).
The Post-independence Era of Niger Delta Youth Militancy
During this era, the youth began to emerge in the mainstream of the 
Niger Delta struggle. However, the post-independence era of Niger Delta 
youth militancy can be broadly sub-divided into three phases. The first 
phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta militancy was least 
violent compared with the second phase and the third phase. The first 
phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy covers 
the relatively more confrontational Isaac Adaka Boro-led Twelve-Day 
Revolution and the relatively less confrontational Ken Saro-Wiwa-led agi-
tation. The second phase of the post-independence era of Niger Delta 
youth militancy spanned between the 1998 Kaiama Declaration and the 
2009 Amnesty Programme of Yar’Adua’s administration. The third phase 
of the post-independence era of Niger Delta youth militancy began with 
the post-amnesty resurgence of Niger Delta youth militancy under 
Buhari’s civilian administration. The third phase can also be called the 
post-amnesty phase.
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The first phase of the post-independence resistant movement was led 
by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, Samuel Owonaru and Nottingham Dick. 
Aggrieved by perceived social injustice, ethnic bigotry, political marginali-
sation and exclusion and economic deprivation, Isaac Adaka Boro with 
other youths in the Niger Delta Volunteers Services (NDVS) rebelled 
against the Nigerian state under General Aguiyi Ironsi in a Twelve-Day 
Revolution by declaring “The Niger Delta Republic” in the early hours of 
February 23, 1966 (Obi and Rustad 2011; Okumagba 2012). It further 
demanded the revocation of all oil contracts with the directives to end oil 
exploration by oil firms (Osaghae 1986; Osaghae et al. 2011).
The NDVS youth-dominated mobilisations clamped down on all oil 
installations and pipelines in Kaiama, Yenagoa, Imbiama, Oloibiri, Nembe, 
Patani, Odi, Sagbama and numerous other communities. The NDVS men 
were eventually subdued and finally surrendered to the superior forces of 
the federal troops. The impact is that it is now considered as the historical 
precursor to the present youth militancy in the Niger Delta. To demon-
strate or underscore the youthfulness of the Twelve-Day Revolution of the 
NDVS, it comprised a core of educated youths between 18 and 30 years 
from the region (Osaghae et al. 2011).
The Twelve-Day Revolution thus laid the foundation of youth militancy 
in the Niger Delta. The worsening condition of the Niger Delta under the 
dictatorial military regimes led to the emergence of the late Ken Saro-
Wiwa-led movement, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) (Ikelegbe 2001a). By adopting a pacifist strategy, Ken Saro-
Wiwa avoided Isaac Boro’s militant tactics. Saro-Wiwa rightly reckoned 
that the MOSOP would be more effectual if it exposed the Nigerian gov-
ernment and oil multinationals to the global court of public opinion. As a 
writer and environmental activist, he massively mobilised the Ogoni people 
against the state and oil multinationals (Obi and Rustad 2011). Thus, the 
later first phase of post-independence agitations was more peaceful than the 
second phase. This has been attributed to the brutal response of the 
Nigerian state—through stationing an “army of occupation”—to the 
peaceful approach (Oronto and Okonta 2003; Okafor 2010; Aminu 2013).
Under the second phase of Niger Delta youth militancy, the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC) in its December 11, 1998, Kaiama Declaration directed all 
the oil multinationals in the Niger Delta to stop operations and vacate the 
region by December 31, 1998. The main grievance of the IYC was that oil 
multinationals in the region caused enormous land damages, extreme 
food scarcities and serious environmental pollution to the region 
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(Ugwuanyi et al. 2014). The expiration of the two-week deadline was fol-
lowed by a peaceful protest march led by the Egbesu Boys. This peaceful 
demonstration eventually degenerated into violent protests as a result of 
police brutality (Ukeje 2001).
The fallout was that the youths militarised the agitation for resource 
control in defiance of state brutality. This triggered the emergence of 
numerous militant groups whose activities had serious implications for 
national security (Ukiwo 2007; Oromareghake et al. 2013). The emer-
gence of the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom and 
the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari 
Dokubo during this period intensified the armed struggle against the oil 
multinationals and the Nigerian state between 2005 and 2009 (Ukeje 
2001; Ibeanu 2002; Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). The main strategies 
adopted by these youth militants included hostage taking of oil workers, 
illegal oil bunkering (oil theft) and massive attacks on oil installations like 
bombing and vandalisation of oil pipelines and facilities (Oriola 2013; 
Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). With the escalation of militant activities in 
this period, the militant youths almost succeeded in crippling oil produc-
tion in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. The oil production was reduced to half the 
production as Angola and others overtook Nigeria in oil production 
(Omeje 2006a; Ugor 2013).
In the usual brutal or repressive style of the Nigerian state, Odi was 
raided by Nigerian soldiers in response to the murder of nine police offi-
cers. About 2483 deaths and the destruction of several properties, among 
other casualties, were recorded (Oronto et al. 2004; Isike 2005; Okumagba 
2012). The raid of Odi was followed by the invasion of Odioma in 2005, 
Egbema, Olugbobiri and Ikebiri in 2004, Okerenkoko in 2006, Agge in 
2008, Gbaramatu in 2009 and Ayakoromo in 2010. The invasion of Odi 
in 2003 was preceded by the Opia/Ikiyan invasion of 1999 (Okumagba 
2012; Oromareghake et al. 2013).
In the post-amnesty phase or third phase of post-independence Niger 
Delta youth militancy, several new youth militant groups like NDA, Red 
Egbesu Water Lions (REWL), Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force 
(JNDLF), Niger Delta Red Square (NDRS) and Niger Delta Greenland 
Justice Mandate (NDGJM) emerged in 2016 to intensify attacks on oil 
installations and bombing of oil pipelines. The NDA was the major mili-
tant group leading the resurgence of militancy in the post-amnesty Niger 
Delta. In less than six months between February and June 2016, it 
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grounded oil production in the Niger Delta. For information on the time-
line of NDA’s attack, see Table 8.1. Expectedly, Gbaramatu and several 
other Niger Delta communities were raided by the Nigerian Army under 
Operation Crocodile Smile.
Table 8.1 A compilation of the timeline on Niger Delta Avengers’ attacks, 2016
Date Time Attacks/Damages
February 10 1:30 am The group claimed to have attacked the Bonny Soku Gas 
Export Line.
February 13 The NDA blew up a major export line operated by the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC).
February 14 It claimed attack on SPDC’s giant underwater Forcados 
48-inch Export Pipeline at the Forcados Export Terminal.
February 19 3:30 am The group blew up the Clough Creek Tebidaba Agip Pipeline 
Manifold in Bayelsa State.
May 4 It attacked the Chevron Valve Platform located at Abiteye.
May 5 It launched a coordinated attack on the Chevron Well D25 in 
Abiteye and blew up major pipelines.
May 13 It bombed a Chevron pipeline at two separate spots near a 
military location.
May 20 It attacked the Escravos Gas Pipeline, Delta State.
May 21 The NDA group blew up Nembe 1, 2 and 3 Brass to Bonny 
Trunk Line belonging to Agip and Shell.
May 25 NDA struck the Chevron main electricity feed pipeline to the 
Escravos Tank Farm at Ciera Creek in Warri South-West LGA, 
Delta State.
May 26 11:45 pm The NDA group blew up another Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) Gas and Crude trunk line close to Warri.
May 27 2.15 am It destroyed Nembe 1, 2 and 3 Brass to Bonny trunk lines 
belonging to Agip and SPDC in Bayelsa State.
May 27 11.45 pm It blew up NNPC Gas and Crude trunk lines in Warri, Delta 
State.
May 31 It blew up Chevron Oil Well RMP 23 and RMP 24.
June 1 3:44 am It carried out twin attacks on wells RMP 23 and RMP 24 
owned by Chevron, Dibi, Warri South-West LGA, Delta State.
June 2 2.00 am It bombed the Ogboinbiri to Tebidaba and Clough Creek to 
Tebidaba crude oil pipelines in Bayelsa State.
June 3 3:00 am It blew up the SPDC Forcados 48-inch Export Line in Delta 
State.
June 3 3:30 am An eleven-member strike team blew up the Brass to Tebidaba 
crude oil line in Bayelsa State.
June 16 The group claimed responsibility for the attack on the NNPC 
pipeline in Oruk Anam LGA, Akwa Ibom State.
Source: Adapted and compiled from Vanguard, July 20, 2016, and Ventures Africa, July 20, 2016
8 YOUTH MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION 
146
the nature, Methods and cases of nIger delta 
Youth MIlItancY
Niger Delta youth militancy refers to all manners of violent agitations for 
resource control, self-determination and separatist and secessionist move-
ments manifesting in the form of abduction of foreign and local oil work-
ers for ransom, blow up and vandalisation of oil pipelines; illegal oil 
bunkering; violent demonstration; hijacking of ships barges; and bombing 
of oil installations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Ikelegbe 2001b; 
Epelle 2010). The Niger Delta youth militants comprised aggressive or 
violent young people who launched their attacks from the creeks and 
retreated to the creeks (Ifeka 2001; Ukeje 2001; Omeje 2004; Ikelegbe 
2006; Kashi 2008; Ugor 2013).
Thus, Osaghae et  al. (2011) characterised the Niger Delta militant 
youths as: (1) composing of youths, (2) operating secretly in cities, (3) 
acting as activists in some cases, (4) operating in camps (deep in the man-
grove swamps or creeks), (5) camping in the creeks (far from towns and 
cities) owned and controlled by “commandants”, (6) comprising over 
2000 youths in numerous camps; (7) obtaining by force or threat, (8) car-
rying lethal weapons (9) and indulging in the abuse of hard drugs like 
alcohol (local gin), marijuana and so on. The youth militants are also 
armed to the teeth.
Niger Delta youth militant groups were the metamorphosis of various 
armed gangs and cults (Ikelegbe 2006). In fact, most of the Niger Delta 
youth militants are loose federations of university cult groups, street gangs, 
drug barons, illegal oil bunkering kingpins and political thugs. Thus, the 
relationship between cults/gangs/thugs and Niger Delta youth militants 
is very close (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010; Peel 2011). Some of the most 
potent and notable militant groups in the Niger Delta include MOSOP, 
the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) led by 
Henry Okah, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Niger Delta Force 
(NDF), the NDPVF led by Asari Dokubo and the Niger Delta Liberation 
Army (NDLA) (Ikelegbe 2006; Okumagba 2012; Aminu 2013). Others 
are the NDVF led by Ateke Tom, the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the IYC, the 
Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM), the Movement for the Survival 
of Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), the Urhobo Youth Movement 
(UYOMO), the Egi Youth Federation (EYF), the Icelanders Coalition for 
Military Action (ICMA), the Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), the Niger 
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Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS), the Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas 
(NDCG), the South-South Liberation Movement (SSLM), the Movement 
for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta (MSSND), the Niger Delta 
Strike Force (NDSF), the Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front (NDPSF) 
and so on (Egwemi 2010; Okumagba 2012; Aminu 2013).
The Niger Delta youths considered their educated and traditional elites 
to be weak and irresolute. The elders are considered to be ineffective in 
compelling the indifferent and suppressive state and manipulative and 
socially irresponsible oil multinationals to address the plights of the region. 
The youths decided to take the lead in mobilising, organising and engag-
ing the state and oil multinationals. The youths have virtually taken over 
community leaderships. They have taken the position of the traditional 
rulers and community leaders in engaging the oil companies (Ikelegbe 
2005a). The youth militant groups have violently or brutally dealt with 
chiefs and other youths who are suspected of colluding with oil multina-
tionals or have defrauded communities of compensation funds and related 
benefits (Ikelegbe 2005b). The youths are now in the mainstream of the 
struggle such that the government and oil firms can only ignore them at 
their own peril.
There is also emerging evidence that the youth militants were initially 
connected with the illegal oil bunkering and trading syndicates who spon-
sored and financed them. Oil theft syndicates encouraged emergence of 
militant youth groups, enriched and armed them for the purpose of pro-
tecting and preserving their illegal businesses. Eventually, the militants 
began to participate autonomously in illegal oil bunkering due to their 
control of the creeks and access to bunkering. Thus, some of the militant 
leaders have become illegal oil bunkerers. They see illegal oil bunkering as 
part, or an extension, of the struggle for resource control. It is seen as tak-
ing, albeit illegally, what naturally belongs to them but appropriated by 
non-indigenes. They also see it as a source of funding for the struggle. 
Thus, the youth militants are now deeply involved in the sale of crude oil 
and refining of stolen crude oil for sale (Ikelegbe 2005b). Perhaps the 
import of this in sustaining, prolonging, perpetuating and intensifying 
youth militancy in the Niger Delta cannot be over-emphasised.
Also, there is emerging evidence that oil multinationals are encourag-
ing youth militancy in the Niger Delta by deploying the youth to protect 
their production and storage facilities or using them for the purpose of 
bullying, threatening and intimidating other firms competing for juicy 
contracts with them (Omoweh 2005; Ugor 2013). Thus, with the spread 
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of militancy across the Niger Delta, oil multinationals became increasingly 
involved with youth militant groups so as to regain access to oil facilities 
closed or repair oil installations damaged by militants (Amunwa 2012). 
The above revelations are very important in understanding the drivers, 
complexities, dynamics and trajectories of Niger Delta youth militancy.
the drIvers of Youth MIlItancY In the nIger delta
Generally, the post-Cold War studies of armed conflict have been domi-
nated by the resource-conflict perspective (Ikelegbe 2006; Obi and Rustad 
2011). However, Niger Delta youth militancy is so multifarious, multi- 
factorial or multi-causal that it embodies or encompasses most of the theo-
ries of violent conflicts such as frustration-aggression theory, relative 
deprivation theory, resource-conflict theory, resource-capture theory, 
resource-curse theory, rentierism, Dutch disease thesis, Marxist political 
economy perspective and so on. Therefore, no single theory can suffi-
ciently analyse or adequately explain all the reasons for the emergence and 
resurgence of Niger Delta youth militancy. We therefore adopt an eclectic 
approach to the causes of Niger Delta youth militancy.
Some of the causes of youth militancy in the Niger Delta include frus-
tration, economic deprivation, political marginalisation, social inequality, 
abject poverty, extreme inequality, youth unemployment, environmental 
degradation, health hazards, infrastructural gap, ethnic and community 
rivalry, tussle for traditional authorities, greed, political corruption, elec-
toral violence, political thuggery, land and resource dispute, militarisation 
by the Nigerian state, police brutality, structural imbalance in Nigerian 
federalism, skewed fiscal federalism, agitation for resource control, lop-
sided oil block ownership, separatist/secessionist movements, prolifera-
tion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and so on (Obi 2009; 
Ukiwo 2011).
The Contradiction of the Nigerian State 
and Militarisation of Youths
The oil multinationals and Nigerian state are implicated in collaborating 
to militarise the Niger Delta region (Oromareghake et al. 2013). Babawale 
(2002) rightly noted that the emergence and rise of youth militant groups 
in Nigeria can be situated within the internal contradictions of the 
Nigerian political economy. The militarisation of the Niger Delta is inher-
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ent in the exploitative, oppressive and suppressive nature as well as the 
neo- patrimonial and rentier character of the Nigerian post-colonial state. 
There were thus phenomena of personal rule, low relative autonomy and 
the repressive nature of the state as well as the high concentration and 
over- centralisation of power by various military regimes that sought to 
destroy any group that was opposed to them (Saro-Wiwa 1992; Okumagba 
2012). Rather than seeking political solutions, the Nigerian state pre-
ferred military solutions.
Perhaps the refusal of the Nigerian state to respond positively to the 
pens and placards of Harold Dappapriye’s and Saro-Wiwa’s era created the 
condition of frustration and aggression. Thus, it has been argued that 
violent agitation arose as a result of the use of force by the Nigerian state 
on initial non-violent protests by Niger Delta youths against the gross 
under-development of their area (Okonta and Oronto 2001; Ukiwo 2007; 
Oromareghake et al. 2013). In other words, the use of force, rather than 
quelling Niger Delta youth militancy, exacerbated it (Ukeje 2001; Ibeanu 
2002; Ikoh and Ukpong 2013; Kio-Lawson and Dekor 2014). The Niger 
Delta has thus become a region of intractable conflict, protracted agita-
tion, perpetual struggle, unending crisis and recurring violence (Ibaba 
2008; Inokoba and Imbua 2010).
Structural Imbalance, Skewed Fiscal Federalism 
and Youth Militancy
Oil-producing states in the Nigerian federation have paradoxically benefited 
the least from oil wealth. The federal fiscal policy in Nigeria is structured in 
such a way as to favour non-oil-producing ethnic majorities at the expense 
of oil-producing ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta. This triggered the 
agitation for resource control, campaign for restructuring, the struggle for 
self-determination and the clamour for a sovereign national conference 
(Oronto et al. 2004; Oromareghake et al. 2013). Thus, the emergence of 
Niger Delta youth militants is attributed to the imperfections inherent in 
Nigeria’s federal system (Saro-Wiwa 1995; Okumagba 2012).
The agitations for resource control, restructuring, constitutional 
reforms, ‘true’ fiscal federalism and perhaps self-determination in the Niger 
Delta derive from the structural imbalance of the Nigerian fiscal federalism, 
which has continually been antithetical to the developmental needs and 
aspirations of the people (Obi 1997). Perhaps it was because of the need to 
redress this structural imbalance in the unjust 1999 Constitution or skewed 
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fiscal federalism that NDA included immediate application of the report of 
the 2014 National Conference as one of its conditions for cessation of mili-
tancy (see Table 8.2).
Agitation for Resource Control and Niger Delta Youth Militancy
This is agitation for access to oil wealth and a greater share of the federally 
allocated oil revenues (Kemedi 2002; Vitalis 2002). Perhaps the most 
coherent presentation of Niger Deltans’ idea of “resource control” can be 
found in the “December 11, 1998 Kaiama Declaration” (Osaghae et  al. 
2011). The agitation for resource control, the struggle for self- determination 
Table 8.2 Niger Delta Avengers’ conditions to the federal government of Nigeria
S/No Conditions
1. Immediate implementation of the report of the 2014 National Conference. 
Otherwise, this country will break up forcefully.
2. President Buhari, the Department of State Security (DSS) and Timipre Sylva 
should apologise to the people of the Niger Delta region and family of Late Chief 
D.S.P. Alamieyesegha for killing him with intimidation and harassment because of 
his party affiliation.
3. The ownership of oil blocks must reflect 60% for the oil-producing people and 
40% for the non-oil-producing people.
4. The only Nigerian Maritime University sited in the most appropriate and 
befitting place Okerenkoko must start the 2015–2016 academic session 
immediately.
5. The Minister of Transportation, Mr Rotimi Amechi, should apologise to the 
Ijaws and the entire Niger Delta people for his careless and reckless statements 
about the siting of the University.
6. The Ogoniland and indeed all oil-polluted lands in the Niger Delta must be 
cleaned up and compensation be paid to all oil-producing communities.
7. Mr Nnamdi Kanu, the Leader of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), must be 
released unconditionally as the court said.
8. The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme must be well funded and let it continue to 
run effectively.
9. All Progressives Congress (APC) members that are indicted in any corruption- 
related cases should be made to face trial like the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) members. Otherwise Buhari should shamefully forget about this nonsense 
anti-corruption fight.
10. All oil multinationals and foreign investors should observe this ultimatum, as 
their business interest in the country must be the first target.
Sources: Adapted and compiled from Daily Post May 9, 2016; Naija News May 9, 2016; The Sun May 9, 
2016; News Punch May 16, 2016
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and the clamour for a sovereign national conference have in turn triggered 
youth militancy in the Niger Delta (Oronto et al. 2004; Oluwaniyi 2010). 
By centralising the ownership and control of oil resource, the youths have 
become increasingly militant, thereby engaging in anti-state activities 
(Ikelegbe 2001a; Okumagba 2012). The escalation of the Niger Delta crisis 
is considered as politics of access to the oil resource which has over time 
assumed different dimensions (Oromareghake et al. 2013). The agitation 
for resource ownership and control is therefore very crucial in understand-
ing youth militancy in the region.
Lopsided Ownership of Oil Blocks and Niger Delta 
Youth Militancy
Oil-bearing communities have been denied the financial and economic 
benefits resulting from the huge wealth or revenue derived from the 
exploitation of their natural resources (Oriola 2013; Ugor 2013). This 
was one of the causes of resurgence of youth militancy by the NDA in the 
post-amnesty era. As a result, one of the conditions of the NDA for cessa-
tion of militant activities to the federal government of Nigeria under 
Buhari’s administration was that the ownership of oil blocks must reflect 
60% for the oil-producing people and 40% for the non-oil-producing 
 people (see Table 8.2).
Ethnic/Community Rivalry and Niger Delta Youth Militancy
The skewed distribution of oil revenue is seen as the cause of the numer-
ous inter-ethnic violence incidents, including the ongoing youth militancy 
in the region. Babawale (2002) observed that one of the reasons for the 
emergence of militant youths in the Niger Delta was the manipulation of 
the factors of ethnicity by the governing elites across the various regions, 
particularly as levers of political power. He further stated that these mili-
tant organisations were formed as a consequence of the mismanagement 
of ethnic grievances by the Nigerian state. Oil exploration and production 
have consequently led to family feuds, intra-communal disputes, inter- 
communal conflicts and inter-ethnic wars (Watts 2007; Olusola 2013). By 
resorting to divide and rule, the Nigerian state and oil majors have aggra-
vated or worsened youth militancy in the region.
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Ecological Pollution, Environmental Degradation, Health 
Hazards and Youth Militancy
There are over 1000 flare sites amounting to about 23 billion cubic metres 
(constituting over 13% of global gas flaring) and approximately 300 spills 
per years in the Niger Delta region (Aniche 2015). Gas flaring and oil 
spills have therefore contributed tremendously in devastating the ecology 
and degrading the environment of the Niger Delta, constituting enor-
mous health hazard (Aniche 2016; Okafor and Aniche 2016). Oil produc-
tion has cost the people their farmlands, fishing rivers and exposed the 
people to health hazards. The resultant effect is the devastation of the 
ecosystem of the region in terms of soil fertility loss, agricultural decline, 
forest loss, fisheries decline and biodiversity depletion. The oil economy 
has disinherited and displaced the indigenous people who are dependent 
on the primary economies of farming, fishing and hunting (Oronto et al. 
2004; Oromareghake et al. 2013).
The Nigerian government has failed to implement the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) report on Ogoniland. Thus, rather than 
beget or facilitate development, oil has actually been a harbinger of devasta-
tion and under-development to the region. All these culminated in rendering 
Niger Delta as a breeding ground for a generation of militant youths and a 
political flashpoint of violence (Oronto et  al. 2004; Oromareghake et  al. 
2013). This is the reason why NDA included cleaning up and remediation of 
oil spills in Ogoniland and all oil-polluted lands in the region and compensat-
ing all oil-producing communities as one of the conditions for cessation of 
destruction of oil installations and facilities (see Table 8.2).
Youth Unemployment, Poverty and Niger Delta Youth Militancy
Although oil from the Niger Delta is the mainstay of the Nigerian econ-
omy, there is abject poverty in the region. Despite the 13% accruing to 
states in the region from oil revenues, the people remain extremely poor 
(Oronto et al. 2004; Okumagba 2012). Youth unemployment in Oloibori 
alone (the first village where oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 
1956 and drilling began in 1958) is put conservatively at 50% (Ifeka 2001; 
Ukeje 2001; Omeje 2008; Kashi 2008; Ugor 2013).
The unemployed and idled youths thus become a readily available pool 
for recruitment and radicalisation into militant activities. Most of these 
jobless youths have also gained direct connections working for oil theft 
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syndicates in the creeks, thereby exposing them to illegal oil bunkering 
business contacts and supply networks. This eventually resulted in the 
exchange of oil for money and arms by the unemployed militant youths 
(Ibeanu 2000; Oliveira 2007; Watts 2009; Ugor 2013). This could be the 
reason why the NDA insisted that the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme 
must be well funded as part of its conditions to the Nigerian state for ces-
sation of bombing of oil pipelines (see Table 8.2).
Infrastructural Gap and Niger Delta Youth Militancy
This is a case of the federal government’s historical neglect of the develop-
mental and infrastructural needs of the region from which the bulk of 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange is earned. Even oil multinationals are not com-
mitted to alleviating the plight of their host communities. Thus, the 
youths have become increasingly militant, engaging in anti-state and anti- 
corporate activities (Okumagba 2012). The violent agitations of Niger 
Delta youths stemmed from infrastructural deficits of their area as a result 
of the neglect by both the federal government and oil multinationals oper-
ating in the area (Ukiwo 2007; Oromareghake et  al. 2013). The point 
being made is that international oil corporations (IOCs) have not ade-
quately discharged their corporate social responsibilities (CSRs) to their 
host communities, thereby fanning the embers of youth militancy in 
the region.
Economic Deprivation, Political Marginalisation, Social 
Inequality and Youth Militancy
The issue of economic deprivation, political marginalisation and social 
inequality became rife in the Niger Delta. The general perception in the 
area is that their marginalisation is attributable to the minority status of 
the region and that the dominant ethnic groups in the federation use the 
oil resources from the Niger Delta to develop areas inhabited by them 
(Saro-Wiwa 1995; Obi 2002; Osaghae 1995). This led to the emergence 
and proliferation of militant youth groups in the Niger Delta such that 
between 1990 and 1999 not less than 24 youth militant groups emerged 
in the Niger Delta (Okumagba 2012).
It suffices to say that the adoption of relative deprivation thesis in 
explanation of the seemingly intractable Niger Delta militancy is already 
well documented in the literature. The deprived and distressed youths 
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resorted to violence or militancy as a way of expressing their grievances. 
Consequently, the renewed post-amnesty militant activities in the region 
by NDA cannot be utterly dissociated from relative deprivation and 
extreme inequality.
Frustration and Niger Delta Youth Militancy
Frustration of the youths of the Niger Delta from the above factors even-
tually led them to aggression against the Nigerian state and the oil multi-
nationals (including their employees, especially expatriates). The inevitable 
aggressive expressions of this frustration or anger were attacking of oil 
installations, destruction oil facilities, bombing of oil pipelines, kidnap-
ping of oil expatriate workers and so on (Ikelegbe 2005b; Osaghae et al. 
2011; Aminu 2013). The aggrieved and frustrated youths relied on mili-
tant activities as the only or best means of bending the unresponsive gov-
ernment and irresponsible oil companies. Suffice it to say that the 
application of the frustration-aggression thesis in explaining the protracted 
Niger Delta militancy is already well documented in the literature. The 
current post-amnesty resurgence of youth militancy in the region by NDA 
cannot be completely divorced from frustration.
Electoral Violence, Political Thuggery and Niger Delta 
Youth Militancy
Most of the militant youths today were used by politicians as political 
thugs for bullying, harassing and intimidating opposition parties/candi-
dates. Some were even recruited from the creeks as assassins by politicians 
to assassinate political enemies. The tribal kings and elders were also 
involved in arming youths to murder and harass opposition political forces 
in their unbridled ambition to acquire power, consolidate it, retain their 
influence and in their quest to exercise authority and control over king-
doms/territories. Usually abandoned and ignored after elections, these 
youths used the weapons to help themselves (Omoweh 2005; Ugor 2013).
One of the reasons attributed for the escalation of the insurgency in the 
Niger Delta as an aftermath the 2003 elections in Nigeria was that some 
of the militant youths who were armed and used by politicians and 
political- office seekers against perceived political opponents were not 
demobilised, rehabilitated and reintegrated into the political mainstream. 
Having felt used and dumped by politicians, the youths used arms in mili-
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tant activities (Okumagba 2012). The import of this is that the second 
phase of post-independence especially post-military youth militancy in the 
Niger Delta cannot be totally disconnected from the 2003 election vio-
lence and political thuggery in Nigeria.
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 
and Youth Militancy
There was a surge in the movement, proliferation and availability of 
SALWs in the Niger Delta region as a result of the escalation of violence 
and militancy. SALWs became not only the sources of strength and power 
but also the sources of illegal income as violence became commodified 
(Ikoh and Ukpong 2013). Some of these small arms were sourced from 
war-ravaged parts of the West African sub-region and war returnees from 
peacekeeping, politicians, traditional leaders, oil dealers, military and para-
military officers and so on (Ikelegbe 2001b; Osaghae et  al. 2011). 
Weapons were often exchanged for stolen or illegally bunkered oil.
There are indeed pull and push factors or demand and supply sides of 
SALW proliferation in the Niger Delta. The resultant effect is that the 
Niger Delta became a centre for the proliferation of lethal SALWs and 
inevitable intensification of armed conflicts, escalation of militancy and 
spread of criminalities. Consequently, youth militants raised arms against 
the Nigerian state and oil multinationals (Omeje 2006b; Watts 2007). 
Therefore, there is a link or nexus between the proliferation of SALWs and 
rising youth militant activities in the region.
the consequences of Youth MIlItancY 
In the nIger delta
The consequences or effects of youth militancy in the Niger Delta are 
legion. Some of the consequences include capital flight, loss of oil reve-
nue, loss of lives and properties, unemployment, poverty, conflicts, insecu-
rity and emigration, social deprivation, oil theft, illegal oil bunkering, 
abuse of cultural values and mores and so on (Osaghae 1995; Ibaba 2008; 
Monisola 2013).
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Youth Militancy, Insecurity and Emigration in the Niger Delta
The violent and criminal activities of the Niger Delta youth militants like 
oil pipeline vandalisation, bombing of oil facilities, kidnapping of oil work-
ers, sea piracy and so on create an atmosphere of insecurity and fear which 
can in turn lead to emigration of expatriate oil workers. These have devas-
tating effects on national security and stability (Ikelegbe 2006; Osaghae 
et al. 2011). For example, over 600 expatriate workers were abducted and 
over 57 armed attacks were launched on oil installations from 2004 to 
2009 (Ikein 2009). At its height, youth militancy rendered the region an 
ungoverned space unleashing tremendous security challenges. The state of 
insecurity in Niger Delta forced the major oil multinationals to withdraw 
their workers from the oil fields in the region and suspended production, 
thereby reducing national output by about 750,000 barrels per day (bpd) 
(Oriola 2013; Ugor 2013).
The recent post-amnesty revival of militant activities by NDA was so 
massive that Nigeria could not meet her Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota. Nigeria consequently lost her posi-
tion as one of highest oil-producing and exporting countries in Africa and 
the world to Angola, Gabon and so on. The insecurity in the region has 
also scared away potential investors in the oil and gas industry. This has a 
serious negative impact on the economy of the federation.
Niger Delta Youth Militancy and Loss of Oil Revenues
The enormity of the effect of Niger Delta youth militant activities on the 
Nigerian economy resulted in 40% reduction in oil revenue from 2005 to 
2008 (Ikein 2009). The militant activities of the youths resulted in several 
shut-ins of oil facilities by the oil multinationals and caused disruption in 
oil production (Aminu 2013). Ojieh (2010) noted that oil production in 
Nigeria dropped from 2.6 million barrels a day to about 1 million bpd at 
the peak of Niger Delta militancy between 2006 and 2009 (Ugwuanyi 
et al. 2014). The implication for oil revenue and capacity of the govern-
ment to meet its expenditure in provision of infrastructures was enor-
mous. The post-amnesty resurgence of youth militant attacks by NDA in 
2016 was attributed as one of the major factors that plunged Nigeria into 
economic recession. The economy has been so devastated and crippled 
that the country is yet to fully recover from it.
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Niger Delta Youth Militancy, Oil Theft and Illegal 
Oil Bunkering
Oil theft and smuggling were rampant in the late 1990s. It was reported 
by NNPC that there were 114 pipeline breaks in Port Harcourt and Warri 
areas between April and May 2000 alone. There were over 101 cases of 
pipeline vandalisation investigated by the Nigeria Police Force between 
April 2000 and December 2001 (Ikelegbe 2005b). Estimates of oil loss 
due to oil theft and illegal bunkering range from 75  million bpd to 
300 million bpd. In 2001 alone, Shell lost on average about 30,000 bpd 
which increased to 100,000 bpd in 2002. The other oil multinationals lost 
about 100,000 bpd in the same year. The total loss to the country in 2002 
was about 200,000 bpd, which was about 10% of total production of 
about 2 million bpd. Shell alone lost about 100,000 bpd and a total of 
about 9 million barrels in 2003. It is also estimated that the Nigerian gov-
ernment loses about $3.5 billion annually (Ikelegbe 2005c).
According to a report commissioned by Shell in 2003, it was estimated 
that “a staggering 275,000 to 685,000 bpd of crude were being stolen by 
oil thieves in the Niger Delta” (Omoweh 2005). The Nigerian govern-
ment was losing an estimated “$22.5 million daily (on $90/barrel price)” 
between 2003 and 2008. Illegal bunkering alone accounted for at least 
15% of annual output losses for the oil majors in the region. Much of this 
illicit fund was channelled back into fuelling the conflict in the form of 
liquid capital for the purchase of weapons by the militants (Peel 2011; 
Ugor 2013). Illegal oil bunkering has resulted in the proliferation of ille-
gal refineries in the region with its associated health, environmental and 
economic implications for the region and the federation.
Youth Militancy, Communal and Ethnic Conflicts 
in the Niger Delta
The Niger Delta region has witnessed a regime of terrifying intra-/inter- 
communal and intra/inter-ethnic conflicts, for example, intra-communal 
conflicts within Ozoro and so on; inter-communal conflicts between 
Basambri and Nembe, Ogbologbomabri and Nembe and so on; and inter- 
ethnic conflicts between the Ijaw and Itsekiri, Ijaw and Ilaje, Urhobo and 
Itsekiri and so on. The most far-reaching and intensifying of these conflicts 
has been the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict in the Warri area, which has raged recur-
rently since 1997. There were further outbreaks of the conflict in 2002, 
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2003 and 2004. These conflicts have at different times escalated so much as 
to engender the state of insecurity and oil production disruptions (Ikelegbe 
2005c). The intensity of these communal and ethnic conflicts has on vari-
ous occasions turned the region into battlefields or theatre of battles.
Niger Delta Youth Militancy and Capital Flight
Due to the atmosphere of fear and insecurity created by youth militancy in 
the region as well as the enormous losses suffered by oil multinationals, 
many of them divested and left Nigeria for other oil-producing countries 
like Angola, Gabon, Ghana and so on. This has also scared away prospec-
tive investors. Some of the resultant effects of this include unemployment, 
loss of public revenues, poverty, hunger, reduction in public expenditures, 
abandoned projects, reduction in inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), rise in outflow of FDI, brain drain, economic recession and so on.
Youth Militancy and Loss of Lives/Properties in the Niger Delta
Niger Delta youth militancy has resulted in the tremendous loss of lives 
and properties. One of the consequences of the militarisation of the Niger 
Delta is inestimable casualties. The loss of lives and human casualties con-
stituted an immense loss in human resources and a huge cost to human 
capital development, while the damage or destruction of properties cre-
ated an enormous waste of physical capital or material resources. The eco-
nomic implication for Nigeria in terms of material cost and financial loss is 
inestimable or immeasurable (see Table 8.3).
conclusIon
We noted that these militant youth organisations in the Niger Delta 
embarked upon a series of peaceful demonstrations against environmental 
degradation. They accused the government of economic disempowerment 
and handling of the environmental consequences of oil exploration with 
levity; hence, they resorted to violence leading to insecurity. They 
demanded for accelerated development of their region from oil revenues 
generated from their area. Some of such militant activities include inces-
sant attacks of oil installations, hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, 
destruction of oil facilities, oil theft or pipeline vandalisation (Okonta and 
Oronto 2001; Oromareghake et al. 2013).
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We subsequently identified some of the causes of youth militancy in the 
Niger Delta. The paradox of the Niger Delta situation is that rather than 
oil being a blessing to the region it has become a curse. Oil has in fact 
under-developed and devastated the region rather than developed it. Oil 
explorations by oil multinationals in the region have bedevilled the region 
with environmental degradation, ecological pollution, health hazard, 
social neglects, political marginalisation, economic deprivation, abject 
poverty, youth unemployment, extreme inequality, infrastructural deficits, 
structural imbalance, oppression and various forms of human rights viola-
tions (Obi 1997). Yet successive governments and oil multinationals have 
Table 8.3 Militarisation of the Niger Delta, 1990–2006
Date Place Operating force Action
October 1990 Umuechem Security 
Protection Unit
Killed 80 unarmed demonstrators and 
destroyed 495 houses
1993 Umuechem Razed houses and destroyed properties
1999 Odi Army and 
Mobile Police
Razed the entire community as every
house and property worth millions of
naira were burnt down
January 2004 Uwheru Operation 
Restore Hope
Killed 20 Persons and burnt down 11 
houses





Used gunboats and military helicopters 
to bomb and destroy 13 communities. 
Razed a total of 500 buildings in which 
200 persons, mostly women and 
children, were feared dead and are still 
missing





Killed 16 youths for agitating for a 
better deal from oil multinationals
October 2005 Odioma Joint Security 
Task Force
Killed 77 persons, including youths
2006 Okerenkoko Joint Security 
Task Force
Killed several people and destroyed 
properties
2008 Agge Joint Security 
Task Force
Killed several people and destroyed 
properties
May 2009 Gbaramatu Joint Security 
Task Force




Ayakoromo Joint Security 
Task Force
Killed several people and destroyed 
properties
Source: Okumagba, P.O. (2012). Militancy and human rights violation in the Niger Delta. International 
Review of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3 (2), 28–37
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failed to address the fundamental issues. They have been addressing symp-
toms rather than the syndrome or the effects rather than the root causes. 
The repressive approach of the Nigerian state thus contributed to the 
change from peaceful protests to violent agitations, leading to the emer-
gence of various militant youth groups (Okumagba 2012).
We have also noted these drivers (as captured by the NDA’s conditions 
to the federal government) that underpin the recent post-amnesty resur-
gence or revival of youth militancy in the Niger Delta spearheaded by 
NDA in 2016. The consequences have been massive, enormous and rein-
forcing. The deepening, prolonged and recurring youth militancy has ren-
dered Niger Delta a crisis region. Until the fundamental issues like 
constitutional reforms, resource control, fiscal federalism, enactment of 
the petroleum industry bill and other drivers of youth militancy are 
addressed, violence, militancy, insurgency, separatist movements and agi-
tations for self-determination or secession in the region will continue to 
assume a more complex form. More militant youths will emerge even after 
NDA.  Already a militant youth group called Reformed Niger Delta 
Avengers (RNDA) is now making its demands.
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CHAPTER 9





The inevitability of crime in every human community is definite and con-
vincing since humans are not angels. Hence, crimes and criminal activities 
have since time immemorial featured prominently in the society irrespec-
tive of the glossary of strict laws and the accompanying sanctions against 
them. This is also true about the emergent virtual world of the Internet 
(cyberworld), which is being terrorized by cyber-criminals. According to 
Umeozulu (2012), cyber-crime connotes “criminal activities, involving 
information technology infrastructure, including illegal access of com-
puter data from or within a computer.” With the application of the infor-
mation and communication technologies, cyber-crime is not limited by 
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time and space, and, as such, it represents a step further from the classics 
of crime which are time and space bound. This fact explains why many a 
criminal have migrated from the streets to the Web for their criminal activ-
ities. This is captured in Umeozulu (2012), when he asserted that the 
Internet is now a safe haven for the criminals who have deserted the streets 
for the cyberworld. To some significant extent cyber-crimes are hardly 
onsite; they are online and mostly committed from the comfort zones of 
the criminals. According to Adeniran (2008, para. 1), series of chances 
offered by the Internet “for instance, electronic mailing, ‘chat’ systems 
and internet messaging (IM), often serve as veritable grounds for carrying 
out evil ‘webonomics’ and other fraudulent activities by the youths” (or 
rather, the criminals). However, Olaide and Adewole (2004) argued that 
the majority of the number of crimes committed in Nigeria are typically by 
the youth.
In today’s Nigeria, a number of cyber-crimes and the like are perpetu-
ated on a regular basis in diverse forms, among which are included, but 
not limited to, fraudulent electronic mails, cyber-impersonation of charac-
ters, pornography, spamming and phishing or hacking of automated teller 
machines (ATM), just to mention these few. It is instructive to note that 
the aforementioned crimes are perpetuated through cyberspace, and 
assurances of huge financial gains are used to lure the online victims by the 
cyber-criminals (Okeshola and Adeta 2013). Internet crimes could be 
committed for several reasons but the enormity of economic undertone 
being commanded by cyber-crimes from Nigeria and/or by Nigerians 
piques interest for investigating the role of the economic realities in the 
country, such as high rate of unemployment, in the surging volume of the 
notorious crime. The possibility of establishing a significant correlation 
between the harsh economic condition in Nigeria and cyber-criminality is 
more palpable, given the fact that “the unemployment level of the youth 
is twice that of the adults unemployment” (Mago 2014, p.  33). Alabi 
(2014) corroborated this position when he wrote that the youth 
unemployment rate has been staggeringly very high in the past ten years 
compared to the national unemployment rates. Furthermore, the 
correlation is no less promising against the increasing urbanization and 
the attendant rural-urban migration, especially by the youths, in search of 
economic succor in the urban centres of the country. Against this 
background, this study assumes that unemployment and migration largely 
account for cyber-criminality in Nigeria.
 C. C. OZEH AND C. C. OHAJIONU
167
theoretIcal orIentatIon
This study is guided by McClelland’s Needs Theory. This theory also 
refers to Three Needs Theory—Acquired Needs Theory, Motivational 
Needs Theory and Learned Needs Theory. David McClelland propounded 
this orientation in his 1961 book, The Achieving Society, following the 
Abraham Maslow’s original idea of Hierarchy of Needs in 1941. 
McClelland highlighted three motivators which he claimed all humans 
possess: Achievement need (n-Ach), Affiliation need (n-Aff) and Power 
need (n-Pow), irrespective of our gender, culture or age. He argued that 
people will display different attributes, given their strongest and dominant 
motivator. And that the dominant need is a product of culture and life 
experiences.
The achievement-motivated individual (n-Ach) pursues in strong terms 
his dreams and goals not minding how challenging the process may be. 
Also, such individual aspires to the highest position of his career. Meeting 
his goals brings about complete fulfillment to the n-Ach. The n-Pow indi-
vidual, on the other hand, is motivated by high position in the society, 
which we can call “authority motivated.” The individual desires to com-
mand public respect by working toward it. He also enjoys being influen-
tial, coordinating other peoples’ affairs and, very importantly, deriving 
satisfaction from his personal status and prestige which dignifies him. 
Lastly, the n-Aff individual is motivated by affiliation. This individual 
craves for relationships, friendship and association in various kinds. His 
ability to connect and be recognized gives him a sense of fulfillment, and 
they strive more within a team.
The McClelland’s theory of Needs is by all intents and purposes a man-
agement theory. Obvious, however, is the theory’s ability to explain peo-
ple’s behavior not only in a work environment but in the larger society. 
These identifiable needs in the theory (n-Arch, n-Aff and n-Pow) are also 
the drivers of the behaviors of people in the society. It could explain why 
people choose any available means to satisfying their individual dominant 
needs. The paramount importance for satisfying the dominant need of an 
individual is certain, and deviant means could be adopted if the acceptable 
methods are absent.
Nigeria of today is faced with the challenge of increasing unemploy-
ment, and the young people are mostly affected in the country. Awogbenle 
and Iwuamadi (2010) observed that according to the National Manpower 
Board and the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria’s youth population is 
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about 80 million which represents 60 percent of the entire population of 
Nigeria. They went further to state that, from the numbers given, about 
1.6 million are underemployed. Doreo (2013) also opined that Nigeria’s 
unemployment rate grows at the rate of 16 percent per year, and the youth 
have been the most affected. For young people, the impact of unemploy-
ment can be threatening. This is because some youth are tempted to 
engage in social vices to meet their daily needs and regain their sense of 
self. From the foregoing, the massive involvement of Nigerian youth in 
cyber-criminality becomes understandable. McClelland was succinct in his 
position that irrespective of age, gender and culture, we all possess the 
needs for achievement, affiliation and power, with one dominating and 
invariably conditioning the behavior of the individual in the society. The 
economic undertone of Nigerian cyber-crime is possibly therefore due to 
the bid to satisfy the individual’s dominant need.
Methodology
This study adopted qualitative method of data collection and analysis 
wherein it analyzed descriptively data collected from the secondary sources 
such as journals, newspapers, textbooks and the Internet.
conceptual and eMpIrIcal revIews
Cyber-Criminality: Definitions and Classifications
Just as with other concepts in the social sciences, the definitions of cyber- 
crime are equally faced with the challenge of a universal definition not even 
among the agencies charged with law enforcement in that regard 
(NHTCU/NOP 2002). As Wall (2001, p.  2) denotes, the concept of 
cyber-crime “has no specific reference in law; although, attention has been 
paid to it in the discipline of political science, media, criminal justice and 
especially academic debates,” where the word connotes a number of illegal 
activities aided by the tools of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT). Thomas and Loader (2000, p. 3), in corroboration, conceptualized 
cyber-crime as “computer-mediated activities which are either illegal or 
considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through 
global electronic networks.” Thus, cyber-crime is domiciled in the cyber-
space, a virtual Internet world (Castells 2002). Britz (2009) in his position 
defined cyber-crime as the deliberate misuses and abuses of computers with 
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an Internet access or web of interconnected computers, which gives rise to 
Internet theft and other related crimes supported over the Internet. Clearly, 
the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime (2005) viewed 
cyber-crime as operational Internet actions that involve using digital tech-
nologies to commit an electronic offence.
Cyber-crime has equally been viewed from sociological and technologi-
cal angles. From the former angle, Cohen and Felson (1979) held the 
opinion that cyber-crime is a form of criminality committed by the cyber- 
criminal against the unsuspecting and unguarded Internet user. Cyber- 
crime, therefore, is similar, if not the same thing, to other criminal offenses 
(Emanuelsson-Korsell and Soderman 2001). From the latter angle, 
Brenner (2007) asserted that it is the application of computer technology 
to commit crime.
Generally speaking, given the daily improvement and innovation in 
Internet technology, cyber-crime can transform into a novel era of crimi-
nal activities unseen and inexperienced (Wilson and Shun-Yung 2009). 
Within the above definitions, it is imperative to group cyber-crime within 
specific typologies such as the following by Wall:
 1. Cyber-trespass—crossing boundaries into other people’s property 
and/or causing damage, for example, hacking, defacement, viruses.
 2. Cyber-deceptions and thefts—stealing (money, property), for 
example, credit card fraud, intellectual property violations (a.k.a. 
“piracy”).
 3. Cyber-pornography—activities that breach laws on obscenity 
and decency.
 4. Cyber-violence—doing psychological harm to, or inciting physical 
harm against, others, thereby breaching laws pertaining to the pro-
tection of the person, for example, hate speech, stalking 
(2001, pp. 3–7).
The typologies of cyber-crime above followed different targets: The 
numbers 1 and 2 are typically “crimes against property,” number 3 bor-
ders on “crimes against morality,” while number 4 supposes “crimes 
against the person.” Given the above, one can also include “crimes against 
the state,” involving actions that prevent and contravene the established 
laws that protect the state and its institutions (e.g. terrorism, espionage 
and disclosure of official secrets). Such a categorization is vital, in that we 
are able to understand and analyze cyber-crime to existing conceptions of 
unlawful and dangerous acts.
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Extant Laws Against Cyber-Crime in Nigeria
Until May 2015 in Nigeria there was no specific law to combating cyber- 
crime. The criminals were on a free ride without any particular legislation 
to checkmate their illegal acts. Although there were laws which was not 
specifically relevant to cyber-crimes but in a way maybe used to a limited 
extent to confront the matter. These laws are: Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 and, Nigerian Criminal 
Code. In May 2015, according to Channels Television (2016, November 
12), the “cyber-crime bill was signed into law, properly defining the act as 
unlawful with penalties attached to any disobedience of the law.” The con-
ducts of the “cyber fraudsters” are detrimental to the country’s economy. 
And, as such, it is tantamount to economic crimes which the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Establishment) defined as:
the non- violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objectives of 
earning wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized man-
ner thereby violating existing legislation governing the economic activities 
of government and its administration. It includes any form of fraud, narcotic 
drug trafficking, money laundering embezzlement, bribery, looting and any 
form of corrupt malpractices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human traffick-
ing and child labour, oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign 
exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intel-
lectual property and policy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and 
prohibited goods etc. (Channels Television 2016, November 12)
The other available law is the Nigeria Criminal Code, which is also used 
in charging for cyber-crimes and other related offences. And a number of 
the cyber-criminal’s activities are hinged on falsehood, pretensions and 
cheating and are contrary to Sections 419 and 421 of the Nigerian 
Criminal Code, respectively. According to Section 418, obtaining prop-
erty by false pretense presupposes “Any representation made by words, 
writing, or conduct, of a matter of fact, either past or present, which rep-
resentation of false in fact and which the other person making it knows to 
be false or does not believe to be true, is a false pretense.”
In the letters and spirit of Section 419:
Any person who by any pretense, and with intent to defraud, obtains from 
any other person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other 
person to deliver to any person anything capable of being stolen, is guilty of 
a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.
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If the thing is of the value of one thousand naira or upward, he is liable 
to imprisonment for seven years.
It is immaterial that the thing is obtained by or its delivery is induced 
through the medium of contract induced by the false pretense. The offender 
cannot be arrested without warrant unless found committing the offence.
There are, however, some draft bills initiated on cyber-crime which include:
• Computer Security and Critical Infrastructure Bill of 2005,
• Electronic Service Provision Bill of 2008,
• Interception and Monitoring Bill of 2009,
• Cyber Security Bill of 2011, and
• Criminal Code Amendment for Offences Relating to Computer 
Misuse and Cybercrimes of 2011.
One common thread that spanned these bills is the fact that none of 
them has been able to make it through the law-making process to becom-
ing a real piece of legislation in the fight on cyber-crimes.
Cyber-Criminality and Nigeria’s International Image
Ogunleye, an ICT and security expert with the Nigeria Cyber Crime 
Working Group (NCWG) revealed that the increasing rates of cyber- 
crimes have outnumbered the rate of Internet usage in Nigeria. He was 
quoted saying that “Nigeria is the 56th out of 60 countries in embracing 
internet usage but third in the fraud attempt category.” This goes to sup-
port the fact that the implication of cyber-crimes in Nigeria and on her 
citizenry is detrimental. The international bodies on corruption, such as 
the Transparency International (TI), have listed Nigeria as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. And this is not unconnected with the mas-
sive cyber-crimes perpetuated from a very significant number of Nigerians. 
This reality has the potential of impacting negatively on the socioeco-
nomic development of the country which is a strong force for innovation 
and job creation in the state. The sorry tales have been that international 
financial institutions are even more critical and doubtful while conducting 
financial transactions. Little wonder that drafts and checks by Nigerian 
banks are not viable international financial instruments.
A major challenge facing the Nigerian state at the moment is that her 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and e-mail services have been barred in 
their systems online. In several cases, access is denied to some Internet 
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network traffic and segment of Nigeria’s origin. Better improved and 
stronger “technovations” have been deployed to aid easy identification 
and subsequent isolation of e-mail traffic coming from Nigeria. Very cru-
cial and classified information are likely to be destroyed by the unhealthy 
character of the cyber-fraudsters if not checkmated. Really, one cannot 
determine the extent to which cyber-crimes will affect the Nigerian econ-
omy. Recent events have been showing that it could have a damaging 
consequence on both the economic and financial life of the state. This 
attributes the reasons why Nigerian financial transactions are often delayed 
by international banks not until proper verification has been conducted on 
such transactions. This in itself affects the prospect of international invest-
ment in Nigeria by foreign investors.
uneMployMent, MIgratIon and cyber-crIMInalIty 
In nIgerIa
It is a household knowledge that unemployment rate in Nigeria has con-
tinued to be on the increase despite the abundant human and natural 
resources available in the country. Every year, thousands of graduates are 
produced, but there are no jobs for majority of them. According to the 
Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria is faced with up to 20 mil-
lion unemployed people, with about 2 million joining the inglorious team 
of the unemployed every year. This among other things has resulted in 
rural-urban, urban-urban and cross-border migration in Nigeria. This is 
understandable as human beings are economic animals, and just like herds 
of cattle and other lower animals that go about in search of greener pas-
tures for grazing, humans go from one place to another in search of better 
economic conditions. Migration has featured in Nigeria’s national exis-
tence following its independence in 1960. Since then, Nigeria, being the 
most populous country in Africa with over 180 million population and 
more than 250 ethnic groups, has battled a number of migration crises, 
from the monstrous brain drain occasioned by cross-border migration, to 
intra-regional and intra-national migration.
After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the federal government created 
additional states aside the existing regions, which encouraged massive 
internal migration of citizens from one state to another, especially in a bid 
to make both ends meet. This was as the emergent state capitals turned the 
hub of commercial activities attracting a great deal of job seekers, traders, 
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civil servants (Mberu and Pongou 2010). Along this line, Aigbokhan 
(1988) wrote that the massive rural-urban migration has since been part 
of Nigeria from the early days of the nation’s independence and got a little 
higher in the 1970s. He argued that the economic imbalance and the 
overconcentration of public infrastructures mostly in the urban centers are 
part of the factors for the rural-urban migration in Nigeria, and that the 
disparity in wages and salaries is also another crucial instance for the mobil-
ity. Thus, chiefly, the unemployment condition in the country has been 
identified as the cause of migration both within and beyond the country. 
Professor Osita Agbualso took that line of thought in an interview in 
Guardian (2015, 24 April, para. 3):
I believe the major factor is unemployment. Many secondary school graduates 
and university graduates who are frustrated due to inability to either get a job 
or a good paying job, often, believe that it is better out there. Many Nigerian 
youths believe life is better out there whereas it not that easy.
It is agreeable that life out there is not easy, given the pressure on 
resources, particularly on agricultural land, threat to food security, hous-
ing, urban land use and infrastructural amenities, employment and so on, 
which their availability and provision are always diminishing.
Migration beyond Nigeria, on the other hand, is also mostly economic, 
and Mberu and Pongou (2010) identified the economic migrants from 
Nigeria to different parts of Europe as an important dimension of recent 
Nigerian emigration, especially as it is mainly secret, involving risky pas-
sage through various transit points, such as through Senegal to Spain by 
way of the Canary Islands. A report in 2008 by Nigeria’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs revealed that there were some 59,000 Nigerians without 
valid traveling documents in North Africa en route to Western Europe. 
And that about 8000 were in Morocco, 16,000  in Algeria, 20,000  in 
Libya and about 15,000 in Mauritania (Mberu and Pongou 2010).
On the whole, key drivers of migration include fat paychecks in the 
destination country, secure employment or job security, career advance-
ment and/or training, access to the best facilities and technologies and 
also the pushy sociopolitical and economic circumstances at home. These 
observable factors of migration above make the destination countries the 
beautiful brides in the pursuit of the individual dominant needs of the 
migrants. But these promises for migration, more often than not, are fias-
cos or out of reach to the migrants in the destination countries or even 
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cities in Nigeria, and leave the migrants with a very high propensity to 
resort to criminalities such as cyber-crimes.
In Nigeria, the dimension of the migration is largely rural-urban. This 
trade of migration was initially seen as good for economic development of 
a society, but in recent times, it has become the most critical challenge 
Nigeria is faced with in her economic development policy (Omonigho and 
Olaniyan 2013). Rural-urban migration has been described as “the phe-
nomenon of a historically unprecedented movement of people from the 
rural countryside to the burgeoning cities of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America” (Todaro 1997, cited in Omonigho, and Olaniyan 2013, p. 186). 
In Nigeria, “while the national population is growing at an annual rate of 
2.8 percent, that of the urban population is growing at 5.5 percent. This 
rate is among the highest in the world today” (Nwakeze 2004, cited in 
Omonigho, and Olaniyan 2013, p. 186). This ugly trend results in a num-
ber of issues the government happens to be dealing with, such as increas-
ing rate of urban congestion, social vices, poor infrastructure (portable 
drinking water, good road networks, hygienic sewage system, stable power 
supply etc.), unending youth unemployment and the explosion of shanty 
and slums centers.
Among these consequences of rural-urban migration, chronic city 
unemployment is the most malignant as it results into social vices in the 
society, for instance, cyber-crimes, riots, drug abuse, emotional imbalance, 
loss of self-worth, depression, sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDs 
and other unwanted outcomes. It is simple—the migrants having moved 
to the city centers with the hope of securing white-collar employment 
most times get disappointed because of the non-availability of jobs. Thus, 
the fact of unemployment is real in Nigeria (Hassan et al. 2012), leaving 
Nigerian streets littered with youth hawkers who ordinarily would have 
been gainfully employed in a given business (Okafor 2011). Some of this 
set of people end up being redundant and, having no meaningful jobs to 
do, constitute themselves into nuisance in the urban areas, most times 
engaging in crimes and other social vices. Accordingly, with the relative 
availability of ICT facilities in urban centres and peer influence,  cyber- crime 
is often the most favored by the migrants in the desperate bid to satisfy 
their various individual dominant needs.
Cyber-crime is a crime perpetrated through electronic communication 
network, particularly the Internet. This menace is very rampant among 
youth, and it has done incalculable damages to the image of the nation. 
Cyber-crime could be perpetrated through Internet calls, sending of scam 
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emails containing “get rich quick” proposals to entice unsuspecting vic-
tims in a bid to defraud them. In the case of email, sometimes, it comes in 
the form of marriage proposal, unclaimed fund, donation, lottery, help, 
bonanza, bank transaction notification/credit alert and so on. Some of the 
youth send as many as 10,000 of such scam emails every day, while others 
send more to increase their chances of getting victims who will fall prey to 
their motive (Onadipe 2015).
The popularity of social media such as Facebook made the website a 
destination of the cyber-criminals in which they create fake accounts with 
the pictures of a handsome man, a beautiful woman or celebrities in pur-
suit of their criminal intentions. There are also platforms for dating where 
singles push to mingle such as Match and other related websites which are 
also where the criminals target the unsuspecting users with promises of 
love and then pretend to be in one need or the other ask the unsuspecting 
user, “now in love” for assistance, and from that would more requests 
come. Business to Business transactional platforms such as Alibaba are also 
targeted by the criminals. They hack into the e-mail accounts of the manu-
facturers, study the email message exchanges between a manufacturer and 
a buyer, clone the two email accounts and then start pretending as the 
manufacturer to the buyer, and as the buyer to the manufacturer. The 
criminals eventually give the buyer a fraudulent account for payments 
which the unsuspecting buyer would accept as coming from the real man-
ufacturer. In recent times, these cyber-crimes popularly called “Yahoo- 
Yahoo” are now done with charms in what they call “Yahoo-plus,” so that 
even the enlightened still fall prey to cyber-criminality.
The economic motive that laces across the forms of cyber-crimes as 
outlined above highlights the connection between unemployment and 
cyber-criminality since perpetrators of the crime having been unable to 
satisfy their dominant individual needs via the acceptable standard in the 
society, seek the satisfaction of the needs through the obnoxious means. 
Suffice it to say here is that it is not only the unemployed who engage in 
cyber-criminality. But, generally, as argued by Ademola and Olajubutu 
(2009), a critical causal of social vices in the society is unemployment, and 
it manifest itself in the form of kidnapping, armed robbery, political mer-
cenaries, destitution and cyber-criminality. Similarly, Anderson (1999) 
submitted that the failure of a state’s macro-economy, will lead to youth 
recklessness, given that the majority who are unemployed are the most 
affected, and if not contained, they will degenerate into social vices and 
even cyber-crimes in the society. Their actions will be hinged on the fact 
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that the governmental institutions have failed them and the best way to 
get back at the state is to seize and engage in nefarious acts in order to 
survive. Little wonder, in Nigeria, the youth who are educated but unable 
to secure a decent employment are the ones at the forefront of crimes in 
the country not to mention cyber-crimes which is becoming more or less 
a safe haven for them (Obaro 2012). This situation is made worse by the 
fact that the social-cultural norms in Nigeria despise poverty but magnifies 
material wealth giving little or no room for hard work. Hence, many 
Nigerian youths just want to appear successful no matter how they made it.
conclusIon
The relationship between unemployment, migration and cyber-criminality 
is quite observable. This is worsened by the fact that in Nigeria, people are 
valued in terms of the resources they command economically. Consequently, 
those without economic success are undervalued and the pressure to 
achieve success is intensified despite the harsh economic conditions such 
as unemployment among others. This more often occasions the resolve for 
survival strategies such as migration (legal and illegal) or cyber-criminality, 
or both. Although a relatively new form of crime, cyber-criminality dam-
ages Nigeria’s economy and international image, and there is the need to 
reduce it to the barest minimum using strategies as recommended below.
recoMMendatIons
It is imperative that Nigeria should brace up to the occasion by adopting 
the following recommendations
 (a) Establishing formidable legal and regulatory framework for 
cyberspace: Laws against cyber-criminality in Nigeria still leaves 
more to be desired. Kithi (2002) observed that the abuse of Internet 
is on the rise in Africa, and there is no law or even that the extant 
laws are too weak to confront it. Ojedokun (2005)  highlighted that 
the institution charged with implementing the laws within the 
African countries cannot take proactive measures against cyber-
criminals because there is no express legislation enacted to criminal-
ize the activities. The lawmakers should properly understand the 
danger of not passing appropriate legislation to curb cyber-crime or 
the serious impacts it may have on the country’s economic growth 
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and national security capability because of no legislation to protect 
the cyberspace of their state.
 (b) Strengthening an institutional framework for coordinating 
cyber-security efforts: Enforcement agencies against cyber-crime in 
Nigeria such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) should be strengthened with more power and indepen-
dence. This is very vital to their being able to lord it over the chal-
lenging and fast-evolving world of the Internet.
 (c) Ensuring adequate public enlightenment and value reorienta-
tion campaign: Cyber-crimes are largely avoidable, especially with 
adequate enlightenment. Nigeria should consistently disseminate 
massive up-to-date enlightenment messages, through various 
media, against falling prey to cyber-criminality. Efforts should also 
be channeled to value reorientation against the high premium that 
the society places on wealth.
 (d) Promoting cooperation between actors and agencies in cyberspace 
regulation and enforcement: It has been observed by T.G. George-
Maria Tyendezwa, Head, Computer Crime Prosecution Unit, 
Federal Ministry of Justice that confrontation (supremacy disagree-
ments) going on between the various intelligent institutions in the 
state is a serious challenge to cyber-security in Nigeria. It is there-
fore instructive that security agencies remove ego and see them-
selves as partners in progress and not watertight compartmentalized 
groups. The Nigerian government should accordingly show no 
discrimination or unwarranted preference for a group than 
the other.
 (e) Embracing international cooperation: Cyber-crime is a global 
enemy. It is blight on the gains of the ever-increasing global inter-
connectivity which is epitomized in the supersonic rate of commu-
nication and connectivity mostly on the social media platform (e.g. 
Facebook &Twitter) and some $8  trillion in online commercial 
transactions (George-Maria Tyendezwa n.d.). If the common 
enemy must be defeated, there is an urgent need for forging a com-
mon front against it.
 (f ) Creating jobs: Unemployment to a very great extent causes cyber- 
crimes. There is an urgent need for job creation in order to engage 
the idle but enlightened minds of youth in Nigeria. This strategy 
will boost the economy and also reduce cyber-criminality to the 
barest minimum.
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 (g) Strictly enforcing the letters and the spirit of laws relating to 
cyber-criminality: This will send the right signal to the cyber-
criminals and serve as deterrence against engaging in the crime. 
Toward this, the judiciary should adjudicate cases bothering on 
cyber-criminality expeditiously and pronounce deserving sanctions 
on convicted offenders.
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All over the world, it is no longer in doubt that a clean and healthy envi-
ronment is necessary for human existence and national development. A 
clean environment is essential for healthy living. According to Maller et al. 
(2006), contact with nature promotes health and mental well-being. Since 
the environment plays a crucial role in shaping people’s physical, mental 
and social well-being (European Environment Agency 2010), it is there-
fore imperative that man should always take actions that will secure his 
environment in order to ensure his continued existence. The need to 
ensure a sustainable environment is better appreciated when discussed 
against the background of the harmful calamity environmental hazards 
such as climate change, flooding, global warming arising from depletion of 
the ozone layer, air/water pollution, desertification and deforestation and 
I. M. Alumona (*) 
Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University, 
Igbariam, Nigeria 
K. M. Onwuanabile 
Department of Political Science, Paul University, Awka, Nigeria 
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nsukka, Nigeria
182
so on have caused and are still causing in different regions of the world. As 
reported by Harmeling (2010), between 1999 and 2009, not less than 
650,000 people died across the globe from severe weather  conditions, and 
over $2.1 trillion losses were recorded globally. In Nigeria, the combined 
value of damages and losses recorded in the 2012 flood disaster alone was 
estimated at ₦2.6 trillion or US$16.9 billion (FGN 2013).
The impact of a harmful environment on human life brings to the fore 
the close and complex connection between the environment and human 
security. Both are like the two sides of a coin. Without a secured environ-
ment, human security remains an illusion. Khagram et  al. (2003, p. 1) 
have aptly captured the nexus between the environment and security; 
thus, “a great deal of human security is tied to peoples’ access to natural 
resources and vulnerabilities to environmental change—and a great deal of 
environmental change is directly and indirectly affected by human activi-
ties and conflicts”. Given that environmental threats have come to be 
accepted as part of the concerns of the unconventional conception of 
security, and that it is the traditional function of the state to ensure the 
security of citizens within its territorial boundary, it has become logically 
clear that the task of ensuring environmental security is the responsibility 
of the state. The state being an abstract entity has entrusted the task of 
maintaining security to the government, which is, in the words of 
Appadorai (1968, p. 12), “the agency or machinery through which the 
will of the state is formulated, expressed and realised”.
In Nigeria, the challenge of environmental security was brought to lime-
light in 1987. Although there were few laws governing the exploitation and 
use of environmental resources in Nigeria before this date (as shall be seen 
later), environmental regulations and institutional mechanisms for their 
implementation came to the forefront following the country- wide condem-
nation that greeted the dumping of waste considered to be toxic in Koko 
Village in Delta State, in 1987 (Fagbohun 2010a). Before this date, the 
Nigeria state had no institutionalised arrangements or mechanisms for the 
protection of the environment and enforcement of laws and regulations 
governing the environment and its resources. It was the events of the Koko 
toxic waste saga that the Nigerian state came to identify the need to secure 
its environment as a fundamental issue of concern necessary for national 
existence and development. For example, in 1988, shortly after the Koko 
toxic waste saga, the Nigerian government enacted the Harmful Waste 
Decree 42. It was this decree that laid the foundation for the establishment 
of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). Furthermore, 
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the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) 
explicitly states that “the state shall  protect and improve the environment 
and safeguard the water, air, land, forest and wildlife” of the country (see 
section 20 of the constitution). The implication of these is that the protec-
tion of the environment of Nigeria should be as sacrosanct as it is sacred, 
and that the state, through its relevant agencies, should ensure safe and 
healthy environment, not only for the present, but for posterity. However, 
evidences abound (as shall be seen later) that environmental threats, arising 
from negligence from both the Nigerian government and the citizens, have 
continued to plague the country.
This chapter, therefore, looks at what constitutes environmental 
(in)security in Nigeria. Following this introduction is conceptual clarifica-
tion which is followed by brief historical background of environmental 
regulations in Nigeria. The chapter equally undertakes a study of the 
nature and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria by looking at 
what constitutes environmental insecurity in the country as it pertains to 
the geo- political zones of Nigeria. The next section of the chapter is an 
attempt to situate the challenge of environmental insecurity in Nigeria 
within the framework of Common Good Theory. The chapter also looks 
at the efforts of the Nigerian government towards environmental protec-
tion. Following this section are problems militating against effective envi-
ronmental protection in Nigeria and then the conclusion.
understandIng the concept of  
envIronmental InsecurIty
Conceptualising environmental insecurity appears to be a matter of defini-
tional convenience and subjectivism rather than definitional uniformity. 
This owes to the fact that ever since the concept gained attention in both 
regional and international discourses, it has continued to change in form 
and scope, mainly due to ever-increasing and emerging manifestations of 
the phenomenon. It is germane to note that it was after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 that the term “environmental security” originated (Mathews 
1989), and it was used to refer to the possible rise of conflicts over natural 
resources. Due to its changing nature, it now focuses on how to guarantee 
the continuous functioning of the ecosystem as the basis for the existence 
and well-being of humans, as championed by the Sustainable Development 
Agenda. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Report (UNDP 1994) also contends that the aim of environ-
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mental security is to protect the people from both short- and long-term 
damaging effects of nature, man-made threats on natural environment and 
deterioration of the ecology. There are varied opinions on environmental 
security, but all seem to agree that, in the long run, the concept itself has to 
do with the question of whether or not people have access to enough food, 
water and environmental resources to live in. In terms of environmental 
change, Lonergan (1999) opined that security entails a situation in which 
people and communities (a) have the necessary options that can enable 
them end, mollify, abate and adapt to risks to their individual, ecological 
and social rights; (b) have the freedom and capacity through which these 
options could be exercised; and (c) take active part in attaining these 
options. Therefore, environmental securitisation denotes the use of natural 
resources in a sustainable manner as well as the increased capacity of the 
people to mitigate or completely avoid (if possible) the damaging conse-
quences of ecological change (Lodgaard 1992).
Conversely, environmental insecurity connotes the absence, or dearth, 
of environmental security. According to Swart (1996) and Brashares et al. 
(2014), the phenomenon is generally regarded as both a source and con-
sequence of declines in biodiversity and social conflict. On the larger level, 
occurrences such as inability of individuals to have access to clean water 
resources, coupled with air pollution, climatic change and constant degra-
dation of the ecosystem constitute some of the key environmental threats 
which affect both developed and developing countries of the world. 
Nonetheless, the worst hit remain the developing countries among which 
Nigeria is part of. At every stratum of the society, be it individual, house-
hold or community (including the traditionally defined and often described 
ones such as women, religious or ethnic groups), nations, states, regions 
and global, there are manifestations of environmental in security. The phe-
nomenon is so criss-crossed that when it manifests in one country, accord-
ing to Florini and Simmons (1998), it could constitute a serious threat not 
only to the individuals and citizens of other countries but to the right of 
self-defence and national sovereignty of those other countries. Therefore, 
the root of environmental security at the higher levels lies in security at the 
lower levels.
To react to the state of environmental insecurity in Nigeria, therefore, 
the following explanations suffice. Evidences abound that natural and 
human-induced disasters such as erosion, floods, drought, industrial 
wastes and so on are currently threatening Nigeria’s environment. This 
opinion is supported by the Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team 
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(NEST), which reported that not only will the problems of coastal erosion 
that are already a menace in Nigeria generally and more specifically 
(although not limited to) the Niger Delta and other parts of the region, 
including Anambra and Lagos States, worsen as a result of rise in sea level 
and constant surge of the ocean, but the associated inundation will increase 
problems of floods, intrusion of sea water into fresh water sources and 
ecosystem, leading to destruction of such stabilising systems as mangrove 
and affecting agriculture, fisheries and general livestock (NEST 2004).
Population increase is another factor of the state of environmental insecu-
rity in Nigeria as the geometric increase of the population is exerting pressure 
on the environment itself. This can be seen in the areas where in trying to 
secure a safe ground far away from areas affected by overpopulation, the emi-
grating populace adds up to the teeming population who are likely contend-
ing with the limited resources in their abode to survive. Furthermore, 
uncontrolled deforestation, arising from unsustainable uses of forest resources 
for human use and survival (e.g. felling of trees for fuel and energy, wood, 
housing, etc.), which is a major contributing factor to land degradation, 
evenly amplifies as one of the factors of environmental insecurity in Nigeria.
Also, some parts of the country have been left bare and unproductive 
as a result of unsanctioned and inappropriate mining activities in the 
affected areas. According to FGN (2012) cited in Amadi (2013), while 
there are also concerns about water and air pollution, continued urban 
and industrial development in the country has led to concern about liquid 
and solid wastes in the country. The combination of these constitutes seri-
ous threats to environmental security in Nigeria.
BrIef hIstorIcal Background of envIronmental 
regulatIons In nIgerIa
The years following independence were characterised mainly by socio- 
economic and political problems, as those who found themselves at the 
corridors of power grappled with the problem of integration. Many years 
after, the policy thrust of the successive regimes in Nigeria remained the 
provision of basic social amenities and keeping the entities that make up 
the Nigerian state as one. Environmental insecurity was either not envis-
aged or not the priority of the government. Even when issues on environ-
ment were discussed, they were discussed only within the context of 
economic benefits the environment could attract to Nigeria. As Nwosu 
(n.d.) sums it, protection of the environment was therefore seen as the 
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same with natural resource conservation, while concerns for industrial pol-
lution control and management of hazardous waste were treated as ambig-
uous and as an attempt to slow down the stride of industrial development. 
No legislations were put in place to check industrial pollution and hazard-
ous wastes. It was believed that industrialisation was a key indicator of 
development; hence, anything that would hinder the pace of development 
was treated as anathema. Tax and other concessions were given by both 
the federal and state governments to lure investors and encourage indus-
trialists to establish industries in their domain. Unfortunately, the citizens, 
being uninformed and ignorant of the consequences, welcomed the idea 
and therefore lived happily with the resultant pollution and wastes consid-
ered hazardous to both human health and environment.
While it is almost a general opinion in literature (Ogbodo 2009; 
Nabegu et al. 2017) that there was dearth of institutional mechanism for 
environmental security in Nigeria before 1987, the Nigerian government 
did promulgate domestic laws and signed and domesticated some interna-
tional conventions and laws to that effect before and after the KOKO saga. 
Some of them are shown in Table 10.1:
Table 10.1 Some environmental laws and dates of promulgation in Nigeria




Territorial Waters Decree 1967
Oil in Navigable Waters Decree 1968
Petroleum Decree 1969
Quarries Decree 1969
Sea Fisheries Decree 1971
Land Use Decree 1978
Endangered Species (Control of International Trade and Traffic) Act 1985
Harmful Wastes (Special Criminal Provisions, etc) Act 1988
National Environmental Protection (Management of Solid and Hazardous 
Waste) Regulations
1991
Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Pollution Control in Nigeria 1991
Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992
Water Resources Act 101 1993
Minerals and Mining Act 1999
Source: Compiled from Makinde and Adegoke (2007), Eneh and Agbazue (2011), Offiong (2011)
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In addition, Nigeria was a participant at both the Stockholm Conference 
on Human Environment in 1972 and the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP). The country also boasts of being a signatory to 
quite a number of environmental-related international multilateral con-
ventions such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer; United Nations Framework on Climate Change (Climate 
Change Convention) in 1992; Convention on Biodiversity in 1992, 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), among 
others (Ogunba 2016).
Despite the efforts of government, environmental security has remained 
problematic. There is hardly any part of the country that is not ravaged by 
one environmental disaster or the other. Currently, about 15 states of the 
federation are facing desert encroachment, whereas one-fifth of Nigeria’s 
landmass is currently “desertified” (Olagunju 2015). Gully erosion is also 
threatening many households and businesses in many states of the federa-
tion. For example, over 20% of the land of Anambra State are presently 
ravaged or threatened by sensitive or risky sites which are at various levels 
of development and stages of maturity. Apart from Anambra, in states 
such as Abia, Enugu, Edo, Osun, Ekiti and so on, farmlands, business 
premises, residential houses and roads are constantly being washed away 
by frightening gullies. This precarious situation creates worthwhile anxiety 
amongst the people. Flood disaster has also become an annual tragedy in 
the country. In 2012 alone, 363 people were killed, 5851 injured, while 
3,891,314 were affected by floods (NEMA 2013). At another level, oil 
spillage destroys farmlands, pollutes drinkable water and causes drawbacks 
in fishing of coastal waters, even as it exposes the inhabitants of the Niger 
Delta region to numerous health hazards. While the problem of oil spill-
age has been given great attention in extant literature, there seems to be 
no hope that the Niger Delta region will ever regain clean and safe envi-
ronment as the region continues to record incidences of oil spillage every 
year. For example, about 40,000 barrels of crude oil were spilled into 
Nigerian waters by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC’s) 
Bonga offshore platform in December 2011. Shortly after that, an oilfield 
owned by Chevron Nigeria Limited witnessed a gas explosion with high 
fatality on January 16, 2012 (Nwosu n.d.).
The challenges of environmental insecurity in Nigeria will, therefore, 
be better appreciated if we take a retrospective view of the phenomenon in 
relation to its peculiarity to different geo-political zones of the country.
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the nature and character of envIronmental 
InsecurIty In nIgerIa
The nature and character of environmental insecurity in Nigeria has differ-
ent dimensions across the different geo-political zones in the country. 
Basically environmental challenges, which constitute threat to security in 
Nigeria, include climatic change and ozone depletion; lack of adequate 
rainfall resulting in drought and desert encroachment experienced mainly 
in the northern part of the country, acute and severe gully erosion in (but 
not limited to) the eastern and northern states; excessive and seasonal 
flooding in low-lying belt of mangrove and fresh swamps along the coastal 
region; oil pollution from gas flaring and oil spillage in the Niger Delta 
area; biodiversity loss arising from uncontrolled and illicit logging; hazard-
ous wastes in mainly city and municipal areas; industrial pollution; inap-
propriate and unsustainable agricultural practices across the country; bad 
roadworks and mining practices which more often than not create burrow 
pits; urban decay and squatter settlements and so on.
These issues vary from one area to another. Though there are states and 
zones which are challenged by two or more of these environmental disas-
ters, the severity and peculiarity of each will determine under what geo- 
political zone it will be discussed.
south-east
There are five states that make up the South-East geo-political zone in 
Nigeria. They are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo.
gully erosIon
One of the greatest environmental challenges facing southeastern states is 
gully erosion. The zone is the worst affected area in the country. Within 
the zone, Anambra State has suffered the menace more than any other as 
many houses, roads and farmlands have been washed away by gully ero-
sion in the past. In fact, it was as far back as 1993 that Egboka raised an 
alarm that over 20% of the total landmass of Anambra State is being dev-
astated at one stage or another by gully erosion. As a matter of clarity, the 
state has been identified as the worst hit, with over 1000 active erosion 
sites. Places like Nanka, Agulu, Nnewi, Ekwulumili, Obosi, Oraukwu, 
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Ekwulobia, Azia, Okija and so on are being swallowed by landslides. In 
Abia State, gully erosion has devastated places like Arochukwu, Isuikwuato, 
Amucha, Ohafia and so on. As indicated in Table 10.2, all the five states in 
the zone have and continue to suffer the menace of gully erosion with 
Anambra State ranking as the most susceptible.
The menace of gully erosion is not limited to the South-East alone, as 
other states of the country are equally being ravaged by the menace. For 
example, Edo State ranks among the top states in the country where gully 
erosion has wreaked havoc. From Ikpoba in Benin City, down to Auchi in 
Etsako West local government area, many residential houses have been 
washed away, farmlands rendered useless, roads destroyed and communi-
ties cut away from others. Kano State equally has its own gully erosion 
problem and so do other states. In the South-West, Ondo and Ekiti States 
are experiencing various degrees of gully erosion problem.
The security implications of gully erosion in Nigeria are enormous. 
Apart from loss of residential houses, which ultimately displaces the own-
ers and residents of those houses, it also results in loss of agricultural land; 
commercial buildings; and destruction of social amenities such as roads, 
electric poles, pipe-borne water; cutting off communities from other com-
munities and so on. On a daily basis, especially during the rainy season, 
families are rendered homeless and landlords rendered tenants due to the 
devastating effects of worrisome gullies. Motorists and road users are 
sometimes made to seek alternative (where available) and sometimes 
deplorable and farther routes to get to their destinations as the menace 
continues to ravage Nigerian roads. In all, gully erosion constitutes a 
threat to life and security, as it engenders poverty by depriving the people 
their sources of livelihood.
Table 10.2 Severity of gully erosion problem in southeast Nigeria
S/N State No. of Gully Sites State Control Measures
1 Anambra 700 Mostly active Not successful
2 Abia 300 Some active/some dormant Not successful
3 Ebonyi 250 Mostly minor gully sites No records
4 Enugu 600 Some active/some dormant None
5 Imo 450 Some active/some dormant Not successful
Source: Igbokwe et al. (2008), Egboka (2004)
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south-south
The South-South geo-political zone consists of the six major oil- producing 
states in Nigeria. These include Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, 
Edo and Rivers. They are, as a matter of fact, referred to as the “core Niger 
Delta States”. The states in this zone are surrounded by waters, which is 
the major reason they are referred to as the riverine area. Hitherto to the 
discovery of oil in the region, the people were majorly known for agricul-
ture. However, ever since the discovery of oil in the area, the environment 
has continued to suffer grave degradation arising from oil exploration 
activities going on in the area.
oIl spIllage, Water pollutIon and floodIng
The Niger Delta is famous and notorious for its large oil deposits in 
Nigeria and that accounts for the region being identified by Annon (2006) 
as one of the most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems in the world. 
The UNDP (2006a) estimated that about 6800 spills which amounted to 
3,000,000 barrels of oil occurred between 1976 and 2001. It is important 
to state that the said value is only but a representative of that reported to 
the Department of Petroleum Resource (DPR) by the oil companies; 
thus, it may not even reflect the magnitude of the problem. As a matter of 
fact, it has been proven by studies that over the past 50 years, not less than 
9–13 million barrels of oil were spilled (FME et al. 2006). Kadafa (2012) 
observes that owing to oil prospecting and exploration, the Niger Delta 
area is now characterised by loss of biodiversity, forest destruction as well 
as streams and rivers that are contaminated. The livelihood of the host 
communities who depend heavily on the environment is therefore affected. 
The consequences of this have been enormous—environmental degrada-
tion, economic impoverishment, protests and litigations, military repres-
sion, militancy and an unending circle of instability. In other words, the 
neglect of the environment has resulted in serious environmental insecu-
rity in the region as land clearing, dredging, oil spillage and gas flaring 
have considerably altered not only the nature of the landscape in the 
region but also the totality of the environment. Hence, the lives of the 
people continue to be endangered and their livelihoods short-changed.
In terms of environmental changes due to oil activities, UNDP (2006a) 
and Kadafa (2012) contend that large areas of mangrove forest from which 
the indigenous people generate wood have been destroyed. The ripple 
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effect, according to Ukoli (2005), is that farmers, fishermen, hunters and 
so on suffer varying degree of losses.
The results of this reckless exploration include poverty, diseases of many 
kinds, social and internal displacement, destruction of the infrastructural 
base of the people, partial and complete loss of human dignity, incessant 
political instability and unwarranted loss of human lives. By 2007, the situ-
ation in the Niger Delta had degenerated into full circle of instability as a 
number of armed youth groups emerged, fighting for survival and control 
of oil resources in their localities. These occurred in the form of kidnap-
ping, oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism. It is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the twin monsters of environmental degradation 
and the spate of insecurity in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The effect of 
which has been a general sense of insecurity in the entire country. As 
encapsulated by International Crisis Group (2007, p. 7):
The persistence of insecurity and deepening violence in the region over the 
years continues to have impacts on Nigeria’s economy and society, with the 
effects including the loss of oil revenues, exodus of foreign workers, alien-
ation of capital investment, decline of businesses from oil service to the 
hospitality industry and the spread of hostage-taking to other parts of 
the country.
Apart from environmental degradation resulting from oil exploration 
activities, the South-South suffers from severe and devastating floods, 
which occur almost every year. Flood according to Oxford Advance 
Learners Dictionary is an overflowing or eruption of great body of water 
over land not usually submerged. It can as well be defined as a severe 
weather event caused naturally by rising global temperature, resulting in 
heavy excessive downpour, glacier melt and thermal expansion of the 
ocean, which, in turn, precipitates sea level rise, ultimately leading to the 
inundation of the coastal lands. Across Nigeria, flood has and continues to 
pose tremendous danger to lives and property. Although this environmen-
tal disaster is not peculiar to any particular state or zone in the country, 
states in the South-South suffer from it more than many other states, and, 
therefore, our analysis on how flood constitutes environmental insecurity 
shall be discussed here.
Like we highlighted earlier, the zone is surrounded by waters, and, 
therefore, at the peak of every rainy season, the environment is always in 
danger of being submerged. According to Okonofua (2011, p. 43), “the 
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Niger Delta is the territory that lies between the estuaries of the Benin 
River to the West and the Cross River to the East of the River Niger. It 
covers a distance of about 270 miles along the Atlantic Coast and stretches 
for about 120 miles inland”. Nseabasi (2005) and Saliu et  al. (2007) 
averred that across the globe, only Mississippi could be said to be a larger 
wetland while in Africa, the region remains the largest wetland. Okonta 
and Douglas (2003) observe that “it is criss-crossed by an intricate watery 
maze of marshlands, labyrinthine creeks, tributaries, and lagoons, which 
link together the main rivers: Forcados, Nun, Benin, Brass, Bonny (all 
estuaries of the River Niger), Akwa-Ibom, Cross River and other sepa-
rate streams”.
The impact of flooding in Nigeria is enormous, not just only in terms 
of physical damage it creates but also in terms of psychological trauma it 
creates in the minds of the affected people. The great flood of 2012 is a 
vivid example where most Nigerian states were submerged for months. As 
a matter of fact, while floods affect the country every year, the damage 
caused by the 2012 floods alone was unprecedented.
Heavy rains between July and October 2012 combined with rising water 
levels resulting from the runoff contributed to the flooding of human settle-
ments located downstream of the Kainji, Shiroro, and Jebba dams on the 
Niger River; the Lagdo dam in Cameroun on the Benue River; the Kiri dam 
on the Gongola River; and several other irrigation dams. In some cases, the 
dams were damaged; in others, water had to be released at full force to avert 
an overflow. According to the National Emergency Management Agency 
(NEMA), 363 people were killed, 5851 injured, 3,891,314 affected, and 
3,871,53 (sic) displaced due to the resulting floods. (FGN 2013, p. xix)
The security implication of this annual disaster is that apart from lives 
that are usually lost, properties worth billions of naira are usually washed 
away while farmlands are not spared. Houses are destroyed; people inter-
nally and externally displaced; schools submerged; livestock killed; roads, 
markets and businesses closed; and medical facilities and other social ame-
nities affected. Giving the account of the 2012 flooding alone, the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that
heavy rains between July and October 2012 in the country led to an over-
flow of river discharge, aggravated by a breach of irrigation reservoirs and 
causing the destruction of roads, bridges and other infrastructure, ruining 
property, killing livestock, and leading to the temporary displacement of 
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people whose homes were inundated. There was also a significant and 
sustained interruption of production activities. The disaster, which started 
as seasonal flooding in different parts of the country at the onset of the 
rainy season in April, suddenly became intensive in late August and mid- 
September. Unprecedented flooding was recorded in Adamawa, Anambra, 
and Taraba States. The North Central states of Nigeria were particularly 
hard hit, especially Kogi and Benue. Other states that were submerged by 
flood waters include Bayelsa, Edo and Delta, among others. (FGN 
2013, p. 1)
Table 10.3 shows some states and the population affected by the flood 
disaster of 2012.
Generally, both artificial and natural factors are responsible for flooding 
in Nigeria. Naturally, flooding occurs when Nigeria experiences heavy and 
torrential rainfall. Artificial factors leading to flooding in the country include 
poor or blocked drainage system, poor urban planning, dam burst levee 
failures, dam spills and so on. Basically, poor urban planning and blockage 
of drainage systems lead to urban flooding in Nigeria, which occurs mainly 






















Adamawa 3,764,021 21 1,470,990 9 189,706 27,101
Anambra 4,932,272 21 1,177,199 8 89,909 12,844
Bayelsa 2,023,760 8 1,770,790 7 387,360 55,337
Benue 5,040,516 23 1,497,707 5 62,303 8900
Delta 4,950,041 25 2,359,262 13 483,517 69,074
Εdo 3,74,746 18 838,832 4 20,505 2929
Imo 4,752,575 27 388,343 2 1587 227
Jigawa 5,166,630 36 3,564,528 18 491,843 70,263
Kebbi 3,890,292 21 2,654,871 14 362,355 51,765
Kogi 3,916,641 21 1,641,503 9 199,511 28,502
Kwara 2,832,619 15 521,215 3 12,468 1781
Niger 4,832,087 25 2,452,419 15 248,934 35,562
Plateau 3,728,276 17 1,304,916 8 123,316 17,617
Taraba 2,733,504 16 1,025,064 6 96,100 13,729
Total 56,337,979 291 22,667,640 116 2,769,415 395,631
Source: FGN (2013, p. 53)
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in towns located on flat or low-lying terrain. This is worsened when ade-
quate provisions are not made for surface drainage, or, in most cases, where 
refuse, municipal wastes and eroded soil sediments have blocked the exist-
ing drainages. Widespread flooding in urban areas has become an annual 
phenomenon during every rainy season in cities such as Port Harcourt, 
Benin, Lagos, Calabar, Ibadan, Aba, Warri, Maidugiri and so on.
north-east
The North-East comprises six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe, 
Taraba and Yobe. One of the major sources of livelihood to the people of 
this region is the Lake Chad which borders Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and 
Niger. Interestingly, the people of these four countries surrounding the 
lake source their livelihoods from the rich water resources of the lake, with 
over 20 million people estimated to be occupying the catchment area. Of 
this 20  million people, 11.7  million are Nigerians, specifically from the 
North-East geo-political zone (Science in Africa 2003  cited in 
Onuoha 2008). Unfortunately, the lake has continued to diminish in size 
and resources in the past few years, the effect of which is felt mostly by the 
Lake Chad Basin population who are dependent on the lake for living. 
According to Onuoha (2008), over 150,000 people source their livelihood 
in the lake as fishermen, but, with environmental changes increasingly 
impacting negatively on the lake, there has been a continuous reduction on 
the quantity and quality of fish available for the fishermen. The Lake Chad 
Basin also provides employment to nomadic herders who are involved in 
cattle, sheep, goats and camel rearing. Harsh climatic conditions in the 
region make the Lake Chad Basin the point of convergence for pastoralists 
as it provides water and green pastures for animal grazing. Pastoralists 
often move their livestock closer to the lake during dry season for water 
and pastures and a little away from the lake during rainy season to avoid 
mosquitoes. However, after the great droughts of the 1970s, the lake could 
barely sustain the animals as herders struggled for grazing field within the 
lake. In other words, not only did the continuous shrinking of the lake lead 
to drastic reduction of land for cultivation, with serious implication for 
food security, it also led to reduction in the size of land available for animal 
grazing. This development, according to Fagbohun (2010b), has intensi-
fied the conflict between farmers, herders and fishermen, while also leading 
to the emergence and exacerbation of environmental  refugees. On the 
other hand, in recent times, we have witnessed situations whereby the lake 
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overflowed its bank as a result of excessive rainfall, causing excessive flood-
ing which destroyed lives and properties, including agricultural farmlands.
Furthermore, the depletion of the lake has drastically reduced the qual-
ity and volume of freshwater available for irrigation and drinking. As 
result, there has been a growing concern for water security, and economic 
livelihoods have equally been appreciably disrupted to a point that local 
populations from the North-East who rely on the lake for livelihood and 
survival have followed its receding waters, a trend which poses serious 
food security challenges for Nigeria. This has, therefore, resulted in spo-
radic incidence of resource conflicts between and amongst the herders and 
farmers or as The Guardian Newspaper (2000, p. 20) puts it, “between 
downstream and upstream users within the basin”.
north-West
The North-West comprises of seven states: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, 
Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara. One of the greatest environmental threats fac-
ing this geo-political zone is desert encroachment, resulting from drought.
desertIfIcatIon
Like other states of the federation, these states have suffered from severe 
environmental degradation, chief among which is desertification. Dregne 
(1986) viewed desertification as a process of land degradation that involves 
a continuous change from slight to very severe and extreme degradation 
of plant and other soil resources, usually arising from human activities. 
Clarifying the concept, he further explained that it connotes improvement 
of the terrestrial ecosystems under human impact, the process of deterio-
ration in these ecosystems that can be ascertained by reduction in produc-
tivity of desirable plants, alteration in the biomass in an undesirable 
manner, the diversity of the macro- and micro-fauna and flora, enhanced 
deterioration of the soil and increased hazard for human occupancy. In his 
own view, Barrow (1999) equated desertification to a process whereby the 
ecosystem no longer retains the capacity to maintain and repair itself. It 
denotes a process whereby the productive capacity of arid or semi-arid 
land falls by ten percent (10%) or more. On this basis, Miller (1999) cat-
egorised desertification into three based on soil productivity: mild, serious 
and severe. It is said to be mild when there is a drop of about 10–25% in 
productivity. On the other hand, desertification is considered serious when 
there is a 25–50% drop in productivity, while any drop above 50% is seen 
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as severe (Miller 1999; Emodi 2013). Desertification can therefore be 
seen to mean an advanced stage of land degradation in which the soil has 
the capacity and capability to support human communities and ecosystem.
As an environmental hazard, desertification or desert encroachment is 
most glaring in about 11 northern states of the federation, where its impact 
has become more severe since the famine of 1971–1973 (Mohammed 
2015). As a matter of fact, Tercula (2015) argues that the country loses 
about 350,000  hectares of land to desert encroachment every year. 
According to the desertification map of the world produced by Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and UNESCO, about 15% of Nigerian land is likely to be affected 
by desertification (Emodi 2013). Visibly, desertification begins with grad-
ual shift in vegetation from grasses, bushes and occasional trees, to dry 
grass and bushes and eventually to expansive areas of  desert- like sand. 
Though all the 19 states in the northern part of the country had at one 
time or the other experienced desert encroachment, the degree of its 
impact varies. Table 10.4 shows the states being ravaged by the menace.
Table 10.4 Degree of desertification in some selected states of the country
State Geographical 
region
Land area Population (2006) Rate of 
desertification




Sokoto North-West 27,825 3.06 3,702,676 133 Severe
Zamfara North-West 37,931 4.17 3,278,873 86 Severe
Katsina North-West 23,561 2.59 5,801,584 246 Severe
Jigawa North-West 23,287 2.56 4,361,002 187 Severe
Kano North-West 20,280 2.23 9,401,286 464 Moderate
Kebbi North-West 36,985 4.06 3,256,541 88 Severe
Kaduna North-West 42,481 4.67 6,113,503 144 Moderate
Borno North-East 72,609 7.98 4,171,104 57 Severe
Yobe North-East 46,609 5.12 2,321,339 50 Severe
Bauchi North-East 41,119 4.52 4,653,066 113 Moderate
Gombe North East 17,100 1.88 2,365,040 138 Moderate
Adamawa North-East 38,700 4.25 3,178,950 82 Moderate
Taraba North-East 56,282 6.19 2,294,800 41 Moderate
Niger North-Central 68,925 7.58 3,954,772 57 Moderate
Plateau North-Central 27,147 2.98 3,206,531 118 Moderate
Total 580,841 63.83 62,061,067 107
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010); Olagunju (2015, p. 200)
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Effect of Desertification: Nobody can overemphasise both the social 
and economic consequences of desertification in Nigeria. The encroach-
ment of desert on lands drastically reduces the available land for agriculture 
and other economic purposes. The reduction in agricultural lands invari-
ably affects food productivity and availability, not just in the affected states 
but the entire country. Northern Nigeria remains the agricultural hub of 
the nation; therefore, anything that impacts negatively on food production 
in the region affects the entire country. The extreme weather condition 
which brings about drought puts both the affected states and the entire 
country under serious threat of hunger. Inadequate and erratic rainfall has 
constrained farmers in the region; a large expanse of land for agriculture has 
equally been covered by dunes. Livestock and crop production in these 
areas have increasingly degenerated to low ebb and therefore can no longer 
meet the food requirements of the local communities in particular, and 
Nigeria in general. As Olagunju (2015, p. 204) summarised it:
Factors that affect soil quality affect agricultural productivity also and indi-
rectly on food supply. Loss of soil structure and cohesion, soil crusting, soil 
compaction and soil erosion especially in arable lands has been enumerated as 
consequences of desertification which also reduce agricultural output.
Furthermore, desert encroachment is the harbinger of the herders- 
farmers conflict in many states such as Benue, Niger, Kwara, Enugu and so 
on. As a result of loss of grasses and freshwater in the desert-ravaged areas, 
herdsmen are forced to migrate to the southern or Middle Belt areas 
where they could find green pastures and freshwater for their livestock. 
The people of the South and Middle Belt are basically subsistent farmers 
with limited land mass. Consequently, there usually ensues competition 
between the pastoralists and the subsistent farmers over the usage of the 
available land; a competition which had more often than not resulted in 
conflict (resource-use conflict), loss of lives, destruction of farmlands and 
properties worth millions of naira.
According to the founder of Fight against Desert Encroachment 
(FADE)—one of the numerous non-governmental organisations 
 determined to support government efforts in addressing challenges of 
desertification, Dr. Newton Jibunoh, the current desert encroachment in 
the northern part of Nigeria has serious implications for security in the 
country. He averred that
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this has become a source of threat to food production while it is equally 
believed that the hostile impact of climate change in Northern Nigeria poses 
serious threat to national security and poverty alleviation strategies in the 
country as those mostly affected are the most vulnerable ones in the society 
that dwell in the villages ravaged by this scourge. (Leadership Newspaper 2017)
north-central
The North-Central comprises six states which include Benue, Kogi, 
Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, and the FCT, Abuja. This zone harbours 
most of the smaller ethnic groups in the country, and like most geographi-
cal zones in Nigeria, the North-Central is replete with tales of environ-
mental challenges which include flooding, overgrazing, deforestation, 
erosion and so on. For example, a study on Zumba community in Niger 
State reveals manifestations of environmental degradation such as drought, 
deforestation, erosion, flood, overgrazed land, heat wave and windstorm 
which were either non-existent or hardly noticeable some 40 years ago. In 
the 1970s, it was observed that climatic temperature was not as high as it 
is now (it was quite low), and there was more frequent and stable rainfall. 
Fertility of the land was quite good, with dense vegetation characterised 
by different plant species and abundant wildlife. Domestic animals such as 
cattle, sheep, goat, camel and so on grazed and roamed freely in a large 
grazing land. However, two decades later, extreme weather conditions 
such as floods, heat wave, deforestation and windstorms became a major 
source of concern, and currently, there has been an obvious intensification 
in droughts and erosion. Over the years, the environment started witness-
ing water scarcity and biodiversity loss as a result of gradual drying up of 
available surface water and vegetation, respectively. Furthermore, the 
intensity of windstorms increased as the effects of vegetation cover was 
reduced. While we acknowledge that contributory factors are varied, illicit 
mining activities in the zone remain worrisome with attendant environ-
mental security implications as discussed later.
IllIcIt mInIng
Mining has to do with all the processes involved in extracting mineral 
deposits from the surface and/or beneath the surface of the earth (Ako 
et al. 2014). It means that the availability and economic viability (or oth-
erwise) of mineral resources determine if mining will take place or not. 
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Although natural resources (metallic, non-metallic minerals and fossil 
fuels) are important in the development of any country, illicit and uncon-
trolled extraction and exploration of such resources could be disastrous 
and catastrophic to the host environment and people. In most African 
states, including Nigeria, mining is usually done in a small-scale level, usu-
ally by people who work with local tools and equipment. And that, in our 
opinion, makes the sector an informal sector in Nigeria because most of 
the activities in the sector are outside the legal and regulatory framework 
of the government. As a result, therefore, the activities of the sector, more 
often than not, impact negatively on the environment.
In Nigeria, the North-Central is rich in mineral resources such as gold, 
tin and lead. The mining of these minerals contributes significantly to envi-
ronmental degradation in the area in different ways such as de- vegetation, 
loss of aquatic animals, water and air pollution and so on. Secondly, the use 
of illicit mining methods in the extraction of these minerals poses environ-
mental health challenges to the people. For example, during mining, min-
ers and their families and people within the surrounding communities are 
exposed to health risks and challenges due to toxic materials that are 
released into the environment (Azubike 2011). Illicit gold mining in Niger 
and Plateau States, for example, constitutes environmental insecurity in 
many ways—the natural landscape of the area is destroyed as a result of ero-
sion, while rock wastes and tailings generated during mining are left in 
heaps as they cannot be easily disposed of. Also, large pits are created as a 
result of the mining activity. These pits can be death traps to both man and 
animals. Reptiles considered harmful to man such as snakes most times turn 
these pits into their habitat. A study by Ogezi (2005) revealed that within 
the city of Jos in Plateau State where tin and columbite are mined, there are 
over 1000 abandoned mine ponds which constitute death traps to humans 
and animals. Similarly, Salati et al. (2011) noted that artisanal mining of 
Azara barytes deposits in Nasarawa State has devastated over 1000 hectares 
of land suitable for agriculture, while flooding of abandoned pits consti-
tutes death traps to both humans and animals.
Illicit mining in North-Central Nigeria equally leads to soil erosion and 
sedimentation. The major cause of erosion and sedimentation is the 
removal of vegetation during mining process. Erosion from overburden 
and tailing piles usually contribute loading of sediment into a nearby 
stream, which in turn modifies the morphology of the stream through 
disruption of a channel, diversion of stream flow and change of the slope 
or bank stability of the stream. As a result of decrease in the depth of 
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streams resulting from high sediment concentration, during times of high 
streamflow, flooding becomes inevitable. Equally, the quality of water in 
the streams and rivers are severely degraded by mine wastes and rock 
dumps. A study by Ako et  al. (2014) revealed that mining activities in 
Luku, Minna, Niger State have rendered streams and rivers in the com-
munity unfit for human consumption. The contamination of water, there-
fore, poses environmental risk and insecurity to both humans and animals.
Illicit mining operations are equally dangerous, not only because of 
water pollution associated with them, but because of other health hazards 
they portend, as the miners often use mercury amalgamation process to 
extract these resources such as gold from ores (CDC 2010). The continu-
ous rise in demand for gold, coupled with the unattractive nature of other 
means of livelihoods like farming in rural areas, has continued to increase 
the quest for artisan gold mining regardless of its dangerous nature. To 
underscore the danger inherent in illicit mining, a study by Medecins San 
Frontieres (MSF) conducted in Zamfara State of North-West Nigeria in 
March 2010 revealed that there was an epidemic of lead poisoning in the 
state, especially in Anka and Bukkuyum local government area (MSF 2010). 
According to Azubike (2011), the source of the outbreak was associated 
with the processes of gold mining in the affected area, but its spread was 
aided by food, drinking water, inhalation of contaminated dust, oral inges-
tion of particles especially by children, breastfeeding and so on. Further 
inquiry on the epidemic estimated that not less than 10,000 people were 
affected overall (MSF 2010), while the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and the Zamfara State Ministry of 
Health (ZMoH) confirmed that due to extremely high concentration of 
lead and mercury in the environment, hundreds of children under five years 
of age were at a high risk of death or serious acute and chronic effects 
(WHO 2011). These underscore the security implications of mining and 
other human-induced environmental degradation in the country.
explaInIng envIronmental InsecurIty In nIgerIa  
(the role of theory)
The theoretical framework adopted in this chapter is the Common Good 
Theory. Throughout the history of Western political thought, the concept 
of common good has played a prominent role in the understanding of a 
political phenomenon. Its origin could be traced to the writings of Aristotle 
(384–322 BC), Plato (427–347 BC), Cicero (106–43 BC) and Thomas 
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Aquinas (1225–1274). Aristotle, in particular, emphasised that the city- 
state could be likened to a particular type of community, as a result, there-
fore, the city-state is established for the sake of some good (Aristotle 
1998). He defined it as that at which all things aim. Cicero conceived it to 
mean salus populi which when translated in its literal form means “safety 
of the people” or “well-being”. In a more recent study, John Rawls con-
ceived the common good as a certain general condition that is to the 
benefit of all in equal measure. The Catholic Social Teaching defined the 
common good as the “totality of those conditions of life which allow 
social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready 
access to their own fulfilment” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 
2004). Other scholars who have contributed to the development of the 
theory include Argandoña (1998, 2001), Mahon and McGowan (1991), 
Naughton et  al. (1995) and Hardin (1968). Common good includes 
physical spaces like parks, streets and public buildings. Some common 
good are technology based and virtual. Yet, others such as the air, the 
oceans and seas, the ecosystem and so on are part of the natural environ-
ment. According to Galston (2013), despite the differences that exist 
among them, they share a common attribute which is on the effect they 
have on everyone when used. In other words, the behavioural pattern of 
people in these places affects the ability of everyone to enjoy them 
over time.
In his Tragedy of the Common, Hardin (1968) made a useful contribu-
tion to the development and expansion of the tenets of the common good 
theory, especially in relation to the environment. He narrates a story of 
herdsmen who use a common grazing area. Each of them (herders) finds 
it economically rational to increase the size of his own herd so as to sell 
more in the market. Nevertheless, if all the herders are given the opportu-
nity to do what they individually feel is rational, the entire group loses 
because the quality of the pastures will deteriorate as a result of overgraz-
ing. This will lead to a decreased output for all the herders because as each 
individual rationally attempts to maximise his own gain, the collectivity 
suffers and, invariably, all herders suffer (Hardin 1968, in Mingst 2003, 
p. 225). The picture of the common grazing area which Hardin paints is 
a common or collective good. Regardless of what contribution each indi-
vidual makes, the grazing area is available to every member of the group. 
The use of collective good involves activities and choices that are interde-
pendent. Decision by one individual or group has effects for other indi-
viduals or groups, directly or indirectly.
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Contemporarily, the common good theory has been adopted in discus-
sions on the environment. The ecosystem or environment is a common 
good owned by nobody in particular; hence, available to all for use. 
However, over the years, this right and freedom bestowed on individuals 
and groups by nature has led to unnecessary quest by these individuals and 
groups to use maximally the resources of the environment, without recourse 
to the dangers and implications it portends, not only for others, but the 
environment itself. As the competition increases, the environment begins to 
deteriorate, and everyone begins to suffer the eventual consequence(s). To 
avert this, the society, individuals and groups enact laws to put limitations 
and checkmate indiscriminate use and abuse of the environment.
Indeed, the Nigerian environment is a good example of common good, 
owned by nobody in particular but accessible to all. Industrialisation and 
urbanisation led to “scramble” for land and the resources therein. People 
began to build indiscriminately; industries and factories began to emerge 
as investors competed with each other. Eventually, the country began to 
witness environmental pollution as a result of overpopulation, indiscrimi-
nate dumping of refuse and industrial waste, poor drainage system, carbon 
emission and so on. As a result, also, many areas began to witness flood 
disaster during rainy season, owing to poor urban planning, indiscriminate 
erection of residential houses, blockage of canals and drainage systems and 
so on. The challenge of global warming began to affect the country, not 
only as a result of misuse of the environment by Nigerians, but from the 
insensitivity of the entire world. However, Nigeria, with other developing 
countries, has continued to suffer the effect more, as drought and desert 
encroachment began to threaten the northern parts of the country, while 
at the peak of rainy seasons, many states of the country, especially the hin-
terland areas suffer flood disasters. Also, the availability of natural resources 
led to oil spillage and other related environmental security threats in the 
Niger Delta. Lack of environmental governance and absence of laws and 
institutions for the prevention and management of environmental risks 
and challenges exposed every part of the country to one form of environ-
mental degradation or the other.
To address this, therefore, the Nigerian government began to promul-
gate laws and establish institutions that would safeguard this common 
good (Nigerian environment) from indiscriminate use. However, these 
institutions have been bedevilled by numerous problems, ranging from 
poor funding, administrative bottleneck, poor attitudes of Nigerians in 
relation to environmental laws and so on.
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the nIgerIan government and  
envIronmental protectIon
Since 1988, the Nigerian government has shown serious commitment to 
issues that jeopardise her environment, and to promote environmental 
security in the context of national sustainable development, efforts have 
been put in place at all levels of governance. The Nigerian government 
recognises that sustainable development cannot be achieved without effec-
tive environmental governance. However, this commitment is apparently 
on policy formulation rather than implementation, as the country contin-
ues to be ravaged by a plethora of environmental security threats, as policy 
formulations rarely translate into policy implementation. For example, 
there was a revision of the 1989 National Environmental Policy in 1999. 
The broad goal of the revised policy was to achieve sustainable develop-
ment in Nigeria, while specifically, it aimed at:
• Securing a quality environment adequate for the health and well- 
being of all Nigerians.
• Conserving and using the environment and natural resources for the 
benefit of present and future generations.
• Restoring, maintaining and enhancing ecosystems and ecological 
processes essential for the functioning of the biosphere and for the 
preservation of biological diversity and adopting the principle of 
optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and 
ecosystems.
• Raising public awareness and promoting understanding of essential 
linkages between environment and development and encouraging 
individual and community participation in environmental improve-
ment efforts.
• Co-operating in good faith with other countries, international 
organisations and agencies to achieve optimal use of transboundary 
natural resources and effective prevention or abatement of trans-
boundary environmental pollution.
Additionally, specific policies and action plans have been put in place. 
They are as follows:
• National Policy on Drought and Desertification;
• Drought Preparedness Plan;
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• National Policy on Erosion, Flood Control and Coastal Zone 
Management;
• National Environmental Sanitation Policy;
• National Environmental Sanitation Action Plan;
• National Policy Guidelines on (a) Solid Waste Management, (b) 
Market and Abattoir Sanitation, (c) Excreta and Sewage Management, 
(d) Sanitary Inspection Premises and (e) Pests and Vector Control;
• National Forest Policy;
• National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan;
• National Healthcare Waste Management Policy/Action Plan and 
Guidelines; and
• State of the Environment Report of 2008.
InstItutIonal arrangements for envIronmental 
protectIon In nIgerIa
The importance of institutions in the achievement of the overall goal of 
every establishment cannot be overemphasised. More important, how-
ever, is the interdependent nature of these institutions in achieving a set of 
goal. To this end, the Nigerian government recognises that such goals 
such as sustainable development cannot be achieved if the institutions 
work in isolation more than they work in a coordinated manner. It, there-
fore, requires that all stakeholders get actively involved in both cross- 
sectoral and multilevel coordination. Against this backdrop, Nigeria has 
established a number of institutions and mechanisms that play different 
roles and responsibilities for environmental protection at different levels of 
government. For national sustainable development, the country is also 
working towards bringing about more coordinated and integrated policy 
development as well as engaging stakeholders in decision-making and 
action plans.
In addition, specialised agencies such as the National Park Service, 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), Forestry 
Research Institute of Nigeria (FRIN) and National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) have all been 
established to tackle some specific problems confronting the environment.
For example, in response to the persistent degradation of the environ-
ment and the devastation of the coastal ecosystem, with particular atten-
tion to the Niger Delta area, the Federal Government of Nigeria, through 
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Act No. 15 of 2006, established the NOSDRA. Statutorily, the agency is 
empowered to coordinate the management of oil spillage and ensure strict 
implementation of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) for 
Nigeria using the 1990 guideline of the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation (OPRC) which has 
been ratified by Nigeria. It is germane to state that NOSCP was drafted in 
1981 and has been reviewed in 1997, 2000 and 2006. It serves as a blue-
print developed by Nigeria for checking oil spill through containment, 
recovery and remediation. By implication, NOSDRA has the mandate to 
play lead role in ensuring that responses to oil spills are not only timely but 
effective and appropriate. It also plays the lead role in the protection of 
threatened environment while also ensuring that already impacted sites are 
cleaned up to the best practical extent.
Another specialised agency involved in environmental protection is the 
NESREA, which was established in 2007 under the administration of 
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The agency could be said to be an off-
shoot of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) because 
the NESREA Act of 2007 only repealed the FEPA Act Cap F 10 LFN of 
2004. Essentially, NESREA is empowered to all environmental laws, 
guidelines, policies, standards and regulations in Nigeria. It is also autho-
rised to enforce compliance in accordance to international treaties, con-
ventions, protocols and other agreements relating to environment to 
which Nigeria is a signatory. More specifically, NESREA has the vision and 
mission of ensuring “a cleaner and healthier environment for Nigerians, 
and to inspire personal and collective responsibility in building an 
 environmentally conscious society for the achievement of sustainable 
development in Nigeria”.
In order to ensure that Nigerian forests and the resources therein are 
adequately safeguarded, the Federal Government established the 
FRIN. Specifically, the agency conducts research into all aspects of for-
estry, conservation and management of wildlife, utilisation of agro forestry 
and forest products. The FRIN is also establishing colleges through which 
it trains technical and sub-technical personnel for forestry and other agro- 
allied services in Nigeria.
In furtherance of its efforts towards the protection and promotion of a 
healthy environment, Nigeria established the National Park Service in 
1999. According to the Act establishing the Service, it is “responsible for 
the preservation, enhancement and protection of wild animals and plants 
and other vegetation in National Parks; and for matters connected there-
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with”. In addition, Section 8 of the Act stated  that the National Park 
Service shall thus, “prepare surveys and maintain up-to-date records of all 
the existing facilities for the growth and protection of the fauna and flora 
in the National Parks, for zoological or botanical species, and for wild or 
domesticated animals and advice the Federal Government and State 
Governments on their adequacy and efficient utilisation in the interest of 
the national economy” (FGN 1999).
Also, to ensure effective environmental management in many sectors of 
the society, the Nigerian government has put in place a number of laws 
and regulatory frameworks.
proBlems mIlItatIng agaInst effectIve 
envIronmental protectIon In nIgerIa
As we saw earlier, Nigeria has over the years enacted numerous laws for the 
protection of the environment. This notwithstanding, environmental deg-
radation continues to plague the country unabated. The following consti-
tute the problems militating against environmental protection in Nigeria:
• Low commitment to implementation and enforcement: Though 
Nigeria has shown commitment towards environmental protection 
by enacting numerous laws to that effect, this should not serve as a 
yardstick for measuring their effectiveness, as there seems to be lack 
of political will to enforce such laws. The country has over the years 
gained notoriety for policy failure at implementation stage. There are 
enough evidences showing that enforcement of these regulations is 
still very poor. On a daily basis, industries and factories discharge 
untreated waste water into the environment. On Nigerian streets 
and markets, heaps of refuse are always in abundance; oil-producing 
companies still indulge in gas flaring and oil spillage; and there is still 
uncontrolled and illicit mining in the country. More worrisome is 
the fact that efforts to prosecute offenders are usually met with frus-
tration. To underscore this, the enforcement of environmental laws 
has been rendered ineffective largely because of the paternalistic 
nature of the Nigerian judiciary whenever issues on environmental 
hazards are brought to the courts against resident companies. 
Corroborating this, Ebeku (2003) bemoaned the reluctance of some 
members of the judiciary in issuing order of mandamus to companies 
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whose operations are damaging the environment to mitigate and 
address such actions. This greatly affects the performance of the rel-
evant agencies for environmental protection in the country.
• Weak institutional capacity: Both the federal and state environmental 
protection agencies (SEPAs) and their local government counter-
parts lack institutional capacity, equipment and adequate staff for 
effective implementation of environmental policies. It is intriguing 
that apart from Abia, Imo, Lagos, Niger and Rivers States, only very 
few SEPAs can boast of staff with Environmental Impact Assessment 
training and laboratory facilities monitoring the environment (Eneh 
2011). Under such conditions, the institutions could be said to be a 
mere camouflage.
• Duplication and multiplicity of roles: Agencies involved in environ-
mental protection in Nigeria are oftentimes involved in conflict of 
roles as there is overlapping and duplication of functions in the 
implementation process. Horizontally, there are role conflicts 
between environmental-line ministries/agencies while, vertically, 
there is role conflict between federal, state and local government 
agencies. These undue controversies have created loopholes for the 
continued abuse of the environment.
• Inadequate funding: Agencies and parastatals involved in environ-
mental protection are one of the least funded in Nigeria. For exam-
ple, in the 2017 Budget, only ₦2 billion was allocated to the Ministry 
of Environment for the preservation of the environment.
Other challenges of environmental preservation in Nigeria include:
• bad governance,
• dearth of requisite human resources for proper environmental man-
agement and
• poor commitment and attitude of Nigerians towards environment- 
friendly regulations.
conclusIon
In Nigeria, the question of national security has extended beyond fighting 
forces and inter-communal clashes to concerns about the depletion of the 
biodiversity, environmental resources and pollution of all kinds. The 
enactment of legislations and policies and the establishment of agencies 
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for the protection of the environment have been described as a step in the 
right direction. However, environment degradation continues to threaten 
the country unabated. As the country continues to be ravaged by frighten-
ing gully sites, desertification, seasonal flooding, uncontrolled mining, oil 
spillage and water pollution, illicit and unarticulated refuse dumps and 
industrial wastes in most metropolises, there continues to be a growing 
concern about the security implications these portend, not only for the 
citizens but the environment itself. While the efforts of the government 
towards mitigating these problems could be commendable, they remain 
inadequate in the face of the security threats associated with them in the 
country. Institutional weaknesses continue to serve as cog on the wheel of 
environmental restoration and preservation in Nigeria. To hurt the tide of 
environmental degradation and avert the catastrophic sociopolitical and 
economic security implication it portends for the country, there is need to 
strengthen all the agencies saddled with the responsibility of environmen-
tal preservation. There should be regular training and retraining of officers 
and personnel of the agencies to constantly equip them with current inno-
vations on environmental management techniques. Improving the institu-
tional capacity of these institutions will also entail adequate funding. Since 
most states in Nigeria are vulnerable to environmental disasters, special 
funds should be set aside for this purpose. Also, achieving environmental 
security and sustainability goal requires the collaborative efforts of all. 
Therefore, Nigerians should show more concern and commitment towards 
maintaining a clean, safe, healthy and secure environment. Conforming to 
environmental ethics and ethos and remembering that the environment 
we abuse today will surely take revenge on our children tomorrow will go 
a long way towards restoring the environment or, at least, averting further 
degradation. Indiscriminate waste and refuse disposal, felling of trees, 
building of houses in unapproved areas, bush burning and so on are all 
part of the challenges of environmental security in the country. If the citi-
zens are conscious and mindful of these and adhere to environmental 
regulations, then the country can achieve environmental security.
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CHAPTER 11
Crimes and Internal Security in Nigeria
James Olabisi Ayodele
IntroductIon
Society is an ordered life because some behaviour are allowed while others 
are disallowed; while some things are considered lawful, others are not. 
There are many reasons some behaviours are proscribed while others are 
not criminalised. Certain acts/omissions are criminalised or made unlawful 
to safeguard the society, regulate human’s hedonistic nature, mitigate 
unforeseen dangerousness of the act/omission and/or to protect elite’s 
interest. Usually, a society frowns at whatever threatens its survival, injuri-
ous to its members and contravenes the interest of the influential minority 
who control the law-making machinery. For instance, the 1999 Constitution 
of Nigeria (as amended) forecloses any attempt to dismember Nigeria by 
describing it as “one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state” (Section 
2[1]). This is tantamount to statutory attempt at self- preservation on the 
part of the Nigerian society. Above all, the need for a society to exercise its 
legitimate power to control its members is key to determining which behav-
iour is considered criminal or non-criminal.
At the end of this chapter, readers should adequately understand the 
meaning of crime (as different from tort), the manifestations of crime and 
J. O. Ayodele (*) 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Obafemi Awolowo University, 
Ile-Ife, Nigeria
216
internal insecurity resulting from crime. Thus, the chapter is structured 
into sections dealing with conceptualisation of crime, manifestations of 
crime in Nigeria, the insecurity caused by crime and recommendations.
conceptualIsIng crIme
Crime (or offence) takes its existence from laws, which are enacted to 
delineate allowable from disallowable behaviours in every society. Put suc-
cinctly, without laws, there is no crime or offence (henceforth, crime and 
offence are used interchangeably in this chapter. Thus, criminologists pre-
fer to define crime in relation to existing law. This preference is inevitable 
in that the scope of deviance accommodates the issue of morality on which 
members of a society would disagree (Clinard and Meier 2004). Across 
societies, countless synonyms such as unlawful, illegal, infraction, forbid-
den, breach, violation, offence, misdemeanour, felony, transgression and 
so on are deployed to describe offence. By implication, all crimes are devi-
ant behaviours, but not every deviant behaviour constitutes crime more so 
that deviance “vary widely across space and time” (Doob 2000, p. 187). 
For instance, drinking beer and adultery are not considered as crimes/
offences in Southern Nigeria (Okonkwo 2005) but are offences in 
Northern Nigeria (Penal Code, Section 96). Unlike morality, crime has 
little or nothing to do with “being good” or “being bad” but more with 
the standard created by existing laws in a society.
What then is crime? Crime is generally seen as an act or omission pro-
scribed by existing law and punished by same after due trial and convic-
tion. Used synonymously with offence, Section 2 of the Criminal Code 
defines crime as “an act or omission which renders the person doing the 
act or making the omission liable to punishment under [the] Code or 
under any Act, or Law” (Federal Government of Nigeria, FGN 2004). 
This definition implies that not all acts are considered unlawful, and that 
persons accused on any criminal infraction must be duly processed before 
a recommended penalty is pronounced (Okonkwo 2005). Again, this 
underscores the subtle negotiations and renegotiations of crime and pun-
ishment in every society. In other words, to proscribe or criminalise some 
(in)actions, prosecute and punish people for undertaken proscribed behav-
iours in any nation, a great deal of negotiations is involved.
Literally, crime occurs whenever there is an infraction on existing laws, but 
technically, this is not the case. Using only the “infraction” yardstick would 
amount to considering only the concrete act or omission (actus reus) to the 
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exclusion of the other more important factor, the mens rea. In determining 
whether or not an offense has been committed, the intention (mens rea) of 
the person committing the infraction must be taken into consideration by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. Usually, crime activates varying forms of 
penalty, implying that there is no punishment without crime (nulla poena sine 
lege), but this must be decided by a court with competent jurisdiction after 
due trial. In strict terms, Section 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) 
forbids illegal trials, mob-justice and the infliction of arbitrary punishment on 
any citizen of Nigeria.
No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an 
offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence heavier 
than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed. (Federal 
Government of Nigeria, FGN 1999, S36[8])
Thus, any citizen accused of violating any section(s) of Nigerian laws is 
statutorily entitled to fair trial to determine her/his degree of culpability. 
In fact, the chapter 5 of the Criminal Code addresses the criminal respon-
sibility of an accused by highlighting some legitimate grounds for defence 
during lawful trials. Stressing the importance of intention (mens rea), the 
code declares that a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omis-
sion, which occurs by accident or coercion (FGN 2004, S24). Other 
grounds for defence include immature age, bonafide claim of right, mis-
take of fact, extraordinary emergency, insanity, compulsion and so on.
Due to the fact that crime imposes penalty, conscious legislative efforts 
are invested in stating all the possible conditions that constitute criminality 
in the law. In other words, unambiguous definition is usually given in the 
opening of every section that seeks to prohibit any act/omission. For 
instance, burglary is defined to happen when a person
breaks any part, whether external or internal, of a building, or opens by 
unlocking, pulling, pushing, lifting, or any other means whatever, any door, 
window, shutter, cellar flap, or other thing, intended to close or cover an 
opening in a building, or an opening giving passage from one part of a 
building to another, is said to break the building. (FGN 2004, S410)
And the Criminal Code acknowledges that a person enters any building 
unlawfully the body (in whole or in part) or the instrument used is within 
the building, whereas breaking into a building occurs when entrance is 
secured by any form of threat or by collusion with any person in the build-
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ing or through openings (chimney or aperture) other than designated 
entrance (FGN 2004, S410). Also, homicide or murder is conceived as a 
situation in which “any person causes the death of another, directly or 
indirectly, by any means whatever” (FGN 2004, S308).
Despite the stern societal warning on criminality, not all violators are 
apprehended, prosecuted and penalised. Full immunity from criminal 
prosecution is conferred on certain public officers (e.g. President, Vice- 
President, Governor, and Deputy Governor), whereas judicial officers 
enjoy immunity in Nigeria only when exercising their statutory duties. 
The criminal code exonerates judicial officer “for anything done or omit-
ted to be done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions,” while the 
constitution protects executive acting in official capacity.
No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a 
person to whom this section applies during his period of office; a person to 
whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that 
period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and no 
process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to 
whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued. (FGN 1999, S308 
[2a, b, c])
Even when a nation desires, no known nation has ever succeeded in 
apprehending, prosecuting and penalising all lawbreakers, and none will 
ever be successful because total enforcement of law is undesirable.
It must be stressed that not all infractions against the laws are criminal 
in nature. As a matter of fact, some infractions are tort-related because 
they are civil breaches which are only prosecuted at the instance of 
affected citizens, whereas crime involves violations solely prosecuted by 
the state. Although torts do cover contract/trust breaches, they often 
cause injury to people’s reputation and properties for which compensa-
tion is sought in the court of law. Thus, tort or civil wrongs are marked 
off from crimes by the person who initiates (or capable of initiating) 
prosecution and the likelihood of compensation. Torts could be 
Intentional (deliberate act against another person to cause harm), 
Negligence (resulting from failure to discharge obligatory duty) and 
Strict Liability (when a person has legal responsibility for which (s)he 
could be held responsible). On the whole, certain actions could consist 
of traits of criminality as well as that of torts simultaneously (Williams 
1991), but each has to be dealt with separately.
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To conclude this section, attention is hereby given to sources of infor-
mation about crime. Every nation relies on its citizens to report infractions 
against the law to the statutory law enforcers, which the Nigerian Police 
represents in Nigeria. Thus, crime statistics are based on the reports that 
citizens make to the police of crimes against themselves, others and/or 
properties. At any given time, therefore, the crime rate in a nation could 
be assessed using the crime statistics, even though the volume of actual 
crimes might remain elusive due to unreported crime incidences. 
Nonetheless, victimisation surveys and self-reports do complement crime 
statistics in providing a better picture of the volume of actual crimes in a 
nation (CLEEN Foundation 2012).
dImensIons and manIfestatIons of crIme In nIgerIa
The Nigerian Criminal Code delineates three types of crime, namely 
Felony, Misdemeanours and Simple, using the punishment parameters. 
Felonious offences are serious infractions that attract death penalty or 
imprisonment above 3 years), Misdemeanours consist of contraventions 
punishable on conviction, with imprisonment between 6  months and 
3 years), whereas unlawful behaviour considered Simple attract imprison-
ment below six months. One major problem with these classifications is 
that the emphasis on punishment clouds every information about the vic-
tims of such unlawful acts/omissions. In terms of complexity, scholars 
have isolated white-collar or corporate crimes (perpetrated by elites in the 
course of lawful duties), organised crimes (involving many people under-
taking multiple criminality across national boundaries) and victimless 
crimes (involving consenting adults for mutual benefits). However, for 
administrative purposes, the Nigerian Police adapted the Criminal Code 
by grouping reported crimes based on their outcomes vis-à-vis the recipi-
ents of the unlawful act/omission. On this basis, we have crime against the 
state, crimes against persons, crime against properties, crime against public 
order and crimes against morality. For instance, of the 125,790 reported 
crime cases across the Nigerian states in 2016, 51.9% were against prop-
erty whereas 36.2% were against persons (National Bureau of Statistics 
2017). It must be noted that infractions against the laws could be commit-
ted by both the state/government and its members acting individually or 
in groups. Our discussions are structured into citizens’ criminality and 
government’s criminality:
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 1. Citizens as Lawbreakers
 (a) Crime against the state: Usually, laws are owned by a society, 
not its members, and it is only the society that is empowered to 
punish any violation of its laws. Due to the fact that society 
owns laws, all infractions are technically viewed as crimes against 
the state, but in reality, not all crimes are against the state. In 
practice, unlawful acts that touch on the basis of social life or 
threaten the continued existence of a society are viewed with 
more seriousness than those that strictly affect citizens. As ear-
lier noted, torts are civil wrongdoings and are not treated as 
crimes. Principal among the crimes against the state is coup 
d’état—the unlawful act of attempting to overthrow a legiti-
mate democratically constituted government by force, especially 
through the use of arms and ammunitions. Section 37 of the 
Criminal Code forbids any person/citizen to levy “war (or con-
spire to wage war) against the State, in order to intimidate or 
overawe the President or the Governor of a State, conspire with 
any person, either within or without Nigeria,” or else be guilty 
of treason punishable with death. Instigating invasion, conceal-
ment of treason or intention to remove elected officers 
(President, Governor) constitute treasonable felony. In addi-
tion, the Criminal Code (FGN 2004) lists Treasonably Felony 
(Section 41), Mutiny (Sections 44–45), Escape from Lawful 
Custody (Section 135), Counterfeiting (Sections 147–155), 
Defacement of Currency (Section 156) and Attack on State 
Security and/or their Uniform (Section 251) as some direct 
affronts against society. Due to its seriousness, many crimes 
against state are capital, and they attract death penalty or very 
severe punishment. Until the recent insurgency of Boko Haram, 
terrorism (proscribed in Section 80 of the Criminal Code) did 
not constitute crime against the state in Nigeria and that resulted 
in the enactment of Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 
(FGN 2013).
 (b) Crime against property: Sometimes, personal or corporate 
properties such as buildings, pipelines, vehicles, farmland and so 
on could become targets of criminality. Any property targeted 
by criminals could be totally or partially torched or damaged. 
This explains why society enacts laws to safeguard valuable com-
monwealth and properties of its members as well. Crimes in this 
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category include arson and arson attempt (sections 443–446) 
and pipeline vandalism or oil bunkering, burglary, for example, 
house breaking (sections 410–413). The Petroleum Production 
and  Distribution (Anti-Sabotage Act) 1975 prescribed death 
penalty or 21 years imprisonment for oil bunkering or any act of 
vandalism against oil pipelines. Until recently, incessant pipeline 
vandalism was the major illegitimate weapon of the Niger Delta 
militants in its agitation for equitable access to oil derivation 
(Ayodele 2008) until this was complemented with ransom-
induced kidnapping of expatriates. Arson involves wilful and 
malicious destruction of property with fire: Arson against gov-
ernment properties such as building/office and ship/vessel 
attracts life imprisonment, whereas arson against privately 
owned properties such as buildings and crops/farmlands attracts 
14 years imprisonment.
 (c) Crime against person: Human beings could become victims of 
the unlawful acts/omissions of other people or of themselves. 
When this happens, human beings become victims. Crimes in 
this category, according to the Criminal Code Act, include 
stealing with violence or armed robbery in section 401, murder 
(sections 306–329), suicide attempt (sections 326–327), infan-
ticide (section 327a), abortion (section 328) and endangering 
life and health (sections 330–350). Notably, armed robbery 
experiences steadily rose from 11% in 2010 to 17% in 2012 in 
Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation 2012) and 18% in 2013 (Sheriff 
Deputies n.d.). Basically, unlawful behaviours in this category 
which constitute serious threats to life are punishable with 
death, while those non-life- threatening cases attract imprison-
ment. Non-life-threatening crimes against persons include 
assaults (sections 351–356), indecent assaults (sections 
357–363), obtaining goods by false pretence (sections 419), 
stealing (section 383) and so on.
 (d) Crime against public order: Laws are made by society to make 
for the predictability of social life and peaceful coexistence of 
members. It is only when social life is predictable that public 
order could be guaranteed. In view of the fact that some infrac-
tions against law disrupt the social equilibrium and threaten 
public order, potential acts/omissions are proscribed. In this 
category, one finds crimes such as affray (section 83), unauthor-
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ised protest, disorderly conduct (section 249), unlawful society 
(section 62), unlawful assembly (section 69), affray (section 
83), insult to religion (section 204), violence against clerics 
(section 205) and disturbing religious worship (section 206). 
One interesting thing about most of the acts considered injuri-
ous to general public order is that they are usually fuelled by 
intolerance, mostly of religious, ethnic and political differences.
 (e) Crime against morality: Despite the fact that it was earlier 
noted that law has little or nothing to do with right or wrong, 
laws create its own standard for morality in every society. Under 
such arrangement, allowable and disallowable behaviours are 
clearly spelt out for members. For instance, sexual intercourse 
within or outside lawful marital relationships are considered 
serious issues in many nations as well as the issue of allowable 
parties to a marriage. In Nigeria, coerced sexual intercourse 
(rape) is proscribed in Sections 214–231 of the Criminal Code, 
while the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act (2013) forbids 
homosexuality. In fact, emotion- evoking labels such as carnal 
knowledge, “indecent treatment of boys under fourteen” 
(Section 216), “indecent practices between males” (Section 
217), “defilement of girls under thirteen” (Section 218), 
“defilement of girls under sixteen and above thirteen and of 
idiots” (Section 221) and “indecent treatment of girls under 
sixteen” (Section 222) were used to describe these “unnatural 
offences” (Section 214). The commercialisation of sex and por-
nography are equally considered unlawful in Nigeria, as speci-
fied in sections 223–229 and section 233D of the Criminal 
Code. Apart from the sex-related offences, monetary or non-
monetary inducement (bribery) to discharge one’s lawful duties 
is considered unethical and outlawed (sections 98–99).
 2. Government as lawbreaker: As a key party to the social contract 
earlier alluded to, government often violates the trust bestowed on 
it. One notable area of government’s criminality in Nigeria is in 
weak adherence to the constitution. For instance, President 
Olusegun Obasanjo’s eight-year administration exhibited penchant 
disobedience for the Constitution and even Supreme Court’s rul-
ings; the Dr Goodluck Jonathan’s administration disregarded the 
National Judicial Council’s order of May 11, 2013, to reinstate the 
suspended President of Court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Isa Salami 
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(Premium Times 2013), and successive administrations have openly 
violated the law that mandated free compulsory nine years of educa-
tion for Nigerian children (UBE Act 2004), as advocated by the 
UNICEF (UNICEF 2014). The Budget Act, signed into law yearly, 
has suffered considerably the judicious implementation by succes-
sive governments due to factors identified by Arthur (2016) as 
corruption/mismanagement, nepotism/tribalism, unqualified per-
sonnel in government, poor public participation and finance. In 
fact, the “Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have bind-
ing force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria” (Constitution, 1999, Section 1[1]). Stressing 
the non-negotiability of obedience, section 13 mandates: “all organs 
of government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising legisla-
tive, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply 
the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.” Also, contrary 
to the spirit and letter of the constitution barring the adoption of 
state religion (section 10), most states in the North-East and North-
West of Nigeria have subtly adopted Islam as well as the Sharia Legal 
System. Although successive governments have subtly violated the 
constitution by funding Hajj Commissions and sponsoring/subsi-
dising pilgrimages for Muslims and Christians, it was ex-Governor 
Ahmed Yerima (now a Senator) who led the northern rebellion in 
2000 by openly instituting full- fledged Sharia Legal System in 
Zamfara State. “The Government of the Federation or of a State 
shall not adopt any religion as State Religion,” is expressly stated in 
Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
crIme as cause of Internal InsecurIty In nIgerIa
Nigerian laws do not only proscribe behaviour considered inimical to sur-
vival, they also harp on the obligatory duties of both government and citi-
zens. This specificity of obligations is a particular necessity because society 
is a social contract between itself and members. In the social contract, the 
state/government is mandated by its laws to be responsible to its citizens 
and, by reciprocity, citizens to their government. Conversely, Section 24 
of the 1999 Constitution provides that every citizen of Nigeria is to obey 
the constitution, project the image of Nigeria, respect the dignity and 
rights of fellow citizens, assist governmental agencies to maintain order 
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and pay appropriate tax promptly among other things. In this section, 
three different types of insecurity (life, labour and knowledge) are identi-
fied and discussed. Security is simply the state of being free from threats 
and/or actual danger.
(a) Life Insecurity: Nigeria is fraught with insecurities to the extent 
that its corporate existence is being threatened. For instance, the highest 
crime cases were reported in Lagos State, whereas Katsina State had the 
least in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics 2016). The spate of insecurity 
or vulnerability of citizens to danger is a pointer to cumulative governance 
failure, because Section 14(2b) of the 1999 Constitution puts “the secu-
rity and welfare of the people” squarely on government’s shoulder. As an 
item in the exclusive list, security is an overarching duty of a government 
to citizens, and this is more the reason government solely controls the 
instruments of law enforcement such as the Police and the Army. “There 
shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria 
Police Force, and … no other police force shall be established for the 
Federation or any part thereof” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 
S214[1]). The Nigerian Police is saddled with statutory duty of maintain-
ing law and order within the country, while the Army, established under 
Section 217 of the constitution, is to safeguard her boundaries from exter-
nal invasions. Regrettably, the Nigerian Police is overwhelmed due to per-
sonnel shortage, corruption and inadequacy of equipment (Ayodele 2012; 
CLEEN Foundation 2012; Akinola and Ayodele 2016) as well as unfa-
vourable supports from citizens (Ikuteyijo and Ayodele 2013; Ayodele 
2015). Nowadays, effective life security is a burden, which has been exac-
erbated by incessant religious conflicts, ethnicity, militancy, communal 
clashes, cattle-rustlings and Boko Haram insurgency. A cursory assessment 
of the issues of insecurity in Nigeria throws up crime as a key cause. 
Individual (fraud, homicide, etc.) or group violations of law for economic 
reasons (e.g. armed robbery, kidnapping, etc.), political vendetta (assassi-
nation, terrorism) and powermongering (e.g. election rigging) have 
heightened insecurity in Nigeria. The spate of violent crimes (murder, 
armed robbery, terrorism) in Nigeria was due to the proliferation of light 
ammunitions and firearms (Ayodele 2006, 2011), as 3% of Nigerians 
admitted owning firearms or with highest possession in the North 
(CLEEN Foundation 2012). Interestingly, both government and citizens 
are complicit in committing criminal infractions of laws even though only 
the citizens get frequently prosecuted in Nigeria.
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(b) Knowledge Insecurity: Closely related to the life security is knowl-
edge security. There is a general belief that ignorance is a disease, and that 
only an informed mind is sane. Knowledge security, the deliberate attempt 
to properly educate people, is central to the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, especially Goal 4, which stresses inclusive and quality 
education. To underscore the importance of knowledge, Section 18(1) of 
the 1999 Constitution (as amended) mandates government to ensure 
“equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.” And to eradi-
cate illiteracy or ignorance, government is to provide free and compulsory 
education at primary, secondary and, where practicable, university levels in 
Nigeria. Nigerian laws conceive the universal basic education as a right 
and mandate government to educate every Nigerian child through the 
first nine years in primary and junior secondary level (FGN 2004, Section 
2[1–2]). As a matter of fact, it is criminal for any government and parents 
to deny citizens (or their children) quality education, as the Compulsory, 
Free Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act prescribes reprimand, fine or 
imprisonment on conviction for any parent who defaults in enrolling her/
his children of school-going ages (Section 2[4]), while any person/entity 
who charges fee is liable on conviction to a fine of ₦10,000 or imprison-
ment or both (Section 3[2]). Despite these laudable statutory provisions, 
knowledge security remains a daunting task in Nigeria, considering the 
below par budgetary allocation by successive governments. A benchmark 
of 26% of the budget was set by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for education in less-industrialised 
nations, but budgetary allocations have never exceeded 15% in Nigeria. 
For instance, 9.86%, 10.21%, 8.44% and 6% of the total budget were ear-
marked for education in 2012, 2013, 2016 and 2017 respectively 
(Abdallah 2016; Oyedeji 2017). The sustained low budgetary allocations 
to education are unarguably an infraction against the UBE Act, and it is a 
confirmation of the government’s unwillingness to tackle headlong the 
myriad of problems in the sector (BusinessDay 2017). Due to poor fund-
ing, dilapidated structures, personnel shortages and meagre/irregular 
remuneration, effective learning in many Nigerian schools is difficult, and 
this has resulted in incessant industrial actions and closures. Sociocultural 
factors also weigh against schooling in Nigeria, especially in the northern 
part where Western education (Boko) is viewed with suspicions in favour of 
the Almajiri Islamic education (Ayodele and Onu 2006; Akinola and 
Ayodele 2016). Due to the preference for the Almajiri system, 52% and 
50% of adult male population in the insurgency- ridden North-East and 
11 CRIMES AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA 
226
North-West, respectively, did not attend formal schools (Afri-Dev 2015), 
and many parents are not likely to release their children for Western edu-
cation. Ben Murray-Bruce, a senator in Nigeria has expressed great fear 
about the dwindling fortunes of education in the country, especially the 
danger it portends for security of lives:
When a nation wastes the minds of her youth by not providing them access 
to education, those youths will WASTE that nation. If a nation does not 
invest her wealth educating her youth, that nation will INVEST that same 
wealth fighting insecurity amongst those same youth. (Murray-Bruce 2015, 
emphasis mine)
Indeed, provision of quality education became so overwhelming for 
government that the sector became privatised. Nonetheless, the private 
providers have worsened learning security at all levels because the entire 
process has become heavily monetised, thus certificates are awarded on 
cash-and-carry basis. The frightening proportion of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) of 3.3 million as of 2013 (Norwegian Refugee Council’s 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, NRC/IDMC 2014) has wors-
ened knowledge security in Nigeria. The North-East, which is the theatre 
of the Boko Haram insurgency is the worst hit, as the IDPs’ population 
soared to 2.2  million between April and August 2015 (IPU/UNHCR 
2015), with Borno State accounting for 672,714 IDPs (IOM/OIM 
2015). Women and children became increasingly vulnerable, as insecurity 
ravaged the North-East (UNICEF 2011; Odunmorayo 2015) with its 
attendant drop in school enrolment. For instance, of the Nigeria’s 
10.5 million out-of-school children, constituting the highest globally, 60% 
were in Northern Nigeria among which 60% were girls (UNICEF 2011). 
Indeed, the invasion and successful abduction of 276 girls by the Boko 
Haram terrorists in Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno 
State, in April 2014, as well as the sustained violent attacks on the 
University of Maiduguri and other schools nailed knowledge security, par-
ticularly in the North-East where teachers/lecturers have resigned in a big 
way (Marama 2017; Olokor 2017). As aptly captured by UNICEF (2011), 
many Nigerian children were deprived of access to education, teachers 
have been killed and schools burnt down or closed for security reasons. We 
could begin to fathom the implication of sustained school closures in 
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northern Nigeria by considering the popular saying that whoever opens a 
school is shutting doors to prisons, which also means closure of schools 
might inevitably result in more criminals.
(c) Labour Insecurity: Labour security is defined as a social justice in 
Nigeria as contained in Section 14[1]) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended). The constitution provides that government shall, through 
appropriate legislations, ensure that citizens have secured access to means 
of livelihood and job security (Section 17[3a]). It is equally the statutory 
duty of government to make workplace environment safe, just and 
humane with “adequate facilities for leisure, social, religious and cultural 
life” (Section 17[3b]), equitable gender representation and workplace 
security, among others. Cautiously, Fallah and Phillips (2015) have noted 
that the Nigerian labour law is quite liberal in terms of conditions of 
employment and more flexible than European employment law. In clear 
terms, the employment law in Nigeria proscribes casualisation, child 
labour in workplaces, arbitrary dismissal of employees and mass reduc-
tions or downsizing among other things, as well as it provides for 
employees’ leave, overtime, privacy, and so on (Fallah and Phillips 2015). 
However, the reality in Nigeria clearly violates these statutory provisions 
on fair labour environment in view of the incidences of casualisation of 
labour (Onemola 2012), wage theft (Johnson 2016), non-payment of or 
delayed salary by federal and state governments and non-payment of 
pensions/gratuity. The dehumanisation of Nigerian workers peaked in 
2016 when governments in about 22 out of 36 States could not pay 
monthly salaries and had to be bailed out by the federal government in 
2017. In addition, the rate at which spouses were transferred apart or 
posted away from their families has created rifts in families and even dis-
integration. Evidently, this is a criminal infraction against the Labour Act 
1974 as well as the statutory provision, which mandates the “promotion 
of family life” (Section 17[3h]) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). 
Sections 34 and 44 of the Labour Act 1974 provide for employees’ right 
to be accompanied by family members at employer’s expense as well as 
employees’ consent to any transfer requiring severance from family. 
Thus, the continued dehumanisation of Nigerian workers by both gov-
ernment and foreign investors constitutes gross criminality and a viola-
tion of their human rights.
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conclusIon/recommendatIons
This chapter concludes that the brazen violation of extant laws in Nigeria 
by both the government and the governed is the major cause of internal 
insecurity in the country. Since laws are enacted to forge orderliness, sus-
tained and unsuccessfully prosecuted violation by either government or 
citizens has inevitable implication for disorderliness. Usually, some viola-
tions of laws are provoked by good intention, so the government only 
needs to ensure that it gets its priority right by effectively sifting through 
volumes of violations to ascertain their threat levels. Criminal violations, 
such as terrorism, armed robbery, homicide (murder), insult to religion, 
cattle-rustling, armed banditry and poor funding of education, that pose 
serious threat to internal security should be decisively addressed by govern-
ment. Government should divest itself of some exclusive responsibilities 
and open up the security provision space to accommodate community/
private participation. Without any doubt, securing the social and physical 
spaces is a daunting task that no single government could effectively han-
dle. In addition, an urgent overhauling of the judiciary is crucial to guaran-
teeing public order and reducing insecurities in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 12




Kidnapping is a long-standing problem but has assumed a worrisome 
dimension globally in the wake of the twenty-first century. Acts of kidnap-
ping are increasingly being adopted by different criminal elements such as 
militias, gangs, ritualists, rebels, and terrorists, among others, for a variety of 
purposes. However, kidnapping for ransom (K4R) is one of the “fastest- 
growing criminal industries globally, estimated to be worth $500 million 
each year” (Bickley 2003, p. 169). It is a common threat in Brazil, Colombia, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, 
and Venezuela, among others.
Ever since the 1980s, kidnapping perpetrated for different reasons 
remains a feature of the landscape of criminal victimisation in Nigeria. 
Kidnapping has been perpetrated for vengeance (as a political or terrorist 
strategy), ritual (power and influence), and exploitation (ransom or sexual). 
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However, what is astonishing is the unprecedented escalation in frequency 
and sophistication of organised criminal gangs that specialise in K4R. The 
growth in the frequency, geographical spread, and operational audacity of 
K4R in Nigeria is a major source of security concern to individuals, corpo-
rate organisations, the diplomatic community, and, indeed, the Nigerian 
government.
The threat of K4R now cuts across the length and breadth of Nigeria. 
The targets are as diverse as the actors who benefit from it, much as the 
factors that underpin its upsurge are many and varied. School children, 
women, businessmen, politicians, government officials, diplomats, expa-
triates, landlords, and traditional rulers, among others, are increasingly 
being targeted by these criminal gangs. The aim of this chapter, therefore, 
is to examine the evolving threat of K4R in Nigeria, with a view to high-
lighting the forms it has assumed, the factors contributing to the menace, 
and measures for combating it.
The chapter is subsumed under eight sections. Following this introduc-
tion, the second section conceptualises the term K4R, while the third sec-
tion provides the theoretical framework of analysis. The fourth section 
discusses the evolution of kidnapping, while the fifth section delves into 
the evolving types of K4R. The sixth section examines the factors contrib-
uting to the scourge of K4R, and the seventh section highlights its effects. 
The last section concludes the discourse.
conceptual clarIfIcatIon
A clarification of the meaning of K4R is fundamental in this chapter, since 
most users of the concept feel no need to explain its meaning to readers. 
Often, the readers’ understanding is simply taken for granted, even when 
the term “kidnapping” is sometimes used interchangeably with hostage- 
taking. In order to gain a shared understanding of the meaning of K4R, it 
is logical that we begin with the meaning of kidnapping.
Greenawalt (1989, p. 92) defines kidnapping as “the unlawful removal 
of someone and confine him or her in isolation, and a situation of false 
imprisonment, to restrain the victim unlawfully, usually accomplished by 
threat of force that coerces him to stay where he is directed”. When a vic-
tim is kidnapped, it suggests that he or she was abducted in a criminal 
manner and taken away, especially to unknown location. In this way, Attoh 
(2012) posits that kidnapping entails an unexpected incident that takes 
place when a person is carried off surreptitiously by another person or 
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group of individuals for an illegal purpose. Hence, victims of kidnapping 
are taken away from the place they know or were seized to other places 
they do not know or wish to be. They are usually denied access to wilful 
communication, unless to those approved by the kidnappers. Thus, the 
defining elements of kidnapping will include seizure of a victim, transpor-
tation of the victim to unknown location, unlawful detention of the victim 
against his/her will, and denial or restriction of the victim’s wilful access 
to communication.
In criminal law, kidnapping “is the taking away or transportation of a 
person against that person’s will, usually to hold the person in false impris-
onment, a confinement without legal authority” (Mbaegbu 2014, p. 31). 
In this light, Section 364 of Nigeria’s Criminal Code provides a penalty 
for kidnapping, stating that:
any person who unlawfully imprisons any person, and takes him out of 
Nigeria without his consent; or unlawfully imprisons any person within 
Nigeria in such a manner as to prevent him from applying to court for his 
release or from discovering to any person the place where he is imprisoned, 
or in such a manner as to prevent any person entitled to have access to him 
from discovering the place where he is imprisoned; is guilty of a felony, and 
is liable to imprisonment for 10  years. (Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990)
The purpose of kidnapping could be to hold the victim for ransom or as 
a hostage, to facilitate the commission of a felony or flight thereafter, to 
terrorise or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another, or to 
engage in sexual activity with the victim against the victim’s will. Kidnapping, 
however, is different from hostage-taking because hostage- taking targets 
victims to achieve some objectives rather than ransom payment. According 
to Etebu et al. (2010), hostage-taking is the act of forcefully abducting a 
person or group of persons with the sole aim of using such captives and 
circumstances or situations as a means of negotiation or to make a particular 
demand, usually not for money.
For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, K4R is defined as any unlaw-
ful act of luring, seizing, and/or transporting a victim—a person or group 
of persons—to an undisclosed location for detention against the victim’s 
wish and threatened with harm in order that money can be extorted 
directly from the victim or from those associated with the victim such as 
relatives, friends, employers, government, or any other third party as a 
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condition for the release of the victim. The difference between most kid-
nappings and K4R is that the primary motive of abduction in K4R is to 
extort money from the victim or those associated with the victim. The 
perpetrators use intimidation and coercion such as torture to ensure that 
money is paid as quickly as possible in exchange for the victim’s release. 
But the outcome of such criminal act is sometimes not certain. There have 
been situations where victims were killed by the kidnappers despite col-
lecting ransom, died as a result of illness, or killed during botched rescue 
attempt. Some have been lucky to be rescued unhurt by security operatives.
theoretIcal perspectIves
This chapter adopts a theoretical bridging approach that combines the life-
style theory, routine activity theory, and economic theory of crime. The 
lifestyle theory posits that not everyone has the same lifestyle, and that some 
lifestyles expose people to more risks than do other lifestyles (Hindelang 
et al. 1978). For example, lifestyles such as dressing ostentatiously and driv-
ing very costly cars could expose an individual to criminal victimisation. 
Beyond lifestyle, certain social adaptations result in routine behavioural pat-
terns that are associated with certain amount of exposure to crime. In this 
light, the routine activity theory states that a crime occurs when the follow-
ing three elements come together in any given space and time, namely a 
motivated offender, an accessible target, and the absence of capable guard-
ians (persons and institutions) who could intervene (Cohen and Felson 
1979). For instance, routine (daily) activities such as going to work, school, 
or worship; vocational activities such as attending sporting events or vaca-
tion destinations could lead to heightened exposure and thus high victimi-
sation risk, while others have much lower exposure and lower risks.
Notwithstanding the analytical strength of lifestyle and routine activity 
theories in explaining the relationship between demographic characteris-
tics and crime victimisation, “they failed to offer explanation for inter- 
individual differences in victimisation risk even when potential victims take 
extra measures to reduce their vulnerability” (Ikoh and Okenyodo 2014, 
p. 56). Also, they fail to account for why criminal groups emerge in the 
first instance and their motives. This weakness is compensated for by the 
economic theories of crime.
Although several economic theories that seek to explain crime victimi-
sation exist with divergent predictive capability, the variant postulated by 
Becker (1968) is pertinent to the Nigerian context. The theory approaches 
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criminals as rational individuals, just like anyone else. Criminals, like 
 ordinary citizens, seek to maximise their own well-being, but through 
illegal instead of legal means. It suggests that the rich would become 
increasingly attractive targets to crime victimisation as the income distri-
bution widens relative to the poor in the society. This theory emphasises 
the role of material deprivation or the desire of the would-be criminal to 
pursue his or her well-being as key factor in shaping the social and physical 
context of criminal victimisation in a society.
From the standpoint of this theoretical bridging, it becomes evident 
that K4R in Nigeria is a product of the interaction of vulnerability created 
by lifestyle and routine engagements that make some people attractive 
targets; material deprivation evidenced in income inequality, widespread 
poverty, and unemployment; and weakness of state institutions manifest in 
the absence (or even complicity) of state officials who should prevent such 
criminal actions or facilitate subsequent criminal prosecution of offenders. 
Having presented the framework of analysis, it is pertinent to examine 
how K4R emerged in Nigeria.
evolutIon and expansIon of KIdnappIng  
for ransom In nIgerIa
Kidnapping is not new in Nigeria. Its history dates back to the 1980s, 
when such acts were associated with rituals, especially for moneymaking. 
It, however, became a very serious crime in the late 1990s following the 
crisis in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. The first major case of kid-
napping in the Niger Delta was recorded on 28 June 1999, when armed 
young men abducted two foreign helicopter pilots (an Australian and a 
Briton) working for Royal Dutch Shell at its Enwhe oil platform. A group, 
Enough is Enough, claimed responsibility for the abduction (BBC News 
1999). Beginning from mid-2000, the menace became even more ram-
pant as aggrieved youth took up arms to protest the marginalisation of the 
region by both the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state. They formed 
different militant groups, including the Niger Delta People Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo Asari. Although several other 
groups operated then, the NDPVF was at the forefront of the struggle.
State-orchestrated campaign against the NDPVF led to the arrest of 
Asari Dokubo in 2005 for treason and attempt to overthrow the federal 
government. The vacuum created by his arrest gave rise to the emergence 
of other groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
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(MEND), Martys Brigade, Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF), Niger 
Delta Militants (NDM), and the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA) in 
the Niger Delta, among others. Consequently, these groups began to make 
various demands which included, among others, the unconditional release 
of Asari Dokubo; the release of Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former gov-
ernor of Bayelsa State who was standing trial for money laundering; pay-
ment of compensation for protracted years of environmental degradation; 
upward review of the 13% derivation to oil- bearing communities to 50%; 
provision of employment opportunities for the youth from the region; and 
the provision of infrastructural facilities (Onuoha 2008).
In order to press home their demands, the militant groups mounted 
attacks on oil and gas facilities, abducted oil workers, and engaged in oil 
theft. They abducted oil workers, particularly expatriates, for the purpose 
of drawing local and international attention to the plights of the region. 
Initially, those abducted were usually released after few hours or days, 
once the kidnappers made their point or were able to negotiate a deal with 
government. On 11 January 2006, four foreign oil workers working on 
the AE fields of Shell petroleum were abducted by militants in Port 
Harcourt, Rivers State (Adelakun 2007).
The outbreak of abduction in the region later mutated into financially 
motivated kidnapping or “commercial hostage-taking”. For instance, on 3 
October 2006, a militant group, the Niger Delta Freedom Fighters 
(NDFF), abducted seven expatriate oil workers of contracting firms to 
Mobil Oil, in Akpan Estate in Eket, Akwa Ibom State. They “demanded 
$10 million ransom for the release of the hostages” (Ajaero and Azubuike 
2006, p. 15). The Nigerian government responded to growing insecurity 
in the region with the reinforcement of military deployment.
Aggressive military crackdown on the militants compelled them to add 
another dimension to hostage-taking. This time around, abducted victims 
were used as human shields to deter the military from launching brutal 
assault on their camps in the creeks. This was revealed in an open letter to 
the international community by the spokesperson of the Joint Revolutionary 
Council (JRC), Cynthia Whyte, in November 2006. While criticising what 
they called “commercial hostage-taking” activities of other militant groups 
in the region, Whyte warned that all future victims “will be serving the 
purpose of human shields and will never be used as bargaining tools” 
(Ajaero and Azubuike 2006, p. 14). Notwithstanding JRC’s abhorrence 
of commercial hostage-taking, some militant and organised criminal 
groups also exploited the security situation to engage in K4R.
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By January 2007, “nearly 100 foreign hostages, mostly oil workers, 
have been kidnapped in the restive region” (Oduwole 2007, p. 6). While 
some militant groups used it as a strategy to rake-off huge amount of 
money from oil multinationals to partly fund their struggle, others saw it 
as purely lucrative enterprise for making quick money. Despite denials by 
government and oil companies that they pay ransom to free hostages or 
kidnapped victims, the then Inspector General of Police, Sir Mike Okiro, 
acknowledged in April 2009 that “kidnappers in Nigeria pocketed ran-
soms of over $100 million (about ₦15 billion) between 2006 and 2008” 
(Okocha and Ikokwu 2009, p. 1).
Gradually, the practice opened a window of illicit business venture with 
network of benefactors, such as criminal gangs, government officials, 
community leaders, oil company staff, security agents, and various indi-
viduals who posed as negotiators (Onuoha 2008, p. 272). As noted by Le 
Sage (2010, p.  66), sometimes “the entire village or communities are 
involved in the kidnapping industry, and share the burden of incarcerating 
and sustaining a hostage in return for a share of the final ransom”.
In order to arrest the growing level of militancy and criminality in the 
region, President Umaru Musa Yar Adua initiated an Amnesty programme, 
in 2009, for all Niger Delta militants. By the time the programme com-
menced in earnest, the act of K4R had permeated other zones in the coun-
try, particularly the South-East and South-West. Increasingly, K4R 
assumed both vertical and horizontal expansion in Nigeria. The vertical 
dimension entails notable increase in the frequency of K4R across the 
country. The Street Journal (2013) noted that the rate of kidnapping in 
Nigeria had risen considerably in the past ten years as not less than 1500 
people were kidnapped on an annual basis. A February 2017 public opin-
ion survey by NOIPolls (2017) revealed that majority of Nigerians (60%) 
agreed that kidnapping is very prevalent in Nigeria and 43% said they had 
heard about some kidnap cases in their locality in the past three months, 
further buttressing its prevalence.
Horizontal dimension reflects the expansion in geographical spread of 
abductions. Previously, K4R was more pervasive and prevalent in the 
South-South zone, but over time, it spread to other parts of the country. 
As evident in Fig. 12.1, further analysis in the NOIPolls survey by geo- 
political zones revealed that respondents in the South-West (74%), North- 
Central (68%), South-South (65%), and the South-East (60%) zones 
accounted for the highest percentage of Nigerians who admitted that 
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kidnapping is prevalent in the country, while the majority of respondents 
who opined that the issue of kidnapping is not prevalent in Nigeria are 
residents from the North-West (43%) and the North-East (33%) zones 
(NOIPolls 2017).
Although kidnapping generally has been an on and off scourge in the 
country, the growth in K4R has assumed a dangerous and very worrisome 
new dimension. K4R is now a big and lucrative business, with perpetrators 
making hundreds of millions of naira or dollars in the process. A typical 
kidnapping gang in Nigeria will compose of a leader, weapon handlers, 
arms couriers, drivers, guards, cooks, food vendors, and informants, 
among others. Criminal gangs behind the new wave of K4R involve largely 
individuals with previous experience in weapon handling gained from par-
ticipation in militancy, pipeline vandalisation, cattle rustling, armed rob-
bery, human trafficking, car theft, or cultism, among other criminal 
activities. They are usually the leaders or original members of the gang, 
who then go on to recruit other individuals who may or may not have 
previously participated in crimes. The new recruits hone their skills as the 
group conducts more and more successful kidnapping operations. With 
high level of drug consumption among gang members, they can easily kill 
Fig. 12.1 Prevalence of kidnapping in Nigeria. Source: NOIPolls public opinion 
survey (2017)
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their victim with the slightest provocation arising from delay or incom-
plete payment of ransom or attempt by victim to escape. The media is 
awash with reports of dreaded kidnapping gangs led by notorious kingpins 
who bear different aliases. Data in Table 12.1 show some of the notable 
dreaded kingpins who have been either arrested or killed by security forces. 
Usually, these dreaded kingpins use powerful charms that protect them 
against gunshots.
Table 12.1 Some dreaded kidnap kingpins killed, arrested, or still operating in 
Nigeria
S/No. Name Alias 
(AKA)
Status Remark




He has been arraigned 
on various counts




The dreaded criminal 
was responsible for 
militant attacks and 
several kidnappings in 
the states of Lagos and 
Ogun




He was responsible for 
the abduction of 
several residents of 
Festac Town in Lagos 
and in neighbouring 
states
4 Mr. Henry Chibueze Vampire Killed 
(2/3/2017)
He confessed to 
having killed over 200 
people in various 
kidnapping and armed 
robbery attacks
5 Mr. Chinedu Oba Okeke Nchoo Arrested 
(30/1/2017)
He had been 
terrorising residents in 
Enugu state
6 Mr. Dominic Nwakpa Alhaji Arrested 
(1/1/2017)
His gang was 
responsible for the 
kidnapping of several 
important personalities 
across the country
7 Mr. Obioma Nwankwo Osisikankwu Killed 
(12/12/2010)
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patterns and modus operandI of KIdnappIng 
for ransom In nIgerIa
In terms of patterns of K4R, different types of operations have emerged in 
recent times. These include routine model, invasion model, highway 
model, and insider model. A brief explanation of these models is pertinent 
at this juncture.
Routine Model
The routine model is the traditional type or K4R that involves well organ-
ised gangs carrying out regular abduction that follows the typical attack 
cycle of kidnapping. Security experts are of the view that kidnappings gen-
erally follow a process that involves six stages: target selection, planning, 
deployment, attack, escape, and exploitation. As noted by Stewart (2010), 
in the act of kidnapping, the group must identify a victim; plan for the 
abduction, captivity, and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure 
the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or 
political gain; and then escape. Although other types of K4R may or may 
not follow some of these stages, the routine model usually follows this 
sequence of actions to optimise the success rate of their operations. This 
type of K4R is carried out by established gangs, that prowl the city or 
towns scouring for potential targets.
The confessions of members of a kidnapping gang arrested in April 
2017, who specialised in serial abduction of people in Abuja, Kaduna, and 
Nasarawa, vividly illustrate their routinised operations (Okolie 2017a). 
Victims of the routine model in Nigeria cut across people from all walks of 
life—expatriates, movie actors, schoolchildren, journalists, priests, tradi-
tional rulers, politicians, doctors, academics, businessmen, and women, 
among others. Their main consideration is whether the individual is a 
highly attractive target (HAT). An individual or group is considered as 
HAT against two key indicators: (1) the target’s worth or value and (2) 
the likelihood of his/her successful abduction. Once these indicators are 
promising, such individual/group becomes a target of serious interest for 
the professional kidnapping gangs. Typically, most victims are released 
unharmed after ransom is paid, though there have been cases where the 
victims were murdered or died in captivity.
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Invasion Model
This type of K4R entails a well-planned attack by a kidnapping gang, 
involving the raiding of a community, estate, school, or any population 
centre to abduct sizeable number of persons considered high-value tar-
gets. In terms of modus operandi, the act involves extensive pre-attack 
surveillance and information gathering about those living or frequenting 
such places, estimation of security arrangement in place in such locations, 
mapping of possible escape routes with the abducted victims, and selec-
tion of likely date and timing of planned attack. Hence, some individuals 
are identified beforehand and included in the target list. This kind of K4R 
usually requires huge resources in terms of the number of gang members; 
logistics for movement, feeding, and accommodation; and volume of 
ammunition needed in the lifecycle of the operation.
The invasion model is often conducted by well-organised, highly 
sophisticated, and operationally experienced kidnapping gangs. The out-
come is usually mass abduction of targets, who will later be transported to 
the kidnappers’ den. Such hideouts or camps are usually located in creeks, 
bushes, or forests that are largely inaccessible to security agents. Although 
statistics in Table 12.2 is certainly not exhaustive, they are indicative of 
this type of K4R in Nigeria. It shows that schools and residential estates 
were targeted by the heavily armed kidnappers to abduct sizeable numbers 
of victims—between four and eight persons.
Highway Model
This type of K4R is highly opportunistic in the sense that the potential 
targets or victims are not known beforehand. The spot of attack is usually 
not locations within towns and cities, but expressways that connect states 
or major cities in Nigeria. The kidnapping gang usually combines such 
operations with robbing or raping of travellers. The modus operandi 
involves heavily armed members laying siege at the major highways. 
Sometimes the kidnappers disguise themselves by wearing army or police 
uniform to easily pass off as genuine state security forces. They will block 
the highway, force vehicles to stop, and proceed to rob travellers (Daily 
Trust 2016). Thereafter, persons suspected to be of high financial value 
will be seized and transported to their heavily guarded camps, usually 
thick bushes and forests. There, they will do preliminary estimation of the 
financial value of the victims and then initiate telephone conversation with 
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the victims’ families to negotiate ransom payments. Some lucky victims 
have been freed through rescue operations by security forces, while others 
regained their freedom after paying ransom. Those who are not so lucky 
have died during rescue operations or as a result of ill-health, or injuries 
sustained during attempt to whisk them away by the kidnappers.
Major highways such as Abuja-Lokoja expressway, Abuja-Kaduna road, 
Aba-Ikot Ekpene road, Benin-Ekpoma-Auchi road, and Akure-Ilesha 
expressway are the major hotspots of this type of K4R in Nigeria. Others 
are Lagos-Sagamu-Ore-Benin road, Lagos-Ibadan expressway, and 
Enugu-Port Harcourt expressway. Although several cases of this type of 
K4R abound, one high-profile abduction that attracted wide publicity 
reveals a practice that is ubiquitous in Nigerian highways. On 30 June 
Table 12.2 Some selected recent cases of invasion model of kidnapping for 
ransom
S/No. Date Location Victims/Targets Remarks





Abduction of three students, 
three female supervisors, one 
female cook, and a female 
Turkish teacher of Nigerian 





for the victims to 
regain their 
freedom.





Abduction of four pupils, a 
teacher, and the Vice 
Principal of the Lagos Junior 
Model College
The heavily armed 
attackers, comprising 
five men and a 
woman, stormed the 
school and abducted 
six persons






Kidnap of four landlords of 
Oshorun Heritage Estate,
It is alleged that 
family members of 
the victims paid 
ransom, before their 
release five days after
4 25 May 2017 Epe, Lagos 
State
Six students of Igbonla 
Model College, Epe, were 
kidnapped
They were released 
on 28 July 2017





Kidnap of the Director and 
Chief Executive, Ogba Zoo 
and Nature Park, Benin City. 
The incident led to the death 
of three policemen.
He was released 
after some days
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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2016, the Deputy High Commissioner of Sierra Leone to Nigeria, Major 
General Alfred Claude-Nelson and his driver were abducted by kidnappers 
while travelling along the Kaduna-Abuja road. Their abductors held them 
for four days before releasing them after ₦1.5 million ransom was paid 
(Ajaja 2016). The intervention of both the police and Department of 
State Services (DSS) facilitated his negotiated safe release, although the 
culprits were later arrested. Also, on 19 October 2017, the Chaplain of 
African Church, Ondo Central Missionary Diocese, Reverend David 
Ayola was reported by the media to have been kidnapped along Imojo- 
Oye Ekiti road and later killed after it became clear to the kidnappers that 
the church could not raise the ₦100 million ransom they demanded.
Insider Model
The insider model is that type of K4R where someone who lives or is 
closely associated with the potential victim plays an active role by initiat-
ing, participating, directing, or enabling the kidnapping of such targets. 
Such insider could be the relative, driver, cook, gatekeeper, nanny, busi-
ness associate, confidant, or any other person who is reasonably in close 
contact with the potential target. The individual is usually the one who 
provides the kidnapping gang with useful information that makes the indi-
vidual an attractive target. Such information may include the victim’s 
financial worth, residence, hobbies, movement, investment, or, indeed, 
any fact that could encourage or inspire his or her abduction.
A typical example of this type was the kidnapping and eventual murder 
of Dr Edith Chinedu Aliyu, proprietress of Chelson Group of Schools and 
Chief Executive Officer of Grant Microfinance Bank. Her abduction was 
orchestrated by her driver, Ali Angba. She was kidnapped in her house on 
29 June 2016 by the trio of Maxwell Ajukwu, Solomon Amodu, and 
Sunday Jacob. Two hours after her abduction, the kidnappers strangled 
her because she recognised one of her abductors as her driver’s friend. 
They later buried her in a bush near Yangoji Village, along Kwali-Lokoja 
Expressway. Meanwhile, they had collected a ransom of ₦5 million from 
the family, supposedly to secure her release. Ali Angba confessed to the 
crimes connived with the three other suspects to kidnap the victim (Mutum 
2014). The main challenge in the insider model, much as in other types of 
K4R, is that once the victim recognises any of the member of the criminal 
gang, the chances of him or her being released alive are very slim.
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factors BehInd the outBreaK and persIstence 
of KIdnappIng for ransom
Several interrelated factors contribute to the outbreak and prevalence of 
K4R in Nigeria. These factors derive from, and reflect, the crisis of the 
Nigerian political economy. They include mismanagement of the econ-
omy, proliferation of weapons, complicity of state actors, and weak institu-
tional capacity for regulation.
The mismanagement of the Nigerian economy, which has deepened 
poverty, unemployment, and inequality, is the main factor responsible for 
the rising incidence of kidnapping in the country. Poverty and unemploy-
ment are socio-economic challenges that have plagued Nigeria since the 
1980s. The situation appears worse with the current economic recession 
in the country. A recent United Nations (UN) report captured the pov-
erty situation aptly:
Nigeria is one of the poorest and most unequal countries in the world, with 
over 80 million or 64% of her population living below poverty line. The situ-
ation has not changed over the decades, but is increasing. Poverty and hun-
ger have remained high in rural areas, remote communities and among 
female–headed households and these cuts across the six geo-political zones. 
(Ujumadu 2016)
Additionally, the National Bureau of Statistics recently disclosed that 
Nigeria’s unemployment rate rose from 13.3% in the second quarter of 
2016 to 13.9% at the end of the third quarter (Onuba 2016). The report 
further noted that unemployment was highest for persons between the 
ages of 15–24 and 25–34, which represents the youth population. As a 
result of widespread poverty and unemployment, some young people have 
taken to criminal activities such as K4R to survive.
The crisis of the Nigerian economy is not only evident in the increase 
in poverty and unemployment, but also widening inequality between the 
rich, who live ostentatious lifestyles, and the poor, who wallow in penury. 
With excessive materialism flaunted in an environment of abject poverty 
and privation, contemporary Nigerian society became mired in moral cri-
sis. Those who have gained wealth want to display it, while those who do 
not have it but get inundated with the display of stupendous wealth want 
to acquire it by all means. The flagrant display of wealth by some people 
has made the get-rich-at-all-cost syndrome to gain momentum among 
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Nigerians, especially the youth. This situation leads to the erosion of moral 
values of hard work and honesty and the promotion of greed and corrup-
tion as means of acquiring wealth. The resultant moral crisis contributes to 
the problem of kidnapping. As Oyemwinmina and Osazuwa (2016, 
p. 208) captured it:
The craving for materialism at all cost in the country generally, has led to the 
high wave of crime in the country. People are ready to do anything to get 
rich and be celebrated in the society and a lot of the youth considered kid-
napping as one of the short means to actualise this purpose.
This explains the involvement of people at the family and community 
levels either as informants or as providers of arms or those who supply 
foods and water to the kidnappers and their detained victims. The eco-
nomic motivation behind kidnapping makes it difficult to be eradicated 
due to the payment of ransom by victims and their families. Confessions of 
arrested kidnap suspects indicate that most of them were apprehended 
either in their newly furnished apartments or while driving exotic cars they 
bought with the share of ransom.
Furthermore, ongoing banking reforms aimed at transforming Nigeria’s 
economy into a cashless society has partly contributed to the rise in 
K4R. For instance, the introduction and penetration of automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) have led to significant reduction in physical cash flow 
and transactions in Nigeria. In fact, the growth of ATMs in Nigeria has 
been explosive over the past few years with transaction volumes growing 
from 1.6 million transactions in 2006 to over 500 million transactions in 
2009. The number of ATMs has also grown from just over 500 ATMs in 
2006 to over 8000 ATMs in 2009 (Moses undated). As banks embrace 
electronic transactions and the use of ATMs, which leads to people carry-
ing less cash with them, many groups hitherto involved in (armed) rob-
bery are now turning to kidnapping as an alternative source of income.
Interestingly, while the economy has witnessed significant decrease in 
physical cash flow, the larger society has witnessed tremendous increase in 
the inflow of illegal small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Nigeria is 
believed to account for about 70% of an estimated 500 million weapons 
circulating in West Africa (Premium Times 2016). In January 2017, 
operatives of the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a total of 661 pieces 
of pump action rifles concealed within steel doors and other goods smuggled 
through Apapa Port in Lagos (Salau 2017). With this volume of SALWs 
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circulating in an environment of worsening youth unemployment and 
poverty, it is not surprising that the nation is witnessing an upsurge in 
violent crimes such as kidnapping (Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino 2013). 
Thus, the scale and intensity of K4R have been compounded by the pro-
liferation of SALWs. During a raid on a compound of one kidnapping 
suspect, for instance, the police was startled by the discovery of large 
cache of arms:
The arms and ammunition include 27 AK 47 rifles, one K2 rifle, two type- 
06 rifles, one general purpose machine gun, one rocket launcher, 17 rockets, 
six pump action guns, three dane guns, one Barrett pistol and 13 rocket 
grenades, as well as 12,800 rounds of AK 47 live ammunition, 530 rounds 
of LAR ammunition, 95 rounds of GPMG live ammunition, 1000 rounds of 
K2 live ammunition and 143 magazines. (Ujumadu 2014, p. 30)
The possession of such sophisticated SALWs emboldens and enables 
the kidnappers to abduct victims at will and, in most cases, overpower the 
police in gunfight. In a sense, SALWs’ proliferation has become both a 
contributing factor and consequence of violent criminality such as K4R 
in Nigeria.
Weaknesses in the ability of security, law enforcement, and regulatory 
institutions of the state to effectively discharge their duties make a tenuous 
security situation even worse. Experts are of the view that the police is 
poorly resourced and staffed to deal with organised criminal groups like 
kidnappers. Nigeria’s reliance on about 377,000 policemen to cater for 
the security needs of over 170, 000,000 people in the country has proven 
grossly inadequate (Ogbozor 2016). In addition, “other factors such as 
the culture of corruption has created a hollowed-out police force—strong 
on paper but ineffective in practice” (Okenyodo 2016, p. 2). Worse still, 
pervasive corruption in security and law enforcement institutions has long 
meant that apprehending kidnappers is unlikely, prosecuting the few 
arrested less so, and securing conviction even more difficult. There have 
been allegations of cooperation and collusion between kidnapping gangs 
and state actors—police, prison officials, military, and government offi-
cials—who benefit from the shadow economy. The March 2017 successful 
rescue of a notorious kidnap kingpin, Henry Chibueze, by his gang mem-
bers who stormed Owerri High Court where he was standing trial paints 
a vivid picture of the complicity of state actors in K4R. It was revealed that 
while in detention at Owerri Central Prison, Chibueze:
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Coordinated several kidnappings and gave out his numerous rifles for hire to 
criminals. Sources at the prison disclosed that Vampire lived like a king in 
the prison. He reportedly had free access to his mobile phones and enjoyed 
regular visits from various persons including his gang members who brought 
food and money to him. In November 2015, he successfully recruited an 
official of the Nigeria Prison Service, Chukwuma Agim, into his gang and 
made him set up a kidnap gang that would enable them raise money for their 
cases. (Okolie 2017b, p. 28)
It is evident that without the assistance, connivance, and cooperation of 
the prison officials, the kingpin would not have been able to continue to 
plot and reap from kidnapping operations while in prison custody, let 
alone coordinate plans for his rescue from the court premises.
The ability of the kidnap suspects to coordinate their illicit activities via 
mobile phones also reveals how the weakness of private corporations con-
tributes to the persistence of kidnapping in Nigeria. The use of Global 
System for Mobile (GSM) communications phones by some individuals to 
coordinate and execute acts of criminality “has been attributed as one of 
the causes of kidnapping in Nigeria” (Adegoke 2014, p. 209). In May 
2011, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) mandated all 
telecom operators in Nigeria to register all existing phone subscribers 
before a January 2012 deadline. The registration of mobile phone users in 
Nigeria was primarily for security purposes, to mitigate the incidences of 
crime and criminalities perpetrated through the use of phones, especially 
kidnapping (Omoniyi 2010). The NCC had ordered that all unregistered 
phone lines after the deadline should be disconnected from operators’ 
networks. However, MTN Nigeria, the largest telecom operator in 
Nigeria, failed to comply with the directive. This, according to President 
Mohammadu Buhari “have facilitated activities of terrorists and kidnap-
ping kingpins who perpetrated several of their murderous and nefarious 
acts that proved costly to the nation” (Omonobi 2016, p. 54).
Consequently, Nigeria imposed a record $5 billion fine on the company 
for failing to disconnect subscribers with unregistered phone lines bought 
before January 2012. The setback from non-registration of some mobile 
phone subscribers is further compounded by the lack of a reliable elec-
tronic national identity management system in Nigeria. Wide-scale cor-
ruption, incompetence, poor planning, and vested political interests have 
frustrated every effort since 1979 to have such a vital system in Nigeria 
(Odili-Idiagbor 2014). This situation has created a terrible security gap in 
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the form of absence of a national database for reliable identification of 
people, thereby severely constraining the evolution of robust crime man-
agement and efficient criminal justice administration in the country. This 
explains why a person with criminal history can operate for years with dif-
ferent names without being easily detected.
The nature of Nigerian politics is another major factor contributing to 
the rise in kidnapping in Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria—especially electoral 
politics—is defined and approached by politicians as a do-or-die affair. At 
every election cycle in Nigeria, there is often a role for godfatherism, 
thugs, hoodlums, and cultists. The stake in Nigerian politics is incredibly 
high, making politicians desperate in the struggle to win elections or 
determine those who get elective or appointive positions. As a result, many 
of them recruit “specialists of violence”—cultists, gangs, and thugs—to 
attain and retain political power (Onuoha 2010). In some cases, these 
“specialists” are compensated with sensitive elective and appointive offices. 
The danger inherent in this form of do-or-die struggle for power is the 
politicisation of security and insecuritisation of politics. First, those who 
are too ambitious of acquiring political power form or fund youth groups 
to help them win elective positions or even settle political scores. Second, 
the practice of arming youth, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence 
and subsequently dumping them after elections, is a well-established elec-
tioneering habit of most Nigerian politicians. Third, the youth groups or 
gangs so “empowered” through funding and arming by politicians, in 
turn, engage in criminal activities that undermine security. In Anambra 
State, for example, unemployed youth were armed and used by politicians 
to unleash terror on people in 2004 when the crisis between Chief Chris 
Uba and Dr Chris Ngige escalated due to the politics of godfatherism 
(Alumona 2016). After this period, kidnapping became a major security 
challenge in the state. Thus, Inyang and Abraham (2013, p. 535) drew the 
link between politics and kidnapping when they argued that “youths 
(thugs) who have been abandoned by their masters after winning elections 
are now busy kidnapping innocent persons and relatives of those persons 
they surged to be wealthy”. Thus, there is a nexus between “do-or-die” 
politics and organised crime such as K4R, with serious consequences 
for Nigeria.
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effects of KIdnappIng for ransom In nIgerIa
The effects of K4R in Nigeria are many and varied. The significant loss of 
human lives and infliction of bodily injuries and trauma are the most seri-
ous effects of K4R. Although the primary motive of K4R is to detain a 
victim in order to receive money in exchange for the person’s freedom, 
innocent bystanders, victims, and security forces have been killed in vio-
lent attacks associated with K4R in Nigeria. The kidnappers, innocent 
individuals, and the targeted victims are usually at risk of losing their lives 
due to the use of arms in the process of trying to scare people away and 
enforce obedience before taking the targets away. Many families have lost 
their members to criminal gangs that engage in K4R. For instance, one of 
Nigeria’s most dreaded kidnap kingpin confessed that he had kidnapped 
and killed 200 persons across the country (Punch 2017). The killing of 
any member of the family by kidnappers leads to a deep fracturing of kin-
ship structures. Some children have been left without parents, husbands 
without wives, and vice versa. For every person killed or injured by kid-
nappers, there are many more who must cope with the psychological, 
physical, and economic effects that endure in its aftermath.
Exposure to harrowing traumatic experiences is another effect of 
K4R. Usually, victims of kidnapping are injured in the process of whisking 
them away or when they are being moved from one location to another to 
avoid being rescued by security operatives. Victims are known to be sub-
jected to several dehumanising treatments such as torture, rape, and star-
vation, among others. Thus, Ilechukwu, Uchem, and Asogwa (2015, 
p. 28) maintain that “victims suffer psychological trauma from the loss of 
freedom and dignity”. The psychological trauma that victims experience 
endures even long after they have regained their freedom. This exposes 
such people to post-traumatic stress disorder that makes it difficult for 
them to recover from the inhuman treatment. Sometimes, the traumatic 
experiences are also felt by the victim’s relatives who often live in fear over 
the safety of their loved ones in the hands of very cruel criminals. In this 
context, children are invariably the hardest hit, both when they are the 
direct victims of such cruel act or either of their parents falls victim.
Another effect of K4R is the deepening of material deprivation of fami-
lies whose member has fallen victim of kidnapping. Kidnappers are known 
to demand huge sums of money before they release their victims. Some 
families have disposed their assets such as land, emptied their life savings, 
or borrowed huge sums of money to be able to pay ransom demanded by 
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kidnappers. Given this situation, the obvious consequence for such family 
is the exacerbation of poverty. For example, the gang that kidnapped a 
former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Chief Olu Falae, 
in September 2015, initially demanded ₦100 million ransom for his release, 
but later collected an undisclosed amount before releasing him (Oluwole 
2015). There were cases where the kidnappers also kill the victim despite 
collecting money. As an example, the kidnappers who abducted a top 
management staff of Dangote Group, Istifanus Bello Gurama, in 
September 2016, killed him after three weeks in captivity. They had earlier 
made a demand of ₦200 million for his release (Okolie and Undu 2016). 
Kidnapping for ransom holds triple tragedy for a family whose member 
died in the hands of the kidnappers. First, they will suffer the trauma of 
losing a loved one; second, they will likely shoulder the huge cost of bury-
ing the victim if the body is eventually recovered; and, third, they will bear 
economic hardship associated with the loss of a person who may be the 
breadwinner of the family.
Furthermore, K4R also induces forced change in the lifestyle of people. 
For fear of being kidnapped, people have been forced to change their life-
style, such as not wearing the kind of dress or driving the type of car they 
would ordinarily prefer to use. Some people who have exotic cars often do 
not drive them to certain places or occasions (burials, weddings, and 
birthdays) to avoid being seen as very rich, thereby heightening their 
attractiveness to kidnapping gangs. Also, Alumona (2016, p. 376) opines 
that “kidnapping affects social and economic context of life, with negative 
impact on interpersonal relationship and social interaction that constitute 
the basis of society”. Such developments undermine much desired inter-
group relations at the community level.
Another effect of K4R in Nigeria is the negative impact on business 
environment, manifest in the increase in the cost of doing business associ-
ated with insurance premium and discouraging of prospective investors. 
Investors are always sceptical of investing their money in an economy that 
is characterised by instability and insecurity. Since the escalation of kidnap-
ping in many Nigerian cities, businesses have been affected while some 
companies relocated their headquarters from insecurity-prone areas to 
more secure towns. In the case of Rivers State, for example, Wilson (2016) 
revealed that kidnapping affected economic activities in Rudele where 
most farmers abandoned their farms as a result of the fear of being kid-
napped by sea pirates and militants, and even fishermen have kept away 
from fishing activities, a situation that made fish scarce in Ahia-Gbo, the 
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biggest market in the community. This, in part, contributes to high price 
of commodities in the economy.
One other effect of kidnapping is the increase in the militarisation of 
many cities in Nigeria. Militarisation involves the deployment of the coer-
cive apparatus of the state, mainly the military, to combat kidnappers and 
other criminals who have bases and camps in many ungoverned spaces 
within Nigeria. As of February 2017, the Army had been deployed in 32 
states of Nigeria’s 36 states to assist in combating violent conflicts and 
criminality (Oyedele 2017). For instance, when kidnappers terrorised 
most parts of the South-East zone, the government responded by launch-
ing a military deployment known as “Operation Jubilee” in September 
2010. Military deployments have attracted both commendations and con-
demnation from the civil society. For instance, the military was celebrated 
for the December 2010 killing of a notorious kidnap kingpin, Mr. Obioma 
Nwankwo, whose gang terrorised much of the South-East region. 
However, military operations have been criticised for adopting harsh tac-
tics that have injured civilians and led to human rights violation such as 
dragnet arrests, unlawful detention, intimidation, and extortion. These are 
some of the unintended consequences of militarisation prompted by the 
upsurge in K4R.
Furthermore, the prevalence of K4R contributes to gradual erosion of 
public trust and confidence on the institutions of the state, especially the 
police. There is growing loss of credibility and integrity by law enforce-
ment institutions in the eyes of many citizens, given accusation of the 
complicity of their officials in K4R. Some serving and dismissed security 
personnel have been arrested for their involvement in K4R, for being part 
of the gang, or providing them with weapons or other forms of assistance 
(NAN 2017; Odunsi 2016; Omonobi 2017; Punch 2016). The conniv-
ance, collusion, and complicity of military personnel, policemen, and 
prison officials in K4R informed the conclusion that “people in many 
towns across Nigeria have lost confidence in the ability of the govern-
ments to eradicate the crime” (Adegoke 2014, p.  213). The seeming 
inability of state security forces to stem the tide of K4R in the country cast 
serious doubt on the integrity of government as the primary guarantor of 
security in Nigeria.
The wave of K4R further slurs Nigeria’s image, given that some for-
eigners and many citizens have been killed in the process. As a result, many 
embassies and countries warn their citizens of the danger of traveling or 
doing business in Nigeria. This situation is made worse by the activities of 
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terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram that have added K4R to their 
means of raising funds to sustain their jihadi campaign. The Boko Haram 
began in mid-2012 to engage in kidnapping for ransom to fund its opera-
tion. On 19 February 2013, for instance, the group kidnapped a French 
family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon and then trans-
ported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on 18 April 2013 after 
allegedly collecting $3.15 million as ransom (Cocks 2013). Worse still, a 
splinter group of the Boko Haram known as the Jama’atu Ansarul 
Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (abbreviated as Ansaru), became famous fol-
lowing a string of kidnappings of expatriates it pulled off in northern 
Nigeria. The February 2013 kidnapping and subsequent murder of seven 
expatriates by the group remain the largest of its kind since the outbreak 
of terrorist violence in Nigeria (Onuoha 2013). Before the 2013 kidnap-
ping, Ansaru was linked to the May 2011 kidnapping of Christopher 
McManus (a Briton) and Franco Lamolinara (an Italian) from their home 
in Kebbi State. They were held for months before their captors killed them 
in March 2012 during a failed rescue mission by Nigerian security forces 
and British Special Forces in Sokoto. The negative publicity K4R attracts 
to Nigeria further discourages foreign investment and visitation by tourists.
the Way forWard
The menace of kidnapping has become a serious security threat in Nigeria, 
with diverse consequences for the victims, families, communities, and the 
country at large. The upsurge in kidnapping for ransom seems to be over-
whelming the Nigerian Police, the agency tasked with the primary respon-
sibility of preventing and controlling such crimes in Nigeria. This situation 
has necessitated the adoption of extra measures by the Nigerian govern-
ment such as the registration of mobile phone users, adoption or amend-
ment of anti-kidnapping legislation by some states to provide harsh 
punishment (death penalty), the deployment of military task force, and 
demolition of structures or buildings owned or used by kidnappers for 
their operations, among others. These and other measures have proven 
largely ineffective in addressing the menace.
There is, therefore, the need for robust interventions beyond legisla-
tions and adoption of punitive measures. Serious attention needs to be 
paid to the nature of the Nigerian political economy that fosters an envi-
ronment permissive of the emergence and flourishing of criminal gangs. 
To this end, it is imperative that government implements measures that 
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would drastically reduce poverty, create employment for the teeming 
youth, curb widespread corruption, and cut down on the high emolu-
ments and privileges of political and public officials that make Nigerian 
politics extremely attractive. Additionally, there is the need to evolve a 
reliable national identification system, capacitate security and law enforce-
ment agencies through proper training and equipment, and prioritise 
community policing.
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CHAPTER 13
The Emerging Culture of (Un)Armed 
Violence by Legal/Illegal Revenue Collectors 




Revenue is the lifeblood of every organised human society because it 
enables the government to perform the function of governance. Generally, 
sources of revenue for modern government include proceeds from export 
of natural resources or finished goods, proceeds from licences granted for 
extraction of resources and other businesses, aids from donors, proceeds 
from sales of government properties, proceeds for services rendered, rates 
and taxes levied within the territorial boundaries of the state and so on. 
Meanwhile, in contemporary societies, the sources of revenue for subna-
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tional governments (i.e. states) depend on the structure of governance 
practised by the country and fiscal leverage granted to the subnational 
governments by the constitution or central government (in the case of 
unitary government). Thus, sources of revenue for subnational 
 governments include allocation from the central government, revenue 
from commercial activities of government parastatals, funding from donor 
agencies, tax levied on individuals, and goods and other taxable objects, to 
mention a few. Of these sources of revenue, rates and taxes remain viable 
sources of internally generated revenue (IGR) but are also among the 
sources that pose serious challenges in terms of collection because of the 
possibility of leakages created by tax evasion/avoidance or even non-
remittance/diversion by collecting officials (see Coker et al. 2015).
Corollary to the above, the success of any government in collecting rates 
and taxes depends greatly on its capacity to block leakages by adopting stra-
tegic collection methods that ensure all rates and taxes are properly collected. 
Thus, methods of tax collection have remained dynamic depending, in most 
cases, on the rate of compliance. During the pre-colonial era, the hitherto 
existing kingdoms, empires and principalities in the area today known as 
Nigeria adopted various strategies, including the use of violence to collect 
taxes from conquered territories. Violence was also utilised by the colonial 
state to collect taxes from the masses. In fact, one remarkable thing about 
colonial state is that it modified and formalised existing pre- colonial taxes 
through legislation and introduced new forms of taxation where there were 
none. For instance, it introduced the first tax legislation, which is the Native 
Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906 in the Northern Nigeria. Although 
Okauru (2012) eulogised colonial tax administration and argued persua-
sively that the formalisation of taxation by the colonial state through intro-
duction of legislations eliminated arbitrary and multiple taxation, and also 
made the taxpayers more satisfied with tax administration, available evidence 
suggests the contrary, as demonstrated by the widespread dissatisfaction with 
colonial tax administration especially in the East and West. For instance, 
there was resistance by the Egba people in 1918, the Itsekiri, Urhobo and 
Isoko people in 1927, and the Aba women in 1929, to mention a few.
Nigeria practises three-tier federal system of government; this greatly 
impacts on the character of revenue mobilisation by each of the three tiers. 
While the federal government retains the major sources of revenue, the 
states (created without consideration of economic viability) have contin-
ued to depend largely on the federal government allocation for execution 
of most of their projects, including payment of salaries. The local govern-
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ments experience financial atrophy arising from the double burden of poor 
economic viability and non-release of allocated funds by the states in 
which they exist. The result of this is the aggressive search for IGR by both 
states and local governments through the adoption of various obnoxious 
strategies, including violence by revenue collectors who have been 
unleashed on the masses. Available evidence shows that total IGR for 
states have mushroomed over the years. For instance, five-year statistics 
indicate that total IGR collected by all the states increased from ₦490.38 
billion in 2011 to ₦784.13 billion in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics 
2017). However, IGR remains an insignificant chunk of total revenue for 
states and local governments. Recent studies have shown that states have 
adopted various strategies such as use of contractors and automation of tax 
collection in order to increase the share of IGR (especially rates and taxes) 
to total state revenue (Odusola 2006; Rotimi et  al. 2013). This study 
intervenes by analysing the emerging culture of violence by revenue col-
lectors in urban cities with specific focus on Enugu metropolis.
InsIght from Extant LItEraturE on rEvEnuE 
coLLEctIon In nIgErIa
The dynamics of revenue collection in Nigeria has no doubt attracted 
attention of writers. In articulating the legality and raison de ‘etre of reve-
nue collection by various agencies, Rotimi et al. (2013) identified three 
relevant tax authorities in Nigeria; they include the Federal Inland Revenue 
Services (FIRS), the State Board of Internal Revenue and the Local 
Government Revenue Committee (LGRC). Focusing on Lagos State, 
they argued that increase in IGR drive by various levels of government 
results from the increasing cost of running government and the need for 
socio-economic and infrastructural development. They remarked that the 
state adopted the Accelerated Revenue Generation Programme (ARGP) 
and utilised the services of tax consultants to raise IGR of the state. 
However, despite the increase in IGR, the challenge of tax evasion and 
avoidance continues to serve as leakages in the government collectible 
revenue. The study, however, did not analyse the strategies adopted by the 
consultants to increase IGR in Lagos State.
In another development, Agu (2010) studied the performance of IGR 
of the five South-Eastern states and blamed weak IGR generation by sub-
national governments on the practice of state creation without consider-
ation of economic viability of states created. This has resulted in weak 
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fiscal strategy and poor government-private sector relationship in the 
states. Contributing to this, Dandago (2015) identified some of the 
 challenges of government revenue collection to include leakages arising 
from multiplicity of collecting agents, neglect of many revenue sources 
and weak institutional capacity, among others. Furthermore, Oladimeji 
and Monisola (2013) noted that there has been little effort in improving 
IGR by local government areas (LGAs) due to reliance on share of reve-
nue from the federal government between 1993 and 1997, and the high-
est IGR collected by all the LGAs put together constituted only 1.6% of 
the total revenue received by the LGAs.
Meanwhile, Nwekeaku (2013) identified weak institutional framework, 
poor tax assessment and multiple taxation, amongst others, as the factors 
that undermine effective revenue collection in Nigeria. He argued that 
inability of the state to adequately block the leakages in revenue generation 
undermines capacity of the state to carry out its functions of providing 
basic social services, as contained in the 1999 constitution under the eco-
nomic objectives and directive principles of the state. This position is but-
tressed by Oti et al. (2016), who remarked that state-owned enterprises 
may generate large revenues but incur larger costs in the process of collect-
ing such revenue. Using Cross River State as a case study, the authors dem-
onstrated that the Cross River State Revenue Administration Law (2011) 
stipulated collection cost of between 5% and 10%. Consequently, the cost 
of revenue collection dropped from 13.03% in 2011 to 4.00% in 2014.
In articulating the challenges of revenue collection by subnational gov-
ernments, Odusola (2006) stressed that the dependence on oil as the 
major source of revenue and the imbalance in the fiscal structure of 
Nigeria’s federal system weaken effective tax administration. The writer 
explained that the federal government accumulates over 90% of the reve-
nue, yet it accounts for 70% of the revenue, thereby emasculating the 
other tiers of government. While sharing this view, Oseni (2013) opined 
that the reliance on oil accounted for the dwindling of IGR in the post- 
colonial Nigerian state. Using data between 2007 and 2011, the writer 
demonstrated that the total IGR collected by all states constituted only a 
paltry 13.5% of the total revenue of the states. Specifically, the percentages 
of IGR to total revenue for South-West was 26%, North-West 11.6%, 
South-East 10.9%, North-Central 9.8%, South-South 9.5% and North- 
East 6.9%. For Coker et al. (2015), the dependence on oil revenue leads 
to neglect of IGR by local governments. Where efforts are made to gener-
ate IGR, a large portion of it is embezzled by public officials, contractors 
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and/or enforcement officials. Again, Odusola (2006) argued persuasively 
that the tax system in Nigeria focused on the formal sector while the infor-
mal sector, which forms the bulk of the economy, appears to be grossly 
under-taxed. The study further observed that another major challenge of 
revenue collection in Nigeria is the fact that the constitution empowers 
each level of government to collect various taxes, which engenders multi-
ple taxation and use of tax consultants by the states and local governments 
to aggressively levy taxes on the masses.
Generally, extant literature tends to argue that the aggressive struggle 
by states to improve IGR is related to increasing cost of governance in the 
face of reducing oil revenue. They conclude that the concurrent revenue 
drive by the three tiers of government engender multiple taxation (Odusola 
2006; Agu 2010; Rotimi et  al. 2013). Much as this is true, such view 
mainly focused on the symptoms of a systemic crisis. Some other studies 
tend to focus on the successes, or otherwise, of various revenue mobilisa-
tion strategies and then proceed to assess which of the strategies enhance 
or undermine capacity of the state and local governments to improve IGR 
(Rotimi et  al. 2013). We argue that this analysis is elitist in nature for 
focusing on the demand side of revenue without analysing what happens 
at the supply side. Again, it is important to appreciate how the structure of 
revenue mobilisation and allocation in Nigeria engenders use of violence 
by tax- or revenue collection agents. This study intervenes by examining 
the culture of violence adopted by revenue collection agents in urban cit-
ies in Nigeria with specific focus on Enugu metropolis.
thEorEtIcaL PErsPEctIvE
Our analysis of the violent character of revenue collection in Enugu State 
is rooted on the epistemological and ideological assumptions of the theory 
of post-colonial state. Initially developed by Hamza Alavi (1972), other 
major proponents of the theory include Ekekwe (1985); Ake (1985, 
1989) and Omeje (2015). The theory of post-colonial state emerged 
mainly from intellectual struggle of scholars in the Global South to analyse 
how the structures inherited from colonialism continue to shape and 
determine the character of the post-colonial states. The proponents articu-
lated the historically entrenched and exploitative structures, institutions, 
networks and process that tend to reproduce and perpetuate the character 
of the colonial state in the various post-colonial African states and went 
further to propose ways of overcoming the constraints immanent on 
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 post- colonialism, redressing African underdevelopment and re-position-
ing the continent on the path to unfettered and robust development 
(Omeje 2015).
Furthermore, Omeje (2015) remarked that the post-colonial states 
“were in part conceived and constituted in the loins of precoloniality, 
mutated, incubated and produced in coloniality, and ultimately prolifer-
ated and aggravated through the incontinency of the postcolonial”. 
Drawing from the foregoing, the crises of the post-colonial state can be 
deduced from the organic unity between pre-colonialism, colonialism and 
post-colonialism expressed earlier. Such crises are the cross-cutting, 
embedded and enduring contradictions and conflicts in the post-colonial 
states which are related to colonial heritage (political and economic struc-
tures, practices, modes of accumulation, education and cultural patterns) 
as well as the nature and constraints of post-coloniality itself. Post-colonial 
theorists further attribute these crises of post-coloniality to the multifac-
eted legacies of colonialism, including the variegated, ambivalent and 
ambiguous experiences of decolonisation and declaration of independence 
in the ex-colonial states (Omeje 2015).
Explaining the transition from pre-colonialism to colonialism, and the 
implications of both epochs for the post-colonial state, the post-colonial 
theorists contend that in the absence of mutually legitimated Westphalian- 
type states, the pre-colonial Africa was characterised by the propensity for 
rivalry and wars of aggression and domination of weak communities by 
more powerful ones (empires, principalities, chiefdoms, etc.). Some of 
these African institutions and characteristics survived the onslaught of 
colonialism, albeit with monumental metropolitan distortions and accul-
turation producing deleterious and disarticulating effects on the entire 
political, social, legal and economic structures. Thus, colonialism created 
enough crises to go round and reproduce itself in perpetuity as seen in the 
post-colonial state (Omeje 2015).
Buttressing this point, Abubakar (2015) contends that the emergence 
of the post-colonial state in Africa did not fundamentally alter the struc-
tures and hierarchies of ideological and political domination resulting 
from the insertion of the continent into the global economy through the 
complex and violent processes of the slave trade which was followed by the 
subjection of the people under colonial rule after the partition of boundar-
ies, territories and redefinition of sovereignties. Thus, the increasing rise of 
violence is not an inherent disease of the post-colonial state but the emerg-
ing transformative phase of Africa’s dual insertion and extraversion in the 
new global division of labour and subjection.
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The Marxian theory of post-colonial state, therefore, reveals that the 
post-colony, being an organic composition of pre-colonialism, colonialism 
and post-colonialism, remains a theatre of war resulting from its internal 
contradiction and external influence of world powers. Thus, the theory 
sheds on how the post-colonial character of Nigeria engenders the adop-
tion of violent strategy in revenue. Specifically, in a bid to retain them-
selves in power and sustain their extravagant life style, the political class 
employ various means to harass and intimidate the masses in order to 
extract taxes from them. In most cases, revenue collection is contracted to 
cronies who pay some percentages up front and are permitted to unleash 
violence on the masses in the process of collecting revenue in order to 
recoup money expended on bribing state officials while seeking the con-
sultancy contract. Against this backdrop, this study examines the incidence 
of (un)armed violence by revenue collectors in Enugu metropolis within 
the context of the post-colonial state theory.
data and mEthods
This study employed a case study design which is a form of research design 
that enables us to carry out in-depth study of a small number of cases in 
their real-life context and understand how the cases influence and are 
influenced by their contexts (see Yin 2009). Thus, Enugu metropolis was 
isolated for in-depth investigation due to the location of Enugu as the 
capital of the old Eastern region amongst others.
We adopted the mixed methods approach for data collection and analy-
sis. Mixed methods involve the collection and integration of both quanti-
tative and qualitative data in a study. It allows for triangulation of various 
data sources in order to attenuate the weaknesses embedded in any single 
method of data collection (Creswell 2014). Accordingly, we triangulated 
by using questionnaires and key informant interviews to obtain informa-
tion from respondents sampled from our area of study. We also relied on 
secondary sources to obtain other relevant information that borders on 
revenue collection especially as it concerns use of violence by the revenue 
collectors.
In line with the mixed methods, data collected were analysed using 
content analysis of documentary data and responses of key informants, 
while simple descriptive analysis such as frequencies and percentages were 
adopted to analyse the questionnaires and other secondary data in quanti-
tative form.
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samPLE sIzE and samPLIng tEchnIquE
We adopted a mix of cluster and purposive sampling technique to select a 
sample 450 respondents. Cluster sampling was employed to select 150 
respondents from each of the three local governments that make up Enugu 
metropolis (Enugu East, Enugu North and Enugu South). To ensure that 
the sample is representative enough in terms of occupation of the respon-
dents, we purposively selected 150 commercial bus and tricycle drivers, 
150 owners of various small and medium scale businesses, and 150 occu-
piers of residential houses. The instruments were administered with the 
assistance of six research assistants who read out the questionnaire items to 
the respondents and filled same on behalf of the respondents, most of 
whom could not read and write. Of the 450 instruments administered, 
443 representing 98.4% were returned while 7 (1.6%) were not properly 
completed and therefore rejected.
hIstory and structurE of rEvEnuE (ratEs and taxEs) 
coLLEctIon In nIgErIa
As noted earlier, revenue collection by states is not new, but the strategies 
have remained dynamic. From the pre-colonial era, the hitherto existing 
empires, principalities and kingdoms had levied various forms of fines and 
taxes on their citizens and conquered territories in order to raise revenue. 
For instance, the Sokoto caliphate had a well-organised system through 
which various forms of taxes were collected to run the caliphate. These 
rates and taxes were in form of Zakkat levied on Moslems for educational, 
charitable and religious purposes; kudin-kasa levied on the utilisation of 
land; Jangali, known as cattle tax; Shukka-Shukka known as plantation tax; 
haraji, known as Moslem community tax; gado, levied as death duty on 
deceased estate paid to Emir in the absence of recognised heir; kudin 
sarauta, an accession duty paid by a Chief or office holder upon appoint-
ment; to mention a few. The Yoruba traditional political system levied 
rates and taxes such as the ishakole, which is a form land tax paid to Obas 
for the use of land for agricultural purposes; Owo-ode, which is individual 
tax paid by men and women in cash and kind in return for services and 
Owo-Asingbu, which consisted of personal services and food contributions 
(ICAN 2009; Okauru 2012). In the Igbo pre-colonial political system, 
there were no generally acceptable rates and taxes because of the decen-
tralised system. However, taxes were levied in the form of Utu on  members 
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of the society through institutions like the age grade, kindred, town unions 
and so on.
However, with the advent of colonialism, the colonial state driven by 
the singular interest of exploitation employed all forms of violent strate-
gies to extract revenue for administration of colonial government and 
remittance of surplus to Britain. Thus, in addition to exploitation of natu-
ral resources through forced labour, legislations were passed to legalise 
imposition of fines and collection of rates and taxes in the colonies. 
Although the colonial government collected various rates and taxes like 
the canoe or boat licensing fee of 10 shillings per annum as in 1866 in 
Lagos, direct taxation under the colonial government could be traced to 
introduction of the Native Revenue Proclamation No. 2 of 1906 in the 
Northern Nigeria; the Native Revenue Ordinance of 1918  in Western 
Nigeria by Lord Lugard. Direct taxation was gradually extended to all 
other parts of Nigeria and physical violence was employed to enforce such 
taxes and repress any form of uprising. For instance, with the introduction 
of taxation in Western Nigeria, the resistance by Egba people led to the 
killing of no fewer than 500 Egba people by a crack force of 1000 soldiers 
dispatched to Egbaland by Lugard to suppress the resistance to tax collec-
tion. Similarly, the introduction of direct taxation in the Eastern province 
led to violent resistance in 1927 by the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko people 
against the tax collectors who were mobbed and fined by the protestants 
for collaborating with the white men. The Aba women riot of 1929 was 
also in resistance to taxation in the Eastern province (see Okauru 2012 
for details).
As a result of resistance from the masses, colonial tax administration in 
Eastern Nigeria has a chequered history. However, taxation in colonial 
Eastern Nigeria is better appreciated from Native Authority Ordinance 
No. 43 of 1933 and No. 17 of 1943, as amended by Ordinance Nos. 3 
and 73 of 1945, all of which governed tax administration in Eastern 
Nigeria until the enactment of the Eastern Region Local Government 
Ordinance, 1950, which led to the creation of counties, districts and local 
councils empowered to collect rates for financing local services and per-
sonal income tax. To correct the anomalies of the previous tax laws, the 
1955 Eastern Nigeria Local Government Law was passed and was followed 
by the Eastern Region Finance Law of 1956, which empowered the 
Department of Inland Revenue to assess and collect income tax. By 1958, 
the Raisman Commission was set up to come up with a uniform tax system 
across Nigeria.
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Upon independence in 1960, the Income Tax Management Act of 1961 
and The Companies Income Tax Act of 1961 were enacted in line with rec-
ommendations of the Raisman Commission (ICAN 2009; Okauru 2012). 
One major feature of tax administration in the independence era is that 
both the federal and regional governments were empowered to collect 
various rates and taxes concurrently, leading to multiple taxation. To 
reduce the multiplicity of taxes of the local and state governments and to 
eliminate the need for consultants, the Joint Tax Board (JTB) publicised 
the taxes each tier is empowered to levy, effective 1 April 1997 as shown 
in Table 13.1. The publication by JTB, which received statutory backing 
with Decree No. 21 of 1998 federal authority, was limited to eight specific 
taxes. The table reveals that the state and local governments were restricted 
to 11 and 20, respectively. However, the taxes yielding large chunk of the 
revenue were retained by the federal government. This partly explains why 
IGR remains low in most of the states, given that the states were not cre-
ated based on economic viability.
rEvEnuE coLLEctIon In Enugu statE
The Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act (PITA) No. 20, 2011, 
Section 87(a) (b) and (c) and Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 
empower all State Boards of Internal Revenue to assess, collect and 
account for personal income taxes and penalties from all taxable adults 
who are resident in the state. Accordingly, the Enugu State Board of 
Internal Revenue (ESBIR) has been saddled with the primary responsibil-
ity of collecting all tax revenues either directly or in collaboration with 
independent revenue agents or consultants. Table 13.2 presents list of the 
IGR items approved by the state government for collection by the 
ESBIR.  Other ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that are 
involved in revenue collection include the state Ministry of Transport, 
Enugu State Capital Development Authority (ECDA) and Enugu State 
Waste Disposal Management Agency (ESWAMA) to mention a few.
Like many other states in Nigeria, Enugu State has continued to depend 
on federal allocation for execution of state projects and payment of sala-
ries. The state budget has continued to depend on the performance of oil 
price and sales. For example, the Enugu State vision 2020 Medium Term 
Implementation Plan 2012–2015 was articulated based on an estimated 
oil price of $75 per barrel (Enugu State Government 2012). IGR contri-
bution to the total revenue of the state has remained low over the years. 
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Table 13.1 Taxes and levies approved for collection (Decree No. 21 of 1988)
Federal Government State Government Local Government
 • Company income tax
 • Petroleum profit tax
 • Value-added tax
 •  Education tax (applies 
to companies, residents 
of the federal capital 
territory and non-
resident individuals)
 •  Capital gains tax (applies 
to corporate bodies and 
Abuja residents)
 •  Stamp duties (applies to 
corporate bodies)
 •  Withholding tax (applies 
to companies)
 •  Personal income tax 
(applies to personnel of 
the armed forces, police, 
External Affairs Ministry 
and residents of Abuja)
 •  Personal income tax 
(applies to residents of the 
state)
 •  Withholding tax 
(individuals only)
 •  Capital gains tax 
(individuals only)
 •  Stamp duties (applies to 
instruments executed by 
individuals only)
 •  Road taxes (e.g. vehicle 
licenses)
 •  Taxes on pool bets, lottery 
and casino wins
 •  Business premises and 
registration fees m urban 
and rural areas:
 •  Urban areas as defined by 
each state, maximum of
  ₦10,000 for registration 
and
  ₦5000 per annum for 
renewal of registration
Rural areas:
  ₦2000 for registration  
and
  ₦1000 per annum for 
renewal of registration
 •  Development levy (max of 
₦100 per annum applies to 
taxable individuals only)
 •  Street name registration 
fees (state capital only)
 •  Fees for right of 
occupancy on urban land 
owned by the state 
government
 •  Market taxes and levies 
where state finance is 
involved
 •  Miscellaneous revenue 
(e.g. rent on property)
 • Tenancy rates
 • Shops and kiosk rates
 •  Fees for on-off liquor 
licenses
 • Fees for butcher slabs
 •  Fees for marriage, birth 
and death registrations
 •  Fees for street name 
registration (except in the 
state capital)
 • Motor park fees
 •  Market taxes and levies 
(except any market where 
state finance is involved)
 •  Fees for domestic animal 
licenses
 •  Fees for bicycles, trucks, 
canoes, wheelbarrows, 
carts and canoes
 •  Fees for right of occupancy 
on land in rural areas 
(except those of federal 
and state governments)
 •  Cattle tax, applies to cattle 
farmers only
 •  Entertainment and road 
closure levy
 •  Fees for radio and 
television licenses
 •  Vehicle parking and radio 
license fees
 •  Charges for wrongful 
parking
 •  Fees for public 
convenience, sewage and 
refuse disposal
 •  Customary ground permit 
fees
 •  Fees for permits for 
religious establishments
 •  Fees for permits for 
signboards, bill boards and 
advertisements
Source: Odusola (2006). Tax policy reforms in Nigeria. World Institute for Development Economic Research 
(UNU-WIDER) Research Paper No. 2006/03. Helsinki, Finland: UNU-WIDER
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For instance, Table 13.3 reveals that on an average, between 2007 and 
2011, IGR has remained a paltry 16% of total state government revenue.
In order to improve IGR performance in the state in line with extant 
tax laws, the Enugu State government has taken various steps to block 
revenue leakages and expand and improve IGR collections in the state. 
Some of the steps taken in this regard include automation of motor vehicle 
licensing (AutoReg), number plate sales and automation of the collection 
process through introduction of the Pay-Direct platform, to mention a few.
The major challenge of revenue collection in the state is the use of 
untrained persons for revenue collection, non-automation of the collec-
tion processes, in most cases revenue are manually collected. Again, there 
is dominance of the informal sector in the state’s economy characterised 
by operators of unregistered small- and medium-scale businesses. This use 
of touts for revenue collection, non-automation of revenue collection and 
dominance of informal sector coalesce to engender violence in the process 
of revenue collection.
Table 13.2 Approved taxes and levies approved for collection by Enugu State 
government
S/No. Description Responsibility
1 Personal income tax ESBIR
1a Pay as you earn (PAYE) ESBIR
1b Direct assessment (self-assessment) ESBIR
2 Withholding tax (individuals only) ESBIR
3 Capital gains tax (individuals only) ESBIR
4 Road taxes ESBIR
5 Development levy (individuals only) ESBIR




7 Stamp duties on instruments executed by individuals Ministry of finance
8 Pools betting, lotteries and gaming and casino taxes Ministry of finance
9 Business premises Ministry of 
commerce and 
industry
10 Naming of street registration fees in the state capital Capital territory
11 Right of occupancy fees Ministry of lands
12 Various SHoA enactments MDAs
Source: Enugu State Board of Internal Revenue (2014). Enugu State IGR Improvement Strategy and 
Implementation Plan










































































































































































































































































































































































13 THE EMERGING CULTURE OF (UN)ARMED VIOLENCE… 
272
thE cuLturE of vIoLEnt rEvEnuE coLLEctIon 
In Enugu mEtroPoLIs: agEnts and vIctIms
Much of the taxpayers in Enugu State operate in the informal sector and 
most are oblivious of their tax liability and/or when such liabilities are 
due. Due to the poor tax collection system, which gives room for tax eva-
sion, in most cases, some of these taxpayers try to evade tax payment. On 
the other hand, the tax collection agents deployed by the tax collection 
agencies are mostly untrained persons who also take advantage of the 
crude collection process and poor knowledge of the taxpayers to indulge 
in racketeering, intimidation of the taxpayers and adoption of violence to 
extract money from the taxpayers.
In Enugu metropolis, both the state government through the ESBIR and 
other MDAs and the three local governments that make up the metropolis 
are always in aggressive search for revenue. This sometimes turns the state to 
a theatre of war between the revenue collectors and the taxpayers, as pockets 
of clashes are witnessed on daily basis between the revenue collectors and 
taxpayers along the streets of Enugu metropolis. In addition to the three 
local governments, some of the MDAs that have gained notoriety for use of 
violence to extract revenue from individuals are the Enugu State Ministry of 
Transport, Enugu State Capital Development Authority (ECDA) and Enugu 
State Waste Disposal Management Agency (ESWAMA).
Some of the contentious rates and taxes collected by these agencies 
include: road taxes/traffic violation fines; radio licences; business prem-
ises; tenement rates and waste disposal (ESWAMA). These revenue items 
have been sources of clashes not just because of racketeering by the col-
lecting agents but also because most of the touts used for direct revenue 
collection are ignorant of the provisions of the law establishing such rev-
enue items. The traffic violation fines, for example, have remained a major 
source of violent clash between the residents/visitors and the revenue col-
lectors. This is because most traffic control officers deployed to the roads 
are untrained and do not understand traffic laws, so it becomes problem-
atic when such untrained officers try to place a fine on road users even 
when such road user has not violated any traffic law. Similarly, the  tenement 
rates are levied on landlords, but most local government councils deploy 
touts, some of whom are armed with machetes to intimidate and harass 
the tenants from whom they collect bribes ranging from ₦500 to ₦2000 
instead of getting the landlords to pay the approved tenement rates. 
Tenants who refuse to pay the bribe usually have their properties confis-
cated by these touts and are asked to produce the landlords or visit the 
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local government council and collect their properties when they are ready 
to offer bribes.
The above argument is supported by the field survey conducted in 
Enugu metropolis. Table 13.4 reveals that almost all of the commercial 
bus and tricycle drivers agreed that they meet revenue collectors on daily 
basis in the course of their business, 88% also agree that multiple transpor-
tation taxes still exist in the state as they pay transport levies to both state 
and local governments. Meanwhile, only 45% of the commercial drivers 
said physical violence has been meted out to them by the revenue collec-
tors at one point or the other. Majority of the respondents said the reve-
nue collectors are not armed. Again, 81% of the commercial drivers agree 
that their membership of union mitigate the harassment by the revenue 
collectors. However, majority (93%) of the drivers believe that the union 
has not reduced the taxes and rates paid. When questioned further, they 
indicated that the union leaders are complicit in the extortion of the 
 commercial drivers. The drivers argue that the union introduced all forms 
of union dues, which increase the rates and taxes the drivers pay. They also 
allege that the union members negotiate taxes and rates with the govern-
ment and revenue-collecting agencies in return for personal favours they 
may get from the government. The implication of this is that membership 
of union by commercial bus and tricycle drivers reduce the tendency by 
the rate collectors to use physical violence on the bus drivers. However, 
the union members tend to further increase the taxes paid by the drivers 
through introduction of union dues.
Table 13.4 Responses of commercial bus and tricycle drivers in Enugu metropo-
lis on use of violence by revenue collectors to collect rates and taxes
S/No. Question Yes No Not sure
1. Do you meet revenue collectors on daily basis in the 
course of your daily business activities?
93% 7% 0%
2. Did the revenue collectors adopt physical violence to 
collect rates and taxes?
45% 37% 18%
3. Do you think there is multiple taxation by both the 
state and local governments in the state?
88% 7% 5%
4. Do you belong to any transport union? 97% 3% 0%
5. Do you think your union assists in reducing the taxes 
and rates charged?
0% 93% 3%
6. Do you think your union assists in reducing the use of 
violence by the revenue collectors?
81% 11% 8%
7. Are the revenue collectors armed? 0% 37% 63%
Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
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Concerning use of violence on small and medium business operators 
and tenants in residential areas of the state by revenue collectors, responses 
of respondents as contained in Tables 13.5 and 13.6 indicate that most 
operators of small and medium businesses (82%) and tenants in residential 
Table 13.5 Responses of operators of small and medium businesses in Enugu 
metropolis
S/No. Question Yes No Not sure
1. Do government revenue collectors visit your business 
premises to collect any form of rates or taxes?
89% 7% 4%
2. Are all the approved rates and taxes demanded by the 
revenue collectors well known to you?
10% 82% 8%
3. Do any use any form of force or harassment to get you 
pay the tax and rates?
86% 10% 4%
4. Do they collect cash or confiscate your properties as a 
form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes?
78% 16% 6%
5. Do they issue receipt when they collect money from  
you as fine for non-payment?
0% 91% 9%
6. Are the revenue collectors armed with any form of 
weapon?
38% 15% 47%
7. Do you get protection from such extortion and 
harassment from any kind of union?
0% 100% 0%
Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
Table 13.6 Responses of tenants living in rented houses in Enugu metropolis
S/No. Question Yes No Not sure
1. Do government revenue collectors visit your home for 
collection of any government revenue?
76% 11% 13%
2. Are you well informed about all of the approved taxes 
and rates they are expected to collect?
2% 92% 6%
3. Do any use any form of force or harassment to get you 
pay the tax?
92% 2% 6%
4. Do they collect cash or confiscate your properties as a 
form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes?
89% 6% 5%
5. Do they issue receipt when they collect money from  
you as fine for non-payment?
0% 91% 9%
6. Are the revenue collectors armed with any form of 
weapon?
41% 23% 36%
7. Do you get protection from such harassment and 
extortion from any security agency?
4% 96% 0%
Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
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apartments (92%) in Enugu are not fully aware of all the approved rates 
and taxes they are expected to pay. This gives room for intimidation and 
harassment by revenue collectors. For example, 86% and 92% of business 
operators and tenants in residential areas respectively agree that the reve-
nue collectors use violence to get them pay the rates and taxes. Again, 78% 
and 89% of business operators and tenants in residential areas respectively 
agree that the revenue collectors collect cash or confiscate their properties 
as form of fine for non-payment of the rates and taxes. Further, all of the 
respondents agree that no receipt is issued when such cash are collected 
from them. Our data suggest existence of widespread extortion and use of 
violence by the revenue collectors in the process of discharging their duties 
as revenue collectors. Again, the collection of cash without issuance of 
receipt indicates that such fines are not accounted for.
Concerning the tiers of government and agents that harass them the 
most, commercial bus drivers identified the local and state governments as 
tiers of government that harass them the most. While local government 
collectors of radio licences and stickers were identified as major users of 
violence in the local governments, and the State Ministry of Transport and 
ECDA were identified as the agencies that mostly adopt violence more in 
revenue collection (see Table 13.7). The tenants in residential apartments 
are divided: while some identified the state agents (ESWAMA), others 
identified the local government agents (tenement rate collectors) as major 
users of violence. Operators of small and medium businesses identified 
also both the state and local government revenue collectors as users of 
Table 13.7 Responses of respondents on which of the tiers of government use 
violence more in revenue collection







1 Commercial bus and tricycle 
drivers
0% 56% 44%
2 Operators of small and 
medium businesses
0% 42% 58%
3 Tenants in residential 
apartments
0% 47% 53%
Total 0% 48.3% 51.7%
Source: Researchers’ field survey 2016 and 2017
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violence in revenue collection. However, most of the respondents 
 identified ESWAMA and local government agents for collection of busi-
ness premises as major users of violence.
Generally, data in the table indicate that the local government revenue 
collectors are the worse in terms of adoption of violence in revenue collec-
tion as 51.7% of the respondents identified them as the major users of 
violence in revenue collection as against 48.3% who identified the state as 
major users of violence in revenue collection. These data have also been 
presented in a pie chart (Fig. 13.1) for clarity. More worrisome is the use 
of arms by some of the revenue collectors. For instance, data in Tables 
13.5 and 13.6 indicate that some of the revenue collectors carry along 
arms in the process of enforcing rates and taxes. Further discussion with 
the respondents reveals that the type of arms carried by these collectors 
include jack knifes, machetes, metals and sticks.
concLusIon and PrognosIs
The study sets out to analyse the culture of violence by armed and unarmed 
revenue collection officers in urban cities of Nigeria with specific focus on 
Enugu metropolis. Our analysis shows that the states and local govern-
ments experience fiscal challenges due to the lopsided federal structure of 
post-colonial Nigerian state which concentrates major sources of revenue 
at the centre. However, in view of the fact that the constitution empowers 
all the three tiers of government to collect specified rates and taxes concur-
rently, the states and local governments have continued to adopt the strat-
egies that translates to use of armed and unarmed agents to enforce rates 
and taxes on the citizens. This is especially so with the reducing oil reve-
nue, increasing cost of governance and growth of neoliberal ideology 
which emphasise the need to increase tax rates while reducing government 
spending. Our study shows that Enugu metropolis has gained notoriety 
Fig. 13.1 Chart of use 
of violence by tiers of 
government
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for the activities of armed and unarmed revenue collectors of state MDAs 
and local government who are turning the state into the Hobbesian state 
of nature by the crude and violent revenue collection strategies. More so, 
the major victims of this violence are the helpless operators in the informal 
economy, such as commercial drivers, owners of small and medium busi-
ness and tenants in residential apartments in the state. Apparently, in 
recent times, the state government has taken measures to reduce the vio-
lent activities of these legal and illegal revenue collectors, but more still 
needs to be done, especially at the local government level.
rEcommEndatIons
On the basis of the findings of this study, we put forward the following 
recommendations:
• Restructuring of the federal system should emphasise economic via-
bility of the states and local governments by allowing states to collect 
big revenue-yielding taxes like value-added tax (VAT) and company 
income tax. This would reduce incidence of multiple taxation and 
the tendency of using violence to suppress resistance to multiple and 
obnoxious rates and taxes.
• There is need for the states and local governments to automate the 
collection system and reduce cash payment. Taxpayers should 
 adequately be educated of how, when and what to pay in terms of 
rates and taxes.
• There should be state and local government tax tribunals for trying 
defaulting taxpayers who should be arrested, if need be, by obtaining 
arrest warrant from the appropriate authority. The tribunals should 
also try revenue collectors who use violence in the course of their 
duty. This would reduce incidence of harassment, intimidation and 
use of violence by the tax collectors.
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CHAPTER 14




Trafficking in humans is not new. It is an age-old phenomenon, which has 
transformed over time from slavery to its present status. The scourge did 
not engage the attention of the international community until it was crim-
inalised in 2000, under the United Nation (UN) Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, referred to as the Palermo Protocol. Since then, issue-based 
problematics of human trafficking have gathered momentum among 
scholars and practitioners, due mainly to increasing political awareness of 
the dangers and the casualties resultant from plight of victims, who suffer 
from the abuse. However, researches have shown how little is known 
about this problem from the African perspective, prompting the interro-
gation of other factors, beyond the normative push-pull factors. As this 
study illustrates, porous borders are a major factor in the commission and 
operation of trafficking, which if addressed through proactive measures of 
early warning and prevention can be potent tools in eliminating the 
scourge. This chapter takes the analysis further through background 
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information, clear statement of objectives and clarification of key con-
cepts. This is followed by methodology, discussion of causative factors and 
 conventions against human trafficking. A broad analysis of the North-
South dynamics is carried out, detailing the routes, pattern, open border 
linkages ending up with straightening border governance regimes, recom-
mendations and conclusion.
Background InformatIon
Human trafficking in Africa has its roots in the pre-colonial slave trade that 
was abolished in the wake of colonialism (Njoku 2015). However, the 
modern organised and non-organised trends of trafficking in humans are 
traceable to the creation of artificial and unrealistic borders by European 
colonialists (Asiwaju 1990; Adejo 2003). These borders were exploited for 
economic gains by cross-border criminals like smugglers and traffickers in 
the face of the prevalent economic hardship. The moral decadence that 
characterised post-colonial Nigeria also exacerbated the situation.
Since independence, Nigeria has experienced bad governance, poverty 
and looting of public funds, made worse by an ineffectual criminal justice 
system. This has cemented the linkage between corruption and organised 
crime and ensured that they are entrenched in the fabric of the society 
(Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Fayomi 2009; Ajagun 2012; Essien 2013; 
IMADR 2015; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu 2016). The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 2004) ranks Nigeria among the poor-
est countries in West Africa, but how this development connects with the 
scourge remains a subject of debate. Hardship and poverty is often con-
nected to the failure of government to increase the living standards of the 
people (Merton, 1968, cited in Aborisade 2013). With abject poverty and 
pervasive ineptitude, the environment for unlawful migration is attained.
The excesses of the military regimes, which the country experienced for 
a significant period of years, have been pinpointed by some scholars as a 
causative factor for the surge in human trafficking. Thus, Olateru (2006) 
fault the severe political, social and economic crises as responsible for out-
ward flows in human trafficking during the decades of military regimes. 
The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and 
Racism (IMADR) (2015) asserts that corruption facilitates trafficking, 
when border security officials are induced, and they create the window of 
opportunity for traffickers to violate the border spaces with impunity. 
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Meanwhile, Fayomi (2009) posits that poverty, which cuts across gender, 
coupled with insecurity, accounts for the sustenance of the trade on humans.
Similarly, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that was a fea-
ture of the Ibrahim Babangida military regime has been identified by 
Iyanda and Nwogwugwu (2016) as a major trigger for the rise in human 
trafficking in Nigeria. This is because this policy further impoverished the 
poor, with cutbacks on social investment, including education, employ-
ment, food and agriculture, thereby making the condition of living 
extremely difficult. Furthermore, IMADR (2015) asserts that corruption 
aids human trafficking and is networked in such a way that it involves sev-
eral chains, right from transit to destination points, whereby illicit pay-
ments are arranged for border officials.
Borders In nIgerIa
Nigeria is an ex-British colony, and it has a total land mass of about 
923,768 square kilometres. It became independent on October 1, 1960 
and it shares international (land, excluding maritime) boundaries with the 
following Francophone countries:
 1. Benin Republic—773 kilometres;
 2. Republic of Cameroun—1690 kilometres;
 3. Niger Republic—1497 kilometres; and
 4. Chad Republic—85 kilometres.
The conditions of most of the borders, especially in the North-East, are 
exceedingly appalling. A climate of porosity is glaring, which portends 
gaps in governance, as the absence of basic infrastructure alienates the 
government from the border communities that ought to partner the secu-
rity agencies in the combat against human trafficking. Basically the bor-
ders have been turned into crime opportunity spaces for smuggling arms, 
humans, drugs and other dangerous substances. It provides a solid basis 
for enemies of the nation to violate the borders and travel to destinations 
of choice because the awareness that the borders are open and leaky aids 
in no small measure in clandestine migration. Permeable borders are 
added incentives that greatly assist in recruitment and transportation 
of humans.
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aIm and oBjectIves
It is easy to discern from the profile of borders in Nigeria that the nation 
is at risk from openness of its borders, made possible due to colonial parti-
tion and the consequence of permeability due to unregulated mobility of 
migrants. Just as migration pressures are on the increase, the ease of 
migrating has improved, and these opportunities are supported by glo-
balised and porous borders. Human trafficking, like normal trade, has 
benefitted from the global trend of reduced hindrance of crossing borders. 
The general aim of this study is to interrogate how porous borders help 
sustain the unintended consequences of traffic in humans for finan-
cial gains by
• identifying patterns and dimensions of trafficking routes,
• analysing the drivers and how they connect with opportunistic open 
borders and
• proffering solutions to strengthen border governance structures 
in Nigeria.
conceptual clarIfIcatIon
Key concepts found important and germane to this study include borders, 
porous borders and border security. Others are human trafficking, forced 
labour and migrant smuggling. These terms are technical and are explained 
in the context that they are used in this discourse. The term “border” is 
used instead of boundary because of the contemporary connotation which 
makes border fluid and not fixated. Similarly, human trafficking is used 
interchangeably with traffic-in-persons as a concept, thus limiting the 
complexity of the dynamics of categorisation of potential victims of abuse. 
Fair enough, terms conceptualised herein are assigned meanings relative 
to what obtains in border studies.
Borders
Border, as a concept, will continue to take on new meanings due to its 
multidisciplinary approach in studies. Traditionally, borders refer to geo-
graphic and legal demarcations of political entities, notably sovereign 
states, federated units and other subordinate entities. In its broader form, 
borders connote identity and separation in that it emphasises what is to be 
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included and excluded, which is evident in the classifications of a border 
by scholars as either geographical or symbolic with the former associated 
with definite territories and the latter associated with social representa-
tions that cut across physical and official barriers. Definition of a border 
will sometimes capture it as a form of demarcation—geographical, his-
toric, socio-economic, political or legal. For the purpose of analysis, the 
border remains that line which demarcates and separates two entities or 
countries, and must be crossed, for external traffic-in-person to have taken 
place. Eselebor (2008) refers to it as line delimiting the sovereign extent 
of a nation and its legal bounds. An example is the border between Benin 
Republic (Krake) and Nigeria (Seme) in the South-West or between Niger 
(Birni Koni) and Nigeria (Ilella) in the North-West. The difference in 
names assigned is also reflected in the features, perspectives and what it 
means historically. No one border is exactly the same, but they share com-
mon features as bridges, barriers or buffer zones. Transactions that take 
place within and around the border spaces are sometimes regulated, with 
the presence of key security agencies, as well as unregulated with the 
absence of security agencies, which makes the facility permeable.
Border securIty
Borders serve as security space, with the function of keeping away undesir-
able elements and harmful substances from gaining access into and from 
the country. The ability to secure territorial borders is one of the features 
of a strong and vibrant government, and a factor in the designation of a 
state as sovereign, viable and secured. Security as a concept defies a single 
and consensual definition due to its broader scope, encompassing both 
tradition (hard) and human (soft) approaches. The concept also overlaps 
with the concept of power, authority and the monopoly of use of force. All 
these entail control measures, and the enabling laws provide for the basic 
regulation. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) 
provides in Section 14 (1) (b) that “the security and welfare of the people 
shall be the primary purpose of government”. In context, it is the respon-
sibility of the government to protect and provide security to its citizens, 
no matter where they are domiciled. Border security as conceived in this 
chapter includes protection from danger, violence, fear and want that 
impairs or is capable of impairing the rights of citizens and non-citizens 
alike, wherever they chose to live, including the border communities 
under the scope of this discourse.
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This is not different from what Okumu (2010) visualised as an aspect 
of border management. Border security entails mechanisms designed and 
put in place to regulate and control the movement of persons, goods and 
service across borders, with due diligence and focus, safety and security. By 
virtue of the foregoing, the Customs, Immigration, Drug Enforcement 
Agency and Directorate of State Security among others are key security 
agencies saddled with the task of securing Nigeria from threats and immi-
nent danger of violation. Traffic-in-humans, which also includes smug-
gling of migrants, has been identified as a part of transborder crimes that 
are of serious concerns to national security.
porous Borders
Porous borders are permeable and leaky borders, which do not have the 
presence of border security agencies. Porosity of borders also refers to the 
penetrability, fluidity occasioned by absence of any form of regulation and 
unofficial transactions outside officialdom in several contexts that are 
unhealthy and harmful. These unapproved entry and exit routes exist in 
borderlands and in the maritime domain. The borders are remote, least 
developed and far from urban centres, which experience neglect in terms of 
provision of basic amenities like health, education and other infrastructures. 
Some notable features include uncontrolled access routes, absence of secu-
rity and rule of law and the existence of village clienteles as support group.
Human traffIckIng
Human trafficking is used interchangeably with traffic-in-persons, though 
there are some levels of difference, which are becoming increasingly 
blurred by confusion over and between smuggle, meaning traffic some-
times and traffic meaning circulation as concepts. There are several defini-
tions and meanings assigned to human trafficking concept from the 
perspectives of International Labour Organization (ILO), International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and others. The United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (Article 3.a) 
defines trafficking in human beings as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
 abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
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vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.
This definition seems encompassing, which in terms means that the vul-
nerable groups are recruited (sourced), transported (transit) and har-
boured to other countries, other than that of origin (received). Nigeria is 
home to internal undercurrents of human trafficking that goes on locally, 
especially for domestic servitude, child labour and sex trade. While the 
impact of internal trafficking is significant, the external dimension of 
traffic- in-persons is more of global concern in this discourse. Nigeria is 
also a receiving country of minors trafficked for labour in quarries located 
in remote areas in Ogun State, South-West Nigeria and other forms of 
domestic servitude mainly in the urban centres of Lagos, Port Harcourt, 
Kano, Abuja and other cities.
forced laBour
Forced labour has to do with conscription and involuntary employment of 
persons. The Forced Labour Convention Act 1930 No. 29, an International 
Labour Organization document captures it to mean:
Forced or compulsory labour is all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered 
himself or herself voluntarily.
Aptly put, the above refers to a condition of use of coercion, deception 
and, in some cases, violence, in which persons are recruited to work. Other 
subtler means such as manipulated debt repayment conditions, bonding, 
retention of valid travel documents or threats of repatriation and deporta-
tion are employed in this regard. Employment-seeking persons, who 
migrate from the South to the North in search of opportunities, fall prey 
and are conscripted into labour in remote farms, construction sites, quar-
ries and mines. They are not waged according to recognised labour laws 
on terms mutually agreeable to the contracting parties, and most often 
because of the low power base to negotiate a living income, they fall prey 
to manipulation of swindlers.
14 POROUS BORDERS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN NIGERIA 
288
mIgrant smugglIng
Migrant smuggling is another variant of transnational organised crime that 
is criminalised. What distinguishes human trafficking from smuggling is 
consent of the victim and the fact that the smuggler is doing it for a fee. It 
is a highly syndicated business that is profit driven and based on contrac-
tual agreement that is finalised, if the deliverable (journey) is successfully 
concluded. According to the UN General Assembly document The 
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants (2000), Article 3 (a):
“Smuggling of migrants” shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry 
of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a per-
manent resident.
This act is carried out without proper documentation and, in most cases, 
crossing of borders illegally. A very typical example is the current surge of 
migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.
lIterature revIew
Many scholars have written on the different dimensions of human trafficking 
in Nigeria, ranging from internal trafficking within rural areas to cities and 
trafficking outside the external borders of the country. They include 
Gbadamosi (2006), Fayomi (2009), Abdulraheem and Oladipo (2010), 
Essien (2013) and Njoku (2015), among others, that tried variously to 
explain the dynamics of trafficking and the possible routes that traffickers 
embark on through clandestine movements. It is instructive that, while 
some of the literature surveyed have been dedicated to narratives on the 
causes and effects of trafficking, including women, children and those 
categorised as smuggled, the role of crime place is sometimes downplayed.
Several scholars have likened human trafficking to a modern-day exten-
sion of the abolished slavery and situated it as crime against humanity. 
Other scholars have also described it as a global phenomenon that cuts 
across borders, that has attracted global responses in the form of interna-
tional statutes and conventions (Gbadamosi 2006; Abdulraheem and 
Oladipo 2010). Other extant literature views human trafficking as migra-
tion crisis, which is poverty induced, arising from unequal opportunities 
between nations that are classified as developed and developing, as con-
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tained in the scholarly work of Gwary (2006). Certainly, inequality in 
standard of living and income are causative factors in the desire to migrate, 
but it must be carried out under lawful circumstances.
Furthermore, Njoku (2015) explained the permeability of the borders 
as an inherent factor that drives human trafficking, more so when there are 
noticeable deficits in manpower and technology required to effectively 
police the vast and expansive borders. Other internal triggers are youth 
bulge and unemployment, a condition which the syndicated traffickers 
explore in convincing unsuspecting youth to embark on migration to 
Europe. The non-inclusion of border communities in border security 
framework also has serious implications, and this also explains the near- 
absence of intelligence regarding the clandestine movement of traffickers 
and how it could be addressed.
However, the link between porous borders and human trafficking has 
yielded inaccurate details in terms of the statistics of outflows since the act 
is clandestine and largely undocumented in nature. The borders are classi-
fied as security constructs, and access to gathering information in such 
domains has been met with stiff resistance from the apparatus of security 
agencies. It is believed that the determination of the National Agency for 
the Prohibition of Traffic in Person (NAPTIP) to reduce and sanction 
human traffickers is not yielding desired results, since the surge is notice-
ably not abating, as evidenced from the number of casualties and those 
rescued of the coast of Libya trying to reach Europe. While this position 
is critical, how porous borders aid human trafficking remains under- 
researched because field data collection in security-regulated environment 
is problematic. The border space in terms of accessibility and how the 
absence of capable guardians assists in crime occurrence are major factors 
which this chapter seeks to establish as part of new initiatives to reduce 
human trafficking occurrences in Nigeria.
Again, Njoku (2015) admits that Nigeria’s borders are hospitable to 
human traffickers, but did not go further to explain how the gaps in secu-
rity governance of borders are exploited by human traffickers. Perhaps, 
Iyanda and Nwogwugwu (2016) made allusion to the fact that
for every trafficker that is apprehended, there are several hundreds who may 
be utilizing some of the many unmanned illegal routes across the country’s 
borders. This makes the war against trafficking a very difficult one in 
the country.
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While these assertions paint a vivid picture of the problems of operational 
failures, current known figures of the number of authorised entry points 
and unauthorised borders in Nigeria are most unsettling. The erstwhile 
Comptroller General of Immigration—Martins Kure Abeshi—in 2016, 
during The Annual Comptroller General Conference held in Lafia, 
Nassarawa State of Nigeria confirmed existence of 114 legal routes and 
about 1400 illegal routes spread over the more than 4084 square kilometres 
of borders in Nigeria. The situation is pathetic because the Nigerian 
Immigration Service has a complement of only 23,000 staff, not sufficient 
to man the borders as required. It goes further to establish why the bor-
ders are porous and exploited by criminal gangs and why migration man-
agement is a significant aspect of security.
Adepelumi (2015) cited porous borders, limited commitments, human 
capacity gaps of immigration and other law enforcement agencies to con-
trol borders as a factor in reducing human trafficking but did not carry out 
an in-depth study on how porous borders aid human trafficking in border 
localities in Nigeria. Olateru (2006) extrapolated the lack of success in 
reducing human trafficking in Nigeria as a function of weak border con-
trols within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
region, while canvassing for the strengthening of border controls as a 
potential strategy for countering human trafficking. It is in recognition of 
the above gaps that this study is found necessary and relevant to strengthen 
the border security architecture of Nigeria.
crIme pattern tHeory
Paul and Patricia Brantingham developed, in 1981, the Crime Pattern 
Theory, which has been widely acclaimed as an improvement on deviance 
or non-conformity in criminal behaviours, as it relates to rational choice 
and routine activity theories. Crime Pattern postulation is firm upon the 
probability that there is a much stronger geographic resonation, which in 
this case is the existence of a porous border, which informs the thought 
process of committing crime like human trafficking. The porous border 
being the action space is the arena in which offenders will make a choice 
to smuggle or traffic in humans, since awareness of such nodes create 
opportunities to commit a crime with lesser probability of interdiction.
Familiarity with the geographical space, openness of the facility and 
increased frequency of commuting have influence and drive the impunity 
traffickers to undertake human trafficking under low-risk-assessment con-
ditions. The trafficker is also familiar with the strength and capacity of the 
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Nigerian Immigration Service to deploy and take proactive measures. 
Most importantly, they build alliances with the border community people 
and local non-state actors to undermine countermeasures.
This theory aids our understanding of the string of indicators of how 
(ways), when (timing) and where (Place) human traffickers choose to 
commit crime. The indicators are critical in identification of crime nodes, 
which this chapter postulates as incidental and not accidental to traffic-in- 
persons. Traffickers engage in crime-related activities after an intelligence- 
driven assessment of the crime place and other opportunities, before a 
final decision is taken to embark on trafficking, which includes evaluating 
the risk of
• the likelihood of successful operations, made possible by porosity 
of borders,
• absence of capable guardians (border security—immigration officials),
• apprehension weighted against weak criminal justice system and
• returns on investment (profit) or net monetary gains accruing from 
the crime.
Trafficking and smuggling of humans are made easy because the border 
settings are porous and cannot work as security filters to deter harmful 
movements. We are better equipped in designing proactive countermea-
sures to human trafficking, if the recruitment process is understood to be 
in remote locations; the methods include deception and where the move-
ment eventually takes place which is the border. This is in addition to cut-
ting of the sources of repatriation of the proceeds of crimes after completion 
of a round trip of trafficking.
In dealing with the problems of trafficking and smuggling, we need to 
expand the scope beyond crime pattern, wearing the lens to visualise also 
the provider (sourcing), the travel agent or facilitator (broker), the transit 
holder (brothel keeper) and the market (consumer). Traffic-in-persons is 
demand driven. Without demand, the supply will be dormant, and the 
lure to engage in trafficking will be negative. It is a combination of a set of 
factors that makes human trafficking thrive, and the possible solutions 
must take into consideration multi-sectoral approaches. We need to under-
stand that each phase of the trafficking process generates its own energy to 
bypass countermeasures to put in place to disrupt human trafficking, be it 
at the local, transit or destination circle.
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metHodologIcal Issues
While noting that trafficking of humans is clandestine in nature and largely 
undocumented, characteristically it thrives on false identity. The interna-
tional borders are important in tracking the number of externally traf-
ficked persons; however, it remains a restricted area for research due to the 
bureaucracy of obtaining permission for field surveys, using questionnaires 
and interviews. This is in spite of the changing nature of state-centric 
approach to border studies, with emphasis on human security. The routes 
are also not regular, which predisposed field surveys to high-risk factors, 
and it makes the generation of accurate data on the outflow of trafficked 
persons difficult to achieve. It is therefore not an accident that statistics in 
this thematic area is limited in scope, and the reliability of any if available, 
is doubtful. The identified shortcomings leave no option for the chapter 
to weigh in on secondary sources such as published materials, reports, 
journals and newspapers. This is, however, complemented with field expe-
rience of non-participant observation in border settings.
causatIve factors of Human traffIckIng
Several factors account for the increase in human trafficking in Nigeria. 
Broadly categorised, they include both push and pull factors.
Push factors—bad socio-economic condition, poverty, corruption and 
injustice. These also include unequal access to welfare conditions, lack of 
employability, deprivation and human rights abuses, which traffickers 
most often exploit to prey on their victims. Conflicts, wars and recession 
in the economy also contribute in no small measure as push factors.
Pull factors—refer to factors that are eye-catching contributors which 
lure victims, such as expectation of higher income differentials, good wel-
fare and social security systems contribute to the pull factors and the desire 
to seek better opportunities in destination countries. Though there is 
demand for cheap labour in countries of choice, the reality that living 
wage in destination countries is far higher than the pay-offs in home coun-
try attracts labour movement.
The above is supported by Pearson and Ezeh (2017), who identified 
living conditions that are harsh and unbearable as trigger factors. Again, 
Gbadamosi (2006), Olateru (2006), Fayomi (2009) and Adepelumi 
(2015) find justification for this development on conditions relative to 
poverty and unemployment, which generate outflow of persons. While 
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noting that push and pull factors are major themes in the analysis of traf-
ficked persons, the causative factors go beyond such explanations to 
include elements such as:
 1. Dysfunctional family setting—obviously, children from large 
families most often feel neglected, if not properly catered for, and 
may want to explore opportunities far away from the home, which 
also includes fending for oneself and a feeling of adventurism.
 2. Weak criminal justice systems—apart from the very fact that the 
criminal justice system is weak, it stands to reason that it offers no 
protection for the most vulnerable in the society, thereby helping 
to sustain the human trafficking network. When people feel unsafe, 
they naturally will seek refuge in any other place that offers the 
hope and security.
 3. Lure of high profits—reasonably tied to weak institutions is the 
lure of profit in the sale of victims into servitude, prostitution and 
forced labour. The victims are first made to believe that the move-
ment is for their self-benefit and that living in poverty reduces self- 
esteem, which makes the need to risk embarking of risky journeys 
across the Mediterranean Sea a better option.
 4. Economic standpoint—job opportunities are shrink in the devel-
oping world and, even if they are available, they are highly con-
tested and corrupted. This leaves no option for a graduate to seek, 
through whatever means opportunities elsewhere, even if the 
income is menial and low.
 5. Emotional distress—due mainly to loss of trust and confidence in 
governance, most youth run into emotional distress and resort to 
drug abuse, which further motivate them into undertaking dan-
gerous journey through deserts and rough terrains to country 
of choice.
 6. Cultural tradition of extended family help—unchanged cultural 
traditions of old practices of family help accounts mostly for inter-
nal traffic-in-persons. Parents in rural villages volunteer to send 
their wards to family members in urban centres to learn profes-
sional trades and apprenticeship skills.
 7. Tough visa regimes—the desire to avail oneself to be trafficked 
can also be attributed to the tough and harsh visa regimes. There 
are high volumes of visa refusals from embassies in Nigeria, which 
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makes intending migrants predisposed to seeking alternative 
means. Narratives from traffic victims attest to the fact that youth 
between the ages of 16 and 40 are at risk of refusal of visas/entry 
clearance, even if the reason for travel is genuine. Conversely, the 
embassies hinge the large number of refusals on document fraud 
and lack of visible means of livelihood.
 8. Brain-drain syndrome—human trafficking lures vibrant young 
men and women away from less developed economies by creating 
the illusion of better living conditions in destination countries. 
Brain drain deprives the country of the services of high-skilled 
manpower required for nation building, while various visa lottery 
programmes take away few who are lucky and the unlucky appli-
cants follow-up through the route of illegalities due to increased 
remittances.
 9. Corruption—corruption plays a crucial role, through bribery of 
border security agencies, brothel keepers and village brokers, 
including duly registered travel agencies that participate in the 
trafficking circle. There is a large army of border guides, escorts 
and crooks who engage in this business and eke a living from 
conveying and connecting potential victims to their clienteles. 
It is a complex web of transaction that is coded and highly 
syndicated.
 10. Permeable borders—the nature and characteristics of existing 
border call to question governance regimes by border security 
agencies. Most of the 4045 kilometres of land frontiers that Nigeria 
shares with Benin, Cameroun and Chad are porous and constitute 
avenues for human traffickers to operate without interdiction.
The advent of globalisation and the widespread introduction of Internet 
facilities may have negatively triggered the misapplication of such com-
munication technologies for criminal activities. Although it is not a caus-
ative factor, it greatly assisted in posting online lucid pictures for online 
dating and sex trade. Evidences abound of postings of pornographic pic-
tures, which are processes in scam activities that finally dovetail into human 
trafficking events. The list of causative factors is inexhaustible, but what 




conventIons agaInst Human traffIckIng
International conventions are instruments that are conduits for dealing with 
the problems of human trafficking. Most of the earliest attempts to crimi-
nalise traffic-in-persons dates back to 1926, when the Slavery Convention 
was first enacted. This was closely followed by the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery in 1956. There are other supportive instru-
ments like The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 
(1949), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979).
Certainly, some of these international conventions have specific areas of 
focus, though related to human trafficking, smuggling and other instances 
of women, child rights instruments are exactly the same, depending on the 
focus, be it labour matters, women and minors smuggled. Looking at the 
specifics, the most potent instruments to combat trafficking have been the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes called The Palermo Protocol, 
being a supplement to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and 
the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea, and Air, which entered into force in 2003–2004. There are other 
instruments from The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
on the Status of Refugees (1951 & 1967). In addition, The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Optional Protocol on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (2000) are 
important in the drive to reduce human trafficking. Recently in 2007, the 
UNODC established the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight 
Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT).
The African Union (AU Commission in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 
in 2002, came out with a draft action plan to combat human trafficking, 
adducing reasons of poverty, inequality, corruption and lack of education 
as causative factors that should be addressed to reduce human trafficking. 
Other supporting continental instruments are as follows:
• The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)
• The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981)
• The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)
• The African Common Position on Children (Declaration and Plan of 
Action (2001)
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At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) was conscious of the evils of human trafficking and 
initiated action plans against trafficking in persons in 2003. The plan of 
action contains measures to be taken, including legal, protection and 
support for victims of human trafficking, prevention and awareness raising, 
information exchange and training. Nigeria is a party and signatory to the 
UN Conventions, as well as African Union (AU) and ECOWAS plan of 
actions, which have been domesticated.
Cascaded down to the national level, Section 34 of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) guarantees the right to the dignity 
of the human person thus prohibiting the subjection of any person to 
slavery and servitude. It prohibits the subjection of any person to slavery 
or servitude. In 2003, Nigeria passed the Child Rights Act, which broadly 
covers the crime of child trafficking. Also, Nigeria became the first African 
country to enact an anti-trafficking legislation with the Trafficking in 
Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003. 
Subsequently, in order to broaden the scope of legislation and firm-up the 
penalties, the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and 
Administration Act was enacted in 2015, which repealed the previous Act 
of 2003. Nigeria also adopted in 2008, the National Policy on Protection 
and Assistance to Trafficked Persons. This was aimed towards increasing 
the efforts of the country’s protection, rehabilitation and integration of 
trafficked persons.
ImplementatIon strategIes In nIgerIa
While noting that human trafficking is a global problem, strategies to 
combat the scourge cannot be limited to internal mechanisms. However, 
implementation strategies must begin with the admission that there is a 
problem to be solved and the setting up of structures to build strategies 
towards resolution. In the follow-up narratives, the implementation strat-
egies can be disaggregated into three strands:
 1. Policy framework—Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human 
Trafficking
 2. Operational level—setting up of an agency with statutory respon-
sibilities for reduction




Policy framework—Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human 
Trafficking:
Nigeria has signed several international treaties designed to combat 
human trafficking, but in 2001, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
Human Trafficking was set up, which effectively recognised the problem 
at the strategic level of policymaking, with the mandate to bring together 
relevant ministerial departments and agencies (MDAs) to collaborate and 
respond to the problems of human trafficking in Nigeria. The committee 
is composed of the following ministries and agencies:
 1. Justice
 2. Interior
 3. Women Affairs
 4. National Planning Commission
 5. Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation
 6. Nigeria Police
 7. Nigerian Immigration Service
 8. Nigerian Customs Service
The Inter-Ministerial Committee activities were to be coordinated 
from Presidency, under the Office of the Special Assistant to the President 
on Human Trafficking and Child Labour. However, this committee did 
not function optimally and due mainly to lack of effective coordination 
and inter-agency rivalry, the tenure was short-lived. Another possible rea-
son may well be the absence of an enabling legislation and lack of cohesion 
over implementation strategies.
Operation Level—National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking 
in Persons (NAPTIP)
In furtherance of the resolve to deal with the problems of human traf-
ficking in Nigeria, in 2003, the National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) was estab-
lished, saddled with operational level functions. In 2005, the NAPTIP Act 
was amended to criminalise brothel keepers, found culpable in trafficking, 
sex trade and the exploitative use of children as house helps. The mission 
statement of NAPTIP is captured in four-Ps, which means prevention, pro-
tection, prosecution and partnership. The functions of NAPTIP revolve 
around administration of the Act in collaboration with key agencies like the 
Nigerian Immigration Service and the Nigeria Police. It must be stated 
clearly that NAPTIP is not fully deployed to border controls, a major gap 
in its operation, but the powers of the agency, among others, include:
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 1. arrest and prosecution of violators of the Act, 2015;
 2. investigate any person, body or entity who may have committed 
human trafficking offence;
 3. seek information to aid enforcement or prosecution of offenders;
 4. enter into any premises for search purposes in furtherance of its 
functions; and
 5. seizure of proceeds of crime associated with human trafficking.
NAPTIP is also involved in awareness campaigns, public enlightenment 
in schools, colleges and the university with a purpose to educate the young 
ones of the dangers of trafficking. It maintains eight zonal offices in loca-
tions that are focal points for human trafficking in Nigeria. The locations are 
Benin, Kano, Lagos and Oshogbo. Others are Makurdi, Maiduguri, Sokoto 
and Uyo. The agency also operates a whistle-blowers’ facility to aid report-
age of suspected human trafficking activities, but its penetration into the 
network of criminal gangs hideouts remain unexplored. Nigeria presumed 
to have met the minimum standard for the elimination of traffic- in- person, 
being rated tier 2 on the watch list of 2017 report released by the United 
States. However, internal trafficking remains difficult due to the local dynam-
ics and the lack of political will of the elites, who are the benefactors in 
reducing the demand for domestic servants in urban centres in Nigeria.
advocacy and actIvIsm
The fight against trafficking in humans requires multi-stakeholder 
approach, and hence the work of non-governmental agencies through 
activism is very crucial in this respect. The role of the traditional institu-
tions, faith-based organisations and the family in human trafficking cannot 
be underestimated. Hence, advocacy including activism, awareness cre-
ation and information dissemination is very crucial in prevention and 
reduction. However, it is accepted that government alone cannot do all, 
but the support of private as well as non-governmental organisations are 
required and found to be cogent. The efforts of the Edo State govern-
ment in enacting a bill to provide for the establishment of a taskforce on 
human trafficking is considered supportive, but enforcement alone will 
not work without the delivery of welfare packages for the youth in terms 
of social security and unemployment benefits. NAPTIP will need to sup-
port and fund NGOs to achieve the desired reduction in the eight focal 
states, identified earlier. Pioneering agencies already working the field of 
human trafficking, among others, include:
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 1. Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Founda-
tion (WOTCLEF)
 2. Idia Renaissance Centre in Benin City
 3. Women’s Consortium of Nigeria
 4. Coalition Against Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation 
of Children
 5. Devatop Centre for Africa Development (DCAD)
 6. Pathfinders Justice Initiatives
tHe soutH-nortH mIgratIon dynamIcs
Classification, based on economic growth and development, has, to a large 
extent, had impact on the flow of migrants, and in this context, movement 
from the less-developed economies of Africa (South) to Europe (North). 
Attention is therefore focused on the drivers and the attractions. What can 
be obviously stated is that most of African are ravaged by conflicts, natural 
disasters and abject poverty. This is compounded by poor governance and 
lack of opportunity that makes people want to migrate to other stable and 
rich economies for survival. As development is sometimes attributed to 
the globalisation dynamics and the increasing structural disparity between 
the rich North and the impoverished South, migrants captured in this web 
are known to be in search of better living conditions and opportunities. 
Balancing this flow has remained problematic and the European Union 
has invested heavily trying to build structures to reduce and contain the 
flow, without corresponding success.
We also need to take into consideration that migration is dependent on 
economic well-being and most importantly, if the immigrant is not likely 
to be a liability on the host country. It is trite to believe that when the 
economy of Nigeria was stable and booming in the early 1970s, citizens of 
Nigeria had visa-free access to the UK. The situation reversed with eco-
nomic downturn and greater exclusionary regimes that tend to restrict 
lawful migration, thus creating a market for transnational criminal net-
works that is profit driven and most often exploited by human traffickers 
and smugglers. The greater the barrier, the more the risks involved in 
illegal trafficking and the more profit that will accrue; hence, trafficking in 
humans continues to survive, since the market is viable.
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The dimensions of human trafficking are not always North bound, but 
also regionalised and sometimes intra-African or intra-nation. The occur-
rences are not new but find explanation in several postulations. The Crime 
Pattern theory offers the framework that best fits the discourse.
dIscursIve analysIs
The chapter sets out to achieve three objectives of identifying the routes 
and drivers, including how they relate to opportunities created by open 
borders and to proffer solutions towards strengthening border regimes 
in Nigeria.
Migration routes—three types of migration routes are easily discern-
ible for prospective migrants, and they include land, maritime and airside. 
While travel through the airport is more security compliant with vetting of 
travel documents to weed out unlawful travels, the same cannot be said of 
land and maritime borders. The land frontiers are particularly problematic 
due to its porous nature and because it is under-policed. ECOWAS mem-
ber states enjoy freedom of movement of persons, goods and services, 
courtesy of the Treaty of 1975 and other related protocols. In addition to 
the above, it is important to note that Nigeria has visa abolition agreement 
with Cameroun and Chad, which are not member states of ECOWAS. What 
this means is that any person can migrate through shared borders (Benin, 
Cameroun, Chad and Niger) without visa requirements or restriction. 
This background is important for us to understand the enormity of the 
problem and that porosity of borders in Nigeria is not only generic from 
the regional policy regime in place but also some existing bi-lateral visa- 
free regimes that Nigeria entered into with Cameroun and Chad.
Generally, traffickers use same routes and methods for commuting. The 
land frontiers are mostly abused; however, they use ocean-going fishing 
boats and sometimes flotillas to evade clearance along maritime borders. 
The migration routes are not clearly defined, but they are conditioned 
upon the level of security and how easy it is to evade clearance from coun-
try of origin-transit-destination. A trafficked person can move possibly 
from Benin City, for example, to
 1. Lagos-Abidjan Corridor–Libya-Spain or France
 2. Kano-Agadez-Libya-Italy




Sometimes preferred destination determines the routes, and Zinder, 
Agadez and Tripoli are preferred transit routes running through the des-
ert. The instabilities and the absence of legitimate regime in Libya have 
also aided the trafficking business, and the Mediterranean Sea is now a 
zone of death for trafficked victims left unattended to in the dangerous 
Lampedusa sea arena.
traffIckIng pattern
Trafficking in humans is dynamic and follows a complex pattern. Just as 
human behaviour is unpredictable, the routes are not fixed, and the pattern 
of movement is mostly influenced by geography, means of transport, com-
munication and how tight or porous the border can be at the time of mobil-
ity. Geographic landscape and proximity sometimes determine how flexible 
and cost efficient the mobility is undertaken. Sometimes, proximity from 
country of origin to that of destination is not reckoned with, and at other 
times, barriers such as mountains, deserts, rivers and seas are factored into 
plans to migrate. Similarly, the availability of easy means of commuting and 
communication are crucial to the choice of transit routes. Traffickers are 
also equipped with networked intelligence of routes that are tough and 
tight in terms of security patrols and policing. They also have insider infor-
mation, which routes are porous and hospitable to movements. Traffickers 
monitor and follow routes where there are few or no checking points and 
sometimes work with the aid of local border community tour guides. While 
there are no border controls relative to internal trafficking in persons, traf-
fickers also avoid police patrols and checking points especially in Nigeria.
drIvers and open Borders lInkages
Crime opportunities are made possible in the absence of capable guardians 
and if, most importantly, the facility, which in this case, is hospitable to crime 
occurrence. This is why the Crime Pattern theory is found appropriate in this 
context of analysis. Prior to 1975 and before the ECOWAS Treaty came into 
effect abolishing visa restrictions to movement, human trafficking was at low 
ebb and not too prevalent. It is also assumed that the states in Africa were 
politically stable and the economies were relatively stable. However, when 
the borders in West Africa became open and fluid, criminalities started to 
manifest in various forms. The instabilities in Libya and the collapse of the 
regime eventually accelerated the outflow of migrants to Europe.
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In reality, therefore, the abolition of visa requirements for travel with 
West Africa accounted for the increase in outward movement to destina-
tions beyond Africa. The stable economies of Europe offer better oppor-
tunities as destination countries, and the trend reflects trafficked victims’ 
preference for Germany, France, Malta, Denmark and UK that have some 
semblance of human rights opportunities of accommodating persons flee-
ing from conflicts and violence. Most of the trafficked victims lay claim to 
asylum, stating that they are forced to flee their country of origin due to 
structural and cultural violence, human rights issues and other fathom 
excuses. Much as the drivers of human trafficking revolve around poverty, 
neglect and bad governance, the open and globalised borders have also 
greatly assisted in the new regime of undocumented outflow migrants 
to Europe.
This trend has remained a major challenge not only for the receiving 
countries but also for the transit and sending countries. The situation 
therefore requires concerted joint problem-solving approach.
strengtHenIng Border regImes
The menace of human trafficking is not abating. It requires the total over-
haul of the present governance structure of the international borders that 
Nigeria operates with Benin, Cameroun, Chad and Niger, in addition to 
addressing the push and pull factors. The borders in the northern axis with 
Niger are particularly troublesome because they are presently hospitable, 
due to its porous nature for smuggling and trafficking towards Zinder, 
Agadez and other transit routes to Morocco, Mauritania and Libya. 
Borders are in context supposed to be security constructs designed to filter 
what is harmful from what is potentially good. Since the management of 
border is a cooperative venture between two or more countries, then an 
integrated approach is the most viable option in dealing with problems of 
transnational organised crimes in Nigeria.
It is difficult also to imagine that while European borders are policed by 
FRONTEX, the borders of West Africa, though strategically merged, do 
not have the luxury of a body specifically empowered to carry out such 
functions. Presently, the policing of ECOWAS borders is still left to indi-
vidual nations, which makes them vulnerable to other forms of criminali-
ties. If the benefits of integration are to be enjoyed by the citizenry, 
ECOWAS needs strong borders to deter criminal elements and not ample 




Incidences of human trafficking are most often linked to push and pull 
factors that are captured in the gaps in the pervasive level of global inequal-
ities. Since some of the factors overlap, it stands to reason not to treat 
them in isolation, but how priority should be given towards a comprehen-
sive approach involves diverse stakeholders.
The antidote to poverty and unemployment is good governance. 
Poverty can be effectively addressed when the citizens of any country, 
especially the youth, benefit from employment, reduced corruption and 
other dividends of democracy. These also include justice, fair play and rule 
of law. It is most often stated that Nigeria being an oil-producing nation 
has no business with poverty. The mismanagement of the sovereign wealth 
has led to infrastructural decay, abject poverty and unemployment—a con-
dition which induces the youths to move and seek better alternatives out 
of deprivation. This must be addressed through concerted efforts in gov-
ernance systems that are transparent and accountable to the people. The 
developed world will help reduce the propensity to steal and deposit funds 
in their home country by rejecting such overtures from corrupt politicians 
and government officials.
The questions of safety and security are also germane to the causative 
factors of human trafficking. The nation must be made safe and secured 
from internal and external security threats, which brings into focus the 
need for security sector reform. Citizens do not have confidence in inter-
nal security systems in Nigeria. The landscape is riddled with incidences of 
kidnap, robberies, hostage-taking, terrorism and herders’ clash with farm-
ers, which have become perineal. The identified internal security threats 
should be addressed to restore confidence, which will reduce elements of 
bogus claims of asylum due to flimsy narratives from victims as justification 
for trafficking.
Paramount in dealing with human trafficking is the issue of good bor-
der management. Nigeria needs a strategic document on border security 
and how this fits well into the larger security architecture of national secu-
rity. There is the need to urgently review the country’s border security 
policy so as to identify the key security agencies, their roles and responsi-
bilities to avoid ambiguities and inter-agency rivalry in the management of 
borders. This will help in the neutralisation of the various illegal routes, 
disrupt opportunities available to traffickers and reduce the attraction 
to travel unlawfully. Nigeria may opt to fence its border facilities, if they 
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become security failures. However, this must be aligned to ECOWAS 
objective of good border management. Again, while structure upgrade is 
important in this regard, capacity building for border security agencies 
may well help in reducing the scourge.
Effective border policing and joint border cooperation with neighbour-
ing countries is required and should be mainstreamed into regional secu-
rity architecture. This is in consideration of the fact that human trafficking 
is transnational and not limited to Nigeria alone. If the routes must be 
disrupted, it requires sharing information on intelligence, tracking of prof-
its from this trade and terminating the connections in source, transit and 
receiving countries.
The issue of brain drain can be reversed through curriculum review, by 
linking the local content of the educational system to industry needs of the 
economy. The educational package should connect with entrepreneurial 
production circle, so that employability is guaranteed and is private sector 
driven. Attention should shift to skills acquisition and what generates 
employment, rather than white-collar jobs. While the universities are grad-
uating higher numbers of youths, employment placement is shrinking 
locally. Youths should be empowered through internship schemes, immer-
sion and mentoring practices.
The development of border communities by the federal government 
through the Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA) must 
be prioritised. This strategy is important in winning the minds of the 
border community’s folks to the side of the law in the fight against cross-
border crimes like human trafficking. When the communities become 
involved in border security management, then agents and brokers 
involved in trafficking may have to contend with alternative counter-
force in same locality.
Finally, the government should show commitment—financial and 
moral—through consistent enforcement procedures. There is the need for 
a document on border security strategy that must align with the larger 
national security strategy, which clearly spells out standard operating pro-
cedures for all border security agencies. This entails the overhaul of the 
criminal justice system and other constrains to free up challenges of using 
technology to manage borders, training and re-training of border security 




The attention accorded trafficking in Africa is indicative that multilateral 
cooperation, coordination and funding are required to prevent, detect and 
prosecute scourge globally. Trafficking as observed is not only understood 
from the standpoint of poverty and inequalities pervading Africa, but also 
from the opportunities that feed into illegal cross-border movements, 
resultant from porous and permeable borders, which must be addressed. 
While rescue missions for the victims have been partially successful, there 
is the need to put in place structures for protection and reintegration into 
the society to prevent incidences of re-trafficking. Reforms in the criminal 
justice system will serve as deterrent to traffickers and those caught up in 
the corruption web. There is need to develop an outcome-driven strategic 
plan to return the borders to safe commuting involving the local cross- 
border communities and civil society organisation. However, there is an 
increasing shift towards measures that look for solutions beyond enforce-
ment to other alternatives such as good governance and institutional 
capacity building to serve as a bulwark against porosity of borders and the 
illicit flow in humans.
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CHAPTER 15




The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in Africa is one 
of the greatest sources of armed conflicts in the continent since the depar-
ture of the colonialists in the 1960s. With the rise of globalisation and 
unprecedented changes in the production of weapons of mass destruction 
and ammunition, Africa has remained the destination of a large cache of 
arms and ammunition sold and smuggled to the conflict-ridden societies 
in the continent. In the ensuring crisis of underdevelopment, Boko Haram 
and a majority of armed groups have benefitted immensely from this 
uncontrolled arms business and proliferation that have dominated the 
continent for some time (Onuoha and Gerald 2013; Adeniyi 2017).
While protracted conflicts and proxy wars may not be new to Africa, 
the rise of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons in these violent conflicts are a source of worry to security 
experts, the international community and the Nigerian government. 
Uncontrolled arms flow has not only led to the proliferation of extremist 
groups, it has consequently emboldened different armed groups, militias, 
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warlords, terrorists, Fulani herdsmen and so on (Schroeder Lamb 2006; 
Sharife 2010; Wezeman 2003; Adeniyi 2017; Eriksson et al. 2017), in 
such a way that one violent conflict can lead to mass casualties. In the 
process, armed groups have caused deaths and fatalities to their nations 
and threatened the internal security of the states.
Although illicit arms trade is opaque in the developing world, in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, it is the source of prolonged violence against the state, 
individuals and the international community. Illicit arms transfer to 
conflicts- ridden areas in Africa usually comes from different parts of the 
world. Small arms are sold to Africa by some European nations in violation 
of UN arms embargoes. A good example is the shipment of arms and 
ammunition to Ivory Coast in July 2000 by a Ukrainian arms company. 
The business of arms transfer has not only enabled the merchants of deaths 
and smugglers to make huge profits from the gains of globalisation, it has 
provided them the opportunities to finance terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa, the Islamic Maghreb and the West African sub-region, leading to 
the birth of Nigeria-born Islamist sects (Musa 2013; Finanicial Action 
Task Force 2016).
In Africa, the sale and transfer of small arms and light weapons have 
exacerbated tensions, threatened democracy and destabilised nations caus-
ing untold hardships, atrocities and deaths to many people that are already 
ravaged by extreme poverty. It is estimated that 500,000 people die every 
year from violent conflicts worldwide, the majority of who are from Africa 
and other developing countries (Adeniyi 2017). Reports also indicate that 
uncontrolled arms transfer has deepened armed violence in many poverty- 
stricken African countries such as Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Kenya, Somalia Lake Chad Basin, 
Sudan, South-Sudan, Nigeria and Cameroon (Inter-governmental Action 
Against Money Laundering in West Africa 2013; Financial Action Task 
Force 2016; International Crisis Group 2016; Adeniyi 2017; Burke 2017; 
Mohamed et al. 2017).
This chapter argues that one of the major causes of Boko Haram 
extremism in Nigeria is the illicit arms trade business in the West African 
sub-region. The chapter argues that illicit arms trade and proliferation 
help terrorist groups have access to cheap arms and ammunition and can 
prolong counter-terrorism efforts. In order to provide a critical analysis of 
this issue, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
addresses the origin and challenge of Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria 
while the second part examines the issue of arms trade in Nigeria and the 
West African sub-region. The third part provides an analogy of the nature 
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of the relationship between arms trade, arms trafficking and Boko Haram 
extremism in Nigeria. The last part discusses possible solutions to the 
problem of illicit arms trade and internal insecurity in Nigeria.
Boko Haram: tHe rIse of an IslamIst terrorIst 
organIsatIon In nIgerIa
Boko Haram, otherwise known as Jama’atul ahl al Sunna li-da’wa wa-l- 
qital, is an Islamist terrorist organisation that was established in 2002 in 
Borno State’s capital of Maiduguri, northeastern Nigeria, by Muhammed 
Yusuf, a 32-year-old Islamic preacher. However, many analysts have argued 
that the history of the sect dates back to the 1980s and 1990s when Yusuf 
and his co-worshippers were brainwashed by virtue of their exposure to 
the radical Salafist movements in northern Nigeria (Thurston 2016) and 
the Sunni reforms of Islam across the African continent.
Pantucci and Jesperson (2015) stated that the emergence of Boko 
Haram can be traced back to the idea of Islamic revivalism that sprang up 
in northern Nigeria in the 1980s, particularly in Kano and Borno States. 
At this time, Yusuf and his friends were reported to have been inspired by 
public movements in religious activities in the north spearheaded by the 
“Shia Cleric Ibrahim Al Zakzaky’s Iranian-funded Islamic Movement of 
Nigeria (IMN) as well as the Salafist scholar Jafa’ar Mahmoud Adam” 
(Pantucci and Jesperson 2015, p. 3). The IMN insisted on the return of 
orthodox Islam, which supports the full implementation of Sharia Law. 
Although ideological differences exist within the association, the IMN was 
said to have drawn its ideological inspiration from the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, particularly from Hassan Al Banna and Said Qutb. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, the two men were reported to have 
revived the idea of an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law.
With Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999 amidts growing pub-
lic resentment against absence of governance in the polity coupled with 
the renewed terrorist attacks on the Western world by Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates in the Islamic Magreb, Yusuf and his group shifted their alle-
giance from local Islamic movements to radical Islamic movements in 
other parts of the world which wanted the imposition of full Sharia law in 
Islamic nations (Manni 2012; Onuoha 2012; BBC 2016). Boko Haram’s 
decision was reported to have been partly informed by the high level of 
corruption in government and the inability of the secular government to 
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address the problem of abject poverty among the youths. Walker (2012, 
p. 3) offered a lucid analysis of the origins of Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria when he observes thus:
Boko Haram’s origins lie in a group of radical Islamic youth who wor-
shipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a decade 
ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth (not yet known as Boko Haram) 
declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and 
irredeemable. The group declared it was embarking on hijra (a withdrawal 
along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to 
Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe State, 
near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hard-
line Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused anti-state ideol-
ogy and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under 
“true” Islamic Law, with the aim of making a perfect society away from the 
corrupt establishment.
The departure of sect leader Abubakar Lawan to Saudi Arabia for fur-
ther studies led to the appointment of Muhammadu Yusuf as the new 
leader of the group. Yusuf transformed the non-violent Islamic group to a 
radical Islamic movement following attacks on its members by the police 
and government forces. The first known major clash between Boko Haram 
and government forces was in December 2003 when a confrontation 
broke out between the sect and the police following a dispute over fishing 
rights with regard to a local pond. During the incident, members of the 
radical Islamist sect overpowered a squad of police officers and seized their 
weapons (Walker 2012). The violence, which killed over 70 members of 
the group in a siege in the sect’s mosque that lasted into 2004, marked the 
beginning of Boko Haram’s transition from a non-violent Islamic move-
ment to a violent Islamic group (Walker 2012).
The few survivors of the 2003–2004 incidents returned to Maiduguri to 
regroup and solidify their activities in Maiduguri. Led by the oratorical 
Muhammed Yusuf, Boko Haram was able to expand its frontiers to other 
northern states such as Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Niger, while also spread-
ing its tentacles outside Nigeria. Ostensibly for reasons of radicalisation and 
reinforcement, the group was not involved in any major anti- government 
uprising until 2009 when the group staged a short-lived uprising.
Boko Haram reportedly transformed from a radical Islamist group into 
an extremist terrorist organisation when it carried out repeated attacks on 
police authorities, religious leaders, churches, mosques and security forces 
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in the city of Maiduguri and in other northern states in 2009. Walker 
(2012, p. 4) captured the transformation as follows:
Much bloodier events soon followed. In July 2009 the group came into 
conflict with the authorities in a strikingly similar way to the events of years 
before. Traveling en masse to the funeral of a fellow member, the group was 
stopped by police traffic officers, who were enforcing a tightened restriction 
on motorcycle helmets, an argument ensued. The circumstances are unclear, 
but a member of the group is reported to have fired on the police, injuring 
several officers. The group then attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe, 
killing scores of police officers. Yusuf released video sermons in which he 
explicitly threatened the state and the police with violence. They were circu-
lated on DVD and gained a widespread audience. These events led the 
Bauchi government to crackdown on the group, arresting more than seven 
hundred members. In Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group’s 
mosque, but members of the sect managed to break out and for days they 
had the run of the town. They roamed the city acting independently, fight-
ing police when they came across them and killing Muslim and Christian 
civilians indiscriminately.
The clash persisted until Yusuf was arrested by the police. He was 
reported to have died in police custody but there were claims that he was 
in fact shot by the police (Onuoha 2013; Pantucci and Jesperson 2015). 
Yusuf’s killing, which was supposedly meant to douse tension, actually 
spurred the group into further attacks on Nigerian authorities such as the 
police, the army, political leaders, politicians and so on. It also embold-
ened the sect and provided it with the opportunity to gain support from 
other international organisations in the Islamic Maghreb and the Sahel.
After a lull in its activities following the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram 
resumed violent action in mid-2010. It repeatedly carried out a series of 
hit-and-run attacks on police checkpoints, killing police officers and seiz-
ing their ammunition. Gunmen also forced their ways into the houses of 
local and religious leaders suspected to have supported the government in 
the 2009 crackdown which led to the death of their leader. In August 
2011, the sect launched itself into the global spotlight by detonating a 
suicide bomb at the United Nations House in Abuja, killing 23 and 
wounding scores of people (Adaji 2011; Onwuamaeze 2011; Walker 2012).
The international outcry that followed the UN House bombing failed 
to deter the group from further attacks on the Nigerian state, as it exe-
cuted even deadlier attacks on churches, mosques and government 
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 institutions. On December 25, 2011, Boko Haram carried out a suicide 
attack on St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, an outskirt of Abuja, 
killing about 37 people and injuring over 50 others (Maiangwa and 
Uzodike 2012). In 2012 Boko Haram massacres occurred more in 
churches and schools, with suicide bombings occurring in churches in 
Kaduna, Yobe, Bauchi, Plateau and Borno states. Sulaiman (2012) noted 
that the federal government had in January 2012 declared a State of 
Emergency in 15 local government areas (LGAs) across five states in the 
north—Adamawa, Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe—which it regarded as 
the hotbeds of Boko Haram violence. In May 2013 the government 
extended this partial State of Emergency to a full State of Emergency in 
three northeastern states: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.
Undeterred by the State of Emergency, on the night of April 14, 2014, 
into the morning of April 15, 2014, Boko Haram besieged a boarding 
school for girls in the town of Chibok, carting away no fewer than 276 
schoolgirls. The incident was deemed an attempt to embarrass the 
Goodluck Jonathan administration, which had boasted that it would soon 
crush the insurgent group. As of late 2017, the Muhammadu Buhari 
administration, after a series of negotiations, had rescued only around 100 
of the Chibok girls (Punch 2017).
Prior to the rescue of a set of 82 of the Chibok girls, a crisis had broken 
out in the Shura Council leading to the emergence of splinter groups 
among Boko Haram ranks. The crisis, which came into global spotlight on 
August 3, 2016, when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) proclaimed 
former Boko Haram leader’s son Abu Musab Al Banawi as the leader of 
Boko Haram (the Islamic State in West Africa), had first occurred in 2012, 
when Ansaru claimed it was seceding from Boko Haram because of 
Shekau’s attacks on Muslims (Guita and Simcox 2014).
Ansaru is the splinter of Nigeria’s largest Jihadist group which special-
ises in attacking foreigners and is believed to be affiliated to Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (Guita and Simcox 2014: Onuoha 2016). Its origins 
date back to 2002 (Guita and Simcox 2014) when Bin Laden dispatched 
one of his aids to Nigeria to distribute $3 million to radical Islamist groups 
that were sympathetic to Al Qaeda. But the 2016 factional crisis exposed 
the prolonged battle between Shekau and Abu Banawi. Despite the ideo-
logical and leadership cracks in the sect, Boko Haram is believed to be 
vociferously committed to its war on the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2016). 
The persistence of the sect on the terror battle is said to have been aided 
by its access to illicit arms and ammunition in the West African sub-region.
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IllIcIt arms trade In afrIca and Boko Haram’s 
extremIsm In nIgerIa
While the arms trade is one of the major sources of income for many devel-
oped countries, in Africa, only a few countries have the capacity and capabil-
ity to produce arms and ammunition. And in countries where local goldsmiths 
manufacture arms, national governments lack the capacity to tightly monitor 
their markets. What this implies is that the large stock of arms and ammuni-
tion that is used by armed groups and terrorist organisations on the continent 
comes from illegal sources (Schroeder and Lamb 2006).
As a continent on the periphery of the world system and one that is 
ravaged by poverty and conflict, Africa receives more arms and ammuni-
tion, especially small arms and light weapons, from other parts of the 
world. Apart from poverty, Africa’s high vulnerability to illicit arms trade 
is caused by many other factors.
Since independence, many African countries have not known peace, 
and governments have been struggling to overcome separatist move-
ments. Although most African conflicts have been attributed to the inabil-
ity of African leaders to develop their individual countries, the Western 
world-imposed role which Africa played during the Cold War, and African 
leaders’ shipment of small arms and light weapons to the continent, are 
largely responsible for the problem of arms proliferation in contemporary 
Africa (GIABA 2013). Sharife (2010) noted that before the Cold War, 
Africa’s political independence and the accompanying armed struggles 
were the first drivers of arms into the continent.
Independence and the Illicit Arms Trade in Africa
Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons existed during the early days 
of Africa’s independence from colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s but it 
was to a limited extent. In the period leading to political independence, 
illicit arms shipment to the continent was either tightly monitored by the 
colonial government or designed to protect the interests of the colonial 
imperialists. At the local level, only a few African countries went to war or 
launched revolutions allegedly designed to get rid of the European colo-
nialists. Algeria was a typical example of an African country where skir-
mishes broke out between the colonial government and pro-independence 
leaders (Fanon 1963; Mamdani 2004).
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At independence, most ethnic nationalities were united by the resolve 
to eject the Europeans. The consensus was that colonialism was detrimen-
tal to African development and would slow down the process of economic 
growth and economic development. Thus, decolonisation was supported 
by many African leaders as an opportunity to end over 100 years of colo-
nial occupation of Africa (Mbaku 2003; Mamdani 2004).
A few years after independence, politics became a national problem as 
it became the only way through which leaders of different ethnic nationali-
ties could amass wealth from the state and empower their people. Ake 
(2000, p. 36) argued:
The coming of political independence did not change this. Independence 
changed the composition of the managers of the state but not the character 
of the state, which remained much as it was in the colonial era. Its scope 
continued to be totalistic and its economic orientation highly statist. It pre-
sented itself often as an apparatus of violence, its base in social forces 
remained extremely narrow and it relied for compliance unduly on coercion 
rather than authority. With few exceptions, the elite who came to power 
decided to inherit and exploit the colonial system to their own benefits 
rather than transforming it democratically as had been expected. This alien-
ated them from the masses whom they now had to contain with force.
At the crossroads over unresolved national issues, many African coun-
tries descended into civil war due to violent agitations to address local 
grievances. The long-term effect of this on the security of lives and prop-
erty was the proliferation of armed conflicts since armed groups could 
easily buy cheap arms from the black market and government forces 
(Schroeder and Lamb 2006). With military intervention, large stocks of 
arms freely went into the hands of regional armed groups within the coun-
tries and this factor led to the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to mention but a few.
The 1980s Global Economic Recession, the Cold War 
and the Arms Trade in Africa
The Cold War is a key player in the clash of civilisations and the ongoing 
armed conflicts in many parts of the world (Huntington 1993; Harshe 
2008). In the 1980s, a large cache of arms entered the African continent 
from the developed world owing to forces at the global level. Two factors 
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played critical roles in the shipment of arms and ammunition to African 
countries, including Nigeria. The first factor was arms support received 
from the Western world in exchange for oil minerals and natural resources, 
which were supposed to wipe off huge debts that had weighed heavily on 
African countries since independence.
At independence, many African countries had sought development 
finance from the World Bank and IMF but a majority of these aids were 
plundered by government officials. Consequently, the theft of public 
resources and other economic problems had brought the continent to its 
knees in the 1980s. Sharife (2010) noted that to stem the tide, the World 
Bank and the IMF recommended structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) which they thought would open up African economies to the out-
side world. Eventually, many African governments embraced the idea of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Nnoli 1993; Ake 1996).
With SAPs, a lot of European extractive companies entered the ailing 
economies to boost the extraction and exportation of natural resources. 
This entry led to what development scholars have called “the politics of 
resource control in Africa”. Armed with the control over oil blocks, self- 
centred African leaders exchanged oil minerals for arms and ammunition 
and these arms subsequently got into the hands of insurgent groups such 
as Niger Delta militants and criminals profiting from illegal oil bunkering 
(Sharife 2010; GIABA 2013). Because the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons is not restricted to any region, the tendency was for such 
arms to move from one armed group to the other and enter a vicious circle 
of conflicts now ongoing in Nigeria.
The Cold War presented the second reason for illicit arms flow to 
Nigeria and many African countries. During the Cold War, large stocks of 
arms were shipped to Africa by the US and Russia to aid armed groups as 
well as the Jihadist groups who were in support of the Cold War. For 
those countries on the side of communism, Russia was reported to have 
empowered them with arms and ammunition, as well as provided training. 
The US also used its clout in the continent to train and arm insurgent 
groups against its Cold War rivalry. Eventually, the US won the war but 
the stockpile of small arms and light weapons that had gone into circula-
tion remained with the groups. The inability to retrieve many of these 
arms was initially responsible for the emergence of Islamist fundamentalist 
groups in the North and West African sub-regions, with Algeria and 
Sudan serving as the hub for the radical Jihadist movements (Wezeman 
2003; Saul 2005; Harshe 2008).
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Harshe (2008, p. 68) summed up the scenario thus:
The rise of contemporary terrorism has its roots in the new cold war between 
the US and the former Soviet Union. Under President Reagan, in the 
1980s, the US began to flex muscles as a global gendarme to contain the 
rising Soviet power by declaring the former Soviet Union as an “evil empire”. 
Certain significant developments in the 1970s such as the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system, the US reverses in Vietnam, Angola and Iran were 
demanding a more aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union from the US 
standpoint. Eventually, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 
1979 had set the pace for the new Cold war. The Soviets in their quest to 
get access to warm waters had moved into Afghanistan by stationing 1,000 
troops. To wipe out the Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the US opted to 
rally all such forces that were ideologically averse to communism. Thus, 
Pakistan under president Zia-ul-Haq became the frontline state to combat 
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, in its turn, became the hub to 
recruit different Mujahedeen groups as holy warriors and Saudi Arabia 
financed these religious extremist or radical Islamist groupings.
Clearly, then, Cold War politics provided the grounds for the emer-
gence of Al Qaeda and other radical Jihadist groups in Africa, including 
the Boko Haram sect.
Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations 
in the West African Sub-Region
Boko Haram’s eight years (2009–2017) of extremism thrives not only 
because the insurgent group has highly trained members but also because 
there is an ongoing illicit arms trade in the West African sub-region that 
has not been effectively tackled by the region’s national governments. 
Boko Haram’s attacks on the Nigerian state are reported to have benefit-
ted significantly from this illicit movement of small arms and light weap-
ons in West Africa (Onuoha 2013; FATF 2016).
For many years, West Africa has served as the hub of the illicit trade in 
SALWs in Africa. The “merchants of deaths”, otherwise called interna-
tional brokers, move SALWs such as AK 47 guns, rocket launchers, self- 
loading pistols, assault rifles, locally made guns, mortars, short, long and 
double barrels, revolvers, hand grenades, pump action, Beretta guns and 
Kalashnikov across the region. Because of the porosity of Nigeria’s bor-
ders, Boko Haram and other armed groups in the north have been able to 
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obtain or traffic large stocks of arms and ammunition from some West and 
Central African countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Mali to the north-
east where they have continued the eight-year-Jihadist war against the 
Nigerian state (GIABA 2013).
Given the porosity of Nigerian borders, Boko Haram’s arms smugglers 
have adopted and been able to use different methods to move arms into 
the country. There are reports that Boko Haram members often conceal 
arms in sacks, trucks and at the back of camels and donkeys to avoid being 
arrested by Nigerian security forces (GIABA 2013; Onuoha 2013; FATF 
2016). Musa (2013) posited that some border towns in the northeastern 
flank often serve as the locus for the trafficking of arms and illicit goods.
Being familiar with these towns, Boko Haram members have been able 
to move arms and ammunition in and out of over 250 border routes link-
ing the Damaturu/Maiduguri axis to Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Musa 
2013). Research into Boko Haram’s arms smuggling strategies has also 
shown that some cows and grains merchants in the northeastern part of 
the country have devised a means of hiding the cache of arms and ammu-
nition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles’ engines and inside bags of 
grains that are mostly undetected by security agencies at the border posts. 
While it may be possible to detect and arrest arms stocked in small vehi-
cles, it is usually almost impossible to detect arms loaded in large numbers 
via trucks, trailers, lorries and old model pick-up vans (Musa 2013).
The Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing (2013) reported that Nigeria has about 2.5 million 
arms and light weapons in circulation. This is closely followed by Cote 
d’Ivoire (458,677), Senegal (263,714) and Mali (174,752). The regional 
estimates given by the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (GIABA) may not actually reflect the 
volume of arms in circulation in the region because the clandestine nature 
of the illicit trade in SALWs always makes it difficult for governments to 
arrive at accurate statistics on the volume of arms in circulation. Table 15.1 
provides a further breakdown of such arms across West Africa.
GIABA also gave a lucid analysis of the types of arms and likely coun-
tries of origins of the illicit arms supply to West Africa and Africa in gen-
eral. As Table  15.2 shows, arms smuggling operations from Libya and 
Liberia as well as production by local manufacturers dominate the major 
sources of arms transfer to Boko Haram and other militant groups in the 
continent.
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There have also been reports of arms seizure by Nigeria’s security forces 
in a bid to break Boko Haram’s arms supply and terrorist financing in the 
northeast. Onuoha (2013) reported that on July 12, 2013, soldiers 
arrested a petrol tanker in Kebbi which was loaded with three AK 47 rifles, 
one rocket-propelled grenade, nine AK 47 magazines, two bombs, three 
Rocket-Propelled grenade (RPG) chargers and 790 rounds of 7.62 mm of 
special ammunition which were hidden in the fuel compartment of the 
tanker. In May 2017, the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a cache of 
arms and ammunition imported through the Tin Can Port in Apapa, 
Lagos. The arms seizure revealed that a total of 440 pieces of assorted 
pump action rifles originating from Turkey were concealed in a 40-feet 
container alleged to be carrying POP powder. That was the second-largest 























Gambia 136,850 – –




Liberia 25,000 – 27,000
61,918,000
–
Mali 174,752 – – –
Niger 117,305 28 12,432
30,000
–




6491 destroyed by the 
Nigerian Army







Source: GIABA Report (2013) on the nexus between small arms and light weapons and money laundering 
and terrorist financing in West Africa. Dakar: Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa
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Types of SALW Likely countries of origin/
Suppliers
Means/Routes
Niger AK 47 guns, pistols, 
long- and double-barrel 
guns and Kalashnikov 
rifles
Libya, Chad, Somali, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina 
Faso and local manufacturers
Land borders 
and footpaths
Guinea Bissau AK 47 guns, pistols and 
short-, long- and 
double-barrel guns
Remnants from the 
independence struggle, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
local manufacturers
Land and sea 
borders
Cote d’Ivoire AK 47 guns, pistols, 
revolvers, assault rifles 
and short-, long- and 
double-barrel guns
Liberia, Guinea, the US, 
Britain, Russia, France, 
China and local 
manufacturers





Pump action guns, AK 
47 guns, revolvers, 
self-loading guns, assault 
rifles and short-, long- 
and double-barrel guns
Chad, Cameroon, South 
Africa, Europe, Niger, 
military and police officers, 
local manufacturers, Great 
Lake regions and Russia
Land and sea 
borders, creeks 
and air strips
Togo AK 47 guns, local pistols 
and long rifles, pistols 
and short-, long- and 
double-barrel guns




Ghana Pistols, AK 47 guns, 
revolvers, pump action 
guns and short-, long- 
and double-barrel guns
Remnants of the military era 
and local manufacturers
–
Sierra Leone AK 47 guns, revolvers, 
rockets, self-loading 
pistols, rifles, assault 
rifles, locally made guns, 
mortars and hand 
grenades
Guinea, Liberia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, remnants of the 







Liberia AK 47 guns, revolvers, 
self-loading pistols, rifles, 
assault rifles, locally made 
guns, mortars and 
grenades
Guinea, Burkina Faso, East 
Europe, Libya, remnants of 
the civil war and local 
manufacturers
Land and sea 
borders
(continued)
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arms seizure that the Nigerian Customs Service would intercept in that 
year. The Customs had in January intercepted 661 pieces of pump action 
rifles, which were neatly packed in 49 boxes by the arms smugglers (Salau 
2017). The continued interception of arms by security forces shows that 
arms smugglers and “the merchants of death” are still very active in 
the country.
The Collapse of the Gaddafi Regime, the Libya War and Boko 
Haram’s Arms Smuggling in the Northeast Region
Boko Haram insurgents and a majority of the armed groups in West Africa 
and the Sahel are believed to have profited significantly from the cache of 
arms and ammunition stolen from the Gaddafi regime in 2011, after the 
collapse of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-old regime. The surge of 
these illegal arms was responsible for the Malian Tuaregs’ uprising in 












AK 47 guns, pistols, 
rockets and short-, 
long- and double-barrel 
guns






Gambia AK 47 guns, pistols, 
rockets and short-, 
long- and double-barrel 
guns
Local manufacturers, Iran 
and Senegal
Land and sea 
borders
Burkina Faso AK 47 guns, revolvers, 
self-loading pistols, rifles, 
assault rifles and locally 
made guns




Mali Ak 47 guns, revolvers, 
assault rifles and 
long- and double-barrel 
guns
Local manufacturers, Niger 
Libya, Algeria, and 
Mauritania
Land borders
Source: GIABA Report (2013) on the nexus between small arms and light weapons and money laundering 
and terrorist financing in West Africa. Dakar: Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa, pp. 16–17
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When the regime collapsed, Libya went into civil war, a situation which 
allowed rebel groups to invade Gaddafi’s armouries and steal rocket 
launchers and other sophisticated arms that had been stockpiled for years. 
Reardon (2016) observed that with two governments now competing for 
power, ISIS and Al Qaeda are more likely to strengthen their strongholds 
in Libya and use that to supply more arms to Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Islamic Maghreb. 
Gaddafi’s arms do not only provide cheap arms and ammunition to the 
various armed groups in the Islamic Maghreb but have also emboldened 
the groups and increased their capacity to carry out more dangerous and 
audacious attacks on civilians and security forces.
It remains a mystery that Boko Haram, being a movement founded by 
the dispossessed, has access to hundreds of armoured tanks and antiaircraft 
guns with which it attacks villages, confronts the military and causes havoc 
in its strongholds. It is believed that most of these weapons come from 
three main sources: continued funding and financing of Boko Haram 
extremism in the north, illicit sale of stolen arms from Libyan armouries 
and Boko Haram’s looting of military bases in the last eight years of its 
so-called holy war. Matazu et  al. (2017) cited an instance where some 
members of Boko Haram surprised a military base in Sabon Garin Kimba 
in the Damboa local government area of Borno State where they attacked 
residents and carted away arms and ammunition, including rocket- 
propelled grenades, antiaircraft guns and armoured personnel carriers. 
The Damboa incidence is one of several ways by which the radical Islamist 
sect has sustained its years of insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad 
Basin states.
Existence of Trafficking Business Between Arms Smugglers, 
Drug Traffickers and Terrorists
Studies have also shown that terrorists do not operate alone, they operate 
in conjunction with other criminal networks in society. Curtis and Karakan 
(2002) opined that there is a nexus between the trafficking in illicit goods 
(such as diamonds, gold and drugs) and arms trafficking. The relationship 
is such that traders in illicit goods may exchange their goods for arms and 
ammunitions at the borders. Similarly, terrorists who specialise in the trade 
of some of these illicit goods can exchange them for arms and ammunition 
at the borders (Curtis and Karakan 2002; Onuoha 2013). The International 
Crisis Group (2016) noted that one of the strategies adopted by the 
15 ARMS PROLIFERATION, BOKO HARAM EXTREMISM AND INSECURITY… 
322
Cameroonian government in 2016 in its war against terrorism and Boko 
Haram extremism was to cut off the sources of financing of the sect espe-
cially its sale of illicit goods at its borders with Nigeria.
natIonal and gloBal efforts at curBIng tHe IllIcIt 
arms trade, terrorIsm and InsecurIty In nIgerIa
Uncontrolled arms have continued to generate global security concerns 
especially with the rise of Islamist terrorist organisations and the attendant 
deaths from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as well as ISIL’s six- 
year- old civil war in Syria and Iraq (FATF 2016). Like its counterparts in 
the Sahel and the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram has remained adamant, 
resistant and audacious in its campaign for the establishment of an Islamic 
State in northeastern Nigeria. This armed struggle has killed over 20,000 
people and displaced close to 2.7 million people. At a time when Nigeria 
is consolidating on its policy and political reforms, the Boko Haram threat 
has come to rub off on these gains while also threatening the country’s 
corporate existence. This is why the insurgency is potentially a threat to 
internal security in Nigeria.
One of the most significant global efforts undertaken by the United 
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was to sign the Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT). The ATT has several provisions that are targeted at 
tackling the illicit arms trade to Africa and the possible termination of the 
transnational organised arms smuggling in West Africa. Adeniyi (2017) 
specified what the UNODA expects countries to do to control arms influx 
into their territories. According to Oxfam, the ATT calls for the establish-
ment of arms control management system by state parties. Articles 6–12 
provide the necessary guidelines on what should be controlled, as well as 
how to control, with respect to brokering, preventing arms diversion, 
record keeping and reporting of arms transfers. This requires the establish-
ment of institutional control mechanisms based on the terms of the ATT 
and respective national laws. If done properly, an arms control manage-
ment system will essentially keep the state updated on the movement of 
arms within its territory. A proper control system must also be accompa-
nied with the resources and personnel to stem the flow of uncontrolled arms.
It is also significant to mention the role of the Financial Action Task Force 
(the global anti-money laundering and terrorist financing  organisation) in 
the war against terrorist financing and illicit arms trade in Africa. Through 
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the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Inter-
Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing (GIABA), policy and institutional supports have been given to 
member nations to strengthen governments against arms smuggling and 
also end the spread of violent extremism ravaging the region (FATF 2016).
In 2013, the Nigerian government strengthened its anti-terrorism war 
by signing into law the amended Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011, which cov-
ers the financing of terrorism and the supply of arms and food to terrorist 
organisations. The law also prohibits anyone in Nigeria from giving any 
form of material assistance to terrorist organisations by way of biological, 
nuclear and chemical weapons. This law has been complemented with the 
regional task force and Nigeria’s Operation Lafia Dole in the northeast. It 
is believed that these aggressive efforts will effectively curtail the Boko 
Haram insurgency by blocking illicit arms shipment as well as their manu-
facturing, transfer or sale to Boko Haram and other insurgent groups in 
the country.
conclusIon
The persistence and lethality of Boko Haram’s eight-year (2009–2017) 
insurgency is significantly linked to the proliferation of arms and ammuni-
tion as exacerbated by Nigeria’s porous borders. This crisis has not only 
claimed thousands of lives but has also remained a major threat to the 
security and stability of the Nigerian state. It has been argued in this chap-
ter that one of the major causes of Boko Haram extremism and internal 
insecurity is the problem of illicit arms trade that is opaque and amor-
phous in West Africa. To curtail this menace and reduce the capacity of the 
armed groups, it is suggested that the government continue with its holis-
tic approach of tackling the insurgency while strengthening border secu-
rity to prevent easy access by arms smugglers both in the northeast and in 
the southeast of Nigeria.
recommendatIons
In view of the above, the chapter recommends the following:
 1. The Nigerian government should strengthen the security of its 
porous borders and tighten the notorious routes by deploying more 
security agents there while increasing interdiction and border patrol.
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 2. There is a need for the government to work with the United Nations 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to ensure that the provisions of 
ATT are not only domesticated but also that arms movement into 
the country is tightly monitored and controlled.
 3. In line with FATF and GIABA, the Nigerian government must 
ensure that the financiers of terrorism in the country are brought to 
book and the wealth derived from such illicit trade confiscated.
 4. There is a need to work with border communities to prevent the use 
of these communities as loci of illicit arms trade and arms 
proliferation.
 5. Public enlightenment should be intensified by the government on 
the danger of small arms and light weapons for human and 
national security.
 6. Appropriate government agencies and the media should mobilise 
the public against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
in their communities.
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CHAPTER 16
Understanding Police Corruption and Its 
Effect on Internal Security in Nigeria
David U. Enweremadu
IntroductIon
In recent years, Nigeria has experienced a rising level of internal insecurity. 
This has seriously affected the nation’s socio-economic and political devel-
opment, as seen, for instance, in foreign investors’ reluctance to come and 
invest in Nigeria (Alemika and Chukwuma 2007, p. 63) and the worsen-
ing levels of brain drain, which has seen the departure of hundreds of 
thousands of talented Nigerians overseas (Mba and Ekeopara 2012). In 
response to these challenges, successive Nigerian governments have cre-
ated several new law enforcement agencies (NDLEA, NAPTIP, EFCC, 
ICPC, NSCDC, etc.), while making attempts to strengthen the Nigeria 
Police Force (NPF), which is the oldest institution for maintaining law 
and security. But despite such efforts, crime rates remain steadily on the 
rise (Naagbanton et al. 2009; Enweremadu 2012; Adebayo 2013).
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In Nigeria, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the lead anti-crime and 
internal security agency (The Police Act of 1943; Police Act CAP 359 
1990). This is in line with global best practices (Isima and Chukwuma 
2010, p. 14). As Alemika and Chukwuma (2007) observes, the police is 
an embodiment of the coercive powers of any modern state, to the extent 
that among all the security agencies that may be found in any state, it is the 
agency with the closest and most frequent contacts with the citizens(Alemika 
and Chukwuma 2007, p. 68). In other words, it is through the police that 
the state performs what can be regarded as the basic function or raison 
d’être of a modern state—the protection of lives and property. This is why 
the performance of the police is a big issue in virtually every country. Most 
citizens usually judge the effectiveness of their government or political 
leadership on the basis of the performance of agencies charged with public 
security, especially the police. It is in that light that the NPF has often been 
a target of public criticism by citizens who have generally adjudged her 
performance over the years as poor. Contrary to popular and reasonable 
expectations, the police in Nigeria has been seriously implicated in crimes, 
including corruption, which has affected their capacity to prevent crime 
and protect lives and property. Similarly, they have also been used by those 
in power for largely negative purposes such the oppression and repression 
of opposition figures and suppression of civil liberties (Heywood 1997, 
p. 365). These developments led Heywood (1997, p. 370) to conclude 
that rather than be the solution to Nigeria’s national security, develop-
ment and integration problems, the police has compounded and perpetu-
ated them. This situation has allowed crimes to proliferate in Nigeria.
Although crimes are not the exclusive preserve of Nigeria, in the sense 
that they are common features of life in many parts of the world, in 
Nigeria, public impression is mostly that
[c]riminals are invincible. This is because any who has had a complaint to 
bring to the police often goes away with the impression that criminals will 
or can get away with their crimes. This impression has been severally proven 
to be true of high profile politically motivated murders, which require the 
political will of the minders of the state to investigate, expose and punish. 
But, even the petty non-political complaints are treated with levity, further 
eroding public trust and confidence in the police. This general attitude fos-
ters and perpetuates criminal behavior and preventable crimes because crim-
inals are assured that they will not be exposed and brought to book. 
(Isumonah 2016)
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Yet to say that Nigerians’ perception of the police is only about lack of 
capacity to investigate and punish crimes is to grossly underestimate the 
problem. Indeed, if one probes deeper, the impression one gets is that the 
Nigerian Police is not only an institution that is incapable of checking 
crime, but also itself an enabler and vector of violence, criminality and cor-
ruption. It is a known fact that policemen in Nigeria, either acting alone 
or in concert with outsiders, routinely engage in several forms of corrupt 
practices. These include extortion, bribery, electoral malpractices, diver-
sion and embezzle of public (police) funds or properties (Enweremadu 
2006; Aremu 2007; Isima and Chukwuma 2010; Ladapo 2011). Some 
members of the Nigeria Police Force have also been widely implicated in 
other types of criminal malfeasances, among which are illegal detention, 
torture, extrajudicial killings, rape and armed robbery, all of which com-
promise the security of the entire society in the sense of constituting a 
threat to the lives and properties of the citizens or the security of the state.
Fighting crime and insecurity is within the ambit of the Nigerian 
Criminal Justice System which includes the police, the judiciary and the 
prison service. The police are in the forefront of detecting and apprehend-
ing culprits, including suspects, and arraigning them in the courts if they 
are convinced of their culpability. These powers derive from the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as well as Section 4 
of the Police Act CAP 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as 
cited earlier (Police Act CAP 359:4). Unfortunately, the same police who 
is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of checking crimes has 
been found to be neck deep in criminal activities. Many persons refer to 
police personnel as initiators and practitioners of corruption and crime 
(Uhakheme 2006). The irony of an organization set up to enforce the law 
turning into a criminal organization was succinctly captured in a 2009 
report by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development 
(CEHRD) which observed that:
By virtue of section 214 (1) of the 1999 constitution and section 3 of the 
Police Act, the Nigeria police is supposed to maintain law and order, protect 
lives and property throughout the country, but the police is a problem in 
this society. They are the worst violators of the law, they receive bribe from 
poor citizens and residents at gunpoint, frame up people, kill and commit 
other atrocities. (CEHRD 2009, p. ix)
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One may wonder why the focus on corruption here, since Nigerian 
police officers are also implicated in several other crimes? The reason is 
that, unlike other forms of crimes involving members of the force, police 
corruption, and particularly its effect on public security, has received very 
little scholarly or policy attention. This is in spite of the extensive scope of 
such corrupt practices and substantial evidences of a link between police 
corruption and the deteriorating security situation in the country as being 
daily reported by the media. This suggests that there is an urgent need to 
interrogate police corruption in Nigeria. Why is corruption such a perva-
sive phenomenon among Nigerian policemen and policewomen? What 
types or forms of corrupt practices are more commonly associated with 
Nigerian police officers? In what specific ways do they interact with and 
affect internal security in Nigeria? What anti-corruption measures are 
needed or are more likely to help produce a more honest police force and 
by extension a more secure society? This chapter relies on secondary data 
(newspaper articles, books, journal articles and official publications) and 
some primary data sourced from a questionnaire administered to a purpo-
sively selected group of 200 stakeholders (police officers, legal practitio-
ners, private and commercial vehicle owners) in two major local government 
areas (LGAs) of Oyo State, namely, Ibadan North and Ibadan North East. 
These LGAs constitute the main business community in the state with 
relatively heavy police presence. Due to limited time, only 150 question-
naires were eventually distributed out of which 112 were successfully com-
pleted and returned. The questionnaire was carefully constructed to 
extract information relating to the major forms of corrupt practices perpe-
trated by members of the Nigeria Police Force, their causes and effects on 
internal security.
The chapter is organized in five sections including this introduction 
which is the first. The second section contains conceptual clarification of 
the two key terms used in this study, namely corruption and internal secu-
rity. In the third section, we provide a theoretical framework which 
explains the origin and causes for the prevailing levels of corruption within 
the police in Nigeria. The fourth section examines the extensive nature 
and dimensions of corruption in the police and their negative effect on 
public security in Nigeria. The fifth section offers some concluding 
remarks, including some recommendations for reforms.
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conceptualIzIng corruptIon and Internal SecurIty
Two concepts are central in the analysis presented in this chapter. They are 
corruption and internal security. This section provides a clarification of the 
two terms.
Corruption
Corruption pervades all strata of society, from the highest levels of the polit-
ical and business elites to the ordinary person in the village. However, there 
are divergent opinions on what really constitutes corruption just as is com-
monly the case with other concepts in the social sciences. Indeed, its defini-
tion now becomes, according to Akindele (1990), ideologically, morally, 
culturally, politically and intellectually elusive to the point of losing sight of 
its detrimental and parasitic influence on people and the society at large. 
Divindi, citing Aluko (2002), argued that corruption includes several wrong 
behaviours such as nepotism, favouritism, bribery, graft and other unfair 
means adopted by government employees and the public alike to extract 
some socially and legally prohibited favours. In the word of Akinyemi 
(2004), corruption is the acquisition of that which one (as a member of 
society, not public official alone) is not entitled to. Doig (2009) described 
corruption as the use of official positions, resources or facilities for personal 
benefit or possible conflict of interest between public position and private 
benefit. This, of course, to him involves offences of misconduct in public 
offices, which are usually covered by a variety of internal regulations.
Certainly, constructing an acceptable definition of corruption is a task 
that has attracted considerable attention of many people, including not 
only scholars, but international institutions, policymakers and even street 
people. Yet, despite their efforts, the search for a clear and universally 
acceptable definition of the phenomenon has remained elusive. This prob-
lem can be attributed to the fact that corruption is, on the one hand, a 
complex word that represents a wide array of illegal and unacceptable 
behaviours and, on the other, to the fact that it is a concept whose use is 
largely culturally specific. A careful review of existing scholarly literature, 
however, shows that there are three basic types or model of definitions on 
corruption across the world.
The first set of definitions are what one may refer to as the public-office- 
centred definitions. These definitions linked to the notion of public service 
and behaviours that regulate its operations are reflected in the writings of 
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Bayley (1966), Nye (1967, 2008), Myrdal (1968, 2008) and so on. 
Generally, they place emphasis on the abuse of trust and power with 
respect to the exercise of public office, in a manner that is aimed at attract-
ing illegal personal benefits which may not necessarily be material in 
nature. The second type of definitions are market-centred definitions, 
which are traceable to the works of scholars like Kluveren (2008) and sev-
eral others. In brief, they emphasize the conversion of public office or 
positions into an enterprise for the maximization of income, almost similar 
to the way in which an entrepreneur will seek to maximize profits from his 
investments. According to Kluveren (2008), a corrupt civil servant regards 
his public office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maxi-
mize. The office then becomes a maximizing unit. The size of his income 
depends upon the market situation and his talents for finding the points of 
maximal gain on the public’s demand curve. The third type of definition 
known as the public-interest-centred definitions are stressed in the works of 
authors like Etzioni-Halevy (1984), Kempe (2000), Friedrich (cited in 
Heidenheimer and Johnston 2008, p. 15) and so on and link corruption 
to the concept of public interest. Within this framework, Friedrich (cited 
in Heidenheimer and Johnston 2008, p. 15) defines corruption as: “a kind 
of behaviour which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or believed 
to be prevalent in a given context, such as the political.” Similarly, Kempe 
(2000, p. 18) views corruption as: “the utilization of official positions or 
titles for personal or private gain, either on an individual or collective basis, 
at the expense of the public good, in violation of established rules and 
ethical considerations, and through the direct or indirect participation of 
one or more public officials, whether they be politicians or bureaucrats.”
These three types of definitions contain each within them their own 
shortcomings or limitations. For instance, all three consider corruption as 
more or less a public sector-based phenomenon, whereas, corruption does 
also occur in the private sector. Similarly, the second set of definitions, that 
is, the market-centred definitions, creates the wrong impression that cor-
ruption involves purely economic or financial gain. In reality, however, 
corruption may involve other benefits that are non-material. One can 
therefore combine and integrate them in order to arrive at a more inclu-
sive, exhaustive and useful definitional framework which gives a clearer 
picture of the concept we are seeking to define. One of such comprehen-
sive definitions which comes to mind is the one offered by Khan (1996). 
According to him, corruption may be seen as:
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[A]ny act which deviates from the rules of conduct, including normative val-
ues, governing the actions of someone in a position of authority or trust, 
whether in the private or public domain, because of private-regarding motives 
(that is non-public or general), such as wealth, power, status, etc. (1996, p. 1)
If we adopt this definition, an act or behaviour can only be termed cor-
rupt if it meets all of the three following conditions:
 1. The act involves an individual holding a position of authority or 
trust irrespective of the domain (public or private).
 2. The act or behaviour in question violates laws and regulations, 
including norms and values.
 3. The act or behaviour is committed using the office or position and 
intentionally with the aim of advancing some non-public goals 
which may or may not be material in nature.
If this definition is adopted, acts such as bribery, extortion, embezzle-
ment of funds and diversion of public property, fraud, nepotism, electoral 
malpractices, examination malpractices and so on can be termed “corrup-
tion.” However, in this chapter, our analysis is limited only to a particular 
variant of corruption which we term “police corruption,” which is here 
defined as those corrupt practices that are perpetrated by police officers. 
These will involve a situation where police personnel use their position of 
authority for non-public benefit. The term “police corruption” as used 
here includes such practices as commonly associated with the police, like 
unauthorized violence and brutality, fabrication and destruction of evi-
dence, favouritism or nepotism, bribery and extortion, embezzlement of 
funds or diversion of public property and electoral malpractices. The last 
three are particularly very common in contemporary Nigeria. However, 
one must note that acts which we label police corruption are not necessarily 
committed by police officers alone. They are referred to as police corrup-
tion insofar as they are carried out by them in a given context, either act-
ing alone or in connivance with outsiders. A number of dimensions have 
also been mentioned in attempting to determine what constitutes police 
corruption. Sayed and Bruce note that corrupt behaviour can include the 
“Blue Glue” dimension—covering up or protecting colleagues—as well as 
behaviour which is specifically designed not to offend businesses or politi-
cians (1998, p. 4). Kleinig (2002, 288) differentiates between “process 
corruption” and “noble cause corruption” and argues that “the pragmat-
ics of policing foster situations of genuine moral ambiguity.”
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Internal Security
Along with food and shelter, security constitutes the most essential of all 
man’s needs. According to social contract theorists, security need was the 
basis of the social contract between the people and the state (which gave 
rise to the state or government), in which people willingly surrendered 
their rights to an organ (government) who oversees the survival of all. In 
this light, security embodies the mechanism put in place to avoid, prevent, 
reduce or resolve violent conflicts and threats that originate from other 
states, non-state actors, or structural socio-political and economic condi-
tions (Stan 2004). For decades, issues relating to security were on the 
front burner in the development discourse. Several attempts have been 
made since the Cold War ended to redefine the concept of security from a 
state-centric perspective to a broader view that places premium on indi-
viduals, in which human security that embodies the elements of national 
security and human rights and national development remains the major 
barometer for explaining the concept. At the heart of this debate there 
have been attempts to deepen and widen the concept of security from the 
level of the states to societies and individuals and from military to non- 
military issues (Krahmann 2003; Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013).
Some scholars in conceptualizing security placed emphasis on the 
absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion and political and 
socio-economic objectives of a country (Oche 2001; Igbuzor 2011; 
Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013). Thus, there is a general consensus in the 
contemporary literature that security is vital for national cohesion, peace 
and sustainable development. It is therefore apparent that national secu-
rity is a desideratum, sine qua non for economic growth and development 
of any country (Oladeji and Folorunso 2007). In the intelligence com-
munity there is a consensus that security is not the absence of threats or 
security issues, but the existence of a robust mechanism to respond proac-
tively to the challenges posed by these threats with expediency, expertise 
and in real time.
The opposite of security is insecurity. The concept of insecurity con-
notes different meanings such as absence of safety, danger, hazard, uncer-
tainty, lack of protection and lack of safety. According to Beland (2005), 
insecurity is a state of fear or anxiety due to absence or lack of protection. 
Achumba et  al. (2013) define insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, 
insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of dan-
ger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury. 
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Secondly, insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where 
anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of 
some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point 
that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what 
would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers 
when they occur.
Security can be further classified into two categories: internal security 
and external security. The first relates to threats emanating from within the 
territory of a state, while the second concerns threat from outside the 
shores of a country. Generally, the police is charged with the task of assur-
ing internal security, while the military takes charges of issues relating to 
external security. A field survey conducted by Nwagboso (2016) revealed 
that Nigeria faces serious internal security problems which impact nega-
tively on the economy of the Nigerian State and statehood. These internal 
security problems that may have impacted negatively on the statehood 
include kidnapping, militancy and terrorism mainly linked to Boko Haram. 
All cases involve armed groups challenging the legal authority of the state 
with reference to protection of lives and property of the citizens, consider-
ing that the primary duty of the state is to protect lives and property of the 
citizens. The mechanism for achieving this lofty objective by the state is 
through an effective law enforcement agency, which the police represents. 
However, available evidence shows that the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) 
has been incapacitated in tackling the increasing rate of internal security 
problems in Nigeria, especially in recent years. This has led to a situation 
where the Nigerian Army, which ordinarily is an institution that is expected 
to protect the nation from external aggression, has now been increasingly 
involved in ensuring internal security in the nation.
Several reasons have been given for the incapacity of the police to 
respond effectively to the security situation. According to the Police Public 
Relations Department (PPRD), they include challenges relating to recruit-
ment, training and indiscipline. The Force, according to the PPRD, also 
lacks expertise in specialized fields and, more importantly, is challenged 
with corruption and dishonesty among its rank and file. These, according 
to them, engender a low level of public confidence in the institution. Thus, 
crime prevention, detention and investigation are compounded by failure 
of the public to report crimes accurately to the police (Nigerian Police 
Watch 2011). Indeed, the people in any situation of sighting the police 
brew in their heart the thought of how to escape from the hands of those 
who are supposed to be the keepers of the society. Today, the popular 
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perception among many Nigerians is that the police force has failed to 
fulfil its role as “guardians” of society (Alemika 1988; Hills 2008; HRW 
2010; Oluwaniyi 2011; Ladapo 2011). Alemika (1988) submitted that 
the legacy of the Nigeria Police Force is that of corruption, arbitrariness, 
ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low accountability to the pub-
lic and corruption (p. 161). But before discussing how corruption among 
the police contributes to the general atmosphere of internal insecurity in 
Nigeria, we first highlight the scope and dimensions of police corruption. 
We do this by resting on a review of existing literature.
polIce corruptIon In nIgerIa: revIew of lIterature
Despite its pervasive and damaging nature, the issue of police corruption 
has not received sufficient attention of scholars. However, a brief review of 
what has been written on it so far still gives an illuminating picture of the 
extent and dimensions of this phenomenon.
On the extent of corruption among Nigerian police officers, Osayande 
(2001), cited in Adegoke (2014), postulated that, in Nigeria, the police 
have been maligned, battered and dismembered. The police have been 
polluted to such an extent that the force requires a complete surgical oper-
ation and dialysis. He identified that the police cannot carry out their 
functions properly due to the shortage of manpower, mobility in the per-
formance of their duties, and communication facilities. Oluyinini (2005), 
cited in Adegoke (2014), averred that what is even more worrisome is 
that, rather than evoke confidence and hope in the public, the appearance 
of policemen often conjures up a depressing picture of fear and mistrust. 
This is in line with the submission of Kehinde (2005) and Adediran (2009) 
that in the Nigeria Police Force, corruption is known to have grown from 
a humble beginning, when the force had little supplies of stationeries 
which contributed to the posting of some officers to solicit assistance from 
the public which gradually led to a sustained behaviour of begging within 
the police force. Aremu considered it a pandemic requiring urgent and 
innovative methods to wipe out (Aremu 2007). In another study under-
taken with two other researchers, he suggested self-efficacy counselling as 
a bottom-up approach for reducing police attitude to corruption in 
Nigeria (Aremu et al. 2009).
Othman (2012) on the one hand posits that there is a link between 
corruption and social diversity, ethnic fractionalization and religious dif-
ferences. A culture of selfishness and greed breeds corruption, the mani-
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festation of which negatively impacts the leaders’ and followers’ decisions 
to engage in corrupt practices. The political system and Nigeria’s many 
diverse cultures could make the police leaders and their subordinates com-
promise and be more susceptible to corrupt practices. There is a popular 
norm within the Nigerian society commonly referred to as chop-I-chop, 
which has become acceptable in many organizations in the country. This 
term coined by political leaders, especially during the regime of Ibrahim 
Babangida (1985–1993)—popularly referred to as evil genius—has crept 
into the police institution. Orole (2013) conducted research on transfor-
mational leadership and perception of corruption within the Nigeria Police 
Force in 2013. According to his findings, two out of five of the respon-
dents (police officers) believe it is wrong to engage in bribery. Yet, almost 
all of the respondents (four out of five) participate in one kind of corrupt 
practice or the other. Many of the respondents believe that it is acceptable 
to use their positions to solicit bribe. So, it has become a dignified and 
glorified practice among the police force to engage in corruption. Worst 
still, most of these practices go unchecked by the leaders who themselves, 
directly or indirectly, engage in gross misconduct.
Still on the same issue, a study conducted by Daniel has shown that 
police corruption exists on a large scale in Nigeria and tends to greatly 
undermine national security. To an average Nigerian, the most corrupt 
organization in the country today is the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). What 
with the horde of policemen, mostly the rank and file (comprising con-
stables, corporals, sergeants and inspectors), who daily troop to the high-
ways to collect illegal tolls, derisively referred to as egunje or green boy, 
representing the 20 naira note.
Apart from bribe taking and extortion, electoral malpractices consti-
tute a second-most common dimension of police corruption covered in 
the literature. The most frequent cited allegations of police electoral 
misconduct include partisanship and discrimination against the opposi-
tion party; functional ineffectiveness to prevent and contain electoral 
crime; and complicity in fraud through brutality, intimidation and vote 
snatching, among others. Several researches have documented cases when 
the police headquarters issued specific instructions to all state commands 
that its officers and men should ensure the success of a particular party, 
usually the ruling party, in elections (Ayoala 2004, pp. 1–2). The report 
of the European Commission Election Observation Mission (2007) also 
emphasized various dimensions of police electoral misconduct: arbi-
trary arrest and detention of opposition supporters before and during 
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elections by the police, without charges; banning of rallies and cam-
paigns mounted by the opposition; and flagrant impunity of violations 
committed by the members of the ruling party.
The third form or dimension of corrupt practices common among 
police officers is diversion and embezzlement of public funds or proper-
ties. This happens to be the least reported form or dimension of corrupt 
practices common among policemen. Aside from media reports, relatively 
few studies have been done on this form of corruption which happens to 
be the exclusive preserve of senior police officers. Few example reports 
will suffice.
The first one occurred in early 2005, when the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s major anti-graft agency, announced 
that almost ₦18 billion and several choice properties have been recovered 
from the former Inspector General of Police, Mr Tafa Balogun. The 
18 billion came from cash lodged in different banks within the country. 
On 4 April 2005, Mr Balogun was arraigned at the Federal High Court, 
Abuja, on charges involving about ₦13 billion obtained through money 
laundering, theft and other sources. These offences allegedly took place 
between 2002 and 2004, when Mr Balogun presided as Inspector General 
of the Nigeria Police Force. In the end, Mr Balogun entered into a plea 
bargain with the court which jailed him for six months, in exchange for 
returning much of the property and money (Enweremadu 2006, p. 329).
The second case occurred in 2012, when a probe by the Nigerian 
Senate uncovered the mismanagement of the police pension funds involv-
ing several billions of naira. The incident revealed how some officials of 
the Police Pension Board, aided and abated by some corrupt police offi-
cers, falsified documents to withdraw ₦24 billion from the budget office 
for the payment of pension that required only ₦3.5 billion (Eme 2014). 
According to media reports, some of the accused officials were subse-
quently arraigned by the EFCC before an Abuja high court on an 18-count 
charge of conspiracy, breach of trust and embezzlement of ₦32.8 billion 
police pension funds. One of the accused, a former director in the Police 
Pension Office, was also sentenced to two years in prison with an option 
of a fine of ₦250,000 on each of the three counts  (http://www.antigraft.
org/cc-case/pension-funds-theft-n32bn-police-pension-fund).
The forgoing analysis shows that the issue of corrupt practices involving 
Nigerian police officers has been extensively covered by the literature, 
especially its nature, causes and scale. However, the same cannot be said of 
the link between police corruption and public security. That area has so far 
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received only very scant scholarly attention. This is in spite of the extensive 
media reportage of this phenomenon and an overwhelming evidence of 
deteriorating security situation in the country.
One of the few studies that have tried to demonstrate how police cor-
ruption directly contributes to insecurity in Nigeria is Ochoche (1998). 
According to Ochoche, the police in Nigeria, like in some other African 
countries, has not been able to maintain internal security, defend the 
national interest nor uphold the protection of lives and property of the 
citizens. One of the major reasons why this is so is because they have 
mainly upheld regime and personal security in the form of corruption and 
criminality (Ochoche 1998, p. 113). Luckham (1998, pp. 12–13) holds 
that in a very fundamental sense, national security is a public good and not 
the private property of the state, nor of particular dominant interests. 
According to Luckham (1998, p. 13), there can exist a tension or contra-
diction between the manifest and latent functions of security. This is espe-
cially the case where the police are employed as an instrument of state 
coercion to oppress, exploit, extort and terrorize the citizenry. A study 
carried out by Nte (2011) also argues that there is some correlation 
between police corruption and national security. The police appears to 
show loyalty to the government of the day and forget so quickly it is an 
institution meant to serve the nation at large. When such an institution as 
the police becomes a political tool, then the security of the nation is at risk. 
Nte therefore concludes that insecurity cannot be combated without 
attention drawn to ensure a responsible and efficient police force. This 
study was carried out to provide some empirical evidence to substantiate 
the claims of this group of scholars, whose arguments, although faultless, 
were largely theoretical.
theoretIcal BaSIS of polIce corruptIon In nIgerIa
While this study was mainly carried out to interrogate how police corrup-
tion contributes to insecurity in Nigeria, it is still necessary to explain why 
corruption is such a widespread phenomenon in the police, as many stud-
ies have demonstrated. The literature is replete with a number of theoreti-
cal views about the origin and reason for persistence of corruption in many 
public and private institutions in Nigeria. However, the institutional the-
ory of corruption appears, in my view, to be the most relevant as far as the 
Nigerian Police is concerned.
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The theory borrows from the (neo)institutional theory in social sci-
ences, which argues that the structure and character of a country’s institu-
tions are the major determinants of political behaviour. Institutional 
theory considers the processes by which structures, including schemes, 
rules, norms and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines 
for social behaviour (Scott 2004). In other words, the theory is about how 
institutions predispose individuals to behave in a particular way or refrain 
from behaving in a given way. The concept of neopatrimonialism has been 
used to explain how established norms (personalization of power and cli-
entelist distribution of public resources in exchange for political support) 
have served as authoritative guides for corrupt behaviour in Africa (Médard 
2008; Joseph 1987; Lewis 2007). In Nigeria, as is the case in much of 
Africa, politicians are often expected to use their position to capture public 
resources and institutions, including the police, for themselves and mem-
bers of their primary groups, or else they lose their relevance. Accordingly, 
the major assumption for the institutionalists within anti-corruption stud-
ies is that contrary to some scholastic belief, corruption in developing 
countries is not just a culturally or economically embedded phenomenon 
but rather an institutional problem (Pillay and Kluvers 2014; Della and 
Vannucci 2012; Thung-Hong and Han 2008). The implication of this 
argument is therefore that the widespread corruption observed within the 
Nigerian Police can only be contained, to a reasonable degree, by institu-
tional re-enforcement or restructuring. As we demonstrate in the rest of 
this chapter, the Nigerian Police has been bedevilled by several institu-
tional challenges throughout its existence, including insufficient man-
power, training, equipment and resources and, most importantly, lack of 
institutional autonomy, which have helped reduce integrity and morale 
within the force.
the nexuS Between polIce corruptIon and Internal 
InSecurIty In nIgerIa
As already noted, the police are in the forefront of detecting and appre-
hending criminals, including individuals suspected of engaging in corrupt 
practices, and arraigning them in the courts if they are convinced of their 
culpability. However, these same institutions have become widely involved 
in the same practices. This study seeks to address three principal research 
questions, namely, what is the nature or extent of corrupt practices among 
Nigeria policemen and policewomen; what are the main courses of cor-
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ruption within the Nigerian Police; and how does police corruption impact 
the levels of internal insecurity in Nigeria? The first question has been suf-
ficiently addressed in the previous section of this chapter. The second 
question has been partly addressed by the two theories discussed in the 
preceding section, while the third question remains unaddressed. This sec-
tion therefore concerns itself with finding answers to the last two questions.
In order to address those two questions, the study included a survey 
research method, which allowed us to collect some primary data directly 
from the members of the public who interact daily with the police. The 
method of data collection here was through the use of the instrument of 
questionnaire. The questionnaire sought information on questions that 
were relevant to the causes of corrupt practices among Nigerian police-
men and the challenges such behaviours pose to insecurity in the country. 
The responses are presented and analysed under two sub-headings below, 
with the help of tables which contain the summary of the major findings.
The first part of the questionnaire solicited information bordering on 
the personal bio-data of the sample which closely approximates the target 
population. This included civil servants, private sector workers and stu-
dents (see Table 16.1).
Table 16.1 Respondents’ bio-data
Frequency Percentage (%)
Occupation
Civil servants 39 38.2














Above 30 yrs. 14 13.6
Total 103 100
Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
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The table shows a relative balance in the sex distribution of respon-
dents. The table reveals that 46.4% of the total respondents are male 
while the remaining 53.6% are female. As for the educational status of 
the respondents, 69.6% of the respondents are university or polytechnic 
graduates, 18.8% are college graduates, 9.8% are secondary school cer-
tificate holders, while primary school certificate holders and persons 
without formal education constitute 0.9% each. The respondents’ occu-
pational distribution is divided along the three strata mentioned earlier. 
As many as 38.2% of the respondents are civil servants, while 32.0% are 
workers in private enterprises. Amongst the respondents also are stu-
dents who make up 20.1% of the total respondents. The age distribution 
of the respondents was also noted. As Table 16.1 shows, 37.5% of the 
total respondents fall between the ages 20 and 30, 35.7% fall between 
ages 31 and 40, while 11.6% fall between 41 and 50. A total of 3.6% 
were people above 50 years of age. Length of residency shows how long 
respondents have resided in their various local government areas within 
the state. Of the total  respondents, 55.3% have resided in Oyo State for 
1–10 years, 19.4% have resided for 10–20 years, 11.7% have resided for 
20–30 years, while 13.6% of the total respondents have resided in Oyo 
State for over 30 years.
As we have argued in the earlier sections of this chapter, the level of 
corruption in the Nigerian Police is very serious and the causes are 
 attributable to different factors. To find out the most common causes, five 
affirmative statements were put forward before our respondents and their 
responses were indeed instructive (Table 16.2).
Table 16.2 Respondents’ view on causes of police corruption
S/N Causes of police corruption in Nigeria SA A D SD
1 The occurrence of corruption within the 







































Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
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Although the key objective was to establish the causes of corruption 
among Nigerian police officers, the first statement put to the respondents, 
as shown above, attempted to solicit the views of the respondents as per 
the level of corruption within the police force as the agency of government 
saddled with the responsibility of internal security in the country. The 
responses show that the majority of the respondents (98.2%) believe there 
is corruption within the police force and these corrupt acts are very ram-
pant. The next three research questions that followed then sought to find 
out the major causes of corruption within the force, in other words, the 
respondents’ views on the factors responsible for police corruption. In 
their responses, the majority of the respondents agree that inadequate or 
irregular salary (63%), low level of professionalism (84%) and political class 
interference (87.5%) are responsible for the incidences of corruption 
within the force. In other words, the most important causes of corruption 
within the Nigeria Police Force are of political (interference and manipu-
lation of the agency by political elites seeking to advance political and 
economic goals) and institutional (poor level of professionalism and inad-
equate remuneration) nature. This validates two arguments advanced by 
the two theories upon which this study was built, namely the institutional 
and neopatrimonial theories (Table 16.3).
As already noted, previous researches showed that corruption within 
the Nigeria Police Force has gotten so deep that its effects have manifested 
in different forms, including internal insecurity. What was lacking was spe-
cific and sufficient empirical data to support that connection. This study 
provides some of such data. Thus, three areas of the possible effects of 
police on internal security were interrogated through three specific ques-
tions contained in our questionnaire.
Table 16.3 Respondents’ views on the impact of corruption on internal security
S/N Effects of police corruption on the society SA A D SD



























Source: Ibitoye O. V. (2016)
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The first one probed the effects of police corruption on their role of 
maintenance of order in the society (apprehend and punish lawbreakers). 
From the responses received, only 57% agreed that the Nigerian Police has 
the capacity to ensure the maintenance of law and order, whereas a size-
able number (43%) felt that the police lacks the capacity to ensure mainte-
nance of law and order. However, it should be noted that corruption is 
not the only explanation for the limited capacity of the police in this 
regard. For instance, the study also discovered that the Nigeria Police that 
is closest to the people is apparently understaffed. In a country of over 170 
million people, the police staff strength is about 371,800. This is an aver-
age of one policeman to about 457 persons. This number, which is hardly 
enough to ensure security for a country the size of Nigeria, and is also far 
below global standards, leaves the citizens vulnerable.
The second question probed the effects of police corruption on public 
trust or confidence in the police as measured by the willingness of citizens 
to report suspected cases of crime to the police, which will ultimately 
enhance their role of maintenance of order and security in the society. On 
this issue, the result from our data analysis points to a high level of distrust 
between the people and the police, with 71.4% of the respondents admit-
ting that they don’t feel safe to report any case to the police due to fear of 
being charged for what they know nothing of or being extorted in the 
process. Given that the agency responsible for the maintenance of order 
within the country has lost credibility before those they are expected to 
safeguard, security of the people becomes a spiritual pursuit where the citi-
zens retire to trusting the invisible to protect them.
Finally, the third question probed the effects of police corruption on 
the loss of lives of members of the public. Here an overwhelming majority 
of our respondents (97.3%) affirmed that indeed police corruption has 
been responsible for the loss of many lives. This occurs, for instance, when 
many in the police are distracted by corruption or deliberately ignore their 
role in providing security after receiving gratification, leading to loss of 
lives and property (Chinwokwu 2013, Olumuyiwa et al. 2014). In some 
cases, police officers themselves murder members of the public who resist 
extortion or refuse to offer bribes (Idio 2016) or even shoot in order to 
rob their victims of their belongings (Hanafi 2016).
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concluSIon
Despite being dotted by several law enforcement agenesis, Nigeria has 
witnessed a rising wave of internal security challenges in recent times. This 
situation has been blamed on many institutional inadequacies found 
within the security agencies, notably corruption. This study thus attempted 
to examine the impact of corruption on internal security focusing on the 
Nigerian Police which is the primary agency for the maintenance of inter-
nal security. The study found that, although the police force is the preemi-
nent public institution established to assure the security of lives and 
property within the country, the institution has ironically functioned more 
as an enabler of corruption and insecurity.
The study reveals three major ways in which corruption in the police 
force has undermined internal security. The first is through declining 
capacity to ensure maintenance of law and order, which occurs because 
police officers are distracted by corrupt practices or look the other way 
after receiving inducement by criminally minded individuals. The second 
is through direct loss of lives or properties of members of the public 
orchestrated by police officers against citizens who resist extortion. The 
third is through the unwillingness of citizens to report suspected cases of 
crime to the police because of their mistrust for the police which will ulti-
mately erodes their role of maintenance of order in the society. The study 
identifies several factors that are responsible for the manifestation of cor-
ruption in Nigerian Police and by extension the high level of internal inse-
curity in the country. These include the misuse of the police by the political 
class, poor welfare packages, low level of professionalism and understaffing.
To strengthen the police force and boost security within the nation, the 
study offers the following recommendations. First, the government should 
recruit more manpower to ensure a representative police force, while pro-
viding adequate logistics, and improve welfare packages that will contrib-
ute to the effective and efficient delivery of the Police Service. Secondly, 
the police should be allowed to act in an independent capacity, as is done 
in developed countries. This means the police should be shielded from 
political interference and “politically motivated appointments.” The role 
of law enforcement in any civilized society is to serve and protect the citi-
zens. Political appointments will end up making the officer subject to the 
whims and caprices of the government of the day, thereby undermining 
his duty to the nation. This is a major obstacle to police effectiveness in 
Nigeria and must be discouraged at all cost if improved police  performance 
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must be achieved. Thirdly, the study also recommends community polic-
ing as a way to ensure accountability of police officers. When the policing 
is reduced to community level, those who misbehave are easily held 
accountable within the society and forced to discharge their duty. Finally, 
there should also be an independent body to check the excesses of the 
police force and assure her prompt responses to security issues.
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CHAPTER 17
Dimensions and Manifestations of Spiritual 




On March 19, 2017, one Dr Allwell Orji jumped into the Lagos lagoon 
from the Third Mainland Bridge in a suicide plunge that led to his death. 
He was reported to have ordered his driver to stop on the bridge after 
receiving a mysterious phone call (Ocholi 2017, p. 4). His associates and 
other people have put forward explanations for his suicide plunge includ-
ing frustration, the poor state of affairs of the nation’s health sector, and 
weight of demands from his numerous dependent relatives. No one has 
given serious thought to the mysterious phone call, through which he 
might have been invoked spiritually or given spiritual commands, just as is 
done in the world of yahoo-plus which is based on spiritual command and 
control by persons using spiritual powers against victims.
In March 2017, the Oyo State Police Command made public the case 
of one Gbenga Babalade who in the search for quick money was alleged to 
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have with the help of other accomplices kidnapped a man, killed him, and 
cut out his heart as directed by a herbalist for money rituals (monitored on 
Galaxy Television 2017). In September 2016, Fani-Kayode, a former 
Aviation Minister, wrote about blood cult in aviation that derived powers 
from causing plane crashes, in view of the plane crashes in Nigeria, and 
many people laughed it off. In the write-up, he stated that the five plane 
crashes that occurred in Nigeria “between 2005 and 2006 were man- 
made and planned”, for sacrifice. In his words:
Most of our leaders are not human. They are “hybrids” and “reptilians” 
working for a hidden hand and some very dark and sinister forces. It is in 
that context that you can understand their exceptional callousness. They are 
cold-blooded reptiles and certified psychopaths… Between 2005 and 2006, 
just before I was redeployed as Minister of Aviation, there were five plane 
crashes in Nigeria in one year. Four hundred and fifty-three innocent souls 
perished in those crashes in that year alone. All of them were man-made and 
planned. They were sacrifices. In one case, a bomb was planted on the plane. 
I know this because I took over as Minister and stopped it. I had access to 
all the reports, particularly the American NTSB reports. I wrote to the pow-
ers that be, and demanded an international investigation, only to find out 
that they were involved too. I was asked to drop it, in very cold and almost 
threatening terms… Members of the public know nothing about their polit-
ical leaders. And it is a worldwide phenomenon. There is a grand conspiracy 
to establish a new world order and most of these world leaders are just pup-
pets of the illuminati, paving the way for the anti-Christ. All you have to do 
is to be in the inner circle of power for one hour to know that these creatures 
are not human. They are cold, unfeeling and callous. They kill, maim and 
destroy at the drop of a hat.
Fani-Kayode went further to add:
There are many secrets that some of us will carry to the grave. They say 
knowledge is power and ignorance comes with a very heavy price and dev-
astating consequences. This matter is for developed and enlightened minds 
and sadly beyond most people. (Fani-Kayode in Daily Sun 2016)
The message is that when political leaders of nations belong to occult 
organisations, the security of nations, citizens, and their properties become 
imperilled.
In the same vein, Abati (2016) wrote about spiritual happenings in 
Aso-Rock Villa, Nigeria’s seat of power, and again many people laughed it 
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off. Even the presidency (in Saturday Vanguard 2016) reacted by saying 
that Abati only wrote from his own perspective. Abati wrote of what a 
 colleague told him that there were “persons in the Villa walking upside 
down, head to the ground”. He also observed that “when Presidents make 
mistakes, they are probably victims of a force higher than what we can 
imagine”. In March 2014, the horrible news broke out about an evil forest 
in the Soka area of Ibadan, Oyo State, where people (including school 
children) were murdered for ritual purposes and their vital parts harvested 
(Daily Sun 2015, p. 1). These are all threats to human and national secu-
rity. Security is the ultimate value that determines all other values, as far as 
human beings and nations are concerned. This is because without security 
nothing else meaningful can be done successfully. For the Nigerian citi-
zens in the North-Eastern States of Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno, life had 
not been meaningful since 2010 as a result of Boko Haram terrorism until 
December 2016 when the group was degraded. Millions of them were 
sacked from their homes to become refugees in Cameroon, Chad, or 
Niger, or internally displaced persons (IDPs) in one of the IDP camps. For 
the Syrian nation today, it has been destruction since 2010. Millions of the 
citizens have escaped abroad to safety. The nation’s leaders under President 
Asad are not talking of national development now. The focus is on national 
survival. Every Syrian citizen too is praying hard to survive the war. Despite 
all evidence on spiritual threats today to human and national security, the 
attention of humanity—scholars, political leaders, students of strategic 
studies, analysts, and commentators—on matters concerning security is 
concentrated almost a 100 per cent on physical (including military) 
(in)security which manifests in various forms such as wars (civil and inter-
national), terrorism, insurgency, border clashes, communal conflicts, reli-
gious riots, ethnic riots, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, murder, national 
disasters (earthquakes, tornados, flood, volcanic eruptions, etc.), and man-
made disasters (fire, plane crashes, road accidents, train mishaps, etc.). The 
definition of health given by the World Health Organization (2000) is 
physically based. In its words: “Health is a state of complete physical, men-
tal and social wellbeing, and not merely absence of disease or infirmity”. A 
person may be looking physically, mentally, and socially fine, but spiritually 
wrecked, and may be on his or her way to the grave.
The spiritual aspects of (in)security have been almost totally neglected 
especially in researches and other forms of scholarly works especially due 
to the dogmatic and pompous prescriptions of majestic science. Thus, 
while the bookshelves and libraries of the world are over-saturated with 
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materials and data on physical (in)security, humanity is left with a 
 resounding dearth of information, knowledge and data on spiritual 
(in)security. Yet individuals and nations battle with spiritual threats to 
their security on a daily basis. The rationale for this discourse at this point 
of our national history is not far-fetched. One, there is too much anarchy 
in the spiritual realm to continue to leave out the study of the spiritual 
dimensions of human and national security, and both individuals and 
nations continue to suffer spiritual decay that adversely impacts their phys-
ical domain. As I have noted elsewhere:
There is so much anarchy and havoc going on in the spiritual realm of 
human and national security today that there is every urgent need for gov-
ernment and societal attention to be focused on that realm to save lives, 
protect human rights, and national values and to enhance human and 
national security. There is nothing happening in the physical world today 
that is not happening in the spiritual world—rape, bombing, robbery, kid-
napping, hostage taking, murder, torture, conspiracy, politics, accidents, 
maiming and others. (Nwolise 2012, p. 6)
Two, there is urgent need for massive public education and enlighten-
ment to raise consciousness to the various spiritual threats, attacks, and 
crimes that occur today so that people will take precautionary measures 
necessary to preserve their lives, rights, health, and property. Three, the 
government has to make new laws and establish new penalties for various 
spiritual crimes. Four, the military and paramilitary security personnel espe-
cially the police have to be trained in new knowledge and their methods 
and equipment upgraded to ensure that they are ahead of those who spiri-
tually threaten the security of others. Five, the entire Criminal Justice 
System has to be tuned to adjust to the new crimes and threats. Judges 
specially have to be prepared and armed with new punishments, for exam-
ple, for ritual rape as against ordinary physical rape of the past. Six, the dead 
no longer have peace in their graveyards that are invaded by human parts 
and skulls hunters for rituals. The cemeteries now need extra-protection.
Seven, certain diseases, sicknesses, ailments, and even death have spiri-
tual origins. People should be fully aware that the evil they perpetrate 
against their fellow human beings, especially innocent persons, as well as 
their sins (murder, robbery, rape, fornication, adultery, etc.), cheating, 
and curses, are all sources of sicknesses. Reductions in this direction will 
decongest hospitals and reduce the quantum of resources the government 
spends on drugs and other health sector requirements.
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Eight, spiritual matters now penetrate the political system or domain of 
the country to the point of even selecting candidates to run for elections 
and lead local governments, states, and the centre. Godfathers mortgage 
the conscience of their godsons, for example, by taking them to shrines for 
ritual oaths of allegiance. This is a deadly blow against democracy and 
public accountability. In September 2016, as Ondo State prepared for its 
governorship election, juju was placed at the gate of the Secretariat of the 
All Progressives Congress (APC). As nobody wanted to suffer the spiritual 
consequence, the gate was not opened by anybody, and the APC Secretariat 
did not function for several days.
Nine, spiritual manipulation is now entering the nation’s monetary 
control domain, and if not addressed, it may make it difficult for the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to effectively control money in circula-
tion. Money rituals and conjured money as being done in Ghana now 
generate huge money outside CBN calculations.
Ten, people commit atrocities without knowing the full consequences, 
especially spiritual ones. Thus, escaping the government law is not uhuru 
(freedom) for a ritual rapist or ritual killer, for example, people need to know.
Finally, people need to know the difference between physical and spiri-
tual ailments. Often, people keep treating spiritual ailments physically in 
the hospital until the patient dies. A deputy vice chancellor in one of our 
universities in Nigeria was spiritually poisoned in a social occasion through 
a mineral drink. Even when drivers and cleaners were fully aware of what 
happened and the wife was told that it was not a hospital matter, the pro-
fessor was left to be treated in the hospital. He died!
What is the probable explanation for these cases of rising spiritual 
threats, attacks, and crimes? Three major factors, poverty, greed, or jeal-
ousy and vengeance, which seek pleasure from the pain of victims are the 
probable explanations. Those locals who are involved in rituals for wealth 
are poor. But the big-time smugglers who engage our customs personnel 
with jujucraft at the borders are greedy elements. Those who use witch-
craft, jujucraft, and so on, to hold people down, kill them, or ruin their 
businesses are the wicked and jealous fellows, some in search of vengeance.
conceptualIsatIon: on natIonal securIty
Throughout the Cold War era, national security was perceived in terms of 
state security which was protected by awesome weapons of all types and 
large military personnel. National security was thus seen as a state good as 
upheld by scholars like Morgenthau (1960), who wrote about the state 
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being able to maintain its territorial integrity and that of its institutions, 
and Lippman (in Imobighe 1998, p. 4), who asserted that “security rises 
and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or defeat it”. 
However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991 without any war 
despite being a well-armed superpower, and the humiliation of the United 
States on September 11, 2001, by a handful of unarmed, angry Arab 
youths, caused a shift in the paradigm of national security perception, con-
ception, and practice.
Thus, the UN began a new campaign on human security which, as the 
United Nations Commission on Human Security noted in 2003, seeks to 
“project the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human free-
dom and human fulfillment”. Hubert (2001, p. 3) went further to assert:
In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and 
non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being, characterised by free-
dom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives 
… it is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of 
reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or 
government.
Following this new thinking, security concepts expanded vertically and 
horizontally: vertically, it now recognised the individual, group, state, and 
humanity and horizontally, Buzan (1991, p. 7) identified the five new dimen-
sions of security as military security, political security, societal security, eco-
nomic security, and environmental security. Nwolise (2009, pp. 263–268), 
perceiving these five dimensions as narrow and Eurocentric, added ten addi-
tional dimensions on spiritual security: physical security, psychological secu-
rity, technological security, image security, territorial security, legal security, 
treasury security, people’s power security, global security, and spiritual secu-
rity. Nwolise (2013, p. 14) asserted that it is not enough for security studies 
to focus on man and that “the focus on man must be bifurcated into physical 
and spiritual security because physical security does not give the total picture 
of man’s security architecture; and also because there are several spiritual 
threats to the (physical) security of man”. He argues:
It is my contention therefore that human security cannot be fully studied, 
understood, predicted and controlled without proper grasping of the spiri-
tual factors at work on and around the person. (Nwolise 2012, p. 16)
He asks, how does one explain the case of a physically healthy pregnant 
woman who after nine months instead of delivering a bouncing baby boy 
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or girl pushes out a stone, monkey, tortoise, snake, or horse from her womb 
as has happened several times? (Nwolise 2013, p. 54). What then is spiritual 
security? As stated elsewhere (Nwolise 2009, p. 264, 2012, pp. 17–18):
In sum, spiritual security is the safety of the human spirit and body from spiri-
tual threats and attacks. In an elaborated form, spiritual security has to do 
with the safety, peace, development, welfare and happiness of the human 
spirit … it concerns getting people and nations close to God who is the 
Supreme Spirit and ultimate Guarantor of real security. The concept of spiri-
tual security has the spirit of people and nations as its point of reference rather 
than exclusively focusing on physical security, because in the final analysis, 
nothing happens in the physical realm without first happening in the spiritual.
There are three key lines of action in the maintenance of spiri-
tual security:
 1. Taking preventive actions to reduce vulnerability to spiritual threat 
or attack.
 2. Carrying out Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) occasionally to 
detect the source and nature of a spiritual threat or attack before or 
when it occurs.
 3. Embarking on quick and effective remedial action to neutralise 
actual spiritual attacks to avoid the attacker’s intended outcome.
The spiritual security approach highlights the need to address the root 
causes of insecurity of a person, group, or nation from the spiritual angle 
before they manifest physically.
In treating human and national security challenges in Nigeria, there-
fore, given the above narrative, the following can be identified. The list is 
in two broad categories: (1) physical and (2) spiritual. The physical has 
three sub-categories: external, cross-border, and internal.
physIcal dImensIon of securIty challenges
External Security Challenges
 1. Aggression by hostile forces (war)—hostile neighbours and impe-
rial nations
 2. Deployment of hostile intelligence services (espionage)
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 3. Massing of enemy troops at the borders (can lead to blockade)
 4. Cyber-attacks (hacking of systems and databases)
 5. Subversive penetration
 6. Influence of information warfare
 7. Deployment of dangerous chemical and biological weapons 
(bio-chem war)
 8. International terrorism
Cross-Border Security Challenges
 1. Cross-border banditry
 2. Rebel raids or infiltrations from neighbours
 3. Cyber-crimes across borders
 4. Car snatching across borders
 5. Piracy and sea robbery
 6. Commodity smuggling (food stuff, petrol, poultry products, etc.)
 7. Human trafficking for prostitution, slave labour, sexual slavery, or 
organ harvest for medical transplants in Europe and Asia
 8. Hard drug trafficking
 9. Arms trafficking
 10. International terrorism/insurgency
 11. Animal and plant smuggling
 12. Toxic waste dumping
Internal Security Challenges
 1. Terrorism (North-East)
 2. Militancy (South-South)
 3. Separatist agitation (South-East)
 4. Natural disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, plane crashes, 
Earth tremors, landslides, mudslides, floods, etc.)
 5. Man-made disasters (fires, floods, road accidents, plane crashes, 
train accidents, building collapses, etc.)
 6. Sabotage
 7. Subversion of government institutions
 8. Ethno-religious conflicts
 9. Kidnapping and abduction for rituals, organ harvest, forced mar-
riage, sexual slavery, slave labour, or ransom
 10. Armed robbery
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 11. Pipeline vandalisation
 12. Electricity pillar vandalisation
 13. Corruption (especially political corruption)
 14. Unemployment
 15. Herdsmen (armed militia) attacks on farms, and villages
 16. Climate change
 17. Rape (physical)
 18. Election violence (political thuggery)
 19. Election rigging
 20. Arson
 21. Population explosion
 22. Proliferation of small and light weapons
 23. Assassinations
 24. Murder
 25. Excessive use of force by defence forces (Odi, Zaki-Biam, Kaduna 
[El-Zakzaky issue], Afara)
 26. Police brutality
 27. Hate speeches and hate silence
 28. Hate appointments and hate policies
 29. Character of the Nigerian state that does not manifest serious care 
about peace and security and has become in itself a harbinger of 
insecurity pathogens
spIrItual dImensIon of securIty challenges
These spiritual threats include:
 1. The wrath of God.
 2. The wrath of local deities.
 3. Aggressive witchcraft.
 4. Aggressive juju, charms (or jujucraft) prepared by mercantile and 
greedy native doctors, pastors, and mallams.
 5. Curses, including curses of the law (divine curses).
 6. Spells.
 7. Possessed objects-humans, plants, animals, eateries, blood test lab-
oratories, monies (dropped on the road), and so on.
 8. Hypnotism—to enable rape, duping, kidnapping, or murder of 
victims (in vehicles, streets, and homes).
 9. Cultism, cult wars, and secret societies.
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 10. Oath-based human trafficking with risks of madness or death.
 11. Controlled prostitution based on deadly oaths.
 12. Yahoo-plus based on hypnotism, and spiritual command and con-
trol (the spiritual aspect of yahoo).
 13. Oath or hypnotism—based on forced religious conversion and 
forced marriage.
 14. Ritual murder—for blood money, political power, self-protection, 
and so on. This is different from the murder of people for meat 
production and organ harvest and sale for medical purposes abroad.
 15. Ritual rape of minors, old women, mad women, and so on for 
blood money, life elongation, or power.
 16. Aggressive spiritual husbands and wives.
 17. Aggressive spiritual or terrestrial groups.
 18. Aggressive familiar and ancestral spirits.
 19. Aggressive ghosts, especially of people who died violent and sud-
den death as a result of murder, road accidents, plane crashes, ship-
wrecks, landslides, armed robbery, or war.
 20. Spiritual poisons delivered through dreams or physical food.
 21. Aggressive roving and static spirits.
 22. People who have acquired supernatural powers and use these to 
kill, maim, dupe, rape, and challenge the state and its security 
agents and officials.
 23. Spiritually induced road accidents.
 24. Spiritual manipulation of innocent people to commit crimes against 
the state and fellowmen.
 25. Breaking of spiritually based oaths—where the moral guarantor is 
a local deity such as Ogwugwuakpu of the Okija shrine fame.
 26. Spiritual covenants.
 27. Occult-oriented leaders and businessmen.
 28. Dream sex—implants sickness or takes away luck or future progres-
sive opportunities.
 29. Dream manipulations to incite people, families, or groups against 
each other (using people’s faces to attack others in dreams).
Thus, my understanding of national security is far away from the tradi-
tional or mainstream conception which is solely based on physical security. 
The chapter now moves on to discussing the dimensions and manifesta-
tions of current spiritual threats in Nigeria.
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dImensIons and manIfestatIons of spIrItual threats
The followings are some of the dimensions and manifestations of spiritual 
threats and insecurity in Nigeria today. In some areas, examples from other 
nations are given for illustration.
Curses
“A curse is a deep heartfelt strong and bitter invocation of evil, calamity, 
suffering, loss, destruction or death upon a person or an entity, propelled 
by anger, anguish, agony or bitterness, and inner cry for divine justice 
when one is cheated, betrayed, denied or wickedly treated especially with 
impunity” (Nwolise 2013, pp. 80–81). Curse is a phenomenon many peo-
ple have not fully understood, yet it is devastating several people and fami-
lies today. Armed robbers, rapists, kidnappers, thieves, and bosses who 
wickedly sit on the promotion of their subordinates and murderers of 
innocent persons come under curses of the law or curses of their victims or 
victims’ relatives. When a man rapes a girl, he thinks he is enjoying him-
self, but he does not know he has brought a generational curse upon his 
present or future daughters. Every innocent person murdered in this 
country curses not only the murderer but also the nation for not protect-
ing him or her. This worsens the insecurity situation of the nation.
In March 2017, during a meeting of the members of Police and 
National Union of Road Transport Workers, and Road Transport 
Employers Association, one of the workers told the Lagos State 
Commissioner of Police (CP), Fatai Owoseni, that the policemen that 
extort money from them tell them that the money is given to him (CP) 
and the inspector general of police. Out of anger probably at the false 
accusation, Mr Owoseni (in Jimoh et al. 2017, p. 9) cursed such police-
men saying:
It will not be well with any policeman who said they are collecting money 
on my behalf or the Inspector General of Police. Such a person will not die 
well! Don’t you know that you should not allow policemen to oppress you? 
As taxpayers, you are the ones paying policemen salaries so you are our mas-
ters. Don’t give policemen money, take their numbers or names down and 
call me. I assure you that I will send policemen to arrest them. The current 
leadership of the police is doing everything to ensure that we change the 
ways things are done.
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The curse has been taken note of by divine forces and those it is directed 
at are in soup. They may not know the sources of their problems when it 
starts work on them, unless they employ Strategic Spiritual Intelligence 
(SSI) early enough.
Cult Clashes
Cultism is about the worship of a local deity by some initiates. Thus, it is 
a spiritual affair. Cult groups abound in our educational institutions espe-
cially universities, and from there they have spread into secondary schools, 
primary schools, towns, and villages. Human lives are lost in two main 
ways in cult matters. The first is through the occasional sacrifice of human 
beings (blood) to the local deities that serve as the nucleus and spiritual 
power base of the cult group. The second is through the clashes between 
rival cult groups. Hundreds of people have been killed in Nigeria on cult- 
related matters, and the media are awash daily of these deaths.
One recent case is the clash between two rival cult groups in Amarata 
area of Yenagoa, capital of Bayelsa State, on March 18, 2017, which 
claimed the lives of two innocent teenagers that were hit by gun bullets. 
In the clash, guns, cutlasses, axes, and other dangerous weapons were 
freely used. The fact that cultism is ruining the country’s future leaders is 
clear from the fact that one of the dead teenagers named Paul (about 
18 years) from Anambra State was the leader of the cult group that came 
on reprisal attack on another group for an earlier attack. He was shot in 
the abdomen and died at the Federal Medical Centre, Yenagoa (Ebipade 
2017, p. 7).
On May 9, 2013, the Imo State Police Command located the embalmed 
remains of a 78-year-old woman (Mr Lucy Osigweh) in a big compound 
in her son’s room. She had been missing for nine years. Her son had told 
the neighbours that she travelled to America on a visit to one of her chil-
dren. The then Imo State Commissioner of Police, Mohammed Musa, 
told newsmen that the remains of the woman were used for ritual purposes 
by her son and his cult group members who held their nocturnal meetings 
in the room to enhance their mystical powers (Nigerian Newsworld 2013).
The case of the Badoo cult group in Lagos is a sad and frightening one. 
The members were specialised in smashing the heads of their victims with 
a large stone and wiping their blood with white handkerchiefs, each of 
which was sold to ritualists for ₦500,000. They were also noted to special-
ise in wiping out whole family members during their operation.
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Forced Marriages and Religious Conversions
Some citizens, especially Christian girls, have been abducted by their so- 
called lovers and forced into marriages and subsequently converted to 
other religions. There have been complaints that some of the girls are 
hypnotised and not in a position to speak their mind. The perverts that 
abduct these girls no doubt use spiritual means to control them, and they 
claim that the girls speak their minds, even where the girls are below 18 
years; what a crime and impunity! No wonder The Punch (2016b, p. 1) in 
its editorial of March 1, 2016, on Ese Oruru asserted that “The abduction 
and ferrying of Ese, then 13 from Opolo in Yenagoa local government 
area of Bayelsa State to Kano by a pervert, ostensibly for marriage and 
religious conversion, is a heinous crime that should be severely punished”.
When Ese’s brother, Onome Oruru, was asked his view on the claim by 
some people that his sister at that period who was still under her abductors 
said she does not want to come back home to Bayelsa and wants to stay in 
Kano, he said:
I do not believe them at all. Even if she said that as they claim, then it means 
they are the ones manipulating her to say such things, because Ese that I 
know cannot say such a thing. (quoted in Umukoro 2016, p. 7)
The fact that Ese was released soon after this statement, and that she 
has since 2016 been staying with her parents, puts hollow the earlier claims 
of her abductors. There are many girls that have been abducted and forced 
into marriages and religions out of spiritual manipulations. We have long 
learnt that even Boko Haram elements who forcefully abducted girls and 
“married” them before they were degraded performed rituals before “rap-
ing” their “wives” so that the children that they will produce will continue 
the terrorist struggle! No wonder some such “wives” who were liberated 
by the Nigerian Army voted to go back to their Boko Haram captors 
because spiritually, their souls had been so programmed. But how does the 
society help such victims of spiritual manipulations? There is no help 
because the police will scream that they do not want to get involved in 
spiritual matters, yet, spiritual matters are devastating the citizens they are 
paid to protect. Only the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking 
in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) has mastered the terrain, 
as the Agency takes rescued victims of trafficking for controlled prostitu-
tion to where they were made to take ritual oath for neutralisation of such 
an oath for the girls to be really free.
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When a forced marriage or a forced religious conversion occurs, parents 
of the girl should know that there is a spiritual dimension to it, either in 
terms of hypnotism or ritual oath or in terms of the spiritual pinning down 
of the victim. In that situation, the girl is not herself and cannot say or do 
anything in her favour or favour of her parents. As such there is no need to 
ask her any questions, involving choice even if she is over 18 years. The best 
thing to do in the situation is to report to the police for record purposes 
only and not to engage the police and abductors in altercations. The main 
work is to break the spiritual force or chains holding her down in the abduc-
tor’s house, and she will return home to her parents on her own, no matter 
how long she has been held and how many children she has delivered—she 
will take all the children along.
Human Trafficking Fired by Ritual Oath-Taking
Human trafficking is a big business all over the world today. It has reached 
the level at which some people describe it as modern-day slavery. People 
are trafficked for various reasons: house help, slave labour, sexual slavery, 
human spare parts (organs) hunting for the organ transplant industry of 
Europe and Asia, ritual murder, controlled prostitution, and so on. In 
Nigeria, people are trafficked in and out on a daily basis.
The spiritual aspect of this inhuman business is that the victims are sub-
jected to ritual oath-taking in shrines pledging to keep the process secret, 
to obey their ogas or madams (traffickers), not to attempt running away, 
not to implicate their traffickers, and to deliver money to their traffickers 
as agreed. These oaths are usually taken on threats of death or madness if 
broken by victims. Often the hair, nails and blood of the victims are used 
for rituals in the shrine. Thus, from day one, the victims are subjected to 
constant fear and pressure.
Nigeria’s porous borders aid human trafficking, which is said to be sec-
ond to the smuggling of drugs and vehicles in terms of profit generation. 
Olabulo (2016, pp. 19–21) informs us from his study that “as soon as a 
maid is about to be brought into a new home, the middlemen will ensure 
that they take oaths in shrines, pledging that they would not steal, commit 
any offence or implicate their madams”. Some victims who broke their oath 
abroad or in Nigeria have died or run mad. The National Agency for 
Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) 
has on many occasions taken victims of human trafficking to the shrines 
where they were earlier subjected to ritual oaths for the reversal of such oaths.
 O. B. C. NWOLISE
365
Aggressive Jujucraft
A juju or charm is an object believed to be imbued with magic powers 
aimed at pursuing a good or evil purpose. It is often in the form of an 
amulet, pendant, padlock, or other objects tied together with threads of 
differing colours. No matter the shape, nature, or how a juju or charm is 
prepared, one thing common to all is that a spirit is or a number of spirits 
are invoked into it to be effective.
Juju can be done for or against someone, a group of people, an organ-
isation, or even a whole nation whose name or names must have been 
mentioned as the target during preparation. Juju or charm can be des-
patched when made ready by burying it in the ground, blowing it into the 
air, nailing it to a tree in the forest, throwing it into a river or ocean, hang-
ing it on a wall, placing it on a table, incising it into the blood, or even 
swallowing it.
The juju or charm that threatens the security of people is the type that 
is meant for harming. The wicked, jealous, or greedy go to any lengths to 
achieve their devilish purpose including effecting what I call jujucraft or 
preparing a charm against their perceived real or potential enemy. The 
Juju can be meant to cause death, madness, and protracted illness or to 
delay or completely block the enemy’s progress or promotion. Juju or 
charm can also be done for good sales, attracting membership, controlling 
someone, protection against evil forces or actions, and so on. Few exam-
ples are as follows:
 1. In December 2015, a clergyman was arrested by the Esigie Police 
Division personnel in Benin City, Edo State, for burying an uniden-
tified object in front of his church at 2:00 am. Before he buried the 
object, those who saw him said that he walked around the church 
building several times in a ritualistic manner. The clergyman how-
ever told the police that he wanted to remove a charm buried by 
some people as the land was in dispute.
 2. I was opportuned to observe the removal of a juju used to lock a 
friend’s car from moving for two years. The car was bought at 
Cotonou, and on the way to Nigeria, something like stone hit the 
windscreen cracking it a little. On arrival at Ibadan, the car was 
packed in the garage. The car did not move again for the next two 
years despite all the mechanic work in it, which included changing 
the automatic gearbox twice. It took spiritual action to remove the 
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juju planted on the engine on that day of return from Cotonou by a 
wicked and jealous fellow from a faraway South-East town. The juju 
was opened by the pastor and it contained a padlock which was used 
to lock the engine, human hair meant for death by accident by any-
one riding the car on the day of action by the evil person, periwinkle 
(sea animal) meant to be fetching ocean salt water into the carburet-
tor, fuel tank, coil, and so on (Nwolise 2013, p. 67). Immediately 
the juju was removed, the car was serviced by a mechanic, and it 
started working and works well till date.
 3. The police in Anambra State found a padlock juju in the house of 
one Mr Kenny Voss in Ifie village, Awka, in March 2006. On one 
face of the padlock was written “Ifeoma Stella Nwolisa must come 
back to my house or die” (Daily Sun 2006, p. 17). Ostensibly, the 
girl’s life and progress had been mortgaged and she was programmed 
to die (if her God approves) if she did not return to Mr Voss’ house. 
The people had to report the man to the police because they were 
fed up with his evil ways, only for the police to discover that charm 
when they entered his house.
 4. On July 29, 2011, a leader of one political party (a ward chairman) 
in Lagos was arrested by the police for using juju to hypnotise three 
people found unconscious in his car, meant for rituals (Saturday 
Punch 2011, p. 8).
 5. In 2007, a Danfo driver was mysteriously killed with a charmed ring 
in Alagbado, Ogun State (Spectacular Encounters 2007, p. 39).
 6. On September 18, 2011, a Togolese living in Nigeria named Komina 
Jakou beat his relative Mr Degol to death with a charmed ring dur-
ing a fight for raping his wife Aminat. The two had come from Togo 
with their respective rings meant for self-protection. The Nigerian 
Police had to call in the Togolese Embassy (Sunday Tribune 
2011, p. 33).
 7. On December 5, 2009, a local vigilante group beat a tailor to death 
with charmed canes at Ijebu Ife in Ogun State. This led to a may-
hem unleashed by youths. In the fracas, three people were killed 
including an Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr Omololu 
Oladokun. Many buildings and petrol stations were set ablaze. The 
town dwellers fled including the Oba (The Nation on Sunday 
2009, p. 1).
 8. In August 2015, one Ahmed Azeez, a 25-year-old okada operator, 
slumped and died at Ifo, Ogun State, after being struck with a charm 
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by an official of the Articulated Motorcyclists Owners and Riders 
Association, following an argument and fisticuff over a levy seen as 
outrageous by Azeez. The police spokesman Olumuyiwa Adejobi 
who confirmed the incident told newsmen that it was being investi-
gated. The question was “how will the police investigate a spiritual 
matter?” (Nwokolo 2015, p. 7).
Aggressive Witchcraft
Some people maintain that they do not believe in witchcraft or the exis-
tence of witches and wizards. They regard it as superstition. However, my 
duty here as a scholar who has been in the research field for decades is not 
to try to convince anybody. My duty is to deal with social realities with 
abundant evidence which I have presented elsewhere in 2012 and 2013 
(Nwolise 2012, 2013). My thesis on the matter is that witchcraft not only 
exists, it exists all over the world, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Russia, and China, and that witchcraft power just like political 
power can be used for good or bad. When corrupted, political power is as 
dangerous as witchcraft power.
The problem in Nigeria and much of Africa where witchcraft seems to 
be more pronounced is that poverty, greed, and associated jealousy as well 
as visionless national leadership tend to make witchcraft power to be 
directed to evil doing. The tendency is for witches to hide as it is seen as a 
negative force. While a witch (woman) or wizard (man) is perceived as a 
person with (evil) magical powers, witchcraft is seen as the practical appli-
cation of the (evil) magical powers in protection and promotion of the self 
or loved ones or the use of spells, juju, and invocation of evil spirits to 
punish, harm, delay, or even kill those marked as enemies. Witchcraft 
power can be used positively to diagnose and heal ailments, x-ray the 
future, and counter the magical powers of others.
Witchcraft threatens the security of people and a nation in four 
main ways:
 1. There can be aggressive application of witchcraft powers to kill, 
maim, ambush, rape, inflict sickness, or take away luck through 
dream food or dream sex.
 2. The sickness inflicted on people reduces national productivity as 
man-hours are wasted in hospitals and or traditional treatments. 
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Also, the money spent on the ailments could have been useful 
elsewhere.
 3. Those who are killed through different ways (accidents, dream food 
poison, fired arrows, etc.) due to witchcraft attacks deny the nation 
a productive workforce that increases national wealth.
 4. The stagnation of people’s destiny, business, and progress delays 
national development.
 5. When pregnancies are tied down, it negatively affects national popu-
lation growth and replenishment.
 6. Many people are killed on the accusation of witchcraft, especially 
children and old women.
A few examples are presented here on how witchcraft negatively affects 
people’s security:
 1. In December 2013, five men confessed being wizards and killing 
their own children and others and have been visiting their commu-
nity in Akwa Ibom State with evil in the last 10 years. Their case blew 
open when one of them bought a goat to be killed for Christmas, 
and his son began screaming that his father must not be allowed to 
kill the goat as he (the son) will die. The father confessed it was true. 
The matter went to the police at Odot, but the police said they don’t 
want to be involved in spiritual matters. The five men were forced by 
the community to release six other persons they had marked for 
death by the end of January 2014 (Saturday Sun 2014, p. 12).
 2. There have been confessions by witches (young and old) in the print 
and electronic media on how they cause accidents on our roads so 
that they can see human blood to drink.
 3. A witch was sent from her coven to Prophet Joshua Iginla’s 
Champion’s Royal Assembly Church in Biaji, Abuja, in June 2011. 
When the Prophet noticed her presence and shouted “fire”, the 
woman charged towards the Prophet at the alter but fell half way. As 
she released her powers, the generators providing light for the 
church were dead, the church was in darkness, and the Prophet got 
temporarily weakened. The woman later confessed that she had used 
her powers and second position in the coven to kill many people 
(even in her extended family), including some of her own children. 
She had also initiated 200 people into witchcraft. At the end, she 
received Christ and never returned to her coven (Saturday Sun 
2011, pp. 30–31).
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 4. One Mrs Grace Okoh’s pregnancy was tied down from development 
for six years through witchcraft. For that period, a woman kept 
appearing to her in the dream, telling her “you will not give birth to 
this child”. No hospital could help, as the doctors could not see any 
child during the scan but the woman felt the child, yet her belly did 
not protrude till church prayers came forward, and the baby was 
delivered after six years (The Westerner 2007, p. 20).
 5. Another woman told her church how her own mother in law alleg-
edly held the delivery of her pregnancy for over eight years through 
witchcraft (Saturday Sun 2012, p. 7). She was lucky.
 6. In Cameroon, a prosperous and generous construction company 
driver called Konany Abel died a sudden and mysterious death in 
1996 in Tarla village of Wumbumland. The chief of Tarla who could 
not bear the loss sent out three delegations to investigate the cause 
of his death traditionally (spiritually). The three delegates came back 
not only confirming witchcraft, but also with the names of those 
who killed Abel through witchcraft, led by a man called Baka. The 
culprits confessed and were banished from the village for a period.
 7. In 1993, a ward head and four other persons were jailed for misuse 
of witchcraft power by a Grade A magistrate court in the Bali town 
of Taraba State. They were attempting to kill a pregnant woman 
named Hassanatu through witchcraft, just because some members 
of the family did not approve of her marriage to their son. The four 
men therefore wanted to destroy the pregnancy, marriage, and the 
woman. They were found out through what I call Strategic Spiritual 
Intelligence, gathered by Hassanatu, and after their confession in 
court, they were jailed (Nwolise 2013, p. 71). So when any police-
man or woman today says that the police does not handle spiritual 
matters like witchcraft, that police personnel is ignorant and does 
not know his job and our laws.
 8. In 2001, a 13-year-old girl, Jummai Hassan, was arrested in Kano 
over 51 killings, including her own father, with witchcraft power; 
she personally confessed over Radio Kaduna:
My body is here but my spirit is away. We go by our spirits, but interact 
as normal human beings. We attend meetings at a church in Lagos at 
night, where instructions are given to us as to which parts of the human 
body to take. We always use powder to kill. Once we apply it on a person, 
he dies and we take his heart. (in Maduagwu 2010, p. 14)
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 9. Accusations of witchcraft have led to the killing and torture of many 
in Nigeria, especially women and children. Akwa Ibom State in 
2010 was in high tension over the issue of child-witches when sev-
eral children were either chased out of their parents’ homes, or tor-
tured to death. Of late, the police in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, arrested 
a man and his wife (Zikeme and Eunice Ideisy) for torturing their 
seven-year-old son (Joshua) to death on accusation of being a wiz-
ard (Folarin 2017b, p. 4). It is time the Nigerian government and 
society take the spiritual security of citizens and the nation serious, 
especially as matters concern witchcraft and jujucraft.
Ritual Murder
Ritualists today abound in the country, hunting for victims. They hypno-
tise, kidnap, and kill innocent people on a daily basis. One-chance buses in 
Lagos, Micra taxis in Ibadan, and Otokoto in Owerri are outstanding 
nomenclatures of the inhuman practice. Innocent people are killed and 
their vital body parts taken away to be sold to organ transplant merchants, 
feeding European and Asian hospitals or for money rituals or political 
power rituals. The organ transplant merchants are very active in the Sahara 
desert where they harvest organs from people escaping Africa to Spain, 
Italy, and so on, even while the victims are alive. A few are lucky to be 
killed before their bellies are torn open for the harvesting of their organs. 
Combating these ritualists has on a number of occasions led to further 
deaths. Recently, in Ibadan on January 15, 2017, to be specific, for exam-
ple, a vigilante group of youths caught a man (Taheed Musiliu) with a 
cellophane bag containing a human head. This led to the gathering of a 
mob that was bent on delivering jungle justice on him. The process of the 
police trying to rescue the man from a recalcitrant mob led to stray bullet 
killing of one person (Atoyebi 2017, p. 48).
Also on March 19, 2017, the residents of the Ikoga Zebbe area of 
Badagry, Lagos State, were shocked with the fresh head and hands of an 
unknown lady found with a man named Taofik aka Kiekie. The man who 
has been living in the community for long led the police from the Area K 
Command from the Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad who arrested 
him to a location in the bush where a stockpile of fresh and decaying 
human bodies were dumped. He used to carry dried wood, but when 
people noticed him carrying sacks stained with blood, he retorted that he 
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had become a hunter and was carrying bush meat. A policeman who had 
been observing him decided to stop him on March 19, on the excuse that 
he wanted to buy bush meat. Sensing danger, Taofik took to his heels, 
threatening the policeman with a knife. But people pursued him, caught 
him, and brought him back only to see a young lady’s head and hands 
when the sack was opened. On interrogation, he said he sold the parts to 
people who needed them for rituals. He confessed that he had a gang of 
three persons and that he always cast spells on his victims before taking 
them to the bush across a river where they were murdered and dismantled. 
It turned out that the lady whose head was in the bag was Taofik’s girl-
friend (Folarin 2017a, p. 4). The three and their witch doctor who escaped 
the arrest are still out there in the streets of Badagry, killing and dismem-
bering innocent people for rituals.
Another case of ritual murder involved one Ibrahim Mohammed who 
first poisoned two brothers of the same father (Muhammed Kudu 
Abubakar and Umar Tanko Abubakar) to weaken them and thereafter 
killed them by hitting their heads with a pestle in January 2016, at Kugbani 
village, Kogi local government area of Kogi State. In an attempt to hide 
his crime, he buried the bodies of the two brothers in his compound after 
robbing them of their Toyota Carina car. The criminal was sentenced to 
death by hanging in a Kogi State High Court sitting in Koton Karfi by 
Justice Alaba Omoley-Ajileye in March 2017 (Oladoyinbo 2017, p. 7).
In January 2012, the Ondo Police Command arrested four suspected 
ritualists who had kidnapped and murdered a 25-year-old hunchback, Mr 
Adeoye Dowo, for money rituals, in Ago Alaye village. On killing him, 
they neatly removed his hunch (Nigerian Tribune 2012, p. 48).
In January 2016, Daily Sun published a screaming headline “Fresh 
Otokoto lands in Enugu: 3 human bodies buried in building foundation” 
(Obi 2016, p. 9). The report was that the police in Enugu had exhumed 
three decomposed human bodies already covered with concrete that were 
buried in the foundation of a new building site at the Ugwuaji area of 
Enugu believed to be a church. The bodies could be keke (tricycle) opera-
tors, some of whom were reported missing for long. It may be recalled 
that in 1996, a man was found in Owerri, Imo State, with the head of a 
young boy by name Ikechukwu Okonkwo. The police traced his buried 
torso to the premises of Otokoto Hotel, and this led to the uncovering of 
a syndicate specialised in ritual killing as well as the selling and buying of 
human parts. The discovery led to violent protests in Owerri during which 
properties were looted or destroyed.
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In the same year, January 2016, a 25-year-old member of a gang of 
ritual killers was arrested by operatives of the Federal Special Anti-Robbery 
Squad, Osun State Command, for luring a 4-year-old boy with ground-
nut, killing, and beheading him for money rituals (Malik 2015, p. 49).
In July 2015, a 16-year-old boy named Tajudeen Azeez lured a little 
boy, Ibrahim, of about 5 years of age to a place, killed him, and cut off 
his penis, kidney, and intestines, and buried his corpse in the bush. On 
his arrest, Tajudeen confessed that one man called Uzor gave him ₦100 
to get the organs of four- or five-year-old boys for rituals (Daily Sun 
2015, p. 16).
In March 2017, four persons were paraded in Ibadan by the police for 
killing a business associate, Mr Oyeyemi Akintoye, cutting off his head, 
and removing his heart for money rituals (Malik 2017, p. 3).
A 23-year-old prostitute Miss Uche Agunta narrated to the Imo State 
Police Command in December 2014 how she and her gang specialised in 
cutting off the manhood (penis) of their victims with a razor blade at 
orgasm during sex. The male organs were sold for money rituals at 
₦150,000 per manhood. Uche confessed to the police, according to the 
then Imo State Commissioner of Police, Mr Abdulmajid Ali, that her gang 
had killed seven men in the hotel through the razor process (Uwujare 
2014, p. 12).
In March 2014, a forest of horror was located in Soka area of Ibadan 
where people were slaughtered for rituals. Human skulls and human parts 
littered the environment with several decomposed bodies and skeletons. 
Several pictures, clothes, shoes, and even school bags of victims were 
recovered by the police (Akpuh 2014, p. 1).
The issue of ritual murder is not only in Nigeria. It is rampant in Africa, 
especially towards and during elections. In Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, 
and Kenya, today, albinos are haunted and killed because witchdoctors 
believe that potions made from albino body parts generate good luck and 
wealth (National Mirror 2015, p. 49). This haunt has damaged the inter-
national image of these nations, especially Tanzania. The government has 
clamped down on witchdoctors in the country as part of counter- measures, 
and offenders suffer severe penalty. For example, two people were sen-
tenced to death in Tanzania in 2015 for murdering an albino woman. 
Also, in March 2015, over 280 witchdoctors were arrested. The United 
Nations has estimated that over 80 albino Tanzanians had been killed 
since 2000. The Red Cross noted that witchdoctors pay as much as 
US$75,000 (₦30,000,000) for a complete set of albino parts (The 
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Guardian 2015, p. 9). In Malawi, in April 2016, ten people were arrested 
for killing a woman with albinism. A mob had earlier burnt to death seven 
members of a gang hunting for albinos after being found with albino parts.
All those who kill for rituals have no knowledge of, or have forgotten, 
or do not care to know God’s aversion for murder. In the Bible when Cain 
killed his brother Abel, God cast a spell on Cain as punishment:
What hast thou done, the voice of thy brother’s blood cried unto me from 
the earth which hath opened her mouth to receive thy hand. When thou 
tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength, a fugi-
tive and a vagabond shall thou be in the earth. (Genesis 4:10–12)
In the Holy Quran also, we are taught that:
If anyone kills a human being, unless it be (in punishment) for murder or for 
spreading corruption on earth, it shall be as though he had killed all man-
kind; whereas if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the 
lives of all mankind. (Holy Quran, 5:32)
Most of these ritualists and their agents are either Christians or Muslims, 
and only few if any are animists or traditionalists. No wonder Douglas 
William Jerrold philosophied that “Religion is in the heart not in the knee”.
Dream Manipulation
Through witchcraft or jujucraft, people’s dreams are manipulated either to 
frighten them to succumb to the manipulator’s will or to show them the 
picture of a wrong person as being a threat to his or her life, well-being, or 
progress. This form of manipulation has created enmity between several 
people and families, as wrong persons are spiritually presented to others as 
enemies. In some cases, such dream manipulation has led to violence and 
death. For example, on August 30, 2012, a 25-year-old man by name 
Ifeanyi Okorie of Amatakun, in Ohaozara local government area of 
Ebonyi State, was arrested for allegedly killing his 65-year-old uncle, Mr 
Uwajie Obasi, with a machete. The reason for killing him as gathered by 
the police, and stated by the Police Public Relations Officer, Mr Sylvester 
Igbo, was that Mr Okorie said that he saw his uncle Mr Obasi in his dream 
pursuing him to kill him with a machete.
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Only Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) can reveal if the person seen 
in the dream by Okorie is really Mr Obasi or not. The person may be a 
woman who took on the physical appearance of a man. The person may 
also be an enemy who wants to plant bitterness and distrust in the family. 
The point of concern to this author, however, is making people to be 
aware that dreams can be manipulated, and therefore nobody should take 
such extreme actions as done by Mr Okorie without fully finding out the 
truth about what one saw in dreams.
Bullet-Proof Charms
From time immemorial, our ancestors used various charms for war: charms 
for disappearance when in danger and appearance in safe places; charms 
against snake bites in the bush; charms to turn from human form to ani-
mal form (fly, lion, snake, tiger, etc.) when in danger; and charms against 
bullets, machete cuts, arrows, nails, and so on. The most outstanding of 
these charms today is the one that protects the body from bullet penetra-
tion and wounds from sharp objects like cutlass, daggers, and so on. The 
problem or threat from this charm is that criminals and violent persons 
obtain them and use the protection from them (where real) to cause havoc 
in the society, for example, terrorists, insurgents, kidnappers, and 
armed robbers.
Another source of threat from this charm or jujucraft is that some 
obtain fake charms, and die in the process of testing it, or in actions based 
on the false belief that they are protected. For example, in July 2014, an 
apprentice bricklayer by name Rasheed Suleiman was shot dead while test-
ing the potency of a bullet-proof charm (in the amulet he wore) which he 
just procured from a herbalist. His death threw the Asipa community in 
the Ife North local government area into confusion. It was gathered that 
the deceased could have been preparing to use the charm for governorship 
election (Makinde 2014, p. 5) activities such as political thuggery. The 
elders of the community were rattled and worried as they “believed that 
some other youths might have similar charms”.
In Liberia’s civil war period (1980–1989), General Butt Naked was a 
well-known warrior who used bullet-proof charms that enabled him sur-
vive the civil war. He was Commander of the naked platoon that fought 
on the side of President Samuel Doe. The khamajors also used bullet- 
proof charms during the Sierra Leone civil war. Many soldiers, especially 
child-soldiers, wore “ronko” (a “country cloth”) which is a bullet-proof 
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material. Mohammed from the Ropet village of Northern Sierra Leone, 
who is a 12-year-old, told researchers that he used to wear “ronko” when 
going to warfront to protect him from the white man’s bullet. He con-
firmed the “ronko” worked well for him as long as he observed all the 
rules and rites, which included abstinence from sex. The boy said that after 
they were initiated, they were given “ronko” to wear. They were then 
lined up and fired at in turn to test the potency. They were assured of 
invincibility to bullets (Gbla, in Sesay, 2003, p. 178).
In Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram in the North-East, the issue of 
use of mystical powers by Boko Haram elements was rife especially between 
2013 and 2014 when the terror group was on a rampage, sacking army 
barracks, burning down villages and towns, and sending our soldiers on 
the run for their dear lives. A New Telegraph reporter, Ibrahim Abdul, 
stated that the tabloid’s correspondents were told by fleeing soldiers that 
Boko Haram elements were using mystical powers. In his words:
Sources told our correspondent that testimonies from fleeing soldiers 
involved in the fight against the insurgents alleged that Boko Haram 
employed mystical powers, to overwhelm the Nigerian troops. They also 
alleged that it was one of the factors that made the soldiers to flee from the 
insurgents. (Abdul 2014, p. 5)
He reported one of the soldiers to have said:
When we fired our guns at the insurgents, they did not die because they had 
mystical powers (voodoo) and kept advancing towards us. So we had no 
option but to flee from them. (Abdul 2014, p. 5)
Nigerian soldiers at the beginning of the anti-terror war were handi-
capped in several areas. First, they were not trained to fight terrorism. 
Second, they were not supplied adequate and proper weapons. Third, they 
were not trained for guerrilla warfare, and above all, fourth, they were not 
trained for spiritual warfare. To overcome these, their training was quickly 
upgraded to fight terrorism and guerrilla warfare, while the government 
struggled to get the needed weapons from China, South Africa, open mar-
ket, and so on. To overcome spiritual warfare deficiency, the idea of 
recruiting local hunters, local vigilantes, and Civilian Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) came up, as they were also “versed in the use of voodoo powers” 
(Abdul 2014, p.  5). They used SSI and carried magical sticks (gora in 
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Hausa), local arms (Dane guns, bows and arrows, etc.), and many of them 
also had mystical powers. I was reliably informed that some of the red 
cloth or band some members of the CJTF tied round their Dane guns 
were prepared with menstrual flows and such guns can bring down any-
body who had anti-bullet charms.
In December 2016, the Federal government announced a ban on 
tokunbo vehicle importation through land borders, and both the smug-
glers and customs officials started getting ready for enforcement show-
down. The preparation was more spiritual than physical. As a customs 
official told a Nigerian Tribune reporter:
Nobody wants to be caught napping. Ali (Customs boss, Colonel Hammed 
Ali rtd) will make us do it (enforce the ban) and you know these people 
(smugglers) won’t just disappear from the land borders because of the ban. 
They are either going to increase bribe offers or get deadlier. They know 
they can’t beat us to gun fight, so it is these babas (herbalists), alagbas and 
alfas (Christian prophets and Muslim clerics) that they will want to move 
closer to. But our people (officers) are not sleeping too (officers are fortify-
ing themselves). (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 19)
One of the herbalists told the reporter:
You know, smugglers constitute a huge percentage of the clients some of us 
(herbalists) who reside around border towns enjoy. They come to us for 
fortification against bullets penetration and all sorts of charms. The kind of 
job they do, which involves confronting customs officers in thick bushes 
along border towns exposes them to exchange of gunfire sometimes. Some 
of them come to us for fortification to avoid being killed during this 
exchange of gunfire. Some smugglers would want fortification against bul-
lets penetration while some would insist that anytime they are approaching, 
the guns of the customs officials should not work until they leave that area. 
Some other people come for charms that would make them invisible and 
others ask for charms that would make their (customs personnel) pursuit 
unsuccessful. (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 20)
This makes it clear that customs officials face a lot of security threats, 
both physical and spiritual, in their job, and many have been killed. 
Smugglers cannot do without magical powers. Some disappear when fired 
at. At times another person appears and dies when a smuggler is fired at. 
Customs officers for their own safety also visit native doctors who give 
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them both bullet-proof charms and white cloth which they tie over the 
muzzle of their guns to prevent the smugglers escape, especially in Seme 
(Lagos) and Idiroko Ogun State (Adewole et al. 2016, p. 20). In some 
situations, a smuggler carrying guns can turn them into stalk fish or walk-
ing sticks when they approach the customs post to deceive the personnel.
The problems here are that security personnel of the state are manipu-
lated or killed! In addition, the state loses revenue as a result of spiritual 
attacks or threats on its security personnel. Yet, the state looks on helpless 
or careless about the situation.
Spiritual Poisoning
There are various types of poisoning that can kill human beings. There is 
natural food poisoning that can occur when someone mistakenly or 
unknowingly eats certain food items such as poisonous mushrooms and 
expired creams. There is the deliberate poisoning of a person by another 
through the application of cyanide, crocodile bile, acid, or similar chemical 
or biological liquids or substances in a target person’s food. Concoctions 
of snake venom, deadly leaves, mushrooms, and other such substances are 
also used by the wicked in eliminating their fellow human beings. These 
are all components of physical poisoning.
But there is the spiritual aspect of poisoning which can be administered 
through dream food or through physical food laced with spiritual agents. 
For example, a little powder or liquid can be sprinkled on a target person’s 
food or drink. Once such food or drink enters the stomach, the spiritual 
agents transform into what they were meant to be to carry out their deadly 
assignments. They can become needles meant to pierce the heart, vampire 
bats sucking the victim’s blood, or scorpions.
The former governor of Kogi State, His Excellency Alh Audu, was 
alleged to have been poisoned. The latest is the first governor of Osun 
State, His Excellency Adeleke, whom the family members believe was poi-
soned to death in April 2017. In fact, one angry young man stated that he 
was killed with juju poison. The problem is that the Nigerian state is not 
equipped to handle such spiritual challenges. But this incapacity does not 
stop the existence of the threat! The wicked, greedy, and jealous elements 
prefer to use spiritual poisons because they are difficult or impossible to 
trace to the doers, and the state is not equipped to prosecute suspects 
without SSI, unless where there is confession, which is very rare.
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Humanity lost three people in April 2015  in the Ukehe community, 
Igbo-Etiti local government area of Enugu State, after they ate food with 
funeral meat. It was believed that the man Mr Eze, his mother, and his 
wife ate meat poisoned at the funeral given by an unknown person. They 
started vomiting blood after eating the meat and later died, shattering the 
family’s joy.
Spiritual Traps Against Sexual Intruders
In several African nations such as Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, there are 
spiritual mechanisms used by men to check infidelity on the side of their 
wives. There are two current strands of such mechanisms. One is prepared 
and laced on the woman, after which any man she copulates with will be 
“gummed” to her body until the antidote is administered. This mecha-
nism has been seen in operation in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria (the Onisha 
incident).
The second is known among the South-West people of Nigeria and is 
called “magun” (meaning “don’t climb”), that is, “don’t climb my wife” 
or “don’t climb this woman”. It is prepared in the form of a string which 
is placed on the ground usually across a door which the wife will walk 
through and over the string. Once she walks over the string, the spiritual 
agents will afflict her, and any man she copulates with will die. Some men 
usually warn the wife and or her illegal lover before the administration of 
the “magun”. Any male victim of “magun” dies in one of five ways: he 
tumbles three times from the woman’s body at orgasm and dies, he crows 
like a cock three times at orgasm and dies, he keeps calling for and drink-
ing buckets full of water till he dies, he dies the day he eats okro soup, or 
the day he hits his toe against a stone while walking.
In August 2014, the Nigerian Tribune (Olukoya 2014, p. 8) reported 
the case of one pastor of a church in Ijebu-Ode who died after having sex 
with a lady friend in a hotel. The lady friend absconded, while the police 
from the Obalende divisional office took his body to the general hospital 
for autopsy.
One problem with “magun” is that once the spell is on the woman, 
even her own husband who administered the “magun” on her is vulnera-
ble. Some husbands who cast the spell and forgot have died after copulat-
ing with their possessed wives. In the course of my research over this 
magun matter in 1978, I was told that a man under the “magun” attack 
can still be saved if the woman can hold him and urinate into his mouth 
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before he tumbles or crows the third time. This information is yet to be 
tested and is difficult to be tested for confirmation.
In 2013, in Kenya, a woman who had been cheating on her husband 
despite appeals and warnings was publicly disgraced along with her illegal 
lover. At orgasm, the bodies of the woman and her illegal lover gummed 
together inseparably. The news spread like wildfire attracting thousands of 
anxious people who wanted to witness the mysterious gumming. The 
Kenyan police ran out of options trying to control the situation and at last 
decided to invite the woman’s husband. People pleaded with her husband 
to set the offenders free. He agreed after several hours but insisted that the 
intruder must pay him 20,000 shillings. It was agreed, they were freed, 
and the money was paid.
Also, in 2012, Adom Television based in Ghana featured in its Ahomaso 
programme on May 22 a video footage of a man and a woman who were 
glued to each other while committing adultery. Hundreds of people 
assembled to see them, and it took the intervention of security personnel 
to save them from being lynched. It took serious prayers of men of God to 
neutralise the spiritual force that bound them together and set them free.
Sin
There is too much evil in the country, especially bloodletting, armed rob-
bery, kidnapping, cheating, rape, assassination, stealing, oppression of the 
poor and weak by the rich and powerful, ritual killing, human trafficking, 
drug trafficking, aggressive witchcraft and juju, nepotism, corruption and 
others. All these are sins before God. Sin is a reproach to a nation as the 
holy books teach us. “Sin puts man under the wrath of God” (Obasanjo 
n.d., p. 35). In Romans 1:18, it is stated that “The wrath of God is being 
revealed from heaven against all the ungodliness and wickedness of men”. 
Sin weakens the spiritual aspect of human beings and elevates the flesh. It 
sets men against God and His angels.
Those Christians who think that they will go free after committing 
atrocities against their fellow human beings should read Hebrews 12:29 
which reminds us that “God is a consuming fire”. They should also read 
the history of King David (who won the heart of God but also got pun-
ished), King Saul, and Sodom and Gomorrah.
In the Holy Quran, Al-Maida 5:2 provides that Allah (SWT) is severe 
in punishment:
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And do not let hatred or ill-will towards any folk incite you so that you 
swerve from dealing justly. Help you one another (in virtue, righteousness 
and piety); but do not help one another in sin and transgression. Be just; that 
is the nearest to heedfulness. Fear Allah, verily Allah is severe in punishment.
Sin is therefore a spiritual threat to man and the nation. The more sins 
citizens commit in any nation, the more such citizens and the nation suffer 
the wrath of God in different forms.
Violent Ghosts
Ghosts are spirits of dead persons. Ghosts of persons who were unjustly 
murdered, as well as some ghosts of persons who died violent deaths such 
as through war, communal clashes, terrorism, road accidents, and plane 
crashes tend to be violent, as they seek revenge on their killers or the soci-
ety that failed to protect them. These spirits can enter the bodies of the 
living especially children and youths and use them to carry out violent acts. 
Osman Gbla noted from his study of post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone that:
It is clear … that majority of the people in Liberia and Sierra Leone like 
those in many other African countries, believe that war-related psychological 
trauma is linked to the anger of the spirits of those killed during the war… 
In Mozambique … these spirits referred to as ‘mpfhukwa’ are generally 
believed to have the power to harm those who killed or mistreated them in 
life… In Sierra Leone, they are called ‘mompilas’ (ghosts), and are also 
believed to have the power to hurt and torment those involved in their 
death. Consequently, people in both countries, especially those in the rural 
areas, still believe that the dead have a role to play in the day-to-day affairs 
of the living. (Gbla 2003, p. 186)
Osman advised that these beliefs and perceptions should be taken into 
account if the treatment of former child-soldiers for post-trauma stress 
disorders in Liberia and Sierra Leone will be meaningful and successful.
It may be recalled that the Igbo people of Nigeria in 2015 had to carry 
out collective burial of men, women, and children who died during the 
two-and-a-half-year Biafran war to give them and the living peace in 
Igboland. Chief Rommy Ezeonwuka, who is a member of the All 
Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) Board of Trustees, said that he was 
now sure that the spirits of the millions of Igbo people that died in that 
war will now rest in peace. In his words:
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Their restless wondering spirits had taken over the souls of our youths and 
used them to commit havoc, kidnapping, armed robbery, occultism, rituals, 
drug trafficking; and other vices have continued to pollute the image of 
Ndigbo before the outside world. Their spirits are also behind the plight of 
Igbo youths who have died in Sahara desert in search of greener pastures 
and those who are languishing in many prisons across European and Asian 
countries. The problem of disunity between Ndigbo and apparent failure to 
realise certain political ambition in Nigeria are also traceable to the failure to 
accord the fallen heroes a befitting burial in line with our tradition as estab-
lished by our forefathers. (Bobby 2015, p. 12)
The message is that society should take the protection of life more seri-
ously, and any innocent person killed must be appeased and given a 
decent burial.
In April 2014, a pastor dropped dead in Asaga-Ohafia, Ohafia local 
government area of Abia State, while conducting the funeral of a renowned 
herbalist, Pa Oji Okoko “who was not only a notable herbalist, but a 
leader of some powerful cult groups such as Uke Aboa, Akpan, and Ekpe” 
(Samson 2014, p. 12). It is said that the man had warned before his death 
that his corpse should not be kept in any mortuary when he dies, or taken 
to any church, and there should not be any Christian funeral conducted 
for him. Two other pastors had declined to officiate at the funeral, but a 
third pastor, Pastor Odum, agreed to officiate but collapsed and died in 
the process. Many believe that the man’s spirit was angry that his death 
wish was not obeyed. Moreover, the pastor was given enough warning 
signs to back off which he stubbornly ignored.
In 2011, a Lagos-based businessman by name Kazeem Ademoye was 
brutally murdered by some men hired by his own wife. After his death, the 
wife so manipulated things that her husband’s brother and their pastor 
were arrested by the police for her husband’s death. Angered by the impu-
nity and wickedness of his wife in not only killing him, but also arresting 
innocent people, Kazeem’s ghost faced the woman, tormenting and 
threatening her to confess or see hell. She had no choice after several days 
of torment than to confess.
Few days after the DANA plane crashed at Iju Ishaga in Lagos killing 
all on board, the residents of the crash site started seeing ghosts and hear-
ing footsteps and other frightening noises around their homes. The Obas 
consult Ifa, who told them to perform cleansing rites to appease the spirits 
of the crash victims who died violent and horrible death and roving the 
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area, before they become violent. The Obas did the cleansing rites, killing 
goats, chicken, and, so on, at the site and since then, peace reigned in the 
area, as the spirits of the dead went to rest. The Aare of Iju Ishaga, Chief 
Olajide Akinwumi, spoke on the matter thus:
What happened has happened. These people died horrible death. Their spir-
its are still roving the place. We have to perform the rituals to ensure that the 
dead leave the people in the area to live in peace. The people living in the 
area complained that they heard noises of the dead at night and they could 
not sleep. We know it can happen like that and we have to ensure that the 
dead allow those living to know peace. (Quoted in Adeseko 2012, p. 5)
The message is that those who murder people will not know peace. 
They may wrongly believe the white man’s view that “dead men don’t 
bite”. It is not so in this continent. We should also note that all this blood-
letting in Nigeria, through religious and ethnic conflicts, Boko Haram 
war, herdsmen (armed militia) attacks, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, 
ritual killings, excessive use of force by soldiers, police brutality, avoidable 
road accidents, and other violent ways throw hundreds of angry and vio-
lent ghosts in the nation, and these worsen the insecurity situation in 
the country.
Static and Roving Spirits
There are static and roving spirits, some of which can do harm to people 
at certain periods of the day or night. It is believed that such spirits can 
turn babies in a woman’s womb into stones or snakes. Among the Yoruba 
of South-West Nigeria, pregnant women rarely leave their homes in the 
afternoons, especially between 12:00 noon and 2:00 pm. Those who must 
leave their homes tie stone or safety pins to their wrappers on top of 
their belly.
Familiar Spirits
Thousands of young girls are in churches for prayers in search of hus-
bands. Several girls who are married have no babies. The two problems are 
at times associated with familiar spirits—spirit husbands and local deities 
that possess these women. Some boys and men are also possessed by spirit 
wives and local deities. The delay in pregnancy negatively affects the 
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repopulation of the society. A lot of productive man-hours are also wasted 
in the church prayers, hospitals, and herbal homes. These reduce the 
quantum of national productivity and national wealth.
Ritual Rape
Rape in contemporary times is no more for the raw sexual pleasure of a 
depraved man. There is pecuniary-induced rape as demonstrated by what 
is called blood minerals in Congo. In Congo, criminals are sponsored to 
descend on villages where strategic minerals are found and rape girls, boys, 
and women continuously until the entire village evacuates, giving way to 
the imperialist sponsors of the rapists to take over the villages for free min-
ing. Also, some old men approaching the end of their lives at 90 years or 
more rape under-aged children in order to rejuvenate their expiring lives. 
Such men apply concoctions to their private parts or rub it on the girl 
before such rape, and this leads to the death of the victim. There is also 
rape for money rituals. An Abuja-based pastor who wanted to harvest 
money from a new church he wanted to establish got juju prepared for 
him. He was told to rape a five-year-old female virgin to activate the juju. 
He raped the five-year-old child of his landlord and got arrested. The rest 
is now history. Rape can also be for political power and influence and can 
cause the death of a victim too.
In September 2015, a 46-year-old man was arrested by the Badarawa/
Malali Concerned Forum in Kaduna and handed over to the police for 
raping an 11-year-old girl. On interrogation, the man confessed that the 
rape is for a money ritual. In his words:
I was given charm by an herbalist in Maiduguri in Borno State for wealth 
purposes and he told me that I need to be sleeping with a minor for it to be 
effective… He asked me to rub it on any girl of between 10 and 11 years of 
age and then sleep with her after which I will have a lot of wealth. (Alabi 
2015, p. 38)
The point here is that people should know that rape now has several faces 
or goals, and that the police should always establish the motive for each rape 
case for proper justice to be done to the victim and ensure her life is secured. 
In the case of the 11-year-old in Badarawa, the Kaduna State Police 
Command Spokesman DSP Zubairu Abubakar confirmed the incident, say-
ing that investigation had begun. The point is, in a state where the police is 
17 DIMENSIONS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SPIRITUAL THREATS… 
384
not equipped or empowered to handle spiritual matters, how can it investi-
gate and prosecute ritual rape? The message is then that the police need to 
upgrade their knowledge and skills, and the laws of the land also need to be 
upgraded to be in tune with the times and transmute the crime of rape.
Spiritual Attacks
Millions of people are under one form of spiritual attack or the other in 
the world, with most not being aware of the sources of their problems. 
The destinies of some people are tampered with, manipulated, or held 
down by the wicked, jealous, and fetish. Several unmarried or unemployed 
young men and women suffer from spiritual attacks. The business of many 
has been collapsed by such evil attacks, and several road accidents have 
emanated from spiritual attacks.
Hundreds of innocent people have been killed and many others made 
mad through spiritual attacks. These attacks are effected through magic, 
witchcraft, or jujucraft. It affects children, men, women, private people, 
and public officials—presidents, governors, directors, and so on. In 
September 2015, there was this report by the Daily Sun titled “El-Raufai 
Admits Spiritual Attacks”. In the words of the reporter, Omipidan:
Governor Nasir Ahmed El-Rufai of Kaduna State yesterday disclosed what 
looked like an admittance that he was indeed attacked spiritually… El-Rufai 
had shortly after superintending over the Kogi State All Progressive Congress 
(APC) governorship primary election, “disappeared” for about 10 days. … 
Though, in a veiled reference, he told some residents, comprising mainly 
workers: They wanted me dead. But what they don’t know is that even if I 
am not here today, my deputy will continue. They can go ahead with their 
fetish activities, I don’t care…
Omipidan went further to report that:
Daily Sun gathered that El-Rufai actually collapsed… Other APC chieftains 
who spoke in confidence previously about the matter disclosed that El_Rufai 
was suffering from a “spiritual attack” over the Zaria demolition: “Ask 
around, the Zaria people who are angry over the demolition he carried out 
have vowed to see his (El-Rufai) end. And these people are using both mar-
abouts and other African traditional magic to hit at the man. So forget about 
what some ignorant persons are saying. I can confirm to you that the man is 
suffering from spiritual attack….” Another APC chieftain said: “We have 
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always told him that Abuja is not Kaduna. Abuja is no man’s land, but in 
Kaduna, we have locals who can invoke whatever they believe in, and in no 
distant time, you start seeing the repercussion.” (Omipidan 2015, p. 5)
Spiritual attacks can take one or more forms. The spirit of a victim can 
be invoked in a mirror, a spiritual pot of water, to a coven and hit with a 
juju, stabbed with a knife, or shot with a gun. People whose spirits are 
weak are easily attacked through this technique. Strong spirits are those 
people who are serious in prayer and fasting, and do good deeds and so are 
protected by God. Pictures of people are also used. The name of someone 
can be invoked into an effigy and attacked by breaking the leg or hand, or 
piercing the eye or heart with a nail or knife. People’s names can also be 
mentioned and a curse or spell pronounced against them. Padlocks are 
also used against victims.
When the governor of a state faces spiritual attacks for performing his 
duties that the government saw to be in the best interest of the state, then, 
such spiritual matters should no longer be perceived as mere superstition. 
This is because events have left the social sphere and registered in the 
political sphere and therefore call for serious intellectual study and govern-
ment response. But who will bell the cat? A South African university dedi-
cated a department from 2018 for the study of witchcraft. They hope to 
reduce fuel importation and traffic jam from the research results that fol-
low. But we here in Nigeria still see witchcraft as superstition! I pity our 
countrymen and women. O ma se o! O di egwu!
In this case, curses or spells are pronounced into a padlock, evil spirits 
are invoked into the padlock to execute the mission, and the padlock is 
locked and buried in the ground, thrown into the bush or river, or nailed 
to a tree in the thick forest. Powder bearing a person’s name and curse or 
spell can also be blown into the air, and it can travel to any part of the 
nation or world. Where witchcraft is the tool, the victim can be attacked 
in his sleep through stabbing, strangulation, curses, or spells. Any mission 
can be carried out depending on the state of the spirit of the target victim. 
Names or pictures of the target can also be deposited in shrines or with 
mercantile pastors and imams for harm.
Spiritual Mortgaging of Political Godsons
Political godfathers today mortgage the conscience and freedom of action 
of their godsons through spiritual means, and this has grave implications 
for public accountability, development, and democracy consolidation and 
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sustenance in the country. Godfathers drag their godsons to shrines of 
local deities to take ritualised oaths of loyalty, obedience, allegiance, and 
money supply. In this the godsons are made to undergo rituals. This form 
of spiritual bondage promotes corruption and constitutes threats to the 
safety of public treasury and the deepening of a democratic culture. We 
recall the case of Dr Chris Ngige, who in the process of being given the 
ticket for governorship of Anmbra State was taken to the Ogwugwuakpu 
shrine at Okija by his godfather, Chief Chris Uba, where he had to take an 
oath of allegiance. It was the refusal of Dr Ngige to play ball and compro-
mise Anambra State’s money that blew the lid open after a few months of 
his assumption of office. If he had not taken that patriotic stand, the 
money meant for the development of Anambra State and the welfare of 
the people would have gone down the drain. Even though he was later 
removed through the court for reneging on the oath, as many believe, he 
had done a great job in Anambra State. Apart from the great transforma-
tions in infrastructure, he enabled Anambra people to know that the state 
was indeed getting money, which was in the past stolen or shared by the 
greedy in the face of weak leadership.
The point remains however that spiritual powers are being used by 
political godfathers to mortgage the conscience of their godsons. It is a 
threat to national peace, national security, and national development. 
Several people were killed, and several public properties of Anambra State 
were destroyed as a result of this crisis. Dr Chris Ngige himself, even as 
governor, was kidnapped and locked up in a toilet. We thank God for His 
mercies that the man survived to be federal minister today.
Increasing Use of Hypnosis
There is increasing use of hypnosis or hypnotism in the society today. 
People are hypnotised in vehicles (taxis, one-chance buses), on the roads, 
and even in their homes. Hypnosis or hypnotism involves spiritually taking 
control of someone’s mind and demobilising the victim’s guards and 
thinking system in order to make him or her answerable to the command 
and control of the hypnotist. People are hypnotised to be duped, raped, or 
kidnapped, or abducted, for rituals, or to be trafficked into prostitution, 
sexual slavery, or forced labour.
The Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS) announced the 
case of one Isiaku Adewale who finished school at University of Abuja and 
was awaiting his National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) programme. He 
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left Shaki town for Lagos, but stopped at Ojoo (Ibadan) to board the 
vehicle to Iwo road, where he would join a Lagos vehicle. He was pro-
nounced missing at the BCOS on February 21, 2016. He had sent a text 
message home when he was in a vehicle between Ojoo and Iwo road that 
he had entered “one chance” (i.e. the vehicle of fraudulent persons—kid-
nappers, ritualists, or traffickers). He was later found unconscious on a 
bridge in Lagos and was unable to recognise anybody or answer any ques-
tion correctly. Definitely, he was hypnotised for a purpose, yet to be identi-
fied. He is lucky to be alive. Hundreds of people have been hypnotised 
and taken to slaughter areas or trafficked abroad.
The hypnotisation process can take any form—tapping of the victim on 
the chest, lap, head, or back; giving food or a drink item; posing a ques-
tion to the victim; and so on. On November 25, 2016, two school pupils 
on their way to school at Masaka, Nasarawa State, were given a yoghurt 
drink by a strange woman. After dinking the yoghurt, they “voluntarily” 
followed the woman away. Their parents believed they were in school, 
while their teacher thought they were at home. It was at 6  pm that it 
became clear they were missing (Monitored on Nigerian Television 
Authority 2016).
Increasing Theft of Human Parts at Cemeteries
Cemeteries and graves in homes and villages are under siege by human 
parts hunters all over Nigeria today. Thus, even the dead is not allowed 
peace, as their bodies and skeletons are mutilated, separated, and the 
needed parts stolen away, especially skulls, torsos, arms, genitals, heart, 
liver, and so on. These human parts are sold to ritualists for money rituals, 
political power rituals, and so on.
In July 2016, Kwara State experienced an unprecedented invasion of its 
cemeteries and graves by criminals and practitioners of rituals. The worst 
hit were the Muslim cemeteries at Osere and public cemeteries at Oke- 
Oyi. An affected relative told The Guardian:
We took the remains of a brother to the cemetery early this month and laid 
him to rest according to the Islamic rites. But when we returned to the grave 
two days after with the aim of putting concrete on the tomb, to our surprise, 
we met a dismembered body outside the grave. (Fagbemi 2016, p. 1)
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This means posting more security men at cemeteries to stem the vice, 
with the implication of less security men to protect the living. The rituals 
done with the stolen parts of the dead also worsen insecurity in the coun-
try or the world.
Wrath of Local Deities
People who take oaths, those who break oaths whose moral guarantor is a 
local deity, and those who cheat or offend others who, in the search of 
justice or out of anger, deposit their names in the shrines of local deities 
suffer the wrath of such deities. In Lagos, the deity called Elegba (the 
devil), among the Ojuelegba community, is believed to bring peace and 
tranquillity to the Lagos community.
In fact, the town got its name from the deity that was located there 
during early times. Elegba was the main deity of the area and was well 
worshipped. Later people abandoned the worship, and problems began 
with constant accidents on the Ojuelegba bridge, cult killings, and dis-
eases. These stopped after the deity was appeased due to the concern 
raised by government functionaries and police officers (Saturday Tribune 
2016, p. 19).
The gods (local deities) are not dead as some people think. Thus, young 
people should stop taking oaths in the name of or before local deities, 
believing that nothing will happen to them when they break the oath. The 
shrine of the Ogwugwuakpu deity at Okija in Anambra State is filled with 
corpses of people who took false oaths in the shrine and died later. Also 
people who steal from shops, homes, and farms placed under the guard of 
sango (the Yoruba god of thunder) see the red eye of the deity as they are 
sooner or later killed by thunderbolt.
In September 2016, a columnist of The Punch Abimbola Adelakun told 
the story of a pastor who invaded a shrine in the Ketu area of Ogun State 
with the aim of destroying the shrine. He claimed that he was instructed 
by the “Holy Spirit” to destroy the shrine in the community. But when he 
got to this shrine, he saw himself transfixed as if under a spell from a super-
natural force. It was the early intervention of the traditional ruler of the 
town that saved the pastor from sudden death (The Punch 2016a, p. 48). 
People should be careful with local deities. Christian pastors particularly 
should leave African traditional religion alone. When prayers are said in 
public places, only Christians and Moslems are called upon to pray. 
Sundays and Fridays are officially marked out for Christian and Moslem 
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worship. There is nothing for African traditional religions, as long as it 
remain in jail in Nigeria, and Africa, so long shall African traditional medi-
cine be in jail because both are linked and all of us, Christians and Moslems, 
will keep suffering the side effects and huge costs of synthetic oyibo medi-
cines that reduce life expectancy. Where is our national sense of justice, 
equity, and fairness? We must promote religious tolerance in word and 
deed and stop all these exclusionisms that divide and radicalise people.
Wrath of God
For those who believe in God, it is said from the holy books that the fear 
of God is the beginning of wisdom. Because the churches and mosques 
often preach that God (Allah, SWT) is very merciful and forgiving, many 
people have been misled into committing sins against God and atrocities 
against their fellow human beings. They forget that God is not the God of 
injustice and evil and that the wrath of God will always descend on the 
wicked and evildoer. Thus, millions of people and several societies are suf-
fering today from the wrath of God due to their sins and man’s inhuman-
ity to man, even without knowing where their problems come from.
The Holy Bible as stated earlier teaches us in Hebrew 12:29 that “God 
is a consuming fire”, while the Quran (5:2) teaches us that “God is severe 
in retribution”. People should read holy books and understand God. The 
wicked will always suffer the wrath of God at the appropriate time, unless 
they repent and make amends to their victims early enough. If they do not 
live long enough to suffer for their atrocities in this life, they will suffer it 
in their next life or the punishment will be visited on their children.
There is no place in any holy book where God has ever forgiven a per-
son who never showed genuine remorsefulness or repentance. Therefore 
any imam or pastor or prophet preaching forgiveness must first preach 
repentance or remorsefulness. Psalm 7 verses 8–16 records as follows 
about God and the fate of the wicked:
8. The Lord shall judge the people.
9. Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end…
11. God is angry with the wicked everyday.
12.  If he turn not, He will whet His sword; He hath bent His bow and 
made it ready.
13. He hath also prepared for him the instruments of death.
16. His mischief shall return upon his own head.
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Also in Psalm 11 verses 5–6, these solemn words are written:
5.  The lord trieth the righteous; but the wicked and him that loveth vio-
lence His soul hateth.
6.  Upon the wicked He shall rain snares, fire, and brimstone, and an hor-
rible tempest. This shall be the portion of their cup.
In the same vein, Psalm 110 verses 5–6 states:
The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through k ngs in the day of his wrath. 
He shall judge among the heathen, He shall fill the places with the dead 
bodies, He shall wound the heads over many countries.
People should stop presenting God wrongly as if He is God of confu-
sion and injustice. His relationship with man is well set out in the holy 
books. The wage of sin is death. It can only be mitigated by prompt 
remorse, confession, plea for forgiveness with a promise of turning a new 
leaf, and restitution or compensation for victims.
Casting Spells
A spell is a set of projected pronouncements imbued with magical powers. 
A young man who copulates with the wife of a very jealous man may end 
up with the spell to “keep having sex with married women until he meets 
his doom”. Some cases of a man having sex with a goat, or with his own 
daughter, are products of spells. A pastor’s or imam’s child who is a way-
ward or a thief may be under an enemy’s spell just to disgrace the father.
In May 1986, a man was charged to court in Kenya for placing a spell 
on his wife to prevent her from having sex with other men. After the trial, 
he was ordered to undo the spell and buy a goat for the wife to carry out 
cleansing rites. We have earlier mentioned “magun” of South-West Nigeria.
In the United Kingdom, a 66-year-old man, William Nicoll, was caught 
having sex with a horse and was charged to court. In Ibadan, Oyo State, a 
boy was caught having sex with a goat. His mother confirmed that the boy 
has been under a spell for years as revealed by pastors (Nwolise 2013, 
pp. 79–80).
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Controlled Prostitution
Several girls are deceived into going abroad for ready-found jobs and 
schools, while some voluntarily accept to go for prostitution. The three 
categories are usually subjected to ritual oaths in Nigeria in shrines before 
leaving our shores. At such shrines their pubic hair, fingernails, and blood 
are used for rituals. They are then told to swear an oath of obedience and 
secrecy of the entire plan and activities under pain of death or madness. 
From the moment of oath-taking, they come under the full control of 
their traffickers. This ritual oath is one of the problems of fully penetrating 
and dismantling trafficking for prostitution syndicates. The National 
Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons has been doing excel-
lent job from the moment they learnt the secret of taking liberated traf-
ficked girls to the shrines where they earlier took an oath for their freedom.
Yahoo-Plus Operations
Yahoo now has two dimensions. One is the usual yahoo everybody hears 
of which involves the use of wits and ability to convince a target victim and 
defraud him or her. The second is the aggressive application of supernatu-
ral powers online by a criminal practitioner against someone in order to 
hypnotise him or her or bring his or her spirit, mind, and body under com-
mand and control for selfish gains. This second yahoo type is what is called 
yahoo-plus. It involves rituals, jujucraft, witchcraft, and magic. Several peo-
ple have lost their lives, money, and landed properties as a result of these 
yahoo-plus activities.
The operators carry a live ritualised tortoise on their chest when com-
municating with the target victim, some wear ritualised charms or rings, or 
some place their hands or feet on a juju. Some rub ritualised powder or a 
potion on their palm while operating the laptop or computer while passing 
instructions to the target victim. Some purchase nice dresses, rings, wrist-
watches, shoes, caps, earrings, and so on, ritualise them, and send them to 
the target person who on getting into direct contact with the objects get 
hypnotised. Some submit names of targeted persons to shrines. Some 
make incisions in their tongues while some lick juju before talking to the 
target person. Some operators sleep in graveyards with their laptops 
for rituals.
Many girls have fallen victim of these yahoo-plus practitioners by drink-
ing minerals from them. The girls soon start bleeding from their private 
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parts and die if spiritual remedy does not come fast. The men will then use 
the girl’s star. Some operators effect ritual rape or even voluntary but ritu-
alised sex with girls they entice with money, cars, jewellery, or clothes. 
After the sex, they wipe the girl’s semen for rituals, and such girls become 
useless in life thereafter (Independent Saturday 2017, pp. B6–B7).
conclusIon
This chapter has not only shown that spiritual security threats exist and are 
increasingly causing havoc among citizens and families in Nigeria, it also 
went ahead to identify their various dimensions and gave living and verifi-
able examples of their manifestations. What is next is for the Nigerian state 
to take up the matter from here and do the needful by making appropriate 
new laws, prescribing appropriate new punishments, and upgrading the 
training, methods, and equipment of security personnel. This is to ensure 
that the security personnel and the Criminal Justice System remain ahead 
of the new threats, attacks, and crimes.
For now, the people feel abandoned by the state, as its security agents 
and the courts are still working with old laws, methods, and tools. For 
example, how does the state investigate and prosecute a man who carried 
out ritual rape on a five-year-old girl? The time of talking about supersti-
tion has passed. The state should charge the universities to commence 
degree programmes on spiritual security studies. State intelligence agen-
cies have to upgrade to Strategic Spiritual Intelligence. I do not agree with 
Sun Tzu’s thesis that “foreknowledge can not be gotten from ghosts and 
spirits”. With due respect to the legendary Chinese general, philosopher, 
and strategist, that statement is outdated.
When I gave my inaugural lecture at the University of Ibadan on 
February 20, 2014, I humbly suggested the establishment of a “new 
Department of Metaphysical Studies, or Department of Spiritual Studies, 
which will serve as the nucleus for a future Faculty of Spiritual Sciences”. 
I further suggested that:
There is a need to open up studies in mysticism, Nigerian and African divini-
ties, magic, spiritual sicknesses, spiritual healing, spiritual warfare, death, 
Strategic Spiritual Intelligence, etc. (Nwolise 2013, p. 110)
But so far in the country nothing has happened. It is rather in faraway 
South Africa that a new department on witchcraft was established to take 
off in 2018, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.
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There is an urgent need to raise public awareness and consciousness on 
these identified and other spiritual security threats and crimes so that col-
lective response can be galvanised while awaiting further state actions. 
There is a need for spiritual security education in schools, via radio, via 
television, in churches, and in mosques.
New laws are needed to control spiritual power especially by native 
doctors, and mercantile pastors and imams against misuse. It is being done 
in Tanzania where native doctors are registered and given orientation. 
Those who violated the laws have been jailed or executed by the state.
Witches and wizards have to be recognised and registered and given 
new orientation to direct their knowledge and powers to positive use for 
the common good. People should depart from evil, trust in God, get close 
to God, and do good deeds to get His protection. They should monitor 
their fellowmen from time to time using Strategic Spiritual Intelligence; if 
not, the evil ones may get them first, attack them, and finish them.
Nigeria majorly and all African nations have to rediscover our social 
values before the continent completely loses its children and youths to the 
devil and the foreign cultures of globalising states. We must remain our 
brothers’ keepers. The sanctity of human blood and sacredness of human 
life must be restored. Social justice must remain the basis for peace and 
harmonious living in the society.
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Nigeria’s return to democratic governance on May 29 1999 resulted in 
the liberalization of the political space that was hitherto occupied by the 
military dictatorship for almost 33 years (1966–1979 and 1983–1999). 
The concomitant effect of this political freedom was massive outbursts of 
sectarian agitations, including the emergence of new forms of violent 
crimes such as terrorism, insurgency, farmers-herdsmen conflict, armed 
banditry, militancy, kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, electoral-related 
violence, and small arms and light weapons proliferation. These internal 
security threats are precipitated by the bourgeoning youth population and 
the threat of an army of unemployed youth, affected by the worsening 
economic conditions occasioned by decades of maladministration. These 
internal security threats have continued to undermine peaceful coexis-
tence and national development in the current republic, and the Nigeria 
Police Force that is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of 
tackling them is largely ill-equipped and ill-trained to handle them. As a 
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matter of fact, policing has always been a major challenge in Nigeria due 
to limited government funding of the police institution, a situation that 
has often constrained the efficiency of the institution. Alternatively, suc-
cessive civilian administrations have had to resort to forming various 
military- dominated Joint Task Forces in many states of the federation fac-
ing security challenges, and such outfits are largely controlled by the army, 
and they are saddled with the responsibility of managing internal security 
threats (Francis et al. 2011).
Despite the regular engagements of the army in internal security opera-
tions (ISOs), domestic security challenges have continued to increase, 
reinventing themselves in terms of their methods, lethality, scale and 
intensity, thereby dangerously undermining the fragility of the Nigerian 
state. Evidently, Nigeria’s internal security has remained very volatile to 
violent conflicts and criminality, thereby according it negative ranking in 
the international community. As a result, the country has been ranked by 
the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in its 2018 report as the third most 
terrorized country in the world, after Iraq and Afghanistan. The GTI mea-
sures the impact of terrorism on countries. Nigeria has also been ranked 
by the 2018 Fragile States Index (FSI) as the 15th least stable country out 
of 177 nations in the world (Failed States Index 2011). The aim of the FSI 
list is usually to assess states’ vulnerability to conflict or collapse. Currently, 
there exists a very sharp fault line along ethnic and religious lines in Nigeria 
permeating intergroup relations in Nigeria. The proliferation of numerous 
internal security threats in the extant Nigeria’s democratic republic clearly 
points to the fact that the country is at war against itself, and this has made 
the security agencies to be stretched beyond their capacity.
The engagement of the army in ISOs by both the federal and various 
state governments is mainly to restore public order and maintain national 
stability. This is with the understanding that security is significant to devel-
opment and progress of any society. ISOs happen to be Nigeria’s Armed 
Forces’ third function of “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of 
civil authorities to restore order” (Omede 2005). This becomes very 
important as Waltz has warned about the primacy of national security in a 
country like Nigeria plagued by national security challenges, when he pos-
ited that, “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured 
can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power” 
(Waltz 1979: 65). The importance of national security as a fundamental 
responsibility of governments cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, gov-
ernments devote huge resources towards ensuring watertight national 
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security architecture. Unarguably, democracy cannot flourish in an 
 atmosphere of anarchy, violence and general insecurity, as it is the case 
under Nigeria’s current democratic experience.
In Nigeria, ISOs are often regarded as a matter of strategic national 
interest to the extent that it is enshrined in the constitution of the country, 
and huge resources are often committed to pursue this objective. The role 
of the Armed Forces of Nigeria in ISOs is contained in Section 217 (2) of 
the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which expressly states that the 
Armed Forces of the Federation have the responsibilities of (1) defending 
Nigeria from external aggression; (2) maintaining its territorial integrity 
and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air; (3) suppressing 
insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when 
called upon to do so by the President and (4) performance of such other 
functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended).
But how well is the Nigerian Armed Forces, especially the army which 
is the focal point of this study, playing this very important constitutional 
role of managing the internal security challenges of the Nigerian state? 
This is against the backdrop that its engagements in ISOs in the current 
republic have increased dramatically, and it appears to be overstretched 
and overwhelmed by the activities of insurgent groups such as the Boko 
Haram sect, the Niger Delta militants, the marauding herdsmen and 
secessionist groups like the indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) and Arewa 
Youth organization. As of 2016, the army was deployed on ISOs in 32 out 
of the 36 states (International Crisis Group 2016), and in 2017, its per-
sonnel were deployed in 30 states within the country (Premium Times 
2018). From 2018 to date, the army has again been deployed in 32 out of 
the 36 states. There are simultaneous military operations and Joint Task 
Forces currently in force in all the 36 states of the Federation, including 
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
The above ISOs are largely meant to assist the ill-equipped Nigeria 
Police Force and other paramilitary agencies. This is a sign that the per-
sonnel of the army are unnecessarily overstretched and unfortunately dis-
charging the traditional responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force, whose 
main responsibility is to prevent and manage internal security threats. This 
is a complete usurpation of the constitutional and traditional role of the 
police by the army and this call for rethinking of the engagement of the 
army in internal security management. Notwithstanding however, the 
existing engagements of the army in ISOs need a thorough examination 
of its capacity to discharge effective ISOs. Under a democratic regime, 
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there must be civilian control of the military as Feaver argues that “the 
military must be strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to 
with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorized 
them to do” (Feaver 1996: 149). Therefore, it is important that the army 
as an institution must display high levels of professionalism in the dis-
charge of its duties, and it must also be strong enough to effectively 
respond to internal and external security threats.
The effectiveness of army’s engagement in ISOs is a function of the 
degree of its capacity and preparedness in terms of its professionalism, the 
quantity and quality of its personnel and equipment and the operational 
strategy it employs in responding to internal security threats. On the one 
hand, if these factors or inputs are adequate, then the army will be able to 
effectively discharge its ISOs’ role more effectively and efficiently. On the 
other hand, if these factors or inputs (professionalism, quantity and quality 
of its personnel and equipment and the operational strategy to be 
employed) are not adequate, then their capacity to effectively and effi-
ciently discharge ISOs will be negatively affected. This chapter evaluates 
the role, challenges and successes of army’s role in ISOs in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic. The study also examines the limits of the engagement of 
army in ISOs since it is not trained to be the front-line agency of managing 
internal security. This study draws on a combination of secondary sources 
and primary data. Interviews were conducted by the authors with key 




The English word “security” originated from the Latin word “securus”, 
“se” means without and “curus” means “uneasiness” (Mesjasz 2004). 
Also, the Latin word securitas refers to tranquillity and freedom of care, or 
what Cycero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life 
depends (Liotta 2002). Unarguably, the term security is an “essentially 
contested concept” (Baldwin 1997: 5) which can be “dangerously ambig-
uous” (Wolfers 1962). During the Cold War era, security was dominantly 
conceived as being coterminous with military security as against other 
states’ military power (Booth 2005). However, since the end of the Cold 
War, the meaning of security has significantly moved away from its tradi-
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tional state-centric character, which primarily conceived  security in mili-
tary sense. This conception focused only on the protection of the state. 
However, the new concept of security has been broadened to dwell more 
on human security issues rather than positing a state-centric perception. 
The expansion of the meaning of security from a state- or military-centric 
sense to the inclusion of human centred security, perhaps informed the 
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs’ definition of the 
concept as a “condition in which States consider that there is no danger of 
military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are 
able to pursue freely their own development and progress” (United 
Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs 1986).
Buzan also define the concept of security as “the pursuit of freedom 
from threats” (Buzan 1991: 18). He maintains that: “Security can be 
approached both objectively (there is a real threat) and subjectively (there 
is a perceived threat), and nothing ensures that these two line up” (Buzan 
1997). Møller (2001) also refers to the term security, explaining that in an 
objective sense, “the term security measures the absence of threats to 
acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values 
will be attacked”, and Wolfer’s characterization of security as “the absence 
of threats to acquired values”. Møller and Wolfer’s definition of security 
explains the value-laden nature of the concept to the extent that it could 
be implied that individuals, families, groups, communities, states and 
organizations have values that they care so much about which they want 
to protect at all cost. The concept of security usually throws up some very 
fundamental questions which should dictate the rationale for security pro-
tection as Baldwin raised some questions such as security for whom, secu-
rity for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what 
means, at what cost and in what time period (Baldwin 1997: 12–18).
In defining the concept of security, there is the need to synergize the 
threat concerns of the state with that of the citizens as this will enable the 
concept to reflect the threat concerns of both the state and the citizens. A 
holistic definition of the concept of security should therefore be viewed as 
the ability to protect values that are critical to the survival of the state and 
the existential needs of the citizens whether from real or perceived threats. 
What this translates into is that the concept of security must take into 
account threats against the state and the human security of the citizens. 
The state has a greater responsibility to guarantee the protection of these 
dual (state and citizens) security concerns, bearing in mind that this is 
what is encapsulated in Thomas Hobbes’ “social contract theory”. Because 
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there cannot be a condition of absolute freedom from threat(s) in any 
society, it therefore makes sense to define the term security “as a condition 
of reasonable freedom from basic existential threats to human life and 
ensuring the safety of objects and institutions critical to human survival”.
Meaning of ISOs
ISOs refer to the constitutional responsibilities of the state security agen-
cies towards tackling domestic threats to the corporate survival of a nation- 
state. Such responses are primarily carried out by the traditional internal 
security agencies vested with the constitutional responsibilities. In the case 
of Nigeria, such agencies include the Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian 
Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Directorate of State 
Security, Nigeria Prison Service and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense 
Corps, and in the event that these agencies cannot suppress or successfully 
manage internal security threats, the military is usually called upon because 
of its professionalism and the sophistic ovation of its coercive capacity to 
respond to large-scale violence and internal insurrections. Nwolise (2007) 
defines ISOs as actions carried out by the internal security agencies for the 
purpose of managing or responding to threats to the security emanating 
within a sovereign state. Such threats may include riots and demonstra-
tions, armed banditry, secessionist agitations, militancy, kidnapping, com-
munal clashes and terrorism, which normally fall outside the constitutional 
duty of the military. Most internal security threats usually originate from 
within a nation-state, and sometimes, some domestic threats may be 
inspired from outside the country.
In his analysis of the Nigerian military’s (which includes the army, navy 
and air-force) internal security function, former President Obasanjo once 
commented that the “military is an instrument of national policy and is 
constitutionally tasked with the responsibility of aiding civil authorities in 
maintaining law and order” (The Guardian 2001). According to the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 14(2 b), it 
expressly states that: the security and welfare of the people shall be the pri-
mary purpose of government. It therefore means that ISOs are a constitu-
tional responsibility of the state. Generally, ISOs deal with the constitutional 
responsibility of the state that rests on the civilian authorities but exercised 
through the state’s coercive institutions of conflict management with the 
aim of ensuring public order and protection of the citizens and the state 
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from domestic threats. It also deals with protection of critical state or 
national infrastructures and institutions.
ISOs are very complex and strategic requiring well thought-out policy 
initiatives that can effectively prevent and respond to threats to the domes-
tic security of a nation. Ineffective internal security policies can undermine 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. In making these policies, 
the state consistently carries out threat analysis to ascertain the degree to 
which the threat undermines its core national security values and then it 
can determine the appropriate security agencies that will respond to the 
threats—whether it is the military or the traditional internal security agen-
cies that is best suited to respond to the threats (Jesse 1972).
Internal security threats to the Nigerian state include armed banditry, 
human trafficking, drug trafficking, armed robbery, border security, finan-
cial/economic crimes, protection of critical infrastructure, electoral vio-
lence, farmer-herder conflict, community clashes, ethno-religious conflicts, 
kidnapping/abduction, assassinations, Boko Haram insurgency, mili-
tancy/oil theft and civil unrests. According to The Law of Armed Conflict 
Internal security operations-Part A (International Committee of the Red 
Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 2002), the doc-
ument highlights the activities carried out by the military while perform-
ing ISOs to include the following:
 1. Cordon and search operations (sealing off a village to search for 
offenders, weapons or equipment)
 2. Urban and rural patrols, possibly joint patrols with police or para-
military forces
 3. Manning observation posts
 4. Guard duties at key points or for very important personalities
 5. Road blocks or vehicle checkpoints (VCPs)
 6. Identity checks
 7. Controlling peaceful demonstrations
 8. Controlling or dispersing unlawful assemblies or demonstrations 
(riot situations)
 9. Enforcing curfews
 10. Making arrests
 11. Detaining persons
 12. Acting as a reserve or reinforcement, that is, quick reaction duties 
on standby for incidents
 13. Keeping sides apart (manning a “peace line” or “green line”)
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 14. Escort duties for the police, civil defence units and the fire brigade
 15. Hostage rescue
 16. Ambush
 17. Securing or picketing routes, for example, to ensure safe passage of 
supplies through sensitive areas
 18. Bomb disposal or dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
Other ISO activities include counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency; 
cracking of armed bandits; participation in complex humanitarian emer-
gencies or disaster management such as flooding, disease outbreaks and 
wildfire management; and election duties.
Defining the Concept of Army
The army is the land branch of the Armed Forces or the military institu-
tion (army, navy and air-force), which is authorized by law to use coercive 
or lethal force to defend a state from both domestic and external threats. 
The army profession is a complex, regimented and bureaucratic organiza-
tion, and it is categorized into two, namely the officer corps and the other 
ranks who are also called the enlisted or rank and file. While the officer 
corps are “the modern professional body and the modern military officer 
a professional man” (Huntington 1957: 7), and the unique, professional-
izing skill practised by the army officer is the “management of violence” 
(Huntington 1957: 11), the enlisted, also referred to as rank and file, are 
not professional soldiers of the army but they “are specialists in the appli-
cation of violence and not the management of it. Their vocation, there-
fore, is a trade and not a profession” (Huntington 1957: 17–18). The 
enlisted does not have the same responsibility as the army officer corps. 
The Nigerian Army has the largest army in West Africa. Currently, it has 
162,000 active front-line personnel and 32,000 reserve personnel. There 
are plans by the present army authorities to increase the number to 
about 200,000.
The army, like the navy and air-force, has both domestic and interna-
tional responsibilities in protecting the Nigerian state. Section 217(2) of 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) 
highlights the responsibilities of Armed Forces which include the Nigerian 
Army as follows:
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 1. Defending Nigeria from external aggression
 2. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from 
violation on land, sea or air
 3. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to 
restore order when called upon to do so by the President
 4. Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act 
of the National Assembly
theoretIcal perspectIve
This chapter is anchored on “social contract theory” propounded by 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The basic tenet of social contract theory is 
that security and order could only be achieved by a contract in which all citi-
zens would give up all their individual powers to a central power—the sov-
ereign—in return for the protection of life and property (Marshall 1998). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
defines “social contract” in the context of fragility and state- building, which 
underline interactions among three elements: (1) expectations that a given 
society has of a given state; (2) the state’s capacity to provide services, 
including security, revenue generation and control of territory to provide 
these services; and (3) the presence of a political elite that manages state 
resources and has the capacity to fulfil social expectations (OECD 2008). 
Under the social contract theory, the state is seen as the guarantor of secu-
rity and the provider of welfare to the citizens (Hobbes 1985).
In pursuant of the objective of providing security and welfare for its 
citizens, the state formulates national security policies to guarantee law 
and order as it is only under a peaceful and secured atmosphere that a state 
can mobilize its human and material resources towards a productive end 
(Willie 2008). The main objective of national security is therefore to 
uphold a country’s national values, which include national survival, self- 
preservation, territorial integrity and economic progress (Abidde 2014). 
The army is a major instrument for guaranteeing national security, and by 
law, it is expected to be subordinate to civilian control to the extent that 
the civilian authorities decide the why, what, when and where the army is 
to apply coercive force, but how to apply coercive force is exclusively 
determined by the army authorities, which is often codified in the “Rules 
of Engagement”. Ball and Fayemi (2008) rightly observe that the quality 
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and effectiveness of protection for the territorial integrity of a nation-state 
and its citizens are directly proportionate to the level of subordination of 
the security organizations to democratically elected leadership structures 
and civil authorities.
The question is, does it mean that the army must do everything it is 
directed to do by the civilian authorities, as Feaver asked—if the issue of 
civilian control of the military revolves around reconciling “… a military 
strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do” (Feaver 1996). 
Nay, the army must at all times rationalize, balance and be sure that it acts 
responsibly in the interest of the state and the citizens, whenever it is 
directed by the civilian authorities to act in matters of national security 
interests. It must be cautious not to carry out any directive from civilian 
authorities that is unconstitutional and capable of threatening societal 
peace. It needs to understand that it has a constitutional responsibility to 
the society by protecting and preventing it from returning to Thomas 
Hobbes’ state of the nature. It also needs to guarantee the society’s contin-
ued existence through the use of its coercive force to guarantee public 
order and national stability. Therefore, the theory of social contract is rel-
evant to the extent that it explains the primacy of the role of the state in 
providing security for its citizens through the security agencies, which is 
clearly stated in the Federal Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), 
Section 14 (2b) “the security and welfare of the people shall be the pri-
mary purpose of government”. And as Marshall (1998) rightly observed 
that security and order can only be achieved by a contract in which all citi-
zens would give up all their individual powers to a central power, the 
sovereign in return for the protection of life and property. However, the 
responsibility of protecting the state and its citizens from violent domestic 
and external threats is best soothed for the military because it has the 
“unique, professionalizing skill for the “management of violence” 
(Huntington 1957: 11).
a BrIef hIstorIcal development of nIgerIan 
army, 1862–2018
The Nigerian Army is the oldest branch of the Nigerian Armed Forces 
established in 1862 by a British colonial officer and the Resident Governor 
of Lagos Captain John Glover with the sole aim of using the troops to 
defend the Colony of Lagos. This small formation called Hausa 
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Constabulary, formed a nucleus of the Royal Niger Company Constabulary, 
which were the troops raised by the Royal Niger Company in 1886 to 
form the West African Field Force (Ukpabi 1966: 17). The aim of estab-
lishing the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was to protect British 
interests in Northern Nigeria. By 1900, when Nigeria officially became a 
colony under the British government, the army became the coercive 
instrument of national security defence of the British colonial government 
in Nigeria. More elaborately, Ukpabi (1987) outlined the reasons for the 
founding of an army by the British colonial government to be threefold, 
namely to protect the British traders, the Christian missionaries and to 
protect the British Trade routes around Lagos (1987). According to the 
Library of Congress Webpage (2002: 2):
The Company Constabulary was recruited to serve an internal security role 
in Northern Nigeria. This constabulary formed the core of the Northern 
Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The third 
unit, the Oil Rivers Irregulars, was created predominantly of Igbo’s in 1891. 
This unit was later designated the Niger Coast Constabulary, and formed 
the Southern Regiment of the WAFF.  The two regiments became the 
Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF on January 1,1914 along with the consoli-
dation of the Nigerian Protectorates. (The Library of Congress Country 
Studies, Nigeria 1991)
The First Battalion was established on 26 August 1896, while the Second 
Battalion was formed in 1898 and the Third Battalion was added later in 
1898 (Butts and Metz 1996; Ukpabi 1966). The formation of the three 
battalions was to prepare for the effective takeover of the disparate nations 
that would be merged under Nigeria as a full colony of the British govern-
ment in 1900. Eventually, the West African Field Force and the Northern 
Nigeria Regiment were amalgamated in May 1900 (Killinggray 1986). By 
1914, the Southern Nigeria Regiment and the Northern Nigeria Regiment 
were amalgamated to form the Nigeria Regiment of the West African 
Frontier Force (Miners, 1971), and this brought about the unification of 
Nigeria’s Armed Forces. By 1928, WAFF was renamed the Royal West 
African Frontier Force (RWAFF), and during the 1930s, it expanded from 
four battalions to six battalions which served in two theatres. The Northern 
and Southern Commands had major installations at Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, 
Kaduna, Maiduguri, Yola, Enugu and Calabar (The Organization of 
African Unity Homepage 2017).
18 THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS… 
410
Furthermore, the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956 led to 
the renaming of the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF to the Queen’s Own 
Nigerian Regiment (QONR). Later that same year, Britain granted mili-
tary autonomy to her dependencies and the QONR was renamed Nigerian 
Military Force (NMF) (Luckham 1994 [1971]). At independence in 
1960, the name changed again to Royal Nigerian Army. As soon as Nigeria 
became a Republic in 1963, the name was changed to the Nigerian Army 
and with the other two forces—navy and air-force—were designated the 
Nigerian Armed Forces, the name it bears till today (Adekson and 
Adekanye 1981). The Nigerian Army has come a long way—it is about 
154  years old (1862–2018), and its numerical strength is currently 
160,000 with a reserve of 132,000, and its responsibilities have grown 
tremendously under the current democratic dispensation, especially in 
terms of protecting the Nigerian citizens and the Nigerian state.
The increase in internal security threats in the North-East of Nigeria 
has led to the establishment of more army formations in the region. The 
Nigerian Army under the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Lt-Gen. 
Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.), in August 2013, established the 7 Infantry 
Division in Maiduguri to boost the military’s counter-terrorism operation 
in the North-East. Under Lt-Gen. Tukur Buratai COAS, 8 Division was 
also established in the northern part of Borno State, as part of strategic 
plan by the army to boost military operations against terrorists, particu-
larly in areas around the Lake Chad Basin. The citing of the Special Forces 
Training Centre in Buni Yadi in Yobe State is also to enhance the counter- 
terrorism operations against Boko Haram. This is an indication of the 
army’s determination to end insurgency. The expansion of the Nigerian 
Army’s Order of Battle (ORBAT), 2016, has led to the establishment of 
three additional divisions (6, 7 and 8 divisions in Port Harcourt, Maiduguri 
and Sokoto, respectively), thereby introducing an eight-division force 
structure.
Also, a military barracks was established in 2017 in Southern Kaduna to 
tackle the activities of Fulani armed bandits. However, the Nigerian Army 
still has a character which it inherits from its British colonial founder, 
which is that, it is an army of occupation and suppression with a responsi-
bility to protect the regime of its master. The army has also adopted this 
same character in the current democratic dispensation as the civilian 
authorities use them as an army of occupation, subjugation and suppres-
sion; they also use the army to rig elections in their bid to capture or con-
solidate power.
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a chronIcle of nIgerIan army’s Isos 
from 1863 to 1999
The Nigerian Army remains one of the foremost coercive instruments of 
stability and conflict management as well as a national security guardian of 
the Nigerian state. As such, it is constitutionally empowered to perform 
three major roles in a democratic dispensation which include (1) protec-
tion of the democratic government by subjugating itself to the democrati-
cally elected government, (2) protection of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Nigerian state and (3) protection of the citizens and inter-
nal security of the Nigerian state. Section 217 (c) of the 1999 Constitution 
forms the basis of involvement of the military in ISOs in Nigeria. It pro-
vides thus in relation to the functions of the military in Nigeria: “suppress-
ing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when 
called upon to do so by the President but subject to such conditions as 
may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly”.
Similarly, section 8(1) of the Armed Forces Act provides that the 
President shall determine the operational use of the Armed Forces. 
Operational use is further defined thus:
“In this section, “operational use of the armed forces” includes the 
operational use of the armed forces in Nigeria for the purpose of maintain-
ing and securing public safety and public order”. The performance of 
these roles is directed and funded by the state, as Huntington (1957) 
rightly observes that national security policy is established by heads of state 
to protect the nation’s “social, economic, and political institutions”. He 
went further to describe three dimensions of national security policy which 
include military security policy (protection against outside threats), inter-
nal security policy (prevention of internal threats) and situational security 
policy (prevention of situations that can hinder governance).
The Nigerian Army’s engagements in ISOs are usually designed by the 
state to focus on the second and third forms of Huntington’s model of 
national security (i.e. internal security policy and situational security pol-
icy), as Kemp and Hudlin rightly observe: “it is for the civilian leadership 
to decide where the line between ends and means (and hence between 
civilian and military responsibility) is to be drawn” (Kemp and Hudlin 
1992). ISOs in Nigeria are designed to respond or manage internal con-
flicts, namely civil war or secessionist violence, riots, military coups, stu-
dents protests, political/electoral crisis, militancy, armed banditry, 
protection of the electoral process, communal/ethnic clashes, religious 
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conflicts, herdsmen and farmers’ crisis, kidnapping, sabotage and acts of 
terrorism, which have all necessitated the engagement of the Nigerian 
Army to assist the police and other agencies involved in ISOs. The internal 
security priority of the Nigerian state can be inferred from the analysis of 
a former Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike (in 
a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institute, London, 26 
March 2010), who affirmed that Nigeria’s security is based on a holistic 
view which sees the citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security 
and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. In a nutshell, 
Nigeria’s internal security priority focused only on two critical factors, 
namely the human security—protection of the citizens and the Nigerian 
state from domestic threats.
The army is the bastion of Nigeria’s national defence, and its personnel 
have been drafted to perform ISOs since the colonial era, especially quell-
ing civil protests organized by nationalist leaders, labour unrests and so 
on. In August 1914, as the First World War gathered pace, an Egba revolt 
was militarily crushed by ten companies of troops from the newly created 
“Nigeria Regiment”. In 1929–1930, the regiment was called upon for a 
major internal security operation against Igbo women, mainly at Aba. It 
also assisted in quelling the Tiv riots induced by the Middle Belt Congress 
party that was protesting against the exclusion and suppression of the Tiv 
people by the ruling Hausa-Fulani–dominated Northern Peoples’ 
Congress of Nigeria from 1962 to 1965 and the dreaded “Operation 
Wetie” political uprising in the Western Region of Nigeria in 1965 between 
the supporters of Action Group party and Nigeria National Development 
Party, both in the same region. Since the country’s independence on 
1 October 1960, the army has contributed to several internal security 
operations, assisting the police and other traditional internal security agen-
cies and the civil authorities to maintain and restore law and public order. 
The greatest ISOs that the Nigerian Army has been drafted to quell is the 
secessionist attempt by the Igbo people of the Eastern Region in 1967. 
The scale of the operations was very huge, including not only the army but 
also the navy and air-force. Their combined efforts assisted in bringing the 
30-month civil war to an end in 1970. Following are the highlights of the 
ISOs carried out by the Nigerian Army since the colonial era up to 1999:
 1. The Epe Expedition of 1863 carried out by the Lagos Constabulary
 2. The Brass River Operation of 1895 (conducted by the Niger Coast 
Constabulary)
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 3. The Benin Campaign 1897
 4. The siege of Yola, Kontagora, Bauchi, Sokoto, Kano and 
Arochukwu (by the Northern and Southern regiments from 1902 
to 1903), under overall direction of WAFF
 5. Egba revolt of 1914 crushed by the army
 6. Maintenance of public order due to Aba women’s riots 
of 1929–1930
 7. The frontier control operations along Nigeria-Cameroun border 
in 1959 and 1960
 8. Implementation of emergency rule in the Western Region in 1962
 9. The Tiv Riots—(1962 and 1965)
 10. Western Region Political Crises—1965
 11. Maintenance of law and order due to the crisis created by the 15 
January 1966 coup d’état
 12. Nigerian Civil War—(1967–1970)
 13. Joint military Police anti-robbery patrols immediately after 
the civil war
 14. Quelling of Ali Must Go riots in Universities of Nigeria in 1979
 15. Maitatsine Religious Disturbances—(1980 and 1984)
 16. Anti-smuggling campaigns Lagos. Management of Ogunpa Flood 
disaster of 1981 at Ibadan
 17. 1983 General Elections crisis
 18. Quelling the anti-SAP riots of 1989
 19. Quelling the Zango-Kataf mini-war of 1992
 20. Quelling of 12 June protests of 1993
 21. Joint Police-Military Security Task Forces May 1993
 22. Political crisis following the annulment of 12 June 1993 elections
 23. Quelling of Ogoni uprising of 1993–1994
 24. Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in Warri 1996–1997 and 2002–2003
 25. Tiv-Jukun crisis—1990–1993
 26. Ife-Modakeke crisis 1996–1999
nIgerIan army’s engagement In Isos In the fourth 
repuBlIc and Its successes
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has been very challenging to the army due to 
the increasing domestic security challenges. However, the army has pre-
vented the republic from disintegration through its active engagements in 
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ISOs. Its men and women have responded to threats such as sectarian 
violence, terrorism and insurgency, armed robbery and banditry, farmers- 
herdsmen conflicts and recent secessionist agitations. Colonel Sagir Musa, 
Deputy Director, Army Public Relations, highlights the achievements of 
the army’s engagements in ISOs as follows:
The Command Post and Field Training Exercises were initiated and exe-
cuted with the major objective of addressing peculiar security challenges 
across the various regions of Nigeria. This idea assisted significantly in the 
huge successes achieved in all the areas where the Exercises were conducted. 
The Buratai’s Approach—that of putting—realism/pragmatism and subter-
fuge into training, exercises and/or operations strategically aimed or tar-
geted to solving identified security threats across the nation has so far yielded 
the desired results. (This Day Newspaper 2016)
Similarly, during the 2017 Nigerian Army Day Celebration, the Chief of 
Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Tukur Yusuf Buratai, praised the Nigerian Army to 
have done brilliantly well in internal security management in Nigeria. To 
cite his words, he maintained that:
Every Nigerian must congratulate the Nigeria Army for stemming Boko 
Haram, Militancy and other security threats. The Nigeria army reflects the 
diversity of Nigeria. Those who have left the service will always say ‘I remem-
ber when I was a soldier’ because the extra-ordinary thing we enjoy is that 
when you are in the service, you live a professional life and unite with every-
one despite our differences because the main aim is to defend our father 
land. (Leadership Newspaper 2017)
There is no gainsaying in the fact that the army’s engagements in ISOs in 
the current dispensation have largely assisted in tackling the several inter-
nal security challenges confronting the Nigerian state. In this regard, the 
army has busted many criminal gangs and has also prevented the escalation 
of several ethno-religious and community violence such as Tiv-Jukun con-
flict, Ife-Modakeke, Zango-Kataf riots in Kaduna, Umuleri-Aguleri con-
flict in Anambra state, post-election crisis in Kano, Kaduna and Niger 
Delta militancy. Some of the organized criminal groups busted are cattle 
rustlers in Plateau, Zamfara, Yobe and Kaduna States; armed robbery 
gangs in Lagos State and cult groups and kidnappers in Edo, Rivers and 
Delta States; as well as some South-East states, among others. The army in 
conjunction with other security agencies wiped out the Boko Haram 
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insurgent group from areas they captured and declared as caliphate in 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in 2014. Generally, the army, under the 
current republic, has tirelessly struggled to ensure national stability and 
the continued corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Its men and 
women have put their lives on the line in discharging their constitutional 
responsibility of managing the internal security of Nigeria. In fact, the 
Nigerian Army, together with the other arms of the Armed Forces, remains 
the bastion of Nigeria’s unity, as they have continued to keep the disparate 
entities within the country together as a corporate entity.
army’s response to ethno-relIgIous conflIcts 
In the fourth repuBlIc
Several ethno-religiously motivated conflicts have occurred since the 
return to democratic governance on 29 May 2017. Some of these conflicts 
are the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari, Taraba State, 1999–2000; Aguleri- 
Umuleri conflict in Anambra State, 2000; Ife-Modakeke conflict, 
1999–2000; Jos crisis 1999–2000; violent crisis between Muslim Fulani 
cattle and Kaduna crisis, 2016; and Shiite crisis with the Nigerian Army in 
Kaduna in 2008. The army has been deployed by the federal government 
to respond to these conflicts and effectively prevent the escalation of vio-
lence in the various conflicts. However, the army was excessive in some 
cases, committing human rights abuses. A case in point is the Zaki Biam 
killings by the army in revenge for 19 of its personnel who were grue-
somely murdered by Tiv militias. This is reported by Human Rights 
Watch report:
The military operation began on October 22, 2001, when soldiers from the 
23rd Amored Brigade of the 3rd Amored Division rounded up villagers at 
Gbeji (in Zaki Biam area of Benue State) in what turned out to be a “ployed” 
meeting. The soldiers made the villagers to sit on the ground, separating 
thereby men from the rest and opening fire on the men indiscriminately. 
(Human Rights Watch, October 25, 2001)
Another case of army excessiveness in ISOs is the Odi killings in Bayelsa 
state, which was a reprisal killing for 15 policemen murdered by members 
of a militia group in Odi community. According to Human Rights 
Watch report:
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In an apparent revenge, the military acting on the directive of the Federal 
government, invaded Odi village in Bayelsa state and raided it. This attack 
was characterized by intense and excessive use of force. In effect scores of 
unarmed civilians, including women and children, were killed. All the build-
ings in the village, except the bank, the Anglican Church and the Community 
Health Centre, were destroyed, leaving the village in a woeful state of deso-
lation. (Human Rights Watch, November 1999)
In both cases, several hundreds of innocent Nigerian citizens were extra- 
judicially killed by the army. Human rights abuses are a regular character 
of army’s engagement in ISOs in the Fourth Republic. Furthermore, 
some army personnel on ISOs have been observed to rain insults, intimi-
date and molest innocent citizens that they ought to protect. For instance, 
in Odi in Bayelsa State, where the army was drafted on ISOs, some of its 
personnel littered the walls and buildings in the community with graffiti 
writings as pointed out by Albert (2003) in its documentation of such 
expressions:
 1. “Bastards, why run, come and fight us now?”
 2. “We don come, where are you bloody fool?”
 3. “Resource control my foot”.
 4. “I Fok you mama; wetin you do?”
 5. “I will kill all Ijaws—By Soldier”
 6. “Bayelsa will be silent forever”
 7. “Odi, where is your pride”
 8. “Dem don run”
 9. “Where is the Egbesu?”
 10. “You are burnt”
The atrocities of Nigerian Army in the Boko Haram insurgency have 
also been documented by Amnesty International in its recent report, “Our 
job is to shoot, slaughter and kill”: Boko Haram’s reign of terror in north-east 
Nigeria. In the report, Amnesty International:
Documented 27 incidents of extrajudicial executions committed by the in 
2013 and 2014. At least 1,000 men and boys, almost certainly many more, 
were killed in these incidents. In 14 of these cases, Nigerian military forces, 
sometimes in collaboration with Civilian JTF members, executed a large 
number of people, at times dozens or even hundreds in one day. The precise 
number of extrajudicial executions is impossible to verify due to the lack of 
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records, cover-up efforts by the military, and the difficulty of reaching wit-
nesses in the areas where the crimes were committed. Cases presented in this 
report provide documentation of extrajudicial executions in Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe states. (Amnesty International 2015: 40)
One point that needs to be stressed here is that some of the excesses of the 
army in ISOs may be state directed like their atrocities at Odi in Bayelsa 
State, Zaki Biam in Benue State, Gbaramatu town in Delta State, the 
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East and many others. 
Such acts may sometimes be justified by the government like President 
Obasanjo and some other leaders did in some instances; however, R. Jervis 
has also rightly argued that “many of the means by which a state tries to 
increase its security decrease the security of others” (1978). 
Notwithstanding, however, it is very wrong to subject the citizens they are 
supposed to protect to human rights abuses under the guise of conducting 
ISOs. This undermines not only Nigeria’s human rights laws but also 
international laws and customs.
nIgerIan army’s response to Boko haram Insurgency
The Nigerian Army has been engaged in the counter-terrorism operations 
against Boko Haram jihadist group in the North-East of Nigeria. The 
conflict dates back to 2009, when the sect waged a violent campaign 
against the Nigerian government. The Islamist group is popularly known 
as Boko Haram, but it prefers to be called Jama’atu Ahlissunnah 
Lidda’awatiwal Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of 
the Prophet’s teachings and jihad”. Like al-Qaida, Islamic states of Iraq 
and Syria and other many jihadist groups, the core objective of the Boko 
Haram Islamic group is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a caliph-
ate, which will be strictly governed by the Shari’a Islamic laws.
In July 2009, Boko Haram launched a violent uprising against the 
Nigerian state taking on Nigerian security forces which led to the extra- 
judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf—the charismatic leader of the 
group—and several hundreds of the members of the sect. Some of the sect 
members managed to escape and went underground but only resurfaced 
in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the second in com-
mand to Mohammed Yusuf. According to Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 
established by the Defence Headquarters, the team acknowledged that 
between 2009 and 2013, the military operations in the North-East against 
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the Boko Haram extremist group changed from internal security opera-
tions to a “full scale offensive against the BHT [Boko Haram terrorist] 
insurgents”. Amnesty International also reports that:
In 2013, as attacks by Boko Haram intensified, former President Goodluck 
Jonathan declared a state of emergency, which was subsequently extended 
repeatedly, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The state of emergency 
gave overly broad emergency powers to the security forces. Former President 
Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force to lead the operations against 
Boko Haram, which included personnel from the Nigerian Army, Police 
Force and other security forces. The army took full control of operations 
against Boko Haram in August 2013. (Amnesty International 2015)
It should be noted that the military’s high-handedness and repression 
of the sect in the July 2009 uprising and the consequent declaration of 
emergency rule by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in May 2013 in 
the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and its renewal after six 
months, largely contributed to the escalation and intensification of the 
violence and the sect’s metamorphosis, first into a terrorist group 
(2010–2013). Later on in 2014, it graduated into an insurgent group 
capturing territories and declaring them as part of its acclaimed caliphate 
in the three states. The army’s engagement in countering the Boko Haram 
insurgency in the North-East has been criticized both locally and interna-
tionally for its ineffectiveness by the US Department Office, who recently 
noted that the security forces’ handling of the counter-terrorism opera-
tions against Boko Haram lacks coordination and effectiveness. In a simi-
lar manner, the Amnesty International has also alleged the security forces 
of committing gross human rights abuses against innocent civilians in the 
North-East. The reports noted:
In the course of security operations against Boko Haram in north-east 
Nigeria, Nigerian military forces have extra-judicially executed more than 
1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly 
young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. 
Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of enforced 
disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military detention as a 
result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of medical assis-
tance… Data collected suggests that since March 2011, more than 7,000 
men and boys have died in detention, their deaths often unrecorded and 
almost never investigated. Amnesty International gathered the data and the 
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details of individual cases through visits to mortuaries, internal military 
reports, statistics recorded by local human rights activists and interviews 
with witnesses, victims, former detainees, hospital staff, mortuary personnel 
and military sources. The highest death rates were recorded in Giwa bar-
racks in May, June and July 2013, where up to 180 deaths were recorded on 
some days. In June alone, more than 1,400 corpses were delivered from the 
barracks to one of the mortuaries in Maiduguri. (Amnesty International 2015)
So far, about four major counter-terrorism operations have been launched 
against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military, with the army spearheading 
the operations. These counter-terrorism operations are identified as fol-
lows by Amnesty International report:
Since 2011, there have been four major operations in the north-east to coun-
ter Boko Haram. Operation Restore Order I (ORO I), from June 2011 till 
May 2013, was the first. Some 4,000 troops served in Borno state and, 
together with the police and members of other security forces, formed the 
Joint Task Force (JTF). In Yobe state, ORO III was established in ORO I was 
replaced by Operation BOYONA, which covered Borno, Yobe and Adamawa 
states (the acronym derives from the names of the three states). Operation 
BOYONA was launched when the state of emergency was announced in May 
2013 and had some 10,000 troops. Both ORO I and its successor Operation 
BOYONA reported to the Chief of Defence Staff. On 19 August 2013, oper-
ational command of Operation BOYONA was taken over by the Chief of 
Army Staff (COAS) when the newly established Army Division 7 took over 
from the JTF and military forces took over fully from the police in actions 
against Boko Haram. Operation Zaman Lafiya, with 10,000 troops, was 
launched as the successor to Operation BOYONA.  Including ‘Operation 
Lafiya Dole’ which is currently ongoing in the north east against the Boko 
Haram terrorism. (Amnesty International 2015: 20)
challenges of army’s engagements In Isos 
In the current polItIcal dIspensatIon
The declining performance of the Nigerian Army in ISOs is a function of 
the long years of neglect of the institution under the successive military 
administrations that tactically and strategically weaken the capabilities of a 
military institution which the army is an integral part of. The International 
Crisis Group report (2015) identifies the root causes of the inefficiency 
that is plaguing the Nigerian military, which includes the army as follows:
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The decline began during 33 years of military dictatorship that took a seri-
ous toll on professionalism, operational effectiveness and accountability. 
Return to democratic rule in 1999 raised hopes the institution could be 
restored, but successive civilian governments’ pledges of much-needed 
reforms proved largely rhetorical. Presidents, defense ministry and parlia-
ment lacked the commitment and expertise to implement significant 
changes. They left the military badly governed, under-resourced and virtu-
ally adrift. Administration and accountability deteriorated throughout the 
sector. Poor, indeed lacking senior leadership has been compounded by 
equally poor legislative oversight and defense headquarters coordination 
and planning. (International Crisis Group 2015)
The cumulative negative effects of the neglect of the army resulting in its 
poor performance became very evident in its inability to contain the mili-
tant groups in the Niger Delta, forcing the government to offer the mili-
tants an amnesty in 2009. Also, the army and the other Armed Forces lost 
territories, personnel and equipment to Boko Haram insurgents in 2014 in 
the North-East. These flaws had on 15 January 2015 made Major General 
(retd.) Muhammadu Buhari, a former military head of state and then pres-
idential candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC), to lament that 
the inefficiency of the Nigerian Army and its sister Armed Forces in con-
taining the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria was “a big disgrace”. Under 
the current administration of General Muhammadu Buhari (retd.), 2015 
to date, the army and the other security forces have been able to degrade 
the capacity of the Boko Haram insurgents, but not without the govern-
ment still being forced to negotiate the release of kidnapped Chibok girls 
for huge sums of dollars and release of Boko Haram commanders.
Some of the factors that negatively affect the performance of the per-
sonnel of the army on ISOs are discussed as follows:
Corruption in the Army
One of the factors that affect the performance of army’s engagement in 
ISOs in the Fourth Republic is corruption. According to Aljazeera Cable 
programme titled Counting the Cost (2015), it noted as follows:
From 2001 to 2012 the military received $19 billion is only about one per-
cent of GDP, even falling to half a percent in 2006. On average, nations 
typically spend around two percent of GDP.  But in 2014, Nigeria spent 
$5.8bn on security, a quarter of the total budget. Of the $5.8bn, roughly a 
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third went to the Defence Ministry that is $830m for the army, $440m for 
the navy, and $460n for the air force. Another $400m was spent on deploy-
ments and missions. However, much of that money has allegedly fuelled 
corruption or been siphoned off to enrich regional governments. This has 
led to an under resourced military, short of guns and ammunition. It has 
allowed Boko Haram to extend its influence, threatening national elections 
which last month were postponed for six weeks so the army could take on 
the armed group. (Aljazeera 2015)
In the same manner, ICG (2015) describes the endemic and institutional-
ized corruption in the Nigerian defence sector as follows:
Corruption is system-wide. Legislators often manipulate the appropriation 
process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather 
than benefit the armed forces. Dubious procurement practices, fraudulently 
bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at 
the national security adviser’s office, the defence ministry and armed services 
headquarters often mean funds are diverted to private or non-military pur-
poses; arms, ammunition and other equipment are sometimes substandard 
and not always delivered. Inadequate funding, corrupt procurement and 
poor maintenance result in serious equipment and logistics deficits.
The army leadership and the defence ministry have been docked in several 
corruption cases. A case in point is the Dasuki-gate corruption scandal 
involving misappropriation of US$2.1 billion meant for the procurement 
of military hardware by the Office of the National Security Adviser 
(ONSA). Money meant for military procurements to fight the Boko 
Haram insurgents were converted to fund campaign for President 
Goodluck Jonathan’s re-election. Even the money allocated for defence 
procurements to equip the fighting forces in the North-East was embez-
zled by the Defense and Service Chiefs. According to International Crisis 
Group report revealed the corruption in defence procurement process 
as follows:
Defense acquisitions are shrouded in secrecy. Rather than explore 
government- to-government arrangements, there is an overwhelming 
 preference for dealing with rent-seeking middlemen, so equipment can be 
bought at grossly inflated prices, with contractors and military/government 
officials reportedly sharing the huge margins. Allegations of inflation or 
over-invoicing of contracts, award of phantom contracts through which 
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funds are diverted to private accounts and fraudulent acquisition of substan-
dard, sometimes useless, equipment are common.58 There have also been 
recurrent reports of phantom procurements—contracts awarded to non- 
existent companies and never seen items recorded as supplied or delivered. 
(International Crisis Group 2016: 11)
Also, in November 2007, military and media sources reported that a 
syndicate had, over a long period, allegedly sold arms and ammunitions 
belonging to the Nigerian Army’s Central Ordnance Depot to Niger 
Delta insurgents (Sunday Punch, Lagos, 20 January 2008; Nigerian 
Tribune, 15 January 2008). A significant number of soldiers have been 
involved in other criminal activities, from armed robbery to ransom kid-
nappings (Vanguard, 29 December 2015). Corruption within the army 
has a tremendous direct negative impact on the efforts of equipping the 
army personnel with the right and up-to-date weapons and equipment to 
conduct effective ISOs.
Personnel and Training Deficit
The military, in which the army is one of its units, is largely understaffed, 
poorly trained and overstretched. A country of about 170 million people, 
with an army strength of about 162,000 and a reserve of 32,000, is 
grossly inadequate. According to a report of International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London (2014), Nigeria has the lowest ratio of military 
and paramilitary personnel to overall population compared to its neigh-
bours except Niger with 0.7:1000. Nigeria currently has 1:1000 ratio of 
military and paramilitary personnel to overall population. Meanwhile, in 
Chad, it is 3.4:1000; in Cameroon, 1.2:1000, while in Benin Republic it 
is 1.1:1000. The capacity of the institution to absorb quality personnel 
has continued to decline, as its training institutions are short of facilities 
and instructors, lack training modules, and because they are largely 
focused on conventional operations, they are somewhat outdated. 
Personnel are under- motivated due to low pay, poor welfare services and 
bleak post-service prospects (ICG 2015). In a bid to address the problem 
of personnel deficit in the army, there is consistent recruitment of person-
nel currently going on, although more Nigerian Army personnel are lost 
to Boko Haram onslaught on a daily basis. This still significantly reduces 
personnel capacity.
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Equipment and Logistics Deficit
Another major challenge of the Nigerian Army is equipment deficit. This 
is so serious to the extent that for many years, the military made no major 
acquisitions, at best taking delivery of refurbished platforms (Leadership, 
21 July 2014). The limited military equipment available is often poorly 
maintained. For instance, the army’s 35-mm anti-aircraft guns, imported 
from Switzerland in 1979, became unserviceable in 2002 and were left in 
that condition until 2013 (This Day, 31 October 2013). International 
Crisis Group (2014) report observed that many soldiers deployed to fight 
Boko Haram in 2013–2014 reported their equipment were obsolete and 
unserviceable and often broke down frequently. This was a major factor 
for the many desertions in those years. Logistics is also major challenge to 
the army. The army’s operational vehicles and aircraft are inadequate, old 
and largely unserviceable, owing to poor funding or capacity challenge to 
routinely service these operational equipment for easy logistics and move-
ment of personnel and equipment.
Generally, the deficit in equipment and logistics in the Armed Forces 
became very visible in 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic gover-
nance. This was a calculated and deliberate attempt by the successive mili-
tary administrations starting from the time of President Ibrahim Babangida 
(1985–1992) spanning to General Sani Abacha (1993–1998). Their aim 
was to demobilize the military so as to prevent military takeover against 
their governments. The deficits in equipment and logistics have contrib-
uted significantly to the poor performance of the army in ISOs in the cur-
rent political dispensation.
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)
The illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons are 
mostly responsible for crime commission and armed conflicts. Small arms 
and light weapons (SALWs) are also the weapons of choice for many non- 
state armed groups (NSAGs) and those seeking to enhance self and com-
munity protection in Nigeria today. Consequently, several seizures of SALWs 
have been made by the Nigerian security services, including the Nigerian 
Army. For instance, the Nigerian Customs Service had, on four occasions in 
2017, intercepted 2671 pieces of firearms smuggled into the country. 
Similarly, between 2018 and 2019, more seizures have been made, especially 
because of the forthcoming general elections in February and March 2019.
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The increasing supply of SALWs within and from outside the country 
has continued to escalate incidences of violent crimes and conflicts, posing 
huge threat to Nigeria’s national security as Krause asserted that although 
the availability and use of more sophisticated weapons have contributed to 
the erosion of state authority, SALWs proliferations in the country have 
equipped many individuals and groups with weapons potent enough to 
challenge the state’s coercive power. This is evident from groups like Boko 
Haram, militants in the Niger Delta, Fulani herdsmen, armed robbers, 
kidnappers and cult groups. These are groups that are now on the ram-
page in the theatre of violence in Nigeria and have made the army to be 
deployed on ISOs in 32 of the 36 states of Nigeria. The problem of pro-
liferation of SALW has become compounded because of the ineffective 
efforts of the Nigerian government towards curbing the proliferation of 
illegal arms and ammunition in the country. The consequence of this fail-
ure has been the numerous security challenges that the country now 
grapples with.
Funding Constraint
The Nigerian Army is suffering from serious funding constraints. The 
33 years of military dictatorship left the army and other Armed Forces 
poorly funded and badly governed. According to International Crisis 
Group (2015):
Until recently, the military was under-resourced, with comparatively low 
budgets, disbursed irregularly and unpredictably. From 2000 to 2008, its 
budget was less than 3 per cent of overall government expenditure. From 
2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 per cent of government 
spending ($5–$6 billion); but, as in the past, this was still allocated dispro-
portionately to recurrent expenditures, leaving very little for crucial capital 
investment. (ICG 2015:i)
The Nigerian Army has continued to expand its personnel strength and 
facilities, thereby necessitating increased budgetary funding. The Acting 
Chief of Accounts and Budget, Army, Brigadier General Jehadi Ezra Jakko 
argued that (Table 18.1):
With the expansion of the Nigerian Army’s Order of Battle (ORBAT) 2016, 
leading to the establishment of 3 additional divisions (6, 7 and 8 divisions in 
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Port Harcourt, Maiduguri and Sokoto respectively), thereby introducing an 
8 division force structure, there is need for the federal government to initi-
ate new sources of funding to halt the continually dwindling financial alloca-
tions to the Nigerian Army. Dwindling resources through the envelop 
system has also impeded routine exercises required for operational readiness 
and efficiency. “There is therefore the need to exploit new budgeting win-
dows to include other channels of funding for the Nigerian army as is done 
in other nations”. “Available options include creating a Defence Support 
Fund as obtainable in Turkey, establishment of a Military Industrial Base 
and Investment Holdings as in Egypt or enacting a local Defence Trust 
Fund Act like existing Tertiary Education Trust Fund in Nigeria”. “The 
government could also include defence and security sector as beneficiaries 
from the National Sovereign wealth Fund. These windows will reduce the 
burden of funding military on government”. (Duniya 2017)
Table 18.1 Nigeria’s military expenditure from 1999 to 2017
Year Defence budget (N) 
1999–2017
% of defence budget from the 
annual budget—1999–2017
Nigeria’s annual budget 
(N) —1999–2017
1999 45,400,000,000 15 299 billion
2000 37,490,000,000 5.3 702 billion
2001 63,472,000,000 7.1 894 billion
2002 108,148,000,000 10.2 1.05 trillion
2003 75,913,000,000 5.2 1.45 trillion
2004 85,047,000,000 0.07 1.19 trillion
2005 88,506,000,000 0.06 1.6 trillion
2006 99,853,000,000 0.5 1.88 trillion
2007 122,200,000,000 0.6 2.39 trillion
2008 191,515,000,000 5.2 2.74 trillion
2009 224,021,000,000 0.8 3.05 trillion
2010 299,108,000,000 0.9 4.4 trillion
2011 369,045,000,000 1.0 4.7 trillion
2012 364,843,000,000 1.1 4.9 trillion
2013 380,500,000,000 1.0 4.99 trillion
2014 968,127,000,000 20 4.96 trillion
2015 387,497,000,000 1.7 4.4 trillion
2016 429,000,000,000 2.6 6.06 trillion
2017 465,000,000,000 3.4 7.4 trillion
Grand 
Total:
4,814,685,000,000 8.1 59.1 trillion
Source: Author’s field compilation
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The above table illustrates Nigeria’s defence budgets from 1999 to 2017, 
which cumulatively stands at ₦4,814,685,000,000 trillion, which is about 
8.1% of the total annual budget which stands at ₦59,100,000,000,000 
trillion. This means that defence budget is very low, leaving the military 
including the army poorly funded, with 8.1% of the country’s 18-year budget.
Human Rights Abuses
Available literature on the Nigerian Army’s counter-insurgency operations 
against the Boko Haram extremist group in the North-East of Nigeria and 
their engagements in other ISOs within the country have exposed its poor 
human rights records (see ICG 2015; Amnesty International 2015). The 
army often grapples with the problem of high-handedness, and insensitiv-
ity to the nature and characteristics of civilian-dominated areas is always 
pointed out as a flaw. While on ISOs, its personnel have constantly engaged 
in gross human rights abuses such as rape, arbitrary arrests and detention, 
extra-judicial killings, brutality, extortion and molestation of civilians. The 
army and other security agencies in order to restore order have often killed 
more people than were killed at the initial stage of the conflict (Hill 2012). 
The Legal Defense and Assistance Project of Nigeria recorded that the 
army killed in 529 of the 880 incidents in which they intervened between 
2003 and 2004. Also, between 2006 and 2014, the security forces killed 
in 2043 incidents, resulting in 12,078 fatalities. Of these killings, the mili-
tary killed more than the other security agencies. In May 2009, over 500 
people were killed in coordinated attacks by a combined team of the army, 
navy and air-force personnel in Gbaramatu kingdom of Delta State (Francis 
et al. 2011). The 2001 Zaki Biam genocidal killings in Benue State is also 
a quick reminder of the extra-judicial killings carried out by some person-
nel of the Nigerian Army. Furthermore, Amnesty International publica-
tion titled Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes 
Committed by the Nigerian Military chronicles the gross human rights 
abuses of the personnel of the Nigerian Army in the North-East as follows:
The military engagements in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko 
Haram in north-east Nigeria, has resulted in the extra-judicial execution of 
more than 1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 peo-
ple, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of 
torture. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have become victims of 
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enforced disappearance; and at least 7,000 people have died in military 
detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of med-
ical assistance. (Amnesty International 2015: 4)
The poor human rights records of the army have often given the institu-
tion a bad publicity both within and outside Nigeria to the extent that 
army authorities are now making frantic efforts to clean itself from within 
by sanctioning its personnel that commit human rights abuses. This action 
is in line with the argument of Huntington (1957: 16–17) who has argued 
that when a military officer has broken the rules of the profession, other 
members hold him accountable. The Nigerian Army authority have also 
instituted human rights standards in their training schools as well as set up 
human rights desks at the theatres of ISOs. Recently, the army spokesman 
Col. Sani Usman, in a statement reminding the officers of the Nigerian 
Army’s Rules of Engagement (ROE) for internal security operations 
(Operation Mesa), warned the personnel of the Nigerian Army on ISOs 
about engaging in unprofessional conducts. He warned:
For the avoidance of doubt, the ROE and Code of Conduct set out the 
circumstances and limitations, under which armed forces personnel may be 
applied to achieve military objectives in furtherance of government policy 
within Operation MESA and other IS Operations. Any officer or soldier 
found aiding or abetting any act of arson, vandalism or unprofessional con-
duct, would be severely dealt with according to the extant laws… Once 
deployed on any internal security (IS) operation it is the duty of an officer 
or soldier to ensure the enforcement of law and order in conjunction with 
other security agencies. Troops on duty must intervene in any situation to 
avoid a breakdown in peace, stability or law and order of any area where they 
are deployed. It is inexcusable for troops to stand aside and watch the secu-
rity situation deteriorate leading to loss of lives or damage to property with-
out intervening. Such intervention should, however, be based strictly on 
sound judgement and within the ambit of the code of conduct for IS 
Operations while exhibiting good professional ethics. Troops have to use 
necessary force to quell crisis resulting in deaths, injury and damages to 
properties”, citing section 217 (2) (c) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended)…. (This Day Newspaper, September 11, 2016)
It is important to stress at this juncture that contemporary warfare is asym-
metric in nature and character, usually involving the professionally trained 
and regimented state army against the ragtag and amorphous non-state 
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armed groups (NSAGs), which often adopt guerrilla tactics against the 
state. Therefore, the nature and character of NSAGs makes it very impos-
sible for the state army to engage them in warfare without committing 
human rights abuses. As a matter of fact, there is no military in the world, 
whether it is sophisticated or not, that can successfully engage NSAGs in 
warfare without occasionally violating the rights of innocent citizens or 
the rebels. The sophisticated military of the United States of America, 
fighting against the Taliban terrorists/insurgents in Afghanistan, has con-
tinued to commit even worse forms of human rights abuses against inno-
cent citizens. It is important therefore that military authorities should 
mainstream human rights education in military training schools and in 
their internal security operations (ISOs). This will assist in committing 
military personnel to their rules of engagement. Setting up of human 
rights desk at theatres of ISOs will also help to expose and punish military 
officers that engage in the violation of human rights of the citizens (Tables 
18.2 and 18.3).
Table 18.2 Nigerian Army’s ISOs in the Fourth Republic (1999–2017)
Administration Period of 
Nigeria 
Army’s ISOs






(a) Odi crisis, 1999, Bayelsa State.
(b) Zaki Biam invasion 2001, Benue State.
(c) Onitsha disturbances, 2006, Anambra state.
(d) Niger Delta crisis, 1999–2009, South-South states.
(e) Ikeja Bomb blasts, 2001, Lagos state.
(f ) Ife-Modakeke crisis, 1999–2000, Osun state.
(g) Plateau State (Jos) crisis, Plateau state.
(h)  Sharia crisis in parts of Northern Nigeria 
(1999–2004).
(i)  Niger Delta militancy (Operation Hakuri—1998; 
Operation Flush II, Rivers state—2004).
(j) Zagon-Kataff riots, 1999–2001, Kaduna state.
(k)  Umuleri-Aguleri communal crisis 1999–2000, 
Anambra state.
(l) Kano religious crisis.
(m) Plateau state (Jos) crisis
(n) Itshekiri/Urhobo/Ijaw crisis of 2004, Delta state.
(o)  Danish religious cartoon crisis, 2006, Bauchi, Kano 
and Borno States.
(continued)
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Table 18.2 (continued)
Administration Period of 
Nigeria 
Army’s ISOs






(a)  Quelling of Islamic insurgency in Borno 
(Maiduguri), 2009.
(b)  Niger Delta militancy (Operation Restore Hope, 
Warri—2008; Operation Pulo Shield-2012; and 
Operation Delta Safe-2016).
(c)  Invasion of Gbaramatu Delta state in 2009 by the 
Nigeria military with the aim of routing out of the 
militants.
(d) Jos crisis, Plateau state.
Dr Goodluck 
Jonathan
2010 to 29 
May 2015
(a) Jos crisis (till date), Plateau state.
(b) Post-elections crisis (April, 2011) Northern states.
(c) Umbasse ethnic killings in Nassrawa State 2013.
(d)  The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Army and police 
in 2014.
(e) Wukari crisis 2000–2015, Taraba State.
(f)   Boko Haram crisis till date, Adamawa, Borno and 
Yobe States (Operation Restore Order I (ORO I); 
Operation—12 June 2011–15 May 2013; Restore 
Order III (ORO III)—13 December 2011–15 
May 2013; Operation BOYONA—May 2013–







(a) Boko Haram insurgency.
(b) Niger Delta militancy—from 2016 to date.
(c) Farmer and Herdsmen conflicts 2015 to date.
(d)  Violent crisis between Muslim Fulani cattle and 
Kaduna crisis 2016.
(e)  The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Army in Kaduna in 
2018.
(f)  Agitations of the independent peoples of Biafra 
(IPOB) in South-Eastern states
(g) Armed banditry in South-Western states.
(h)  Commercialized Kidnappings in the South-South, 
South-East and North-West regions.
Author’s field data
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What should Be the lImIt of the army’s engagement 
In Isos In nIgerIa?
The ISOs’ role of the Nigerian Army is contained in Section 217 (2) of the 
1999 Constitution (as amended)—“suppressing insurrection and acting 
in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the 
President”. The performance of this role in the present republic has led to 
a situation where the army is excessively engaged in ISOs. This has been 
emphasized by the current Chief of Army Staff, General Tukur Buratai, in 
his words that: “Currently, the Nigeria Army is deployed in about 32 
states fighting to eradicate terrorism, cattle rustling, kidnapping, pipeline 
vandalism, armed banditry and communal clashes among others”.
The challenges have in many instances necessitated the deployment of 
Quick Response Groups to troubled areas and establishment of new units 
in some cases (This Day Newspaper 2017). Its men and women are over-
stretched by multiple deployments to assist an ill-equipped and inefficient 
federal police that is unable to play its role effectively in terms of maintain-
ing law and order in many areas of the country. The Nigeria Police Force 
(2008) annual report observes that the “police is handicapped because of 
combination of factors that plague them, among which are; lack of 
resources, poor government support, poor condition of service, lack of 
appropriate and adequate training and ill-equipped workforce”. In June 
2014, former Army Chief, General (retd.) Abdulrahman Bello Danbazzau 
alluded to this serious concern when he observed: “the armed forces are 
the ones doing the duties of the police” (International Crisis Group 
2014). As of June 2015 military units were deployed in joint operations 
with the police and other paramilitary organizations in 32 of the 36 states. 
At present, the army is currently on ISOs in 34 of the 36 states of the 
federation. Internal security deployments prevent the military from surg-
ing to areas like the North-East and distract troops from preparing for real 
combat (The Sun, 5 July 2013; IRIN, 3 June 2015; ICG 2015).
The Director of Defence Information (DDI), Brig-Gen. Rabe 
Abubakar, has acknowledged the enormous role played by the army in 
internal security in Nigeria. He maintained accordingly:
There is no military in the world that can claim that it is overstretched when it 
comes to internal security challenges. This is our primary duty to ensure that 
our country is united. Even though the military would have loved a situation 
where other security agencies step up and play their role to complement our 
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supporting duties. There are certain security operations that could have rightly 
been carried out by other security agencies to assist the armed forces but in the 
event this was not done we cannot just fold our arms to allow things to dete-
riorate. This is our country, it is our duty to protect it and we are able and 
capable of defending our territorial integrity. (This Day Newspaper 2016)
Brig-Gen. Rabe Abubakar’s comments are a direct admission of the fact 
that the military is unnecessarily overstretched and overburdened by its 
regular engagements in ISOs which ought to have been the responsibility 
of the police. It is instructive to argue that the continued excessive engage-
ments of the army in ISOs can fundamentally exhaust and civilianize its 
men and women from being a professional army to a non- professional 
army, thereby predisposing them to corrupt practices, which can poten-
tially undermine the professionalism of the institution. This has currently 
been observed in most of the army checkpoints in the North-East where 
its personnel extort money from motorists. Its personnel can also be 
tempted to subvert or overthrow the democratically elected government, 
as they did in the past. To this extent, therefore, the regular engagements 
of the army in ISOs should be restricted to only its core constitutional role 
of defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial 
integrity and securing its borders from violation on land; suppressing 
insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when 
called upon to do so by the President; and performance of such other 
functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. This 
can only be possible if adequate funding, training, provision of equipment 
and motivation are given to the police and other traditional agencies of 
internal security so as to enhance their capacity to effectively deter, respond 
and manage internal security threats in the current dispensation.
current Internal securIty threats and suggestIons 
on hoW to strengthen nIgerIan army’s 
engagements In Isos
The Nigerian Army has engaged in many ISOs since its creation and even 
more since the return to the Fourth Republic. Its current ISOs include the 
protracted war against the Boko Haram extremist group which has lasted 
for about eight years now (2009–2017), the deadly and recurrent farmers 
and herdsmen conflicts, cattle rustling, kidnapping, oil bunkery, pipeline 
vandalism, secessionist agitations in the South-East and armed robbery. The 
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proliferation of internal security threats in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has 
made peace elusive in the country, and this has often negatively affected 
the country in the Global Peace Index ranking as shown in Table 18.4:
Notwithstanding the magnitude of insecurity facing the Nigerian state, 
the Nigerian Army in collaboration with other security agencies has been 
recording tremendous gains in their engagements in ISOs in the current 
republic. However, US Country Report on Terrorism for the year 2016 
submitted to the US Congress produced by the US Department of State 
has expressed worry about Nigeria’s inability to effectively hold on to ter-
ritories recaptured from Boko Haram terrorists. This report underscores 
the urgent need for overhauling the ISOs strategies designed to tackle the 
Boko Haram terrorism and other ISOs in the country. The following sug-
gestions if implemented by the government and army authorities can assist 
in repositioning the army institution towards better performances:
 1. The Nigerian Army should incorporate ISOs’ training in its train-
ing schools, and it should also train its members regularly on inter-
national best practices on ISOs.
 2. The government should increase budgetary funding for ISOs, espe-
cially for procurement of modern equipment in order to withstand 
the challenges of modern threats. This is important because  soldiers 
involved in ISOs are often not properly equipped to carry out 
their tasks.
 3. The army should leverage on the community leaders in informa-
tion gathering on activities around their jurisdiction when on ISOs. 
Table 18.4 Nigeria Global Peace Index trend from 2008 to 2018












Source: excerpt from Global Peace Index (2018) documents
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They also need to collaborate with the police and other security 
agencies in the area of intelligence gathering and sharing and train-
ing to enhance the efficiency of its personnel on ISOs.
 4. The National Assembly should as a matter of urgency design stan-
dard rules of engagement for the Nigerian Army and other security 
agencies which will assist in regulating their conducts in ISOs as well 
as ensure that they efficiently carry out their duties with precision.
 5. There is also an urgent need to improve leadership, oversight, 
administration and accountability across the entire defence sector.
 6. The Nigerian Army should mainstream human rights education in its 
training curriculum and as part of its regular field instructions in ISOs.
 7. The Nigerian Army needs to create a very robust platform for 
engaging the civil populace at all times and especially during its 
engagement in ISOs. This is important because civil-military rela-
tionship tends to be calm when both civilians and the military 
understand and accept their appropriate roles.
 8. There is also the need for the government to improve funding to 
the Nigeria Army Defence Industrial Corporation of Nigeria 
(DICON), with a view to enhancing their capacity for local pro-
duction of basic military items, particularly arms and ammunitions, 
combat kits, electronic gadgets and so on.
 9. ISOs should also ensure the mopping up of the surplus small arms 
and light weapons used by militant, religious extremist, armed ban-
dits and ethno-communal groups. The influx and proliferation of 
small and light weapons are greatly impacting on the internal secu-
rity of Nigeria in the contemporary times.
 10. The Nigerian Army Command should ensure that a high level of 
professionalism is entrenched in the army institution, and acts that 
fall short of this standard should be sanctioned.
 11. The Nigerian Army should enhance its collaboration with other 
security agencies (air-force, navy, Nigeria Police Force, Directorate 
of State Security, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, 
Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigeria Security 
Organisation and Vigilante groups at the community levels). Areas 
of collaboration should include intelligence gathering and sharing, 
training in ISOs and carrying out joint security operations.
 12. Recruitment of more personnel to meet up the numerical personnel 
strength to respond to the ever-increasing internal security chal-
lenges to the Nigerian state.
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conclusIon
The army is an indispensable institution of national security defence in any 
nation including Nigeria. As part of the core constitutional mandate of the 
army in securing the Nigerian state, its men and women have carried out 
many ISOs since the country’s independence to date. Since the return to 
democratic governance on 29 May 1999 to date, the army has been 
engaged in more ISOs than any other time in the history of the Nigerian 
state. However, it is in the same political dispensation that its weaknesses 
have been exposed in terms of its inefficiency and unprofessional conducts 
in the theatres of ISOs. In particular, some personnel of the army on ISOs 
have often committed human rights abuses such as human rights abuses, 
extra-judicial killings, rape, extortions, torture and acts of insurrection. 
These misconducts have often negatively affected the public trust in the 
institution. The authorities of the army need to make concerted efforts to 
try to re-invent and reposition itself in its constitutional efforts of promptly 
responding to and managing internal security challenges within the 
Nigerian state.
The numerous internal security threats within the Nigerian state are the 
consequences of the structural problems plaguing the country, coupled 
with the prolong years of bad governance and social and economic injus-
tice. Therefore, it will be improper to believe that only deploying the 
army’s coercive power can adequately tackle the country’s internal security 
challenges without addressing the economic and social injustices prevalent 
in the country as well as strengthening the weak public institutions of 
justice through responsible and efficient good governance as McNamara 
(1999) maintained that “any society that seeks to achieve adequate mili-
tary security against the background of acute food shortages, population 
explosion, low level of productivity and per capital income, low techno-
logical development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic 
problems of unemployment has a false sense of security”.
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CHAPTER 19
Military Joint Task Force and the Challenges 




On a daily basis, Nigeria is faced with numerous security challenges. In 
recent years, especially since the year 2000 to date, Nigeria from its North- 
Eastern part is confronted with insurgency. South-South (Niger Delta) is 
confronted with militancy, while cattle rustling and herdsmen and farm-
ers’ conflicts ravage the North-Central and North-Western parts. South- 
East and South-West are plagued with kidnapping, trafficking and other 
violent crimes. Due to the rise and persistence of conflicts in most states in 
Nigeria and the worrisome lack of capacity to curb conflicts by the Nigeria 
Police Force (NPF), the military has been actively involved in maintaining 
internal security in most states, especially those that are facing more wor-
risome security challenges. In situations like these, the military is required 
to perform one of its constitutional roles/duties in maintaining, and if 
need be restoring, law and order.
M. D. Yake (*) 
Early Warning Coordinator, Search for Common Ground  
Nigeria, Adamawa State, Nigeria
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To this end, men and officers of the Armed Forces are seen on streets 
and in communities of different parts of Nigeria supporting and assisting 
the Police in maintaining law and order, which has led to the formation 
and establishment of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in various states and regions 
of the country with different code names and mandates, such as Operation 
Restore Order (Yobe), Operation Sweep, Operation Harmony, Operation 
Restore Hope (Borno), Operation Gbale, Operation Rainbow (Plateau 
State), Operation Yaki (Kaduna), Operation Safe Haven (Plateau) (Essien 
2012). In recent years, Operation Pulo Shield, Operation Crocodile Smile, 
Operation Delta Safe, Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Zaman Lafiya 
were established in South-South states and North-East states and 
Operation Harbin Kunama in North-West states recently.
Nigeria seems to utilize the multitrack diplomacy in its management of 
conflict. Specifically, the role of security agents in the management of con-
flict in Nigeria ranges from prevention to total control of the situation at 
the spot of violence, which is mitigation. In many cases, the adoption of 
the military in the management of conflicts is usually occasioned by indis-
criminate use of illegitimate firearms and ammunition by the belligerent 
groups, which result in higher number of casualties in terms of loss of lives 
and properties during the conflict (Karim 2013). The primary responsibil-
ity of the Nigerian Military (Army, Air force and Navy) is to protect the 
territorial integrity of the Nigerian state from external threats, provocation 
and aggression; the military on many occasions are invited to support and 
assist other civil authorities (whose primary responsibilities are to maintain 
internal security) to address other forms of violence and tensions that pose 
as threats to the internal peace and security of the country. As such, the 
military could be asked to assist the Police in restoring law and order in 
the country or as stated earlier (Azinge 2013).
Despite efforts put in place by the government to curtail or resolve ten-
sions as reflected earlier, the continuing conflicts and security challenges 
witnessed in the country raise serious questions about the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the state machineries or mechanisms in managing con-
flicts in the country. Albert (2012) notes that inter-agency collaboration is 
important in problem-solving. To this end, Joint Task Forces are usually 
set up for specific purposes and assignments to resolve different security 
concerns. For example, the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta is set up to 
checkmate militancy in the region, the Special Task Force (STF) in Plateau 
State is set up to curb ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State and some 
parts of Bauchi State, and the Joint Task Force in Borno, Yobe and 
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Adamawa is set up to curtail insurgency. In other states like Kaduna State, 
the JTF is there to address the cattle rustling and ethno-religious conflicts 
in Southern Kaduna and other North-West states. Joint Task Forces are 
usually set up based on the principle of inter-agency collaboration, mean-
ing that all the security groups would formally work together to attain 
specific integrated mandates (Albert 2012). But despite the heavy pres-
ence of the military and its joint operations, conflicts seem to persist, and 
capacity of the military to curtail them seems to be threatened or ques-
tioned. Therefore, this chapter examines the challenges of Joint Task 
Force Operations but with particular focus on its internal security opera-
tions in Plateau State.
The actor network collaboration theory provides the theoretical orien-
tation for this chapter. The theory is drawn from different social theories, 
such as actor network theory and collaboration theory. Here the actor 
network collaboration theory postulates that every group is an actor (actor 
group), and every actor group is made up of different individual actors 
which form the actor group; it goes further to say that when different 
actor groups come together to form a network, there is a need for collabo-
ration among them to work effectively. Therefore, the Joint Task Forces 
can be likened to be a network of actors in which there must be collabora-
tion among them and other stakeholders for them to succeed in their 
assignment.
The next section of this chapter undertakes a conceptual analysis so as 
to provide a detailed understanding of joint task force. The third section 
is an overview of military and internal security operations in Nigeria. It 
provides a snapshot of internal security operations through the years. The 
fourth section examines joint task force operations in Plateau State, 
Nigeria. In the fifth section, the challenges of internal security operations 
in Nigeria are investigated and discussed.
conceptual analysIs of JoInt task force
Joint Task Force
The American Heritage Dictionary of English language (cited in Mejabi 
2012) defines a ‘task force’ (TF) as a temporary formation of military units 
under one commander for specific assignment or operations. It is also a 
grouping of different actors and resources for the achievement of specific 
task or goal. Furthermore, the Collins English Dictionary defines task force 
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as a temporary grouping of military units formed to undertake a specific 
mission. It could also be a semi-permanent organization set up to carry 
out a continuing task (Mejabi 2012).
According to a US publication on Joint Task Forces (2012), joint forces 
are composed of key different departments under a commander (who is 
responsible for joint force). The commander of the joint forces or forma-
tion may create other units or heads to command other operations under 
it at specific places and jurisdictions or areas of responsibilities, while 
receiving orders from its established authority that is headed by the com-
mander. Looking closely at the dictionary definitions of task force given in 
the preceding paragraph suggests that a Task Force is created for a specific 
assignment over a certain period of time. From these definitions, there is 
a time frame that would be allowed for a ‘Task Force’ and would mean an 
ad hoc force mandated to achieve specific objectives. On the accomplish-
ment of the task(s), the force is dissolved to pave way for an established 
formation in the area of operation to continue with the mission.
Given the roles and responsibilities, context and areas of operation, a 
Joint Task Force is established under the authority of a single commander 
(known as the Joint Forces Commander). It is the responsibility of the 
establishing authority to designate or assign the Commander of the Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), assign the mission, designate the forces and provide 
other necessary command and control guidance and assistance that are 
necessary for the commander and the joint forces to commence opera-
tions. The establishing authority may establish a JTF for a specific geo-
graphical area or functional basis as the case may be. As previously stated, 
the establishing authority is responsible for assigning the areas of opera-
tion or responsibility for the Joint Task Force, and the task (mission) of 
each JTF might differ depending on the context in which the JTF would 
be operating in (Joint Publication 2012).
Joint Task Forces can be organized, staffed and equipped for operations 
across the full range of military operations. Commanders of joint task 
forces mainly serve at the operational level while deploying and assigning 
responsibilities to other areas of assignments in the field (tactical level). 
For instance, the missions of JTFs in the Niger Delta are different from 
the ones in South-Western Nigeria and also different from those in 
Northern Nigeria. While a mission of one may be to secure the economic 
activity of an area, the other JTF team may be tasked with maintaining/
restoring law and order and, like in the case of some parts of northern 
Nigeria, to fight insurgency. This shows that joint operations are specific, 
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time bound and are dissolved when the purpose for which it was  established 
are achieved. Occasionally, the factors that necessitated the formation of 
the task force might be prolonged and as such might call for the need to 
re-examine the assignment which should inform best options for either 
continuing the operation, ending it or a redesign of its terms of reference. 
For example, the Multinational Joint Task Force in Baga, Borno State, was 
established in 1998 with the mandate of curbing armed banditry in the 
Lake Chad Basin, but the operation has lasted for more than 20 years. 
With the insurgency ravaging the Lake Chad region, it calls for the need 
to re-examine the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task in the region. 
However, like the Multinational Joint Task Force, there are many types of 
task forces which include Combined Task Force, Combined Joint Task 
Force and Joint Task Force.
overvIew of MIlItary and Internal securIty 
operatIons In nIgerIa
Internal Security has to do with the activities and services of the Police and 
other security agencies in ensuring the maintenance of peace, law and 
order, as well as security of lives and properties. From the military perspec-
tive, it is defined as the roles the military play in maintaining and restoring 
law and order, as well as providing key services which may involve primar-
ily the maintenance, restoration of law and order as well as essential ser-
vices in the face of civil disturbances while using the least level of force. It 
includes revolt and even the early stages of rebellions (cited in Mejabi 
2012). Mejabi, in buttressing the concept of internal security operations 
as discussed by Nwolise (2006), is of the view that the activities and ser-
vices of the Police and other security agencies suggest that internal security 
is a venture that calls for the integration of the Police and other security 
agencies to achieve a common goal, which is the security of lives and prop-
erty and the maintenance of law and order. In other words, internal secu-
rity operations are activities which are collectively undertaken by all 
security agencies, toward the restoration of peace and stability in Nigeria.
Ihejirika (2012) noted, over time, massive deployment and engage-
ment of military in internal security operations during peacetime in 
Nigeria. He added that by December 2010, the army had deployed 17,000 
men in internal security operations across the country. Furthermore, 
Ihejirika noted that the security challenges in the country and other exter-
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nal demands have stretched the military to a great extent and even its 
limited resources. There has never been a democratic dispensation in 
Nigeria that has been confronted with enormous security challenges other 
than the present and immediate past dispensations. Hence, internal mili-
tary operations are imperative to maintain law and order and sustain 
democracy. In buttressing this point, Fayeye (2012) noted that preserva-
tion of social order and democratic consolidation are also dependent on its 
formidable security agencies.
Internal security operations are carried out in fulfillment of the consti-
tutional provision of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil 
authorities to restore order when called upon to do so. This is provided in 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 217 
Subsection 2c as “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil author-
ity to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but sub-
ject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National 
Assembly”. It is also in line with Nigeria’s Defence Policy of strengthening 
our national character by eliminating social vices. Operations concluded in 
this regard ranged from anti-crime to suppressing insurrections like the 
quelling of Maitatsine religious uprising in Kano and some cities in the 
north, and other vices in other parts of the country. Military task forces 
were involved in various anti-crime operations such as Operation Burst, 
Operation SWEEP and Operation GBALE in Lagos and Oyo States, 
respectively, Operation YAKI in Kaduna State as well as Operation 
HARMONY and Operation RESTORE HOPE to contain ethnic mili-
tancy. To fight against indiscipline among its own personnel, the Nigerian 
Army also launched Operation CHECKMATE (Albert 2012). Operation 
Crocodile Smile, Operation Lafiya Dole and Operation Pulo Shield.
The participation of the military, especially as Joint Task Forces in inter-
nal security operations in Nigeria, has undoubtedly had challenges, but 
according to Omede (2012), the most perceived controversial and possi-
bly most challenging experience for the military in internal security opera-
tion was the March 2010 Jos crisis. He noted that issues involved were an 
eye-opener on how the military ought to understand and adapt to the 
context and ensuring law and order that fosters peace, while nipping in the 
bud emerging threats to the nation’s national security in a dynamic world. 
He further added that the March incident revealed necessities and impera-
tives of civil institutions to take the lead in maintaining security and curb-
ing violent conflicts in Nigeria. Omede further observed that though the 
military had been applauded for quick intervention and dousing tensions, 
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many had critiqued and condemned some of the military’s conflict 
 management styles, citing the March 2010 Jos ethno-religious crisis as the 
one which was not handled well (Omede 2012).
The military were alleged to have delayed responses to early warning 
signs and inappropriate responses to stop attackers from reaching villages 
on smaller roads, despite being on duty along major roads in and around 
Jos. That they (the military) compromised the security of the state by 
showing bias in their handling of the crisis and finally were also accused of 
slow reaction by other security forces (such as the Police) and being part 
of the (sectarian) problem in Jos. However, in a similar pattern taken by 
other scholars, Omede did not explain what could have been the chal-
lenges encountered by the military in maintaining internal security in Jos. 
Hence this chapter is a response to that vacuum of scholarship.
On a broader spectrum, Fayeye (2012) observes that military in inter-
nal security operations have helped to consolidate democracy in the 
country, especially since the return to democracy in 1999. He added that 
if not for military internal operations, there would have been a break-
down of law and order. He further asserted that the plurality of the coun-
try’s ethno-religious groups has been a challenge for the military (which 
is part of the security sector of the country) and hence the need for con-
tinuous impartiality and neutrality in all its operations in the country 
(Houngnikpo 2012).
JoInt task force operatIons In plateau state
Since the outbreak of conflicts in Plateau State in 1991, governments (both 
state and federal) have responded to the conflicts in three major forms: set-
ting up of judicial inquiry, peace initiative committees and deployment of 
security agencies (Krause 2011; Crisis Report 2012). The state has wit-
nessed several commissions of inquiries, yet the conflict has persisted—
some of these commissions of inquiry include Justice J.  Arbitration 
Fiberesima Commission (1994), Justice Niki Tobi Commission (2001), 
Plateau Peace Conference (2004), Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry 
(2009) and Solomon Lar Presidential Advisory Commission (2010), 
though Osareti and Akov (2013) notes that there have been at least 16 
commissions so far. Despite the recommendations and communiqués writ-
ten by various committees, publication of the reports is slow, especially of 
the 2010 Presidential Advisory Commission for wider circulation.
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Also lack of political will in implementing or acting on the recommen-
dations made by the commissions has posed serious challenges. Crisis 
Report (2012) reveals that in many cases, governments (state and federal) 
get selective in acting on some of the recommendations being made. Also 
some security agencies were accused of lacking the capacity to pin down 
instigators of the conflicts in the state and also hardly inquire about the 
authors of inflammatory, inciting and provocative speeches. As a result, 
there was little or no deterrence against recklessness and impunity (Crisis 
Report 2012). Due to the overall lack of political will, the protracted con-
flict which was getting worse or the increase in violent conflicts in the 
state, despite the several commissions of inquiries and peace conferences 
and deterioration of law and order in the state, the Special Task Force was 
established (Emelonye 2011; Krause 2011).
The Special Task Force (STF) was established in September 2010, 
when President Jonathan directed the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) to 
assume full responsibility of Plateau State. The Chief of Defense Staff’s 
main assignments included overseeing the work of the STF.  The STF 
comprises the Nigerian Army, Air force, Navy, Mobile Police Force, the 
State Security Service (SSS) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense 
Corps (NSCDC). In buttressing the above points, the commander of the 
Special Task Force in the State concurred that the security challenges in 
the State led to the establishment of the Special Task Force, and the situ-
ations on the ground had escalated beyond what the statutory agencies in 
the state can handle.
Roles and Rules of Engagement
The role of security agencies in the management of conflict ranges from 
prevention to total control of the situation on the spot of violence. In 
order to appreciate the role of the Armed Forces in the management of 
conflicts, the consequences of insecurity must be recognized. Without 
security, no other activities can be effectively carried out. Life itself would 
be in jeopardy, economic activities would come to a standstill or would go 
down. Daily religious activities and political processes would not be feasi-
ble because of insecurity (Karim 2013). Like in the case of the Plateau 
State, either on Fridays or on Sundays, the roads are usually blocked or 
closed for at least three hours because of fear of attacks.
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Security agencies, under the Constitution, are responsible for the con-
tainment of conflicts. In doing so, they are expected to comply with the 
provisions of the nation’s Constitution. Though the Nigerian Police and 
State Security Service have the primary responsibility for internal security, 
however, the Armed Forces may be deployed to complement or take over 
the operations. The guidelines for the involvement of the Armed Forces in 
internal security are clear in the Nigerian Constitution. Primarily, for inter-
nal security operations, the situation on ground determines the rules of 
engagement in that area. Hence, while the STF troops in Plateau State are 
tasked with the protection of lives and deterring the enemy from attack, 
the rule differs from one area of operation to another.
The Mission or Mandate of the STF
The Special Task Force, with an operation code name known as Operation 
Save Haven at inception was mandated primarily to restore law and order, 
aid civil authority, and protect lives and property. The overall objective is 
to achieve long-term peace settlement in the state and also ensure socio-
economic stability in the environment, especially among herdsmen and 
farmers. Normally, Joint Task Forces’ Operations are usually short termed 
with a time frame of 90 days, but in the case of the STF, there is no specific 
time frame given for its assignment. Rather the state of peace and stability 
in the state is a determinant of achieving or not achieving its mission in the 
state. Hence, the STF could remain in the state as long as possible. That is 
why the task force is called a Special Task Force and not just a Joint Task 
Force. So far, the operation has lasted four years and is still ongoing with-
out achieving the desirable result (peace and stability) in the state.
Achievements of the Special Task Force
According to the key respondent, Major General Henry Ayoola, 
Commander STF noted that the task force has recorded some substantial 
levels of success in the state, especially in the areas of protection of lives 
and properties and outright inter-communal conflicts. He added that eco-
nomic activities once again have begun to flourish in the state. These 
achievements are further discussed later.
19 MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCE AND THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNAL… 
450
Breaking Barriers Among Conflicting Parties
As a result of the conflicts in Jos (Plateau State capital), places like Tudun 
Wada, Anguwan Rogo and Nassarawa Gwom were no go areas to 
 non- residents of those places. Usually, when non-residents of these areas 
were passing by, they were attacked by residents of the area and as such 
had created fear among the people. Also until the banning of commercial 
motorbikes in the state, they were used for silent attacks and other crimi-
nal activities, especially after sunset. The ban on commercial motorcycles 
led to a reduction in criminal activities and silent killings that occurred on 
a daily basis.
In the so-called no go areas, the presence and formations (such as check 
points) of the STF helped to reduce attacks on non-residents moving 
through those areas and also to reduce interpersonal/inter-communal 
conflicts. Personnel of the STF also engaged in mediating small-scale dis-
putes in communities that could lead to large-scale violent conflicts; their 
interventions in helping to mitigate the problem led to such issues being 
quietly resolved. This led to confidence building among residents in the 
communities and helped to strengthen inter-group relations. Though it 
can be observed that in some of these communities, the peace recorded 
was negative peace arising from the fear of the uniformed men (soldiers).
Civil-Military Relations
In order to strengthen civil-military relations and inter-group relations, 
the Special Task Force embarked on a number of outreaches in the state. 
Some of these outreaches included free medical outreach, drilling of bore-
holes in communities and organizing peace soccer tournaments in com-
munities, especially those torn apart by violent conflicts. These outreaches 
helped to bring conflicting parties together, to reconcile and tolerate 
each other.
Inter-agency Collaboration
In many cases, especially when different agencies are brought together to 
work on a common cause, there is usually the problem of lack of proper 
synergy among these agencies for effective service or pursuance of the 
assignment. Thus, in looking at inter-agency collaboration, General Henry 
Ayoola commented that the STF in the State is an epitome of formidable 
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synergy among security agencies in the country. The commander of the STF 
noted that strong leadership base of the outfit is what makes the synergy 
easy among the personnel of the task force. This synergy helped the STF 
to carry out its assignments effectively and successfully without many 
hitches from personnel. Therefore, Intelligence gathering and informa-
tion sharing among the STF flowed with little or no barrier. As postulated 
in the actor network collaboration theory, the base of effective delivery is 
collaboration among the different networks of actors and actor groups 
that are brought together. Without collaboration, the collective goal to be 
achieved by a network of actor groups is likely to be futile.
challenges of Internal securIty operatIons 
In plateau state
Internal security operations have been on for over five years in Plateau 
State and yet constant attacks on communities remain the norm. This 
signifies that the presence of the Military Special Task Force (MSTF) in 
the state is not a guarantee for sustainable peace. It is therefore noted that 
the right political will of the government (from local up to federal level) to 
tackle the insecurity challenges in the state is key to achieving sustainable 
peace. Over the years, government inability to decisively take actions to 
resolve some of the conflicts in the state has kept the state in a vicious cycle 
of violence. For example, the conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers 
in the state can be decisively settled, as Henry Ayoola puts it in these words:
There are vast and abundant lands in the state, which is big enough for every 
farmer to farm as far as he wants and large enough for every herdsman to 
feed his flock as far as he can go. It is only trouble. As far as I am concerned 
for some fellows to deliberately go and graze on someone else’s farmland. 
(cited in Yake 2014)
Religion has been used as an instrument to escalate the conflict in Plateau 
State; hence religion is being used as a tool for political gain. This in turn 
frustrates the efforts of the STF in doing its best to maintain the peace in 
the state. Many times, politicians have tried to drag the STF into the 
conflict, trying to make them partisan. In buttressing this point, it should 
be noted that the conflict in Plateau State is a political one that would 
need political solutions to resolve it. This points out that the MSTF is 
caught in a political web that may have grave consequences for it. This 
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confirms what Mejabi noted in 2012, that the military is a profession 
which in the modern complex and dynamic world cannot bear the stresses 
of Nigeria’s precarious political practices, in which either the nation is 
unduly militarized or the military is dangerously politicized. Therefore, 
no matter the high level of military preparedness, either combat readi-
ness or equipment readiness and enough manpower, the conflict in 
Plateau will remain in an unending cycle. This is because the conflict in 
the state is multifaceted that needs a multifaceted approach with the 
needed political will (Yake 2014).
The above points out the need to settle root causes of the Jos conflict 
on the table and not just involving the military to change conflict behav-
ior; because of the presence of the military, the use of arms could be 
reduced, but other forms of violence may increase which in turn may 
lead back to the use of arms. This would only create a situation of recy-
cling those who hold arms and not an end to the conflict. The state of 
peace in the plateau which is the determining factor for the withdrawal 
of the STF in the State can only be fully achieved if all the previous rec-
ommendations made by the different commissions of inquiry are imple-
mented. However, the major issue which is indigene/citizenship 
(indigene-settler dichotomy) in the state can only be settled when ambi-
guities around it in the Constitution of the country are also settled. This 
is to say that it seems that the Special Task Force has come to stay in the 
State. While the presence of the MSTF doesn’t resolve the conflict in the 
State, the presence and activities of the operation can only change the 
conflict behavior among conflicting parties and to some extent secure 
lives and properties in the state.
Maintenance of security in Plateau State is also beyond the presence of 
the MSTF alone but also includes the need for collective responsibility and 
sincerity of purpose by politicians in the State. Hence, the need for good 
governance can only be made possible with the right and positive leader-
ship. Just as positive leadership is key to good governance, multitrack 
diplomacy has also become imperative in the Plateau if peace must be 
sustained. Despite the successes recorded by the STF so far, some chal-
lenges still persist that frustrate their efforts, which is actually the crux of 
this research. Respondent had noted that if not for recurring challenges, 
the successes would have been more. The challenges therefore are 
recorded below.
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Lack of Manpower
At the inception of the STF in the State, there were about 3200 personnel 
deployed to carry out its task. The present manpower of the STF is grossly 
inadequate to address the security challenges in the state. The STF is made 
up of nine sectors and each of these sectors has its area of responsibilities 
(AOR), some of areas of responsibility could be two local governments to 
a sector or a local government to a sector, depending on the responsibility 
given. But in places where attacks have been severe, especially in commu-
nities of Jos South, Riyom and Barkin Ladi local governments, the num-
ber of men for the task there is grossly inadequate. Most of the rural 
communities are far from each other, and in some cases, there isn’t any 
telecommunication network to facilitate communication among residents 
of the community and members of the STF. This in many cases has enabled 
assailants launch attacks on such unfortunate communities.
Lack of Equipment and Logistics
Lack of equipment such as binoculars, arms/ammunitions, communica-
tion gadgets, night vision goggles and other military equipment has con-
tinued to frustrate the efforts of the STF in carrying out their responsibilities 
in the state. Personnel of the STF in rural communities lack equipment 
and facilities that can facilitate their assignments there. In a country where 
power supply is a problem, rural communities suffer most of this power 
shortage, and as such, STF personnel working in these areas would need 
equipment such as solar power to carry out their responsibilities effec-
tively. Without adequate logistics, success would be difficult on any given 
assignment for the security personnel. Other logistics such as operational 
patrol vehicles are grossly inadequate for patrolling in rural communities, 
especially communities with difficult road terrains. Also in many cases, 
respondent noted that inefficient communication gadgets among the per-
sonnel have resulted in the use of their personal mobile phones for com-
munication, which constitutes a security risk.
On the other hand, availability of global system mobile (GSM) com-
munication has added another challenge to internal security operations. 
Just as security operatives enjoy the benefits of the mobile phones, hood-
lums and terrorist seem to also have a better use for it. Due to how hood-
lums and terrorist use the GSM to successfully plan and execute their 
operations, the network of the telecommunications had to be shut down 
in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa for some months.
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Respondents also noted that the major cause of the conflict in Plateau 
State is control of the political economy of the state. This concurs with the 
view of Alozieuwa (2010), who noted that the political economy of the 
state is at the center of the Plateau conflicts. Some other respondents 
noted that since the bombing of the terminus market in 2001, many busi-
nesses are yet to fully recover. They also added that even as the rebuilding 
of shops and other commercial centers are built, they are now allotted to 
indigenes only. Other challenges include the welfare of the personnel, 
which includes their feeding and accommodation. STF have been faced 
with harsh weather conditions, and they don’t even have a conducive 
accommodation to keep them warm during the cold seasons. In terms of 
feeding, the troops are to fend for themselves, as there is no provision for 
constant supply of food for them, especially those in the interior 
communities.
Sometimes troops have to rely on the goodwill of host communities to 
assist them with food, which isn’t good for the kind of assignments being 
carried out as it affects their mandate to be neutral. These have posed seri-
ous challenges for the troops, as sometimes when they are needed to 
quickly respond to attacks or security threats in some places and one or 
two personnel isn’t anywhere to be found, as such one might have gone to 
look for what to eat. The above challenges are a result of national demand 
in the country. The country is presently in a state of high demand of its 
resources on different competing needs, especially because of the state of 
insecurity in the country, especially in Northern Nigeria. Hence, these 
challenges may not be limited only to Special Task Force in Plateau State 
but also to other Military Joint Task Forces across the country at large.
Management of Diversity Among Troops
Members of the Special Task Force come from the various ethnic and reli-
gious groups in the country and, as such, at both tactical and operational 
levels, management of diversity matters. A commander of every troop 
must at all times keep abreast with the rules of engagement and with uni-
versal rules of neutrality and impartiality. Troops of the STF have been 
accused several times of taking sides in the conflict. The peak of these 
accusations came when women first protested against them and demanded 
their removal from their localities in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
In 2013, the caretaker chairmen of Riyom and Barkin Ladi local govern-
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ments also called for their withdrawal from their local governments. They 
further accused the STF of escalating the conflict in order to justify their 
stay in the localities and yet they are doing nothing.
Respondents noted that such accusations from the people, especially 
that of the local government chairmen, were not only baseless but also 
lacked merit and were made out of ignorance. He further added that com-
munity leaders and politicians needed perception management and needed 
to ensure that they were more informed before making public comments. 
Other respondents also noted that because of the instrumentalism of eth-
nicity and religion in the conflicts, the STF troops had faced very serious 
criticisms to the point that whatever actions they carried out, the public 
looked at it through the lens of religion and ethnicity. And whatever the 
troops do that do not favor any of the conflicting parties was seen as biased.
Communication and Language Barrier
Communication and language barrier has been a major challenge for 
troops in various communities in Plateau State. In many cases, troops have 
found it difficult to communicate with residents of the communities 
because of the language barrier. For example, Yoruba-speaking troops 
would find it difficult to communicate with the residents who primarily 
spoke Berom and not English as a language. Communication for some 
troops becomes easier when they are deployed to areas in Jos metropolis, 
while the ones in the interior communities continue to battle with the 
language barrier. Sometimes, this language barrier creates an unknown 
fear in troops and makes them unnecessarily suspicious of some communi-
cation which may not be directed at them.
Lack of Training
Troops of the Special Task Force in Plateau State are drawn from the Armed 
Forces, Police, State Security Service and Nigerian Security and Civil 
Defense Corps (NSCDC), and as such, their individual unit training dif-
fers. While those of the military (Army, Air force and Navy) may not have 
problems on the laws governing armed conflicts, those of the other para-
military agencies may have. Also, their individual training and orientation 
are not the same. Hence, it is a challenge to properly train the personnel 
and to handle internal operations in the country. This challenge sometimes 
determines the roles of each participating agency in the operation.
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Lack of Political Will
As far as one of the respondents is concerned, there is a lack of political will 
by the government (from local up to federal level) to tackle the insecurity 
challenges in the state. He noted that the government was unable to 
 decisively take action in resolving some of the conflicts in the state. For 
example, he noted that the conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers in 
the state can be decisively settled, as he puts it in these words:
there are vast and abundant lands in the state, which is big enough for every 
farmer to farm as far as he wants and large enough for every herdsman to 
feed his flock as far as he can go. Its only trouble as far as i’m concerned for 
some fellows to deliberately go and graze on someone’s else farmland.
The respondent also noted that religion is being used as an instrument 
to escalate the conflict in the state; hence religion is being used as a tool 
for political gain. This, he says frustrates the efforts of the STF, as many 
times politicians have tried to drag the STF into the conflict, trying to 
make them partisan. In buttressing this point, he stated that the conflict in 
Plateau State is a political one that would need political solutions to solve 
it. This suggests that the STF is caught in a political web that may have 
grave consequences on it. Which also confirms what Mejabi noted in 
2012, that the military is a profession which in the modern complex and 
dynamic world cannot bear the stresses of Nigeria’s precarious political 
practices, in which either the nation is unduly militarized or the military is 
dangerously politicized. Therefore, no matter the high level of military 
preparedness, either combat readiness or equipment readiness and enough 
manpower, the conflict in Plateau State will remain in an unending cycle. 
This is because the conflict in the state is multifaceted that needs a multi-
faceted approach with the right political will.
The availability of these parameters to the extent of efficient perfor-
mance of the internal security tasks indicates good operational readiness. 
The insufficiencies of the needed resources pose real challenges to the STF 
and as such stretch their capabilities. The spillover effect of insurgency in 
other neighboring states could result in the proliferation of arms and 
ammunitions in the State. The above points out the need to settle root 
causes of the Jos conflict on the table and not just involving the military to 
change conflict behavior.
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Media Reports and Public Perception
Media reports, especially hostile media reports as noted by respondent, 
could stir up public dissent against the STF, thus making the operations 
uneasy and winning the hearts of the people difficult. This in turn makes 
the operational environment for the security personnel unfavorable. This 
is why the STF Public Relations Officer briefs the general public from time 
to time on the activities of the STF and sometimes responds to false media 
reports on its activities. The challenges mentioned earlier also confirm the 
works of Mejabi (2012), Karim (2013), who noted that corruption, poor 
equipment, inadequate infrastructure, poor intelligence gathering, lack of 
adequate knowledge of the areas of operation and operational order, pro-
liferation of illegal weapons and lack of adequate training are issues that 
affect security agencies in the management of conflict.
conclusIon
This work has attempted to examine Joint Task Force and internal security 
operations in Nigeria with particular reference to Plateau State. It has also 
examined the factors militating the achievement of Joint Task Forces in 
internal security operations. The chapter concludes that the challenges 
faced by the Joint Task Force in Plateau State are not peculiar to the state 
alone but reveal a national problem that cuts across other states of the 
federation. It is crucial to emphasize the need for effective collaboration 
among agencies participating in joint operations in the country; as such, 
there is a need for a holistic security sector reform to accommodate and 
provide robust mandates for Joint Task Force operations to be more effec-
tive in the country, which would include robust policy framework in order 
to address overlapping responsibilities. Even though the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution (as amended) backs the role of the military in internal secu-
rity operations, a robust policy framework for joint operations would help 
strengthen the operations, especially in providing the needed funds to 
procure and efficiently carry out its mandates.
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CHAPTER 20




Provision of security to guarantee the protection of lives, properties, wel-
fare and rights of the citizenry has been the primary responsibility of a 
responsible government. This is in view of the fact that individuals under 
social contract have surrendered their sovereignty to government (through 
electoral legitimacy), while government undertakes the protection of their 
lives and property. Thus, protection of lives and properties of the people 
remains the major objective of the government. Until recently, the relative 
peace that Nigeria enjoys among the comity of nations in West Africa has 
been overridden by high level of insecurity. The country now witnesses 
incessant kidnapping, insurgency, armed robbery, political violence and 
ethno-religious conflicts, among others, mainly as a result of the political 
and religious differences in the country (Odeh and Umoh 2015). Nigeria 
now witnesses a high rate of insecurity which permeates all geopolitical 
zones, especially the North-East that is riddled with insurgent attacks. 
These posed a great threat to national security, which consequently led to 
increase in budgetary allocation to the security sector (Achumba et  al. 
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2013). Despite the increased funding to the sector, the spate of violent 
crimes is not reducing; rather, it is fast becoming one of the major occur-
rences in the nation (Adegoke 2014).
Section 14(2b) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended) man-
dates the government to give primacy to the security of the people. In 
view of this, the Nigerian government delegates the management of inter-
nal security of the country to the Nigeria Police and other sister security 
agencies. By this, the police is required to detect and prevent crime, main-
tain peace and orderliness, as well as enforce the laws and other regulations 
of the government. However, the continuous increase in the rate of inse-
curity in the country raises concerns on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the police. Premised on this, it becomes significant to look into the activi-
ties of the police to identify its achievement, challenges and prospects in 
light of world’s best practices in security management.
It is against this backdrop that Odekunle (2004) opined that identify-
ing the challenges militating against the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
police should be of concern to scholars and policymakers rather than trad-
ing blames. While one may agree with this notion, it is not out of place to 
do a comprehensive tripartite assessment of the situation on the basis of 
the achievement, challenges and prospects. The essence of this is to make 
a case for the reformation of the Nigeria Police to come up with a formi-
dable security agency that can perform its basic constitutional duty of 
securing the lives and property of all Nigerians. The discourse also con-
tributes to the ongoing debate among security experts, politicians and 
other stakeholders on whether or not to unbundle the Nigeria Police to 
allow for more inclusiveness of other actors (especially the state govern-
ments) in supporting the federal government to secure the lives and prop-
erties of the people.
With regard to the ongoing debate, there are basically three arguments 
to the reformation of the security sector. While some call for the incorpo-
ration of non-state policing (vigilantism) into the mainstream of formal 
policing project bringing about community policing (see Bakare 2014; 
Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi 2010; Inyang and Abraham 2013; Brogden 2004; 
Alemika and Chukwuma 2004), others led by Babatunde Fashola (a for-
mer Governor of Lagos State) and his Edo State counterpart, Adams 
Oshiomole, and most of the sitting Nigerian Governors believe that the 
only solution is to unbundle the Nigeria Police by amending section 
214(1) of the constitution to allow the establishment of state police. The 
third category, prominent among whom are Goodluck Jonathan (a former 
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Nigerian President), M. D. Abubakar (former IG of Police) and Abubakar 
Tsav (retired Senior Police officer), argues for the maintenance of status 
quo with the call for strengthening the force with regard to acquisition of 
modern technology, weaponry and recruitment of more personnel, among 
others (see also Soyinka et al. 2011; Nimbe and Bayo 2011).
It is on this note that this chapter attempts a discussion of the perfor-
mance level of the Nigeria Police in managing internal security in the wake 
of the contesting contemplations of the struggle for sustainable peace and 
safety of lives and properties in the country. To do this, the chapter is 
divided into sections. Following this introduction is the review of litera-
ture on policing heterogeneous societies and a theoretical exposition. The 
third section traces the historical development of the Nigeria Police Force 
(NPF) and the argument for the reformation of the police. Section “The 
Institutional and Constitutional Framework of the Nigeria Police” dwells 
on the institutional and constitutional framework of the Nigeria Police. 
Section “Assessing the Nigeria Police in the Management of Internal 
Security” assesses the role of the Nigeria Police in the management of 
internal security. This is followed by section “The Nigeria Police and the 
Dynamics of Nigerian Politics and Governance: Issues, Challenges and 
Prospects”, which examines the Nigeria Police and the dynamics of 
Nigerian politics and governance, looking at the contending issues and 
challenges hindering the effectiveness of policing the nation as well as the 
prospect of a virile policing in Nigeria. The chapter ends with recommen-
dations and conclusion.
PolIcIng Heterogeneous socIetIes
The concept of policing has become a contested issue among scholars, 
especially with respect to the meaning ascribed to concept. The concept of 
police connotes an institution primarily charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing law and order. In a general term, the major role of the police is 
to secure compliance to the laws of the land and ensure compliance to 
government’s regulations. Put simply, while ‘police’ is an institution, 
‘policing’ is the art and act of the institution. There is no significant differ-
ence in the organization and roles expected of the police in all political and 
administrative systems (Jones and Maguire n.d.). However, what differen-
tiates the political systems is how the police are put into use, whether as a 
civil organization or an agent of oppression. Each ruler may tend to use 
the police based on his interest, for instance, for overall good or sectional 
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good. This is why Reiner (1993, p. 1) argued that the police is an institu-
tion that shows how powerful a state is, especially on the use of force.
In a contextual meaning, police refers to any institution backed by law 
(constitutional or traditional) to enforce law and maintain order in a given 
society. This means that there are other police institutions aside from the 
normal police that could provide security. Such institutions could be cat-
egorized into two. The first are the paramilitary agencies such as the immi-
gration and custom services charged with policing the territorial borders 
to regulate inflow and outflow of people and goods to avoid breakdown 
of order. The second category is those non-state security outfits set up by 
the people to complement the state security in regulating social and cus-
tomary relations in the community. The two categories usually coexist to 
provide policing functions though with varying degrees of power to sanc-
tion and use force. This is why Reiner (2000) argued that policing is a 
subset of control processes that ensure the establishment of surveillance 
systems to detect crime and deviant behavior. To this end, policing is an 
act that transcends the state provision of security; rather, it involves the 
cooperation of both state and non-state agencies. This is referred to as 
community policing.
It should be noted that the non-state security agencies usually derive 
their legality based on the approval and license by the state security agen-
cies. This is as a result of the fact that state enjoys monopoly of the use of 
force which is evident in the control of the police and other security agen-
cies. The government manifests its power and authority to enforce law and 
maintain orderliness through the policing institution (World Encyclopedia 
2006; Sullivan 2005; Das and Palmiotto 2004; Ascoli 1979; Robinson 
et  al. 1994; Suleiman 1996). Aside from enforcing law, the police also 
perform other functions as deemed fit by the policymakers (Bittner 1970; 
Potholm 1969). This accounted for the reason why defining the police in 
terms of provision of security seems problematic (World Encyclopedia 
2006; Klockars 1985). Therefore, any definition of the ‘police’ must take 
cognizance of other social functions of the institution outside crime con-
trol. These functions include traffic management, road safety mainte-
nance, firefighting and crowd control. Perhaps, this is why Sullivan (2005) 
and Tamuno (1985) argued that the duty of the police covers crime con-
trol and any other activities that require intervention to avoid chaos and 
anarchy. However, providing other social services does not remove the 
fact that the police is an institution primarily charged with the responsibil-
ity of crime prevention (Suleiman 1996) making other functions to be 
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regarded as secondary. To this end, one will expect that the police need 
wide discretionary powers to perform these multitude of duties. However, 
this does not connote that the police can resort to use of force at all times, 
as world’s best practices show that contemporary policing entails the craft 
of handling crime and other social vices without the use of force (Das and 
Palmiotto 2004; The African Guardian 1986).
Aside from the function and techniques of policing, there is the issue of 
variation in the institutional organization of policing system, especially 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies. This variation is 
mostly as a result of the cultural diversity and the pattern of ethnic politics. 
Ben-Porat (2007) contends that while it is easier for homogeneous societ-
ies to organize their policing structure given their homogeneity, the 
reverse is the case for heterogeneous societies because of the complications 
attached to multicultural diversity. The multicultural diversity usually 
affects the organization of government and all agencies of government, as 
different sections of the society will want to get a share of the government 
structure to show their membership of the union. This poses a great chal-
lenge to policing as the interests of the diverse groups must be considered 
first before looking at the primary role of the police institution (Stenning 
2003). The tendencies for conflicts between majority and minority groups 
over the claim of domination and marginalization not only affect the orga-
nization of the policing system but also portend a threat to the effective-
ness of the police. It becomes difficult for the police to battle inter-ethnic 
violent crises given the interests and forces at play. The outcomes usually 
show that the police is not prepared and capable of battling the scourge 
(Stenning 2003), sometimes leading to the invitation of the military. In 
some cases, the reactions of the police, to prove its effectiveness, escalate 
the crisis on the argument that the police is taking sides with one particu-
lar ethnic group.
Over the years, policing is one of the major sources of concern for het-
erogeneous societies. No government will allow any section of the country 
to negotiate its authority, especially through secession. While the govern-
ment has the power to draft the police to maintain peace and order in 
every region of the country, the agitating minority groups see it as purpo-
sive clampdown using the police as an instrument of terror and subjuga-
tion by the government. This contradictory tendency usually leads to the 
public’s negative perception of the police as being brutal and not civil as 
expected. From another perspective, the police in heterogeneous societies 
is also questioned on the basis of its mode of operation and organization 
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structure. For instance, the Nigeria Police is structured under a single 
command attached to the presidency. This often creates the atmosphere 
for people to agitate for reform. The argument is premised on the fact that 
the unified structure of the policing system is too rigid and encourages 
bureaucratic bottleneck in decision making and slow rapid response and 
alienates the local community from policing their communities. This is 
why Fleras (1992) describes policing systems in heterogeneous societies, 
especially those under a unified command like Nigeria as an institution 
with military overtones characterized by central command and hierarchy 
which make flexible enforcement of rules difficult, if not impossible. While 
there is no end in sight for the blame trade associated with policing het-
erogeneous societies, Manning (2006) contends that it has become an 
important aspect that the police will have to live with and continue to defy 
the effectiveness of the police except if decentralization of the policing 
system is considered. This is because the police is operating in a society 
that is conscious of political contest with the aim of protecting different 
conflicting interests.
HIstorIcal develoPment of tHe nIgerIa PolIce 
and tHe argument for Its reform
The history of the Nigeria Police can be divided into three periods in line 
with the historical development of the Nigerian state itself. The first period 
being the pre-colonial era, followed by the period of colonial rule and, 
lastly, the era of self-government (post-colonial era). In the period before 
the advent of colonialism, indigenous institutions such as the traditional 
rulers were charged with the responsibility of crime prevention and man-
agement. Though laws were not codified, they existed with almost every-
body knowing the punitive measure placed on each crime or offense. 
These ranged from imprisonment, forced community service, banishment 
from the community and capital punishment. Aside from the traditional 
rulers, there were other institutions that complemented the enforcement 
of laws and regulated behaviors based on the customs and traditions pre-
vailing in each community. These institutions include the secret societies 
(ogboni confraternity), kings’ messengers, youth leaders, family heads and 
palace guards (Marenin 1985; Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi 2010; Inyang and 
Abraham 2013). During this period, the laws enforced by these security 
institutions were not documented but were known to all and sundry. The 
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policing structure was directly under the control of the political or admin-
istrative leader as the case may be.
The policing system changed during the colonial period as the institu-
tion was operated in line with the provisions of the British colonial laws. 
This period witnessed a paradigm shift from the tradition-based policing 
to modern-based police system. The first implication was the change in 
orientation and objective of the police where it no longer protected the 
people’s general interests, rather protected the colonial and commercial 
interests of the Britons at the expense of the people. Officials of the old 
order and the control chain were discarded, with new recruits manning 
the structure under the direct control of the colonial officials, a situation 
which Rotimi (2001) described as ‘strangers policing strangers’. The con-
sequence of this new order is seen from the incessant clash between the 
police and the people. This situation made scholars and criminologists 
such as Alemika (1988), Ahire (1991), Ikime (1977), Tamuno (1970) 
and Crowder (1978) to opine that the activities and rules of engagement 
of the police during this period were tailored toward the protection of 
British occupation in Nigeria. This prompted Onyeozili (2005) to argue 
that early recruitment and deployment of police and security resources 
were done to achieve the colonial economic and political objectives which 
consequently shaped the current posture of policing in the contemporary 
period given its oppressive tendencies.
The third period (post-colonial era) in the history of policing in Nigeria 
is heavily influenced by the second period (colonial period). During inde-
pendence, the departing British colonial authority handed over power to 
the natives, forcing the apparatus and methods of political administrative 
system on the newly independent Nigeria. One of such apparatus was the 
police. Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi (2010) observed that the police of the inde-
pendent Nigeria was not in any way different in orientation and objectives 
from that of the colonial period as the security institution is still enmeshed 
in the sectional interest protection, especially that of the political elites. 
Since the departure of the colonial power, the Nigeria Police is still faced 
with the challenges which the colonial police faced. The contemporary 
police despite its human and material resources still fall short in providing 
adequate security for the people.
Despite several efforts at reforming the police by succeeding authori-
ties, the implementation of the reform exercise has always been problem-
atic. This has led to continuous agitations and scholarship proposition of 
various models of policing that best suit the specificity of the Nigerian 
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heterogeneous structure. Options such as devolution of police structure 
from federally controlled police structure to allow state participation in 
policing; community-based policing; and the incorporation of non-state 
policing institutions to mainstream policing, have been proffered for effec-
tive and efficiency policing system in the country. None of the proffered 
options is without problems.
Critics of the establishment of state police opposed it on the ground 
that Nigeria may witness the repeat of the 1960 experience where the local 
police was used as an instrument of political oppression against the oppo-
sition politicians and the people who held dissident views against the gov-
ernment (Nimbe and Bayo 2011 cited in Inyang and Abraham 2013, 
pp. 54–55). The implication of this according to Soyinka et al. (2011) is 
that most state governors will have undue advantage over their political 
opponents and may use the state police to victimize the people, especially 
those who oppose their interest; all in the name of policing the state and 
fighting crime. One may question the basis of the critics’ argument on the 
ground of whether the federal government is also not using the federal 
police in this direction.
Aside from the argument for the establishment of state police, there is 
also the argument for reforming the existing police structure to make way 
for community policing which requires a partnership arrangement between 
the police and the host community to prevent and manage crime (Bakare 
2014). This position gains the support of the police hierarchy as shown in 
the research conducted by the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in 
Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation) in partnership with the NPF in 14 states 
selected from the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria between March 2001 
and December 2003. The study found and established the fact that com-
munity policing if well implemented is capable of eradicating security chal-
lenges and criminal tendencies in Nigeria (Pam Sha 2005). However, this 
position seems to have low publicity and acceptance as the argument for 
state policing is the most widely reported by the media.
tHe InstItutIonal and constItutIonal framework 
of tHe nIgerIa PolIce
The institutional and constitutional framework of the Nigeria Police is pro-
vided for in Section 214 (2)(a) and 215(2) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution 
(as amended). The constitution recognizing its inexhaustiveness makes provi-
sions for the enactment of other laws to guide the  structure and functions of 
 A. R. BAKARE AND G. T. ADERINOLA
469
the police. For instance, Section 214(2)(a) states that: ‘Subject to the provi-
sions of this constitution (a) the Nigeria Police shall be organized and admin-
istered in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed by an Act of 
the National Assembly’. Section 215(2) provides that ‘The Nigeria Police 
shall be under the Command of the Inspector-General of Police and any 
contingents of the Nigeria Police stationed in a state shall; subject to the 
authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of 
Commissioner of Police of that state’. Premised on these constitutional provi-
sions, three structures of the Nigeria Police are identified. These are: the 
command (authority) structure, administration structure, and organization 
structure, all designed to achieve the objectives stated in the constitution.
The first structure (command), also seen as the authority structure of the 
police, is predicted on the regimental nature of the police and configured 
along the badges of ranks. This is premised on the provisions of Section 
215(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 6 of the Police 
Act, 1990, which provides that the police should be under the overall com-
mand of the Inspector-General of Police, who is expected to dish out direc-
tives to other officers for the purpose of effective and efficient policing. The 
law also empowers the Inspector-General to sanction any officer found 
wanting in implementing the directives (see http://www.npf.gov.ng/).
Aside from the rank of the Inspector-General, Section 5 of the Police 
Act also provides for other ranks in the following order as captured in the 
Regulation 273 of the Police Regulation, Cap 359 laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1990:
 1. Inspector-General of Police
 2. Deputy Inspector-General of Police
 3. Assistant Inspector-General of Police
 4. Commissioner of Police (in-charge of contingents in a state)
 5. Deputy Commissioner of Police
 6. Assistant Commissioner of Police
 7. Chief Superintendent of Police
 8. Superintendent of Police
 9. Deputy Superintendent of Police
 10. Assistant Superintendent of Police
 11. Inspector of Police
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The Nigeria Police is administratively structured and divided into nine 
departments: (1) Finance and Administration, (2) Operations, (3) 
Logistics and Supply, (4) Investigation, (5) Training, (6) Research and 
Planning, (7) Information & Communication, (8) Force Secretary and 
(9) Force Intelligence Bureau. Each department is headed by a Deputy 
Inspector-General (DIG) and sometimes Assistant Inspector-General of 
Police (AIG). All heads of departments assist the Inspector-General of 
Police for effective policing and administrative conduct of policing busi-
ness in the country. The IG is directly under the executive control of the 
president and his delegated personalities such as ministers and national 
security adviser as the president deems fit. Each department is expected to 
perform peculiar duties as allocated to it, but such duties must be comple-
mented and mutually inclusive with other departments. In designing the 
structure of the police, consideration is also given to the geopolitical struc-
ture of the country. There are 37 commands comprising the 36 states 
commands with Federal Capital Territory (FCT) commands which are 
organized into 12 zonal commands. Each zonal command is headed by an 
Assistant Inspector-General of Police (AIG) who oversees the activities of 
state commands under his/her sphere of jurisdiction. At the state level, 
the State Command is put under the control of a Commissioner of Police 
(CP) who is responsible for the operation and activities of the police in the 
management of security in the state. While the CP is responsible to the 
AIG, he/she is also expected to take orders from the state governor who 
is constitutionally the chief security officer of the state without prejudice 
to police structure and chain of command.
In order to ensure adequate grassroots coverage, each state command 
is further divided into Area Commands and Divisional Police Headquarters 
usually manned by a Superintendent of Police (SP) or Deputy 
Superintendent of Police (DSP) as the case may be, who serves as the 
Divisional Police Officer (DPO). Each Divisional Police Headquarters 
also has a number of Police Posts for administrative and security manage-
ment convenience, especially in the rural areas where population is mini-
mal and geographically scattered. The structure formation enables effective 
and efficient policing operations in the heterogeneous and vast  geographical 
cleavage of Nigeria. The structure of the Police Force in terms of organi-
zation and hierarchy is represented thus: Force Headquarters (with nine 
departments), Zonal Headquarters, State Commands Headquarters, Area 
Commands Headquarters, Divisional Police Headquarters (generally 
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called Police Station) and Police Posts, all which is diagrammatically 
depicted in Fig. 20.1:
As stated earlier, all the 36 states and the FCT commands are distrib-
uted into the 12 zones as depicted in Table 20.1:
Fig. 20.1 The organizational structure of the Nigeria Police. Source: Authors’ 
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By this structural arrangement, the operational crime-fighting duty of 
the police is enhanced and distributed to cover the nooks and crannies of 
the country. This is better appreciated from the fact that no part of the 
country whether urban or rural is left out of the direct command of the 
police chief, which enables total coverage of the entire country with a clear 
chain of command for two-way flow of information on policing and inter-
nal security management.
assessIng tHe nIgerIa PolIce In tHe management 
of Internal securIty
From the foregoing analysis, it is noted that the establishment and organi-
zation of the control and command structure of the management of the 
Nigeria Police is predicated on an Act legislated by the colonial regime 
and subsequently domesticated in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) 
and the Police Act (CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1990). For instance, Section 4 of the Police Act provides that:
The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the 
apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection 
of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with 
which they are charged, and shall perform such military duties within or 
without Nigeria as may be required…. (emphasis added)
Table 20.1 Zonal commands of the Nigeria Police
Zone Geographical location States
Zone 1 North-West Jigawa, Kano and Katsina
Zone 2 South-West Lagos and Ogun
Zone 3 North-East Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba
Zone 4 North-Central Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau
Zone 5 South-South Bayelsa, Edo and Delta
Zone 6 South-South Akwa-Ibom, Cross-River, Rivers and Ebonyi
Zone 7 North-Central FCT, Niger and Kaduna
Zone 8 North-Central Kogi, Kwara and Ekiti
Zone 9 South-East Enugu, Anambra, Imo and Abia
Zone 10 North-West Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara
Zone 11 South-West Ondo, Osun and Oyo
Zone 12 North-East Bauchi, Borno and Yobe
Source: Authors’ conception with data from Nigeria Police official website http://www.npf.gov.ng/ 
(May 16, 2017)
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According to the provision, officers of the police have statutory powers 
not only to investigate crimes, but to also apprehend offenders, interro-
gate them and prosecute such as suspects before a court of law of compe-
tent jurisdiction. The police is also empowered to grant bail to suspects 
provided such person(s) meet the requirements, pending completion of 
investigation or prior to court arraignment. The law empowers the police 
to serve summons and regulate or disperse processions and assemblies, 
especially when this is perceived to threaten peace and orderliness in the 
society. Having known the constitutional duties and power of the Nigeria 
Police, the question to be asked is, to what extent is the force successful in 
the performance of its statutory duties of maintaining internal security?
According to Owen (2014, p. 10), Nigerians seem to have some sort of 
confidence in the police despite some reported challenges facing the insti-
tution. Perhaps, this is because the police enjoy monopoly of the use of 
force as civil security service providers. The people report criminal con-
cerns to the police with the expectation that such concerns will be handled 
professionally by the police. However, the negative public perception 
against the institution beclouds its effectiveness in this regard. Many peo-
ple never see anything good that the police is doing; they are rather quick 
in pointing out the bad side of the security agency. In this regard, Owen 
(2014) contends that the media is not interested in reporting the crime 
preventive efforts of the police but have passion for reporting criminal 
activities that the police were unable to avert.
On the contrary, Owen’s assertion is contradicted by the survey con-
ducted by CLEEN Foundation in 2009 which found that 52 percent of 
Nigerians prefer to report crimes to members of their family, while only 
20.2 percent of the people report crime incidences to the police. On the 
other hand, the report shows that 3 percent of the people consult the tra-
ditional leaders and 2.3 percent have preference for their religious leaders, 
with 2.4 percent to non-state security provider (vigilante). This shows that 
the people did not have confidence in the police as one would expect. This 
could be attributed to the structural and institutional challenges hindering 
the police from performing at the optimal level. These challenges include 
inadequate manpower, underfunding, inadequate training, poor welfare 
package for personnel and negative public perception. The consequence 
of these challenges is the poor, inefficient and ineffective policing system 
which paves way for manipulation by the rich and powerful in the society. 
As noted by Marenin (1985), the rich people use the police as their per-
sonal bodyguards and often turn them into some sorts of errand boys. 
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Aside from this, he observed that a substantial number of the police per-
sonnel are concentrated in the urban areas, leaving the rural areas to be 
under-policed. This observation is corroborated by a former police boss, 
Ibrahim Coomassie, who based on his experience as an Inspector-General 
of Police claimed that:
… any time a citizen becomes a public figure, his first official correspon-
dence on assuming duty is to write the Inspector-General of Police to ask for 
an orderly and policemen to guard his house … Everybody wants to use the 
Police as status symbol, yet the members of the organization remain without 
accommodation, adequate remuneration, tools to work with, transport to 
patrol, effective communication and appropriate intelligence outfit to sup-
port their operations. (Coomassie 1998, p. 10)
In view of this, the Nigeria Police can best be described as elite- policing 
system which according to Alemika (2003) is greatly influenced by the 
colonial manipulation of the agency to protect the interests of the colonial 
officials and some accomplice natives who worked for the colonial govern-
ment. At independence, the new political class maintained the inherited 
policing orientation which consequently shaped the policing structure of 
the country to date. Premised on the foregoing analysis, one can deduce 
that the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police is questionable given the myr-
iad of challenges confronting it. However, it may not be out of place to 
argue that the police have the potential to be effective, but the challenges 
will have to be tackled. It should also be noted that aside from the institu-
tional challenges, there are also behavioral challenges which on the part of 
the officers influence their performance level. For instance, the poor remu-
neration and lack of motivation have lured most of the officers to engage 
in sharp practices which made them lose respect of the public 
(Ibidapo-Obe 1995).
The alleged widespread corruption and incidences of police brutality 
have made scholars, analysts and security practitioners to question the 
integrity of the Nigeria Police. Alemika (1993) noted that extortion, bru-
tality, extra-judicial killing among other uncivil acts characterized the 
behaviors of most officers. These according to Ibidapo-Obe (1995) are 
consequences of poor training, lack of motivation, infrastructural and 
equipment deficit and administrative nepotism in personnel deployment 
and promotion, among others. Despite the modern techniques of policing 
that come with the waves of modernization and globalization, the Nigerian 
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Police still use archaic methods of crime investigation, prevention and 
management such as extreme torture which include beating, sticking of 
pins and other sharp objects into suspects’ penis, shooting of suspects’ legs 
to elicit confessional statements from the accused (Nwankwo et al. 1993). 
All these contributed to the alleged abuse of human rights by the police 
which consequently lower the rating of the institution locally and 
internationally.
tHe nIgerIa PolIce and tHe dynamIcs of nIgerIan 
PolItIcs and governance: Issues, cHallenges 
and ProsPects
A lot of issues bordering around governance and political dynamics within 
Nigeria’s political and social terrain appear to affect the operational capac-
ity of the police force. Some of these issues and challenges include the 
following.
Manpower Shortage and Elite Policing
The first and most prominent challenge hindering the effectiveness of the 
Nigeria Police in internal security management is shortage of manpower. 
According to global best practices, the United Nations recommend 222 
police officers per 100,000 persons (Nkem-Abonta 2015). This means 
that a police officer is expected to secure about 450 people. However, the 
current manpower strength of the Nigeria Police is around 370,000 (Daily 
Post 2015) expected to police about 180 million people. This amounts to 
a ratio of 1:487, that is, one policeman to 487 people, which is far below 
the standard. Sad enough, the few police officers mostly engage in elite 
policing—a situation where the president, governors, ministers, commis-
sioners, senior special advisers (both federal and state levels), local govern-
ment chairmen and their deputies, 109 Senators, 360 members of the 
house of representatives, director generals of government agencies, other 
government appointees and even ruling political party officials have police 
officers attached to them. Expatriates who are mostly commoners in their 
home countries are also treated like kings in Nigeria, with police officers 
serving as personal guards and errand boys to them. These elites not only 
use the officers and men for security purposes but also have them do 
menial jobs such as buying groceries in the supermarkets, carrying bags of 
20 THE NIGERIA POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT… 
476
wives of public officials, washing cars and sweeping the floor and some-
times drive their children to school, all at the expense of the average peo-
ple being terrorized by kidnappers, armed robbers, ritualists and hired 
assassins. This drastically reduces the manpower capacity of the Nigeria 
Police to combat crime in the country.
The Challenges of Ineffectiveness and Inefficiency
Studies have shown that some of the allegations leveled against the Nigeria 
Police and the unsatisfactory comments passed on its personnel about its 
low level of performance have proven to be true. There is increasing tra-
jectory of police ineffectiveness and inefficiency through arbitrariness in 
exercising its power, corruption, extra-judicial killings, lack of strong will 
to combat crime, needless confrontation with other security agencies, and 
disregard for the respect of human rights in policing procedure, perver-
sion and delays in justice administration, inadequate funding, manpower 
shortage, obsolete information and communications technology (ICT) 
equipment, among others (see Ali 2008; Karimu 2015; Guttschuss 2010; 
Alechenu 2013; Alemika 2005; Bakare 2014; Inyang and Abraham 2013 
among others). This perception of the police officers and the citizens they 
serve is not helping the cause of security provision. It has led to the problem 
of mutual suspicion, mutual distrust and mistrust among the formal police 
and the informal police which was established by the people out of the loss 
of confidence in the former (Bakare 2014). In view of these, the questions 
as to what is responsible for the continuous decline in police effective-
ness and how to salvage the situation become pertinent. Addressing these 
questions, it is hoped, would enable the building of an effective policing 
system that will be dynamic to new trends of criminalities, especially in the 
wake of the advent of new technology and globalization.
Poor Public Perception
The Nigeria Police suffers from poor public perception which often leads 
to loss of confidence in the policing system. Most people never expect 
anything good from the police and see all police officers as indispensable 
bad eggs. The institution is rated as one of the topmost (if not the top-
most) institutions that abuse human rights (Alemika and Chukwuma 
2000; Ali 2008; Coomassie 1990, 1996; Nwankwo et al. 1993; Okeshola 
2013). There are cases of human rights violation pending in courts all over 
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the country, some of which have been decided against the police. According 
to Arase (2015), the Nigeria Police has paid over ₦1 billion to Nigerians 
whose rights were abused by police officers between 2012 and 2015. 
Many police officers who perpetuate this act of torture hide under the 
Order 237 which allows the police to use force. Despite the fact that local 
and international groups and individuals are criticizing this law, the police 
hierarchy is not doing enough to repeal it or caution its officers. The 
police cell has become a den of torture where implicating statements are 
retrieved from suspects under duress, just for the suspects to argue that 
they confessed to have committed the alleged offenses to escape the 
unbearable inhuman torture meted out to them. In most cases, the presid-
ing judges dismiss such cases, as confessions made under duress cannot 
stand in the law courts. The Nigeria Police also engage in double standard 
in the arrest and treatment of suspects. While the underprivileged are dis-
gracefully arrested in handcuffs even without arrest warrants, the privi-
leged are mostly invited with courtesy despite alleged to have committed 
heinous acts.
The Issue of Politicization
The Nigeria Police is also perceived to be politicized. Recruitment, pro-
motion, posting, appointment and training in the police force are highly 
based on ethno-religious affiliation. The religious and tribal background 
of majority new intakes at a point in time usually reflects that of the top 
hierarchy in the force. Those appointed to specific juicy leadership roles 
are majorly ethno-religiously inclined. Cronies are posted to juicy states 
while others are posted to less economical and crises-ridden states. Top 
officers’ appointments are usually influenced by political and ethnic affili-
ations, with experience and capabilities relegated to the background. This 
affects the performance output as the officers who benefited from impu-
nity and nepotism will be loyal to their benefactors rather than the coun-
try’s interest. This fuels patron-clientelism in the police at the expense of 
meritocracy.
Public Alienation and Corruption
The Nigeria Police is alleged to be enmeshed in corruption to the extent 
that it perverts and beclouds the moral consideration of most officers. 
As argued earlier, this is unconnected with the influence and legacy of 
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colonialism. The use of the police during the colonial period to protect 
sectional interests erodes the culture of accountability to the people. There 
is wide disconnection between the police and the people to the extent that 
the people perceive police stations as dens of corruption. To average 
Nigerians, the word ‘police’ is synonymous to ‘corruption’. Events and 
experiences of the people make them believe that it is practically impossi-
ble to eradicate corruption in the police force. Some even consciously 
joined the force despite the meager salary and welfare package with the 
notion that they will make it through ‘bribe and runs’. The situation wors-
ens as a result of the alienation of the people from the activities of the 
police. The people of the communities that host police formations have no 
input on how they are policed, thereby widening the gap between the two 
parties and making intelligence gathering more difficult for the police.
Commercialization of the Police
The Nigeria Police Force has become commercialized and has become a 
money-making enterprise. This disturbing trajectory is acknowledged by 
the police authority. According to Abubakar (2016), the former Nigeria’s 
Inspector-General of Police noted that the police has become a subject of 
ridicule as a result of the perceived commercial activities of the institution. 
He further noted that:
Police duties have become commercialized… Our men are deployed to rich 
individuals and corporate entities such that we lack manpower to provide 
security for the common man. Our investigations departments cannot equi-
tably handle matters unless those involved have money to part with. 
Complainants suddenly become suspects at different investigation levels fol-
lowing spurious petitions filed with the connivance of police officers. Our 
police stations, State CID and operations offices have become business cen-
tres and collection points for rendering returns from all kinds of Squads and 
Teams set up for the benefit of superior officers. Our Special Anti Robbery 
Squads (SARS) have become killer teams, engaging in deals for land specula-
tors and debt collection. Toll stations in the name of check-points adorn our 
highways with policemen shamelessly collecting money from motorists in 
the full glare of the public.
The consequence of this on policing is a state security system that is 
tailored along patron-client system. This brought about a police force that 
is nothing but an instrument of oppression in the hands of hegemonic 
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capitalists. The police as an institution now enjoy little independence from 
the ruling elites and have since immersed in the struggle of the class, espe-
cially between federal ruling and opposition political parties. It is against 
this backdrop that advocates of effective policing are calling for a break 
from business as usual toward evolving an efficient policing system charac-
terized by world standard with its own outstanding character suitable for 
its effectiveness and efficiency.
Centralized Command Structure and Nepotism in 
Leadership Appointment
The highly centralized command structure of the Nigeria Police seems 
antithetical to the diverse nature of the country. It disallows states’ partici-
pation in police decision making. The states’ commands only take orders 
from above but cannot take decisions on their own. This slows down effi-
ciency of service delivery and creates bottlenecks during periods of emer-
gencies. On the other hand, there is high handedness in the appointment 
of police leadership where nepotism is the order of the day at the expense 
of meritocracy. There were reported cases of undeserved promotion and 
appointment of officers to leadership positions where those who deserved 
were jettisoned for nepotism. For instance, it was alleged that 7 DIGs and 
13 AIGs were unduly promoted in 2012 without considering qualification 
and experience, whereas those who are genuinely qualified were neglected 
(Okenyodo 2016).
conclusIon and recommendatIon
From the foregoing study, it is established that the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the Nigeria Police in the management of internal security are 
questionable. This disturbing conclusion is attributed to the heap of chal-
lenges hindering the performance of the police. These range from under-
funding, inadequate training, lack of motivation, politicization of the 
police, influence of political elites, effect of colonial legacy and negative 
public perception, among others. The study argues that the Nigeria Police 
have the potential to be effective and can manage the security concerns of 
the country based on world’s best practices, but the identified challenges 
are hindering the optimal performance.
Based on this assertion, the study recommends among others that the 
presidency should consider increasing the funding of the police so as to 
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enable the institution to purchase modern equipment and embark on massive 
training of personnel. It is also recommended that the police authority should 
depoliticize the institution by giving priority to merit and jettison nepotism 
in the appointment and promotion of officers. This will improve the morale 
of the men and spur them to put in their best in serving the country. It is also 
recommended that adequate provisions be made to put an enticing reward 
system in place to motivate and reward hard work. Finally, the gap between 
the police and the community should be bridged to make way for community 
policing which will enhance intelligence- gathering capacity of the police 
toward successful management of internal security in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 21
The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence 




The relevance of security in relation to human survival, national stability 
and sustainable development cannot be overemphasised. In modern times, 
placing premium on the safety of citizens has become the hallmark of any 
leader or society that wishes to be perceived as democratic, civilised and 
advanced in the progressive sense. Furthermore, ensuring the protection 
of the lives, property and resources of citizens from the encumbrances of 
threat and danger has become the major pre-occupation of governments 
that wish to be adjudged or evaluated as successful (Omah 2013, p. 5).
In recent years, Nigeria has been experiencing serious incidents of secu-
rity threats. In the same vein, Nigeria has continued to be affected directly 
or indirectly by the dynamics of the global environment with attendant 
national security concerns that border on virtually all aspects of our 
national life. These concerns often translate to matters that require the 
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employment of security agencies (especially the armed forces and the 
police). While some of these threats may be considered minor, others may 
pose serious danger to the unity and stability of the nation. The internal 
security threats to Nigeria include terrorism, kidnapping, indigene-settler 
conflict, ethno-religious conflict, pipeline vandalism and armed robbery. 
Others are corruption, transnational crimes, political thuggery and assas-
sination, cross-border banditry, sea robbery, cattle rustling, herdsmen and 
farmers’ clashes and proliferation of small arms. These internal security 
challenges necessitated the Nigerian government to deploy the military in 
managing them. However, the military cannot do it alone. Hence, the 
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has been mandated 
to assist the military in managing threats to internal security in the country.
This chapter examines the role of NSCDC in internal security manage-
ment. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first is the introduc-
tory part, followed by an overview of internal security challenges in 
Nigeria, the historical background of NSCDC and the constitutional role 
of NSCDC. The third section examines the NSCDC and internal security 
management. The fourth section examines the challenges of NSCDC in 
internal security management. The final section is the conclusion. This 
chapter adopts the qualitative research methodology. Data were sourced 
from secondary data via relevant books, journals, conference papers, news-
paper publications, government documentations and online materials. 
The secondary data were supplemented with personal interviews of some 
NSCDC personnel, which served as tangible sources of insight into the 
role of NSCDC in internal security management. Data from these sources 
were qualitatively analysed in a descriptive format.
overvIew of Internal SecurIty challengeS In nIgerIa
Nigeria is currently experiencing some form of insecurity which threatens 
the country’s democracy, with great potential of impacting its national 
development negatively. The spate of insecurity and threats to lives and 
properties in Nigeria has reached alarming proportions despite the increas-
ing viability of the Nigerian Police and the military in the management of 
internal conflicts (The US Department of State 2008; Omede 2011; 
Minimah 2015; Johnson 2016). The following are some of the internal 




The manifestations of upsurge in ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria could 
be captured in the various violent conflicts that erupted in different parts 
of the country immediately after the inauguration of a new democratic 
government in May 1999. Cases of violent religious crisis were recorded 
in some parts of the country with ethnic dimensions. These crises which 
were mostly recorded in northern Nigeria have been between Christians 
and Muslims, thus making that part of the country notorious for ethno- 
religious crises (Odoma 2014). For instance, the February 21, 2009, 
ethno-religious conflict at Makama New Extension in Bauchi State claimed 
over ten lives, more than 400 houses burnt and several properties destroyed 
(Ugwueze 2016, p. 263).
terrorISm/relIgIouS fundamentalISm
Since the end of the Civil War in 1970, no other internal security threat 
has dominated national discourse like the current Boko Haram terrorism. 
The activities of this sect and others with similar extremist ideologies/nar-
ratives have been a great concern to the government and ordinary 
Nigerians. The sect seeks to impose what it terms as an absolute Islamic 
ideology on the country, starting with Borno State. Their methods have 
mimicked those of other extremist groups across the globe and involved 
the sophisticated use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide 
bombings, beheadings, mass abductions and the sensational use of the 
media (Minimah 2015, p. 13).
IndIgene-Settler conflIct
The indigene-settler dichotomy is one problem that has made many 
Nigerians ask whether or not their citizenship is anything they can be 
proud of (Odoma 2014). Although crises relating to indigene-settler 
questions have reared their ugly head in many parts of Nigeria over the 
years, the worst cases were recorded in Plateau State in recent years. The 
Hausa-Fulani, who have lived for years in Jos, see reason to lay claim to Jos 
North Local Government, while three other tribes—Anaguta, Berom and 
Afizere—also lay claim to the same on the condition that the Hausa-Fulani 
met them there as indigenes (Odoma 2014). This indigene-settler conflict 
has claimed hundreds of lives and unquantifiable resources in the series of 
violent clashes and reprisal attacks.
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KIdnappIng/hoStage-taKIng
Kidnapping and hostage-taking is still prevalent, especially in the South- 
East and South-South Zones. These started as political actions in the 
South-South meant to attract external and governmental attention to the 
plight of the long neglected region, but it has ended up as commercial 
actions in the South-East for criminal enrichment of the self (Nwolise 
2014). These nefarious activities, no doubt, have a negative impact on the 
level of socio-economic development in the affected areas.
Illegal armS prolIferatIon
The alarming rate of small arms trafficking and proliferation nationwide 
has contributed to changing the face of conflicts in Nigeria. Thus, the 
internal proliferation of arms has threatened Nigeria’s security. Security 
reports on various conflicts have implicated both Nigerians and foreign 
mercenaries from across the borders in the trade in arms and use of the 
same. In the same vein, the capacity of local arms manufacturers and deal-
ers to produce and sell arms within Nigeria is increasing by the day. These 
arms are mostly used to perpetrate political violence, kidnapping, armed 
robbery and other criminal acts within the country.
the nIger delta crISIS
The security challenge posed by the emergence of Niger Delta militants is 
enormous. The militant groups include Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). Their modus operandi has 
defied national security mechanisms, and the strategic dexterity with which 
they operate, coupled with the sophisticated nature of their weapons, has 
raised such questions as to the source of their military training and experi-
ence. As a result of the conflict in the region, lives and resources have been 
wasted; hostage-taking, shoot-outs between soldiers and armed militant 
groups, petroleum pipeline sabotage and so on have led to production 
shut-in and deferment (Omeje 2006; Johnson 2016).
Other manifestations of insecurity in contemporary Nigeria include 
armed robbery, political thuggery and assassinations, cult clashes, urban 
crimes, vandalisation of electricity equipment, cross-border banditry, oil 




hIStorIcal BacKground and conStItutIonal role 
of nScdc
The NSCDC was established on May 23, 1967, during the Nigerian Civil 
War. Then, it was initially referred to as the Lagos Civil Defence Committee 
charged with the fundamental responsibility of precaution during the Civil 
War. However, the Charter of April 6, 1968, made it possible for states 
that wished to establish the Corps within their jurisdiction to do so 
(Abolurin 2010, p. 132). However, the promulgation of the Act known as 
NSCDC Act No. 2 of 2003 and amended by Act 6 of June 4, 2007, makes 
the Corps a full-fledged paramilitary outfit of the government under the 
then Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, now Ministry of Interior, and by 
this enactment the Corps now has some statutory responsibilities to per-
form. Some of the constitutional roles of NSCDC as contained in the 
establishing Act (as amended) are to:
 1. Assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the protection 
and rescuing of the civil population during periods of emergency.
 2. Recommend to the minister the registration of private guard 
companies.
 3. From time to time, inspect the premises of private guard com-
panies, their training facilities and approve the same if it is up 
to standard.
 4. Supervise and monitor the activities of all private guard companies 
and keep a register for that purpose:
 (a) Periodically organise workshops and training courses for pri-
vate guard companies.
 (b) Seal up any private guard company which operates without a 
valid licence.
 5. Maintain 24-hour surveillance over infrastructures, site and proj-
ects for the federal, state and local governments:
 (a) Enter and search any premises and seize any material suspected 
to have been used in vandalisation or the suspected process of 
vandalisation.
 (b) Enter and search premises of any suspected illegal dealer in 
petroleum products or material used by the Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria, postal services, Nigeria telecommunica-
tions or for any other public utility or infrastructure.
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 6. Have power to arrest with or without a warrant, detain, investigate 
and institute legal proceedings by or in the name of the attorney 
general of the Federal Republic of Nigeria against any person who 
is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence under the 
Act or is involved in any:
 (a) Criminal activity.
 (b) Chemical poison or oil spillage, nuclear waste and poisoning.
 (c) Industry espionage or fraud
 (d) Activity aimed at frustrating any government programme 
or policy.
 (e) Riot, civil disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest.
 (f ) Power transmission line, or oil pipelines, Nigerian Postal Service 
(NIPOST) cables, equipment, water board pipes or equipment 
vandalisation.
 7. Monitor the activities of religious bodies and trade associations.
 8. Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any 
planned act of terrorism, particularly:
 (a) Cult and ethnic militia activities.
 (b) Criminal activities aimed at depriving citizens of their proper-
ties or lives.
 (c) Syndicate activity aimed at defrauding the federal state or local 
governments.
 9. Monitor, investigate and take every necessary step to forestall any 
act of terrorism and report the same to the appropriate federal 
security agency.
 10. Provide necessary warning for the civilian population in times 
of danger.
 11. Evacuate the civilian population from danger areas.
 12. Provide and manage shelters for civilians during period of 
emergency.
 13. Assist in the decontamination and in the taking of precautionary 
measures during any period of emergency.
 14. Carry out rescue operations and control volatile situations.
 15. Assist in the provision of emergency medical services, including 
first aid, during any period of emergency.
 16. Detect and demarcate any danger area.
 17. Assist the federal and state fire services in fire-fighting operations.
 18. Assist in the distribution of emergency supplies.
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 19. Provide assistance to restore and maintain order in distressed areas 
in any period of emergency.
 20. Assist in repairing indispensable public utilities during any period 
of emergency.
 21. Provide intelligence information to the military on any matter 
relating to:
 (a) Crime control generally.
 (b) Riot, disorder, revolt, strike or religious unrest.
 (c) Subversive activity by members of the public aimed at frustrat-
ing any government programme or policy.
 (d) Industrial action and strike aimed at paralysing government 
activities.
 (e) Any other matter as may be directed by the minister.
 (f ) Have power to arrange and mediate in the settlement of dis-
putes among willing members of the public (Abolurin 2010).
Having examined the constitutional role of the NSCDC, what then is 
the role of the Corps in internal security management?
nScdc and Internal SecurIty management
The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) since its incep-
tion has evolved from an insignificant status to an enviable height and has 
become an organisation to be reckoned with in the area of internal secu-
rity management. The worsening security situation in the country where 
acts like vandalisation, oil bunkering, kidnapping, cult clashes, violence 
and bombing are now the order of the day posits that Nigeria’s internal 
security is being threatened by organised criminals who have devised mod-
ern techniques of carrying out their nefarious acts and by other cases of 
insecurity that are being perpetrated by ordinary citizens. Thus, the task of 
securing the nation cannot be left only to the Armed Forces and the 
Nigeria Police.
The Corps on many occasions has performed creditably well to actu-
alise the mandate given to it in the area of checking of vandalism, in 
maintaining peace and conflict resolutions, in resource management and 
in being proactive in countering terrorism. The Corps has worked assid-
uously to reduce to the minimum acts of vandalism in the oil industry as 
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well as the telecommunication sectors. With regard to the oil industry, 
the former Commandant-General, Dr Abolurin, in his interview with 
Leadership News, confirmed the prosecution of not less than 30 culprits 
in the first two months of 2012, which has proven that the Corps is not 
leaving any stone unturned in that direction (Leadership News 2012). 
Also worthy of commendation in this regard is the contribution of 
NSCDC in the containment of riots and protests that greeted the 2012 
oil subsidy removal in Nigeria.
Crime has been identified as a social problem and constitutes a threat to 
Nigeria’s national security (Aderinto 2002). The responsibility of prosecut-
ing criminal offenders was solely that of the Nigeria Police Force. Prior to the 
constitutional approval of the NSCDC as an agency with legal rights to pros-
ecute criminal offenders, offenders were arrested, investigated and handed 
over to the police for prosecution. Pursuant to the promulgation of the 
NSCDC Act of 2007, the agency is empowered to prosecute criminal offend-
ers at the constitutional law courts. To be sure, the NSCDC has always been 
co-opted into a different Joint Task Force in preventing criminal activities.
More importantly, criminals do not live in isolation; they live among 
other citizens within the same community. For security agencies to be 
effective in crime control, they need information, and this information 
may not come voluntarily. In view of this, there is the need to interact with 
the public to extract information from them. The NSCDC in this regard 
did this within the context of grass-roots intelligence information gather-
ing. In the same vein, one of the methods of NSCDC in crime control 
during conflicts or violence is education. The civil populace is often given 
orientation on what should be their reactions or responses to various 
developments that may occur during conflict in order to accelerate the 
peace process and resettlement of affected people.
In the area of humanitarian assistance and managing of relief materials, 
the NSCDC has been very active. In cases where humanitarian relief mate-
rials are allocated to people who suffer losses during conflicts, the NSCDC 
is one of the prominent government agencies usually directed to protect 
and oversee the judicious distribution of these materials. For example, the 
Corps has assisted in providing humanitarian services in the following cases:
 1. Bellview air crash at Lisa Village in Ogun State in 2005.
 2. ADC air crash in Abuja Airport in 2006.
 3. Dutse River flooding in Jalingo, Taraba State.
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 4. Prophet Muhammed cartoon riots in Maiduguri, Borno State, and 
its fallouts in Onitsha, Anambra State, Enugu State and in Aba, 
Abia State.
 5. Pipeline explosion in Abule Egba in Lagos, December 2006.
 6. Bomb blast at the Army Cantonment, Ikeja, Lagos.
 7. The Sosoliso air crash in Port-Harcourt.
 8. Train derailment and petroleum spillage rescue operation at Apete 
in Ibadan 2005 (Abolurin 2007, p. 13).
 9. Rescue operation of a nine-year-old boy chained in a church for 
stealing soup in Ota, Ogun State, July 2016.
 10. Collaborated with other security agencies for the rehabilitation of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North-East, 2016.
 11. The Borno command deployed about 600 Corps to various wor-
ship centres in Maiduguri to assure worshippers of their safety dur-
ing the month of Ramadan, June 2017 (Daily Post.ng).
In addition, the NSCDC has contributed immensely in preventing and 
mitigating disaster and emergency throughout the country. It has estab-
lished a Disaster Management Department whose sole responsibility is to 
raise alarm on disaster and emergency areas. NSCDC has been very active 
in medical relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as health care of 
the people during national functions like sports fiestas, religious crusades 
and events organised by the government and NGOs. The Corps has 
defined four areas/issues in disaster management, namely: prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery. Preventive measures are undertaken 
through early warning conducted through aggressive and massive public 
enlightenment and education in disaster-prone areas. Preparedness is 
about the machinery put by the Corps to counter the occurrence or miti-
gate the impact of disaster, whereas response takes the form of search and 
rescue operations designed to salvage lives, properties and environment. 
Recovery entails reliefs, rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at restor-
ing normalcy (Alao 2017). For instance, the Corps participated in the 
management of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Boko Haram 
terrorist attacks. The Corps not only safeguards their lives and properties 
from looting but also guards against further attacks.
Terrorism and violence are the major security threats to Nigeria’s inter-
nal security. These include violent riots, kidnapping, explosive bombing, 
assassination, incendiary attacks, herdsmen-farmers’ clashes and cultism. 
There is an upsurge of terrorism occasioned by the Boko Haram insur-
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gency which has led to loss of lives and property. The NSCDC has dis-
charged its mandate on terrorism through public enlightenment, education 
and intelligence gathering. The Corps has collected intelligence on the 
activities of different terrorist groups and passed the same to the appropri-
ate authorities such as the Army, Navy, Police and the Air Force. Also 
relevant to this discussion is the training of the Anti-Bomb and Counter- 
Terrorism units. The Corps, in line with its mandate, has sent its officers 
on counter-insurgence training overseas and in order to competently fore-
stall all subversive activities, the agency has set up a unit to coordinate all 
its anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. Since the return of 
the Corps personnel from overseas training, they have assisted in reducing 
kidnapping, cultism and, to some extent, foiled several terrorist attacks 
and helped in assisting victims of bomb blasts. The Corps cooperated with 
other security agencies to free a Lagos Monarch Oniba of Iba Land, Oba 
Yushau Oseni, from abductors in 2016. In the same vein, the Corps, in 
collaboration with the Kwara State Police Command, arrested about 40 
suspects in connection with a clash among the Aiye and Eiye cult groups 
at the Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin, in 2015 (Daily Trust 2015). Of 
late, the Borno Command of the NSCDC said it has discovered “Count 
Down Timers” used by Boko Haram terrorists to detonate explosives. The 
Commandant of the Corps, Mr Ibrahim Abdullahi, said that the instru-
ments were discovered by men of the Disaster Management Unit of the 
Command at the scene of bomb blasts in Kalari area of the state capital 
(www.garanews.com/2017).
The protection of vital key infrastructures is one of the constitutional 
responsibilities of the NSCDC. It is imperative to note that the security 
and safety of Nigerians have been undermined by the activities of vandals 
motivated by a variety of reasons, namely: political, economic, vengeance, 
sabotage, conspiracy and the rest. Vandals have destroyed petroleum pipe-
lines, Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) high-tension cables, 
rail lines and railings on bridges, public vehicles, properties and utilities, 
among others. For instance, the Corps revealed plans by some persons to 
attack investments of Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) in 
Bayelsa State as a reprisal following the xenophobia attack on Nigerians in 
South Africa. The anti-vandalism role of the NSCDC is a key mandate 
which the Corps has carried out with competence and result. The Corps 
has carried out their role through media campaigns, public enlightenment 
and orientation, rating vandals’ activities, vulnerability analysis, threat 
analysis, planning and preparedness (Alao 2017). The success recorded by 
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the Corps is immeasurable. For instance, the National Mirror of July 28, 
2008, reported that the Corps arrested over 300 pipelines’ vandals in riv-
erine areas like Ebonyi, Abia, Warri, Ondo and other axes. The paper also 
reported that in Abia State, over 200 arrests were made and 53 cases are in 
the law court (National Mirror 2008, p. 24). Also, the Corps resorts to the 
use of force where clear evidence of pipeline vandalisation is detected and 
the culprits can be identified. In this regard, arrests are made and the van-
dals are taken to court for prosecution.
In the area of private guard companies, the NSCDC has contributed to 
safety and security through the registration, monitoring and supervision of 
these companies. It is a known fact that state security agencies cannot cope 
with the volume, nature and dynamics of common crimes, hence the 
emergence of private guards to provide security to clients for a fee. The 
private guard companies have been established in every part of the country 
providing services for clients. However, the issue of private guard compa-
nies fizzling out or being unable to arrest culprits when crimes are traced 
to their doorsteps has become a thing of the past. This is because the 
NSCDC makes sure that no private guard company is floated without 
prior registration, training, inspections and renewal of registration licence. 
Thus, the NSCDC in this area has enhanced the security service delivery 
of these companies, enthroned professionalism and created a congenial 
environment for private guard companies and their clients. The Corps has 
also sensitised the private guard companies to make meaningful contribu-
tion to Nigeria’s national security. The Corps within a year licensed 285 
private guards companies, sealed 96 and renewed 600, while 210 are still 
waiting to be licensed (aljazirah news.com/appraising-giant stride). It has 
also reduced to a minimal level crimes and other social vices in Nigerian 
urban and rural settings. For instance, the Corps arrested a tanker load of 
suspected adulterated fuel in the Odukpani Local Government Area of 
Cross River State in May 2017. The Corps in collaboration with the Police, 
Army and Air Force recovered over 200 cows and sheep from suspected 
rustlers in the Birnin Gwari Local Government Area of Kaduna State. The 
animals were recovered during a raid at a forest in Buruku village, follow-
ing intelligence reports from patriotic residents concerning the activities of 
suspected rustlers in the area in May 2017 (www.channelstv.com).
Finally, the NSCDC has participated immensely in elections for the 
purpose of enhancing its smooth conduct. The Corps encourages voters 
and politicians to conform to the rules and norms of Independent National 
Electoral Commission’s guidelines. This is aimed at ensuring a peaceful 
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polity even after the conduct of elections. It should be noted that the role 
of NSCDC is not only during elections but also before and after elections. 
In the 2011 general elections, a sizeable number of NSCDC personnel 
were noticed in all the 36 states of the federation and the federal capital 
territory (Abuja), making sure peace and tranquillity existed among spec-
tators and actors. The Corps helped in the transfer of equipment and 
materials (sensitive and non-sensitive) needed for the purpose of the elec-
tions. In addition, the Corps recorded a significant achievement during 
the 2015 general elections. The NSCDC deployed its officers for effective 
monitoring before, during and after the elections. The deployment of 
Corps personnel was to identify black spots with the collaborative efforts 
of all security apparatuses in order to ensure hitch-free polls. In short, the 
deployment of the Corps personnel was to ensure effective protection of 
residents and government installations against attack during the polls. 
About 60,000 of the Corps personnel were deployed for this task. In the 
same vein, the Corps deployed dogs which were used to detect improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). The agency also put in place the use of forensic 
psychologists and the deployment of modern surveillance vehicles to 
ensure a peaceful atmosphere for the conduct of the 2015 general elec-
tions (http://www.airmaxfreedom.com/nikeairmaxgriffey).
challengeS of nScdc In Internal SecurIty 
management
The challenges confronting the NSCDC within the context of internal 
security management are enormous. These challenges must be seen as 
problems that must be attended to urgently in order to restore the reputa-
tion of the country that has been dragged in the mud before the comity of 
nations owing to the present internal security predicament in Nigeria.
First, the NSCDC is ill equipped to meet the present internal security 
challenges in the country. The most common weapons available to the 
agency according to a personal interview with an officer of NSCDC are 
G3 and AK 47. It was observed that the Nigerian Army trained the 
NSCDC personnel on the stripling and assembling of G3 and AK 47 rifles, 
description of the G3 rifle, arms maintenance and shooting positions. 
However, the criminals that the Corps daily confront come up with more 




Second, the Corps has serious challenges in the area of logistics. Not 
only that vehicles are in short supply, the ones that are available cannot 
match the terrain on which they operate mostly. The vehicles are either old 
or by design not good for paramilitary operations. For instance, the oil 
pipeline vandals operate inside the bush, sometimes mostly rough terrain 
that only vehicles with high-ground clearance and four-wheel drive could 
effectively be used for operations. In view of this situation, the Corps 
should be equipped with enough vehicles of paramilitary design.
Third, the state governments have not been fully supporting the 
NSCDC as a law-enforcement agency. The federal government cannot do 
it alone. This is why the state governments have been assisting the Nigeria 
Police Force with patrol vehicles, armoured personnel carrier, bullet-proof 
vests and helicopters. Thus, for effective performance, state governments 
should extend the same to the NSCDC.
Fourth, some law-enforcement agencies which have been regularised 
before NSCDC do act as if they are superior to the NSCDC. The NSCDC 
is now in rivalry with the police. The police authorities have been protest-
ing the establishment of the NSCDC, stressing that the Corps is perform-
ing their duties. While the police have had more clashes with the Army, 
Navy and the Air Force, they also engage in a serious superiority contest 
with the NSCDC (Abolurin 2010: 334).
Other areas calling for urgent attention are:
• The need for the NSCDC to focus on long-term strategy on grass- 
roots intelligence security and civil defence operations
• The need to diligently assess new and emerging threats to 
national security
• The need to develop the ability to initiate measures in terms of intel-
ligence networking and information gathering both as short- and 
long-term projections
• The need to monitor and upgrade existing security mechanisms to 
commensurate with the level of identified threat, especially in this 
state of heightened insecurity in Nigeria (http://www.nscdc.gov.ng)
concluSIon
This chapter has been able to identify internal security challenges in 
Nigeria. The present state of insecurity in Nigeria makes it crucial that the 
capacity of security agencies be built to prevent and respond to them. The 
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NSCDC within its constitutional responsibilities has been responding to 
the issue of internal security threats. It is evident that the NSCDC has 
discharged its mandate to a satisfactory level of providing safety and secu-
rity to Nigerians. The Corps has demonstrated civility in handling security 
and safety assignments. Through dialogue, negotiation, debate, public 
enlightenment and civic education, the agency has contributed positively 
to the management of internal security in Nigeria. In spite of some of its 
challenges, the Corps has demonstrated a high level of professionalism in 
security matters. In conclusion, there is a great need for the government 
to improve the recruitment and training process of NSCDC.  This will 
enhance their skills in combating crimes and managing internal secu-
rity threats.
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CHAPTER 22




One of the characteristics of a state is the existence of laws and norms. 
They are enacted for the purpose of peace, security and stability of the 
state. Unfortunately too, persons are bound to violate societal norms, laws 
and values. These kinds of persons can be sanctioned in several ways 
depending on the kind of society they belong to and the severity of the 
offence committed. Punishments for offences are guided by different prin-
ciples and theories. One of the principles of punishment is the principle of 
retribution or desert theory. This says that punishment is a morally appro-
priate response to crime. It adds that those who commit crimes should be 
punished in proportion to the gravity of the offence committed or the 
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extent to which others have been made to suffer. Deterrence principle is 
another. This says that for the offender to be deterred from further com-
mitting crime in the future, she/he should be punished. Another principle 
is the principle of rehabilitation which aimed at the restoration and refor-
mation of the offender with the rationale of preventing further offence 
through the strategy of rehabilitation. This stems from the belief that 
criminal behaviour is treatable. The last is the principle of incapacitation. 
This principle is based on the assumption that by removing the offenders 
from the community, either by putting them to death or by hiding them 
for a specified period of time, the capacity to commit crime is removed. 
This last principle is the philosophy behind establishment and manage-
ment of prisons by the state. There are various forms of punishment that 
can be meted out to offenders. However, imprisonment is the most widely 
used form of punishment for criminal offences (Bamgbose 2010). It 
involves placing the offender in a secluded environment away from the 
society. This secluded place is called prison, correctional facility, detention 
centre, gaol or jail, among others, depending on the country. The use of 
prisons began after the emergence of state and the development of formal-
ized legal codes for regulating social conduct in society. It specifically arose 
from the evolution of punishment (Bamgbose 2003). For instance, among 
the Babylonians where the Code of Hammurabi existed, a place of incar-
ceration called bit kili existed where debtors and petty criminals, slaves or 
foreigners were kept. Among the classical Greeks and Romans, private 
prisons or carcer privates existed.
The principle behind the operation of prisons by the state is that there 
are some people that constitute threats to the national security of a state. 
Those people must be taken out of the society into a secluded area. As 
Duff (2007) observed, sentencing a criminal to prison sends a message to 
the prisoner that she/he is unfit to continue living in that society. Keeping 
such persons away from the public does not only incapacitate him/her 
from further committing crimes, it also allows for the opportunity to reha-
bilitate such persons to live a better life after they are released. Apart from 
this, there are so many advantages of imprisonment of criminals for peace 
and national security of the state. First and foremost, keeping a criminal in 
prison send messages to would-be offenders that committing crimes does 
not pay. In this respect therefore, it helps to serve as deterrence to other 
people who may want to commit similar or related crimes. The fact that 
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anybody can be kept in custody for crimes committed has deterred many 
people from committing crimes with impunity. Second, keeping a criminal 
in prison helps assuage the feeling of the affected parties—individuals, 
groups or society. Many people who have been affected by the criminal 
actions of other people have been consoled by simply sending the offend-
ers into prisons. This does not only prevent self-help from the injured 
people but also help repose their confidence in the state and security agen-
cies. Thus, it prevents them from taking laws into their hands, which, most 
times, would result in a circle of violence. Third, criminals are influenced 
into committing crimes by peer groups. Therefore, taking them into 
prison custody protects the convict from the destructive influence of peer 
groups on them. Many offenders who have come into prison custody have 
suddenly realized through reflection that they become criminals because 
of bad company. The essence of imprisonment in the contemporary penal 
system is however not just to punish the offender as a form of retributive 
justice but also to rehabilitate the offender from criminal behaviour and 
reintegrate him or her into the society for the security of the state.
Imprisonment is one of the available punishments under the Nigerian 
criminal justice system. In fact, it is the most common sentence adminis-
tered by the court in Nigeria because for some offences, there are no 
alternative options. Even where there are options, the structures for the 
use of the options are not put in place (Bamgbose 2010). The essence of 
imprisonment in the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Act is not only to use 
prisons as a form of punishment for the offenders but to serve as a refor-
matory home for the offenders such that when they leave prison, they 
become better citizens of the Nigerian state. Olusola Ogundipe, former 
Comptroller-General of the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), corroborated 
this point when he observed that:
… except for prisoners on death row, every person sent to prison to serve 
terms, must one day rejoin the society again at the expiration of his/her 
terms. Even those on death row, if their sentences are commuted, also have 
a date with destiny because they too will one day rejoin society. It behoves 
on the prisons to make sure that when these people leave the prison they 
leave as reformed persons—law abiding, productive, and better citizens. It 
follows then that apart from taking and keeping the prisoners in secure cus-
tody, the prison is expected to work on (i.e treat) them so that on discharge 
they will no longer pose further threat to the society. (2010, 370–371)
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It is to ensure this value that the Nigerian Prisons Service was created. 
The mission/vision statement of the agency buttressed this fact very fer-
vently when it said:
Our intention is to establish a credible Prisons Service which through excel-
lent penal practice seek lasting change in offender’s attitudes, values and 
behaviour and ensure successful reintegration into the society. To promote 
public protection by providing assistance for offenders in their reformation 
and rehabilitation under safe, secure and humane conditions in accordance 
with universally accepted standard and to facilitate their social reintegration 
into society. (http://www.prisons.gov.ng/mission_vision)
The import of this is that the Nigerian Prisons Service has a role to play 
in the internal security management of the Nigerian State. Beyond keep-
ing criminals that can constitute security threats to the state in custody 
away from the public, they have the duty to rehabilitate them to become 
better citizens after release. Unfortunately however, persons sent to pris-
ons in Nigeria come out to become more hardened and constitute security 
threats to the state. Nwolise (2010, 240) observed correctly that:
Corrections/prison service are meant to keep inmates reform, reoriented, 
and rehabilitate them to avoid recidivism, and empower them to be law 
abiding and productive members of society on release from prison. But the 
situation on ground today in much of Africa (Nigeria) is the opposite. In 
several African nations, not only is there no rehabilitation and empower-
ment, several inmates go back to crime soon after discharge from prison to 
terrorise the society, and return to prison to worsen the overcrowding and 
financial crisis of the prisons.
This chapter interrogates the role that the Nigerian Prisons Service is 
playing in the management of internal security in Nigeria. Data and infor-
mation for this study were gathered from primary and secondary sources. 
Primary information was sourced from  a senior prison official in Yola, 
Adamawa State and an ex-inmate in one of the prisons in the state. 
Furthermore, secondary data were collected from Federal Office of 
Statistics (FOS), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and other relevant 
textual materials like books, journal articles, online reports, especially those 
of the Nigerian Prisons Service, and newspapers. The thesis of the chapter 
is that Nigerian prisons have a significant role to play in the management of 
internal security of the Nigerian state. However, the institution is yet to 
perform this role effectively due to challenges such as inadequate funds, 
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poor rehabilitation programmes, the mixture of minor offenders with hard-
ened criminals, problems of awaiting trial persons and philosophy of the operat-
ing Nigerian prisons as punitive rather than reformative systems. As a result, 
Nigerian prisons have become avenues for criminalization of inmates rather 
than reformation centres, thus complicating Nigeria’s national security. The 
chapter is written in sections. Section “Introduction” is the introduction that 
gives background to the chapter. Section “Evolution of Nigerian Prisons 
Service” chronicles the evolution of the Nigerian Prisons Service. Section “NPS, 
Prison Management and Internal Security in Nigeria: An Assessment” is the 
assessment of the contributions of the NPS to internal security management of 
the Nigerian state. The fourth section examines the challenges militating against 
the NPS while the fifth section concludes and makes recommendations.
EvolutIon of nIgErIan PrIsons sErvIcE
The use of prisons in Nigeria can be traced to the period before the coun-
try was colonized by Britain (Awe 1968; Asuni in Adewale 1982; Ogunleye 
2007). People who deviated from acceptable societal norms were kept in 
places of detention for trial or punishment. For instance, among the 
Nasarawa people in the present-day North Central region, persons who 
stole were usually locked up in the compound of their victims (Gunn 
1960). Among the Hausa-Fulani people, offenders were kept in prison 
custody where he or she would be visibly seen by passers-by and be jeered 
at. Among the Yoruba, prisons (known as tubu) existed where grave 
offenders were kept. Among the Tiv, a building was set aside in the chief’s 
compound where offenders were kept. Even among the Benin people 
there existed the Ewedo where offenders were detained till they were either 
sold into slavery or released (Bradbury 1957). However, according to 
Meek (1970), cited in Adewale (1982), the operation of places of deten-
tion was not popular among the Igbo people. There, habitual criminals 
were killed or sold into slavery. The foundation of a modern prison system 
in Nigeria was laid with the British colonization of Nigeria and the estab-
lishment of the British colonial administration in Lagos in 1861.
The British colonial government headed by I.I.S. Freeman was autho-
rised to set up courts and also appoint judges. With these powers, four 
special courts were established in Lagos in 1863. These courts were the 
court for resolving petty disputes, the court for trying serious criminal 
cases, the court for addressing cases arising from abolition of slave trade 
and the court for resolving disputes relating to trade and commercial activ-
ities. To complement the establishment of these courts, there was a need 
to establish prisons. Thus, the establishment of courts necessitated the 
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establishment of prisons in colonial Nigeria. The first prison in Nigeria was 
established in colonial Nigeria in 1872 at Broad Street, Lagos, with the 
capacity to accommodate 300 inmates (Adewale 1982; Alemika and 
Chukwuma 2001; Orakwe n.d.). After the amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern protectorates in 1914, the establishment of prisons outside 
Lagos started. Three types of prisons basically developed during this 
period. These were maximum security prisons, the provincial prisons and 
the divisional or native authority prisons. The maximum security prisons 
were large prisons in towns like Enugu and Calabar and some parts of 
Western Nigeria. They had high walls around them and accommodated 
convicts who had long sentences to serve. The provincial prisons were 
located at Owerri, Ogoja, Makurdi and Onitsha to custody inmates whose 
sentences were not more than two years. The divisional prisons were 
located at Nsukka, Uyo, Itu, Okitipupa, Umuahia and Kano, to take care 
of inmates whose sentences were less than two years (Dambazau 1999; 
Moses 2011). It is important to note that the colonial prison system was 
not designed to reform anybody in prison custody. As Orakwe (n.d.) noted:
Instead prisoners were in the main used for public works and other jobs for 
the colonial administration. For this reason there was no need for the 
recruitment of trained officers of the prisons. Hence colonial prisons had no 
trained and developed staff of their own and instead the police also per-
formed prison duties. As time went on ex-servicemen were recruited to 
do the job.
They were also very poorly run and the local prison conditions varied 
from one place to another in their disorganization, callousness and exploi-
tation. But so long as they served the colonial interests of ensuring law and 
order, collecting taxes and providing labour for public works, they were 
generally left alone. The result was that the prisons served the purpose of 
punishing those who had the guts to oppose the colonial administration in 
one form or the other, while at the same time cowing those who might 
want to stir up trouble for the colonial set up.
The first important step in the unification, modernization and upgrad-
ing of prison services in Nigeria was executed in 1917, when Prison 
Regulation Act was published, to ensure the regulation. This took care of 
admission prescription, staffing, treatment, feeding and clothing of 
inmates, among others. It must further be noted that the new prison 
 regulation then also clearly differentiated between awaiting trial persons 
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and convicted inmates and even specified the categories of convicts in each 
of the prisons. Though this was a step in the right direction, it was essen-
tially a tokenistic intervention. This is because these provisions could not 
be described as the national prison policy, owing to the fact that inmates 
of native authority prisons were excluded from these provisions 
(Orakwe n.d.).
Be that as it may, the beginning of the modernization of prisons services 
in Nigeria on the national scale could be traced to the time Mr R.H. Dolan 
served as the Director of Prisons (1946–1955). He began his service as an 
experienced prison officer. Prior to his appointment by the colonial admin-
istration in Nigeria, he had acquired considerable training in prison man-
agement and administration from Britain, Trinidad, Sierra Leone and 
Tanganyika (now Tanzania) (Adewale 1982). It was also at this time that 
vocational training which was earlier introduced in 1917 but with a limited 
success rate was re-introduced by him. He also introduced mandatory 
prison classification and began allowing prison visitation by inmates’ rela-
tives. In addition, earning schemes for long-term first offenders, moral and 
adult education while in custody, establishment of a body to pay attention 
to care and reformation of freed inmates were introduced under his leader-
ship. With these, many other developments followed in Nigerian prisons 
which enhanced the effective rehabilitation of inmates. For instance, with 
the introduction of custodial education, libraries were established in prisons 
and there was a sporadic increase in literacy among prisoners (Awe 1968).
Basically, Mr Dolan can be regarded as the father of modern prison 
services in Nigeria. This is because during his term in office, he did not 
only focus on the welfare of the prisoners, but also worked to ensure that 
prison members of staff were adequately trained with the establishment of 
the Warders’ Training School. In addition, educated wardresses were 
recruited into the prison service especially to administer female wings of 
the Nigerian prisons. He also improved the service conditions of prison 
staff. By 1948, he had opened four reformatory homes in Lagos and con-
verted part of the Port-Harcourt prisons for the housing and treatment of 
juveniles. Dolan left behind indelible legacies in the annals of prison ser-
vice in Nigeria. No wonder Orakwe (n.d.) states that: “Dolan’s tenure 
represented a very high point in the evolution of Nigeria Prisons Service.”
However, by 1958, Prison Ordinance (cap. 159, 1958) was promul-
gated. This commenced the beginning of the “Nigerianization” of prison 
management and administration in Nigeria with the appointment of a 
Nigerian—Chief Giwa Osagie—as the Director of Prisons for the country. 
After independence in 1960, the Nigerian prison system underwent sig-
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nificant change. The change was occasioned by certain realities in the 
prison system left behind by the British colonial masters. The native 
authority/divisional prisons were filthy, overcrowded and understaffed 
while those in control of the regions were becoming instruments of politi-
cal victimization. Furthermore, there was irregularity in the standards and 
conditions of prisons throughout the country (Dambazau 1999). As a 
result, the native authority prison was abolished and the federal and pro-
vincial prisons were unified in 1968. This marked the beginning of 
Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS).
NPS came into full force after the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) 
ended. It was established in 1972 after government white paper on the 
reorganization of the Nigeria prison was issued and a decree (Decree No. 
9) stating the establishment of NPS was released (Orakwe n.d.). The 
Nigerian Prisons Service is under the direct control of the Ministry of 
Interior. However, it is headed by a comptroller-general (CG) assisted by 
six deputy comptrollers for zonal commands. At the state level, it is headed 
by the comptroller who oversees prison facilities in the state. The Nigerian 
Prisons Service is charged with the following duties:
 1. Take into lawful custody all those certified to be so kept by courts of 
competent jurisdiction.
 2. Produce suspects in courts as and when due.
 3. Identify the causes of their anti-social dispositions.
 4. Set in motion mechanisms for their treatment and training for even-
tual reintegration into society as normal law-abiding citizens on 
discharge.
 5. Administer prison farms and industries for this purpose and in the 
process generate revenue for the government  (http://www.pris-
ons.gov.ng/).
nPs, PrIson ManagEMEnt and IntErnal sEcurIty 
In nIgErIa: an assEssMEnt
Generally, prisons have basic functions that are significant to the internal 
security of the state. These functions are to secure and control, to punish 
and to rehabilitate and reform offenders. The Nigerian Prisons Service has 
a significant role to play in internal security management in Nigeria. From 
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the constitutional roles of the Service highlighted above, it has a duty that 
extends beyond keeping in custody persons convicted by courts of compe-
tent jurisdiction to be imprisoned. It is also statutorily obligated to iden-
tify the causes of inmates’ anti-social dispositions and put in place 
machineries to reform their behaviours. This also includes training them in 
the skills that will enhance their speedy reintegration into the society after 
release. This function is particularly important to ensure internal security 
of the Nigerian state. This is so because a criminal whose cause of anti- 
social disposition is known can easily be reformed. Effective reformation 
of such a person will ensure that she/he does not come back to the prison. 
This task of the prison is necessary to ensure adequate internal security 
because most people who offend the state and are certified to be kept in 
prison custody are people who find it extremely difficult to conform to 
societal norms. Ogundipe buttressed this point more fervently when 
he observed:
It is assumed that those who have committed crimes need help so that rather 
than be punished for their offences should be assisted to lead a good life on 
discharge from prison. This view is predicated upon the understanding that 
those who have fallen foul of the collective norms and law of their societies, 
as expressed in their criminal law, are those who have had problems of adap-
tation and conformity with the general value system of their societies. And 
this is largely due to the fact that they were unable to some extent in their 
socialisation cope with the internalisation of the values and norms of their 
society and therefore express this shortcoming by breaking the laws. When 
therefore they commit crimes, they are sent to Prison more for reform and 
rehabilitation than punishment so that on discharge they would be free to 
rejoin the society as normal law abiding citizens. (2010, 372–373)
These functions, if well performed by NPS, will contribute to internal 
security of the Nigerian state. Effective custody of persons considered to 
be of significant threat to the state will ensure public safety but curing and 
reforming them while in prison will ensure better public safety. This is 
because identifying their anti-social behaviours and rehabilitating them 
while in custody will make them better citizens such that whenever they 
are discharged, they become law-abiding citizens and it becomes impos-
sible for them to reoffend and go back to prison. Unfortunately, the 
extent to which the NPS has been able to perform these functions may 
be doubtful.
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The most common internal security threat that Nigeria is currently 
experiencing is increasing crime rate. As a result of this, there is a signifi-
cant rise in prison population.
As Table 22.1 shows, the population of inmates in all Nigerian prisons 
in 1969 was 9203. It increased to 11,508 in 1970. It was 16,848 in 1971, 
20,705 in 1972 and 26,243 in 1973. In 1974 and 1975, it was 24,161 
and 23,001. In 1980 the inmate population was put at 36,000. By 2013, 
the total number of inmates in Nigerian prisons increased to 52,769. As 
on December 2016, the population of prison inmates in Nigeria was 
65,000. Between December 2016 and February 2017, the number of 
prison inmates in Nigeria increased from 65,000 to 72,000 (Olawuyi 2017; 
Daily Trust, 9 February 2017a). As the crime rate continues to lead to the 
swelling inmate population, other associated problems such as the rate of 
jailbreak and rate of recidivism (the rate of reconviction) also continue to 
increase. Between 1971 and 1972, 12,526 or 74.3% of the population of 
inmates in Nigerian prisons had previously been to the prison. Of these, 
43.5% had one previous conviction, while 30.5% had two previous convic-
tions. The remaining percentage had three or more prior convictions and 
imprisonment (Adewale 1982). Between 1973 and 1974, 17,401 inmates 
had one or more previous convictions, while between 1986 and 2009, the 
rate of recidivism increased sporadically as shown in Table 22.2.
Table 22.1 Population of inmates in Nigerian prisons over various years
S/N Year Numbers of prisoners in the country Number of prisons
1 1969 9203 –
2 1970 11,508 –
3 1971 16,848 –
4 1972 20,705 –
5 1973 26,243 –
6 1974 24,161 –
7 1975 23,001 –
8 1980 36,000 –
9 2005 39,006 227
10 2006 40,953 227
11 2007 39,691 229
12 2008 41,143 228
13 2009 41,786 230
14 2013 52,769 242
15 2016 65,000 242
Source: Adapted from Adewale (1982), Federal Office of Statistics (2010) and Shajobi-Ibikunle (2014)
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challEngEs of thE nPs In thE ManagEMEnt 
of PrIsons for IntErnal sEcurIty of nIgErIa
A major point from the statistics above is that the prisons in Nigeria do not 
rehabilitate or reform inmates to be good citizens after serving prison 
terms. Rather, what happens is that they become further hardened. This is 
why most of the notorious criminals in Nigeria today have been impris-
oned previously. They were released after completing their jail term only 
to become hardened. This obvious fact was better captured by the report 
of The Punch on Nigerian prisons:
Our prisons are no longer correcting people. Our prisons have become a 
training ground to make a detainee graduate from a misdemeanor to real 
crime. Our prisons have become a training ground for a man who was 
imprisoned for wandering to come out and become a hired killer and an 
armed robber who will carry gun and bullets around his neck like necklace 
and shoots sporadically and our policemen will go for cover. (The Punch 
2009, March 14, p. 68)
The question an inquisitive mind would want to ask is why Nigerian 
prisons are unable to effectively perform their core functions of rehabili-
tating and reforming inmates to be better citizens. Some of these chal-
lenges are discussed below.
Inadequate funds: One of the major challenges to the effective admin-
istration of Nigerian prisons by Nigerian Prisons Service is inadequate 
funds. In rehabilitating inmates to become better citizens, many reforma-
tory programmes have to be implemented. Similarly, prison officials have 
to be involved in day-to-day training to be abreast of new trends in inmate 
management. Other activities such as prison administration, salaries and 
allowances and structure and equipment maintenance need to be carried 
out on a daily basis. These need adequate finance. Unfortunately, prisons 
are poorly financed in Nigeria. Less than 1% of the Nigerian budget is 
allocated to corrections annually whereas in developed countries like the 
United Kingdom and the United States, more than 6% of their annual 
budget goes into corrections. Nigeria is among those countries in the 
world where correction is less funded (Nwolise 2006, 2010; Ogundipe 
2010). This has serious effect on the correction of inmates as majority of 
them are poorly treated in custody. For instance, until recently an inmate 
in a Nigerian prison was entitled to only ₦150 daily for feeding. This was 
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recently upgraded to ₦400, which is still low (Interview with Prison 
Official, Adamawa State, June 12, 2017). These prisons are seriously lack-
ing in health-care facilities. Other programmes that prisoners are entitled 
to en-route reformation and rehabilitation are abruptly stopped due to the 
inadequate finance of the prison system. As a result, the reformation activi-
ties are weak. Similarly, prisons officials are denied frequent personnel 
training which could have enhanced their performance in rehabilitating 
inmates. This significantly contributes to producing detainees that will 
graduate from misdemeanour to real crime and will also return to prison 
shortly after release.
Poor rehabilitation programmes: Another major challenge of NPS in 
the management of prisons in Nigeria is poor rehabilitation programmes 
provided by prisons. Carefully conceived and well-implemented rehabilita-
tion programmes are key to rehabilitating a criminal into becoming a good 
citizen. This is because those who commit crimes in society are usually 
people who could not cope with the developmental process of the society. 
As a result, they are school drop-outs, lumpens, homeless, the unemployed, 
the unskilled and the poor, among others. Therefore, training them on 
skills, vocation or education while in custody is key to reintegrating them 
into the society and not by presenting them with sermons and dawah on 
the need to lead a decent life after custody (Ogundipe 2010). This is neces-
sary so that when they leave custody, they will be able to engage themselves 
in economic activities that will continue to sustain them. While describing 
programmes embarked upon by NPS to reform, rehabilitate and reintegrate 
inmates into the larger society, Ogundipe (2010) observed that the agency 
embarked on a series of human development programme on inmates. These 
programmes involved schools, vocational workshops, the operation of 
mechanized farm centres and prison cottage industries. However, the 
extent to which these programmes are actually implemented is in serious 
doubt. This is because many of the freed detainees still find it difficult to 
reintegrate into the society as a result of lack of training in educational or 
vocational skills that could have sustained them after custody. In line with 
this thought, Igbodipe cited in Feyisetan (n.d., p. 69) observed that:
The prison system is not merely to punish but to correct, to redeem, reha-
bilitate, regenerate and restore the offender to the status of a respectable or 
respectful law abiding citizens. The conditions in our prisons have made 
such aims useless and unattainable because of lack of reformative and reha-
bilitative programmes….
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This problem is linked to poor funding. A senior prison official observed 
that “most of these programmes only exist in paper but NPS cannot imple-
ment them due to poor fund” (interview with Prison Official, Adamawa 
State, June 12, 2017). However, another significant factor is that the pro-
grammes are not carefully conceived and implemented. Most inmates are 
“forced” to acquire skills in which they do not have interest (interview 
with an ex-inmate in Yola town, May 2017). Thus they fail to practise the 
skill after custody. This easily encourages recidivism.
Mixture of minor offenders with hardened criminals: There are dif-
ferent kinds of people in prisons. One category is convicted people, those 
found guilty of a criminal offence by the verdict of a jury or the decision 
of a judge in a court of law. These kinds of prisoners may be condemned 
(sentenced to death), sentenced to certain years in prison or a lifer (sen-
tenced to life imprisonment). Another category is awaiting trial persons. 
These are persons who are still undergoing court trial to determine 
whether they are guilty or not. These various kinds of prisoners are locked 
together in the same confinement with no classification. In the process, 
minor crime offenders are locked up with hardened criminals. In the pro-
cess, the minor offenders undergo steady but a consistent process of crimi-
nalization. This results in a situation whereby the minor/first-time 
offenders are hardened by learning sophisticated crimes from the hard-
ened criminals who may have been condemned or subjected to life impris-
onment. This surely promotes recidivism. One major reason for lumping 
minor offenders with hardened criminals is due to the challenge of space 
in Nigerian prisons.
Over-congestion of prisons: Prison congestion is a serious concern in 
the Nigerian Prison system. The Nigerian government over the years has 
grappled with the challenge of decongesting prisons. The current Nigerian 
Minister of Interior Abdulrahman Dambazau listed the option of setting 
free those who have served ten years and above in prison without trial as a 
way to decongest Nigerian prisons (Daily Trust, 25 May 2017b). In the 
same vein, the government has commuted prison sentences of other cate-
gories of prisoners to fines; this implies that upon payment of imposed fines 
this category of prisoners will be released. However, the clog in the wheel 
of this policy is that some inmates who have been released based on this 
arrangement could not meet the condition for release which is payment of 
the imposed fine. The Senate Committee on Interior once offered and 
indeed rescued some inmates in Kuje and Suleja prisons who were unable 
to pay the fines imposed on them by the courts as part of their intervention 
in the decongestion of prison facilities (Table 22.3).



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The committee visited these prisons and facilitated the release of these 
inmates by making available to them money for the payment of fines. One 
major outcome of the over-congestedness of Nigerian prisons is lack of 
effective management. It is also a strong factor in the frequency of prisons 
breaks in Nigeria as the demographic pressure sometimes serves as impe-
tus for prison breaks. However, some prison breaks might have been insti-
gated by  other factors like inadequate physical activities in prison, 
inadequate quantity and quality of food and other unavailable wel-
fare packages.
Problem of awaiting trial persons (ATPs): Another major challenge 
of the NPS in the management of prisons for internal security of the 
Nigerian state is the problem of ATPs. Statistics shows that there are 
65,944 prison inmates across the country, more than 70% of which consti-
tute ATPs (Punch Newspaper, February 5, 2017). This was also confirmed 
by the Nigerian Minister of Interior, Abdulrahman Dambazau, recently. 
The minister, on a Salah visit to the Kano prisons, buttressed this fact 
when he said:
The high number of awaiting trial inmates is worrisome because the prisons 
are meant for convicts, but you find out at the end of the day that more than 
70 per cent of the people there are awaiting trial inmates. (Daniel 2017)
Many factors have been adduced for the growing population of the 
ATPs in Nigeria. One major factor resulting in the problem of ATPs is 
judicial congestion which results in a long period of litigation on cases. 
Cases are unjustifiably adjourned for a long period of time, while the 
accused is kept in prison custody unnecessarily.
The above assertion is corroborated by a report compiled by the 
National Human Right Commission (NHRC). An excerpt from that 
report states that:
… More than 70 per cent of inmates are awaiting trial because their cases are 
not going on in court or are not moving as fast as possible. A situation 
where somebody is supposed to stay two years in prison if convicted, and he 
has stayed five years awaiting trial, what kind of compensation will you give 
to him, if at the end, he is not guilty? Our constitution says that you are 
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innocent until proven guilty, so what happens if this person who has been 
awaiting trial for five years is innocent? That means he has stayed in deten-
tion for five years for nothing, for an offence he did not commit, so we think 
that the criminal justice administration should be improved. (cited in the 
Guardian Newspaper, November 20, 2015)
This prolonged trial leading to the congestion of prisons with ATPs has 
caused a lot of havoc on prisoners and their possibility of been corrected. 
Continuous co-existence with hardened criminal enables them to learn to 
become hardened while in the prisons as ATPs. As Ogundipe observed:
The lumping together of awaiting and pre-trial detainees in congested cells 
for these long periods produce damaged personalities who are no longer in 
tune with what we can call normative laws and customs governing social 
existence. Years of staying in congested cells make even those on the periph-
ery of crime become so schooled that they idolize crimes, banish fear and 
make up their minds that if they can suffer this much for doing nothing, 
then there is nothing more to fear. (Ogundipe 2010, p. 375)
The implication above is that ATPs are likely to return to the society as 
hardened criminals after staying for long in the prison with career crimi-
nals as a result of judicial congestion. Meanwhile as they are awaiting trials, 
they are not subjected to any form of correction programme as correction 
programmes are for convicted prisoners and often come as part of the 
sentence of the jury (interview with prison official in Yola, June 2017), but 
while in prison, they are consistently criminalized by hardened criminals. 
This also explains the high rate of recidivism among Nigerian inmates.
Punitive rather than reformative correction systems: Offenders are 
supposed to be sent to prisons as punishment and not for punishment 
(Bamgbose 2010). Unfortunately, in Nigeria offenders are sent to prisons 
as punishment and for punishment. Freed prisoners left prison custodies 
without any hope of a better life or means for starting life afresh. This fac-
tor also pushed some of them back into criminality. For instance, there is 
no statutory provision for freed inmates to be reintegrated back into soci-
ety. Oftentimes they leave the prison custody without any means of sur-
vival, and the drive to search for survival by all means possible usually leads 
them to new forms of criminality, which may lead them back to prison.
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conclusIon and rEcoMMEndatIons
Prisons play a significant role in the security of people within the state. The 
recognition of this fact is the reason developed countries of the world 
concentrate on prison management. It is not only where persons who 
constitute serious security threats to the state are kept, it is also an avenue 
to rehabilitate social deviants and criminals. While prisons in Nigeria serve 
as spaces where people who constitute risk to the state are kept, it is not 
yet a place of rehabilitation and reformation. It is rather a place where 
hardened criminals are produced. Some of the factors responsible for this 
have been extensively discussed in this chapter. There is a need for prison 
reform in Nigeria. The following are recommended:
 1. Imprisonment as a form of punishment should be de-emphasized. 
Except where custodization is absolutely necessary such as in cases 
of serious offenders/criminals and for the sake of public safety, other 
forms of punishments for minor offenders should be adopted. 
Alternative punishments that can be administered especially on 
minor offenders are community service, probation, compensation, 
plea bargaining, binding over and restoration, and fine, among oth-
ers (see Bamgbose 2010, pp. 60–72).
 2. The deteriorating conditions of Nigerian prisons must be addressed. 
Inmates too must be adequately catered for and be made to undergo 
programmes that will enhance their effective reformation and inte-
gration into the society. Fundamentally, the successful rehabilitation 
of prisoners has three components. These are healing, treatment and 
education/training. This may be part of the rehabilitation agenda of 
the NPS but it is hardly implemented. Most times, they depend only 
on spiritual healing and counselling of clergymen while aspects of 
training and education are less pursued. Therefore, these reforma-
tive programmes especially vocational training and education of 
inmates should be improved upon. Earning an education in prison 
opens up opportunities for employment and a career that ex- 
prisoners feel is out of their reach. This is why the tendency to come 
back to prison is high. Apart from this, education helps to build 
self- esteem of convicts. It is recommended that prison education 
and training in Nigeria should be strengthened.
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 3. The government must effectively fund prisons in Nigeria. This is 
necessary as the effective reformation of offenders is a function 
of funding.
 4. The problem of ATPs must be addressed through judicial reforms 
that speedily and effectively dispense justice. This can help decon-
gest the congested prisons in Nigeria. The following approaches 
may be applied to the problem of lengthy pre-trial detention that 
ultimately contributes to the swollen number of ATPs:
 (a) Increasing legal aid and assistance to the less privileged.
 (b) Enforcing time limits in criminal proceedings.
 (c) Offering bail and other alternatives to pre-trial detention.
 (d) Reforming criminal procedures so that cases are reviewed regu-
larly and brought to a conclusion more speedily.
 5. Minor offenders must be separated from major offenders. A situa-
tion where a misdemeanour offender is placed in the same gaol with 
a terrorist or hardened criminal is not the best.
 6. There should be a national review and reformation of the criminal 
justice system in Nigeria. There should be huge government invest-
ment in crime prevention and reduction. Imprisonment comes at 
the end of a long chain of decisions involving legislators and policy-
makers, the police, prosecutors and courts.
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Non State Actors and Internal Security 




Security of lives and property is the most important role of the state. In 
fact, one of the indicators of a failed state is its inability to properly secure 
the lives and properties of its citizens. In the social contract theory, this is 
the main reason people had to give up some of their natural rights to the 
state in order for the state to provide them protection. Thus, the state is 
the result of an agreement entered into by men who originally had no 
governmental organization, and as such, everybody was living at the mercy 
of nature. In such an unorganized environment, life was “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short” (Appadorai 1974, p.  22). People, therefore, 
decided to set up a government to which they parted with their natural 
liberty and agreed to obey the laws prescribed by this government. On its 
part, and to fulfil its own part of the contract, this government or the state 
was to provide them and their properties with security.
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In the context of Nigeria, this role was clearly articulated in section 14, 
subsection 2(b), of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which  emphasizes 
the pre-eminence of security and welfare of the people as the raison d’être 
of government. Consequently, by surrendering some of their natural 
rights to the state, it is expected that the security of the lives of the citizens 
and those of their property shall be guaranteed by the Nigerian state using 
the instrumentality of the military and diverse security agencies such as the 
police, the Directorate of State Security, and other para- military agencies.
However, this has not always been the case. Presently, Nigeria is con-
fronted with a series of security challenges ranging from the less serious 
crimes such as pick-pocketing, home breaking, and burglary to the more 
heinous and sophisticated crimes such as armed robbery, car snatching, 
kidnapping, political assassinations and other related killings, trans-border 
crimes, ethno-religious conflicts, the Fulani herdsmen menace, and insur-
gency. In fact, insurgency has become so intractable that the military, 
whose traditional security role is external—safeguarding the territorial 
integrity of the country—has had to be drafted to contain it. Despite all 
the resources and personnel that have been deployed in combating the 
Boko Haram insurgency, it has continued to wreak havoc on the citizens 
of the country, especially in the northeastern part of the country where it 
has been fighting to create an Islamic caliphate.
Containing these security challenges has proven to be a herculean task 
for the state security agencies for a number of reasons. One, these security 
agencies are already overstretched by the enormity of work they have had 
to do given the sophistication of the criminals they are contending with 
and the number of Nigerians there are to protect. Available evidence indi-
cates that Nigeria is highly under-policed, compared with some other 
countries. Bodunde et al. (2014) have noted that the minimum bench-
mark for police strength as recommended by the United Nations is 222 
per 10,000 persons. This means that the ideal is one policeman to about 
45 persons. Nigeria is far from achieving this, as the ratio in the country 
presently is 1 to about 500, since the Nigerian Police presently has a 
strength of about 370,000 officers and men (Bodunde et al. 2014). Two, 
and as a consequence of the above, security agencies cannot be everywhere 
at the same time. Many of the crimes are committed in localities where the 
presence of the police and other security agencies is hardly felt. Three, 
most of these security agencies are concentrated in urban areas, where 
crime rates tend to be higher. This has left a security gap in most commu-
nities, neighbourhoods, and localities.
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In order to address this lacuna, therefore, communities have resorted to 
self-help initiatives to protect themselves and their property in their 
 communities, and these self-help initiatives, in the form of non-state secu-
rity actors, have, to a large extent, closed the gap created by the failure of 
security agencies to guarantee the safety of the citizens and their property 
(Ogbozor 2016). According to Nyiayaana (2015), this has called into 
question the purpose of the state as the sole legitimate security provider. 
These self-help initiatives or non-state policing measures are in the form of 
vigilante groups or, in some parlance, referred to as neighbourhood watch.
This contribution, therefore, adds to the gamut of literature on internal 
security management by examining the role of vigilante groups in internal 
security management in Nigeria. It attempts a conceptualization of the 
term ‘vigilantism,’ traces the origin of vigilante groups in Nigeria, and also 
examines the rationale for the introduction of vigilantism in the country, 
that is, its role in internal security management. The chapter also assesses 
the nature of the relationship existing among these vigilante groups and 
state security agencies, especially the police. It further discusses the factors 
militating against effective operation of vigilante groups and finally prof-
fers solutions to these problems, in the form of recommendations. The 
study basically adopted desk research, relying mainly on the documentary 
method of generating data. As such, secondary data/information were 
essentially utilized. Also, authors’ personal observations of the workings of 
these groups in communities where they operate were also a veritable 
source of data. Content analysis, based on systematic logical deductions, 
was used to analyse data.
conceptual dIscourse
Vigilantism
Buur and Jenson (2004) have noted that the conceptualization of the 
term ‘vigilantism’ is important for two related reasons. First, the concept 
is very much embedded in the fashion and encompassment that need to be 
unravelled to provide the academic space needed to address the phenom-
enon on a daily basis. Second, there is a need to show that the concept has 
been unstable. Thus, the word ‘vigilante’ is used in Nigeria vaguely in 
reference to diverse groups which have different aims. The appellation has 
been used to describe formations such as the Bakassi Boys, whose initial 
assignment was to fight crime but who eventually became a tool in the 
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hands of politicians. The term has also been used to describe the Oodua 
People’s Congress (OPC), a militia group native to the Yoruba race and 
very active in the southwestern part of the country, whose original aim was 
to champion for self-determination for the Yoruba people, but it widened 
its operational scope to include crime fighting. It has also been applied to 
the Hisba in the north, introduced by 12 northern states in 2000, whose 
mandate was to ensure compliance with sharia law. The term has also been 
used to describe several other groups in the villages and communities who 
perform either the role of security guards or some other functions in dif-
ferent parts of the country. Even hunters’ associations and the civilian 
Joint Task Force (JTF) in the northeast are also described as vigilantes.
Thus, Johnson (1996) conceptualized vigilantism as acts that are 
focused on crime and societal regulation in the form of enhanced security 
for partakers and constituents of the group. More so, they are viewed as 
groups that are established outside the legal structures administered by 
the state. This view seems to be a re-echo of Nina (1995), who had earlier 
argued that vigilante groups are constituted outside the law. In other 
words, they are extra-state, and as such, their operations are extra-judicial. 
Some have also ascribed mob or spontaneous action to vigilantism (see 
Sundar 2010). This involves ordinary people lynching or beating up sus-
pected thieves, rapists, and other social deviants. This is usually in prefer-
ence to the criminal justice system which takes ages to give justice. 
Therefore, by this definition, any act by which suspected criminals are 
brought to instant (jungle or extra-judicial) justice is termed ‘vigilantism.’ 
It is little wonder that Ogbozor (2016) noted that researchers have tended 
to focus on the negative aspects of these vigilante groups, including abuse 
of human rights, instead of the critical roles they play in the security of a 
community.
As Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) have noted, vigilantism is of four 
different types. These include:
• Neighbourhood or community based: These are neighbourhood 
organizations formed by communities or neighbourhoods.
• Ethnic: These are groups organized along ethnic lines for the pur-
pose of defending the interests of the ethnic group.
• Religious: These are groups that are faith based.
• State-sponsored: Vigilante organizations which have the mandate of 
the government to operate.
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These typologies are, however, not mutually exclusive, as one group 
can combine the characteristics of more or all of the above types.
What could be deduced from this gamut of definitions and conceptual-
izations is that there is no scholarly consensus yet on the exact meaning of 
vigilantism. However, for the purpose of this chapter, vigilantism is con-
ceptualized as groups of citizens who volunteer themselves in local com-
munities to assist the regular security agents by arresting criminals or 
suspected criminals and handing them over to the police for further inves-
tigation and possible prosecution. It is an admission that the state has not 
lived up to its expectation in this regard. As Jones (2008) has rightly 
argued, they were created in response to the inability of the state to guar-
antee the security of lives and property of its citizens. In most cases, the 
volunteers who make up the membership of vigilante groups are youths 
who have regular employment and who are highly recommended by the 
community leaders; otherwise, they would not be accepted as members of 
the vigilante group. The idea behind this is to ensure that criminals are not 
recruited as members as well as to prevent members from engaging in 
unwholesome practices such as extorting money from innocent citizens. 
This is important because their services are to a large extent voluntary 
since members do not receive salary either from the government or from 
the community, though stipends could be paid from time to time by the 
community.
Non-state Security Actors
Onuoha (2017) defined non-state security actors as a group of actors who 
are outside the formal security apparatus of the Nigerian state, saddled 
with the responsibility of performing security and law enforcement func-
tions on behalf of their communities. At times, they are referred to as the 
informal police force or voluntary police force. In the case of Nigeria, they 
operate in the form of vigilantes, neighbourhood guards, community or 
village guards, or traditional policemen (Ogbozor 2016). They emerged 
to complement government efforts at addressing challenges arising from 
the inadequacies of state institutions in security provisioning. In other 
words, they emerged in response to gaps or deficits in security provision-
ing by formal state institutions (Onuoha 2017).
Mohammed, 2013 (cited in Onuoha 2017), has identified three cate-
gories of non-state security actors in Nigeria. The first one consists of a 
group of able-bodied young men in the village who organize themselves 
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to patrol their areas mostly at night in order to protect the community 
against armed robbers. The second category is largely a product of 
 community decisions whereby the community contributes money and 
hires people, which they pay on a weekly or monthly basis to guard the 
community. The third group is mostly hired and equipped by the local 
government areas to prevent crimes and arrest criminals.
These informal (or non-state) security actors play diverse and impor-
tant roles in African communities. However, researchers have always 
focused on the negative aspects of their work, especially as regards abuse 
of human rights, while neglecting the important roles they play in provid-
ing security and safety in communities. Among the different non-state 
security actors in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria stands out as the 
oldest and most recognized actor (Ogbozor 2016). The group plays 
important roles in providing essential policing services to Nigerians, espe-
cially in rural areas. They have increasingly filled the void created by the 
failure of official or state security actors to provide security for the citizens.
Internal Security Management
Malik (2010) has noted that in Arthashastra, Kautilya had written that a 
state can be exposed to four different types of threats. These are internal 
threats, external threats, externally aided internal threats, and internally 
aided external threats. According to him, among these four types of threats, 
domestic threats should be addressed without delay. This is because just 
like the fear of a snake hidden around the corner, they are much more 
damaging than threats from outside. The most dangerous enemy is the 
internal enemy. Kautilya (c.350–275 BC), an ancient Indian statesman and 
philosopher, had written the treatise, Arthashastra, as a handbook for run-
ning an empire (Violatti 2014). Kautilya’s thesis underscores not only the 
seriousness of internal security threats, but also the importance of internal 
security management in containing security threats within a state.
Internal security management, therefore, has to do with those policy 
actions introduced by the government, and implemented or carried out by 
government officials and security agencies, especially the police, for the 
purpose of containing internal security threats to the state. Such security 
threats include violent demonstrations; riots; communal, ethnic and reli-
gious clashes; and terrorism. These threats could be sponsored by external 
forces but certainly need internal collaboration to materialize. Containing 
these threats connotes all those activities that are geared towards maintain-
ing peace and security internally in a state.
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Vigilante Groups
Vigilante groups are groups of people who take up armaments to protect 
themselves and their communities when they feel that the government has 
failed to do so. The agenda of these groups is to deter the ever-increasing 
crime cases in their surroundings (Oyagi 2016). In this case, it is assumed 
that it is the failure of state security agencies to ensure adequate security to 
the citizens that gave rise to vigilante groups. In line with this, Jones 
(2008) has argued that vigilante groups arose as a result of the inability 
and failure of the state to provide and ensure adequate security for its citi-
zens. Thus, they were established to fill the security void created by the 
state and its security agencies. Ojebode et al. (n.d.) referred to them as 
Community-Based Crime Prevention (CBCP) strategies.
According to Okeke (2013), a vigilante is an individual who lawfully or 
unlawfully metes out punishments to a suspected offender or gets involved 
with a group that imposes extra-legal penalties on a suspected offender. 
Arising from this conceptualization, vigilant groups are perceived as met-
ing out extra-legal or extra-judicial penalties to suspected offenders. The 
definition also presupposes that some vigilante groups carry out illegal 
activities. However, most vigilante groups operate legally, as they are a 
creation of legally constituted authorities, most times by local government 
authorities, traditional authorities, and town union authorities. Since they 
are registered with formal security institutions such as the police, their 
activities are also monitored, to avoid taking laws into their hands. As 
such, they apprehend suspected criminals or offenders and hand them 
over to the police for further investigation and possible prosecution.
The above therefore conforms to Fourchard’s (2008) view of vigilan-
tes as a number of individuals coming together at the community or local 
level with the aim of gathering intelligence on people with questionable 
character in their area and using it to help the police to detect and pre-
vent crime. Their major objective is to monitor their area, collect infor-
mation on people with questionable character, and pass them on to the 
police. Thus, vigilante groups could be considered to be a formal institu-
tionalization of the erstwhile night guard that patrolled communities in 
the past. As was the case with the night guards that existed in the colonial 
era, vigilante groups do keep watch over the local communities and hand 
over arrested suspected criminals to the police for further actions 
(Fourchard 2008).
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Though the tasks and roles assigned to vigilante groups range from 
ensuring adequate security, detecting early warning alerts, control of traf-
fic, intelligence and information gathering, and settlement of disputes to 
helping in organizing communal development initiatives and exercises 
(Ogbozor 2016), the primary reason for setting them up is to protect the 
people from incessant raids by armed robbers in their neighbourhoods 
(Adigwe 2013).
orIgIn of VIgIlante groups In nIgerIa
In the precolonial era, vigilantism found explanation in the activities of 
secret societies, warrior groups, and night guards who performed various 
law enforcement duties, external defence and peace-making (Nyiayaana 
2015). During this period, vigilante groups were few, known for uncoor-
dinated and loose leadership and activities, and operated autonomously in 
the various areas of the federation (Ogbozor 2016, pp. 3–4). Thus, before 
the advent of colonialism, all societies in what later became Nigeria had 
their respective ways of policing their communities and, in so doing, pro-
tecting the lives and property of the people (Okeke 2013). For instance, 
in the Igbo precolonial societies, this role was performed by the system of 
Age Grades and that of masquerade societies. Whenever there was any 
breach of law in the community, a youthful age grade was usually man-
dated to deal with the situation on behalf of the entire community. Beyond 
law enforcement, they also provided security for their respective commu-
nities, ensuring that criminals were kept at bay, and those that were appre-
hended were dealt with according to the rules prescribed by the community. 
When very serious crimes were involved, masquerades, who were generally 
revered, feared, and regarded as agents of the gods, were used to enforce 
laws and maintain security.
In the Yoruba communities, hunters were usually used as night guards 
in several of the cities even before the nineteenth century, when the coun-
try was colonized. However, with the advent of colonialism, this practice 
was proscribed by the colonial government. In fact, the district officer had 
to put an end to the system in Ibadan in 1903, because it was seen as dan-
gerous, and changed it with a formal police force (Fourchard 2008). In 
the north, security functions were predominantly performed by palace 
guards in their respective emirates. They ensured that security was main-
tained and laws were enforced. In fact, because most settlements and 
emirates were walled, it was usually difficult for criminals—particularly 
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thieves—to succeed without being noticed by watchful emirate guards. 
During the colonial period, the Emir’s Native Authority police were ubiq-
uitous and the chain of daily intelligence ran from the ward head up to the 
Emir (Last 2008). In other localities, there were also different forms of 
vigilante services which maintained law and order and ensured there was 
safety and security of life and property in their different communities.
However, as time went by, they took on a more formal structure, got 
more organized, and their operations spread across local government areas, 
states and regions of the country. The origin of state-created vigilante ser-
vices in Nigeria could be traced to the era of General Babangida’s adminis-
tration when military governors in that regime officially created vigilante 
groups (Fourchard 2008). In March 1986, the Military Governor of Oyo 
State, Adetunji Olurin, and his Niger State counterpart, David Mark, 
declared that their governments would encourage vigilante groups in dif-
ferent states to help in fishing out criminally minded people in their com-
munities (Fourchard 2008). Soon after these announcements, the then 
Inspector General of Police, Etim Inyang, made a more general announce-
ment in August 1986, at the time of the raging battle between the police 
and the dreaded notorious armed robber, Lawrence Anini’s gang. He for-
mally legitimized the formation of vigilante groups by communities in 
partnership with divisional police officers in their areas (Fourchard 2008).
In the mid-1990s, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) emerged in 
the southwestern part of the country. It doubled as both an ethnic militia 
group contending for self-determination of the Yoruba people and a vigi-
lante group involved in crime fighting, more importantly in Lagos State 
(Nyiayaana 2015). Indeed, in June 2001, Ahmed Bola Tinubu, the then 
governor of Lagos State, made a public announcement about his inten-
tions to engage the OPC to help in combating criminals in the state, espe-
cially as the police seemed overwhelmed by their nefarious activities 
(Fourchard 2008). It was later to be officially recognized by the State 
House of Assembly and subsequently was backed by the state government 
(Reno 2002). Eventually, Oyo and some other state governments in the 
southwest publicly requested for their assistance in fighting crime.
In the southeast, towards the dawn of civilian rule, the Bakassi Boys 
sprang up in Abia State. Initially, it was a case of cooperation between the 
Abia State government and security agencies to combat crime, especially 
armed robbery menace in the state, particularly in Aba, where armed rob-
bers were attacking and harassing market traders and residents, thereby 
endangering their safety and sources of livelihood (Jones 2008; Nyiayaana 
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2015). Though it was hugely criticized because of its style of jungle justice 
on presumed criminals, their activities to a large extent reduced the men-
ace of armed robbery in the state. Its success story led to its adoption in 
the neighbouring Anambra State, where criminals were having a field day, 
particularly in the commercial city of Onitsha. It got total support from 
the state government and before long, was able to tackle the spate of 
armed robberies in the state. But it soon degenerated into a tool in the 
hands of politicians to fight their political enemies in both states. This, 
coupled with its barbaric style of dispensing justice, led to its banning by 
the federal government in 2002.
In 2000, after the return to democratic rule, the Hisba vigilante groups 
were created by 12 northern states to enforce the implementation of sharia 
law. Though this group also maintained security in communities in those 
states, their creation was a reflection of ethnic, identity and religious poli-
tics being played in Nigeria (Nyiayaana 2015). These 12 states are Zamfara, 
Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Borno, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Kano, 
Niger, and Sokoto States. According to Olaniyi (2005), the creation of the 
Hisba was not only meant to help these government implement sharia law 
but was also meant to curtail the pervasive insecurity and increasingly 
growing anomie among the youth.
However, the need to have some form of operational uniformity and 
streamlined leadership resulted in the formation of the Vigilante Group of 
Nigeria (VGN). The VGN serves as the umbrella body of all vigilante 
groups in the country and was formally registered with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission on February 18, 1999. Operationally, it has four 
structures: national level, regional level, state level, and local government 
levels. Its headquarters was moved from Kaduna to Abuja in 2011 in order 
to give it a national outlook. In early 2017, a bill seeking official recogni-
tion for the VGN by the federal government was introduced in the House 
of Representatives. The Speaker, Hon. Yakubu Dogara, apparently uncom-
fortable with the whole concept, argued that since vigilante services are 
part of social activities by various towns and communities, it is a residual 
matter and falls within the authority of state governments. Moreover, 
since there is already the National Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC) assisting the police, and even the Peace Corps of Nigeria being 
proposed, he posited that there is no need for another security outfit at the 
national level. Be that as it may, vigilantism has become part of the lives of 
several communities in Nigeria because of the important security  functions 
they perform in such communities. Recognition or non-recognition by 
the federal government will do very little to change this.
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ratIonale for VIgIlante groups: theIr roles 
In Internal securIty ManageMent In nIgerIa
Nigeria’s security architecture is made up of several security agencies: the 
military (army, navy, and airforce), the police (mobile force and regular), 
the para-military (Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the customs, 
the prisons, etc.), and the intelligence (Department of State Security, 
National Intelligence Agency). Beyond these, there are other agencies and 
commissions established by law to help in fighting different types of 
crimes. Inyang and Abraham (2013) have articulated some of these agen-
cies. They are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 
charged with the responsibility of fighting economic crimes; the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC), empowered to fight corrupt practices in government circles; the 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), established to tackle 
drug-related crimes; and the National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Trafficking in Persons, otherwise known as NAPTIP, established to com-
bat human trafficking. With all these array of state security outfits all 
geared towards one goal—security of the lives and properties of Nigerians—
the questions that arise are the following: do Nigerians still need non-state 
security outfits like vigilante groups? If the proliferation of armed vigilan-
tes is the result of state failure as Nyiayaana (2015) has argued, would 
these vigilante groups be able to tackle security challenges where the regu-
lar state security outfits, with all the sophisticated weapons at their dis-
posal, have failed? What exactly are the roles of vigilante groups in internal 
security management in Nigeria?
The answers to these questions are provided from three mutually rein-
forcing standpoints. First, there are some who hold the view that vigilante 
groups emerged as a result of the state’s inability to police the society 
properly and secure the lives and property of its citizens (Neild 1999; Jones 
2008; Ajayi and Adefolaju 2013). Following this view, it is believed that 
the Nigerian state has failed to keep to its side of the social contract. Thus, 
it has failed to provide security to its citizens as they constantly live in fear 
of armed robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, assassinations, car snatch-
ing, Fulani herdsmen attacks, Boko Haram bombings, ethno- religious 
conflicts, and so on. As a result, communities have resorted to self-help as 
they can no longer rely or wait for the ineffectual state. This also explains 
why wealthy individuals sometimes move around with their private security 
guards, portraying a deep-seated mistrust of the security agencies, espe-
cially the police by some communities and persons. They would rather 
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entrust their security into the hands of people they know very well rather 
than security officials that do not even speak their language. This school of 
thought, therefore, believes that the emergence of vigilante groups casts 
doubts on the capability of state security agencies to protect and secure the 
lives and properties of citizens.
Extending this argument further, some scholars have argued that vigi-
lante groups emerged as a result of the surge in criminal activities in recent 
years and the incapacity of the Nigeria Police Force and other security 
agencies to contain the rising wave of criminality (see Umar and Bappi 
2014; Inyang and Abraham 2013). As a result, registered private security 
outfits emerged. However, only those who can afford their services do 
hire them because they are profit oriented. As such, only organizations 
such as banks, multinationals, government parastatals and few private 
businesses could afford them, thereby leaving the poor masses to their 
fate. Wealthy individuals and senior government officials have regular 
policemen attached to them for their security. The result is that communi-
ties who were left at the mercy of the hoodlums had to organize them-
selves and provide alternative security measures for their safety and security. 
That effort resulted in the formation of vigilante groups.
Second, there are also those who hold the view that vigilante groups 
emerged to complement the work of state security agencies (see Fourchard 
2008; Umar and Bappi 2014). They disagree that the emergence of vigi-
lante groups amounts to a vote of no confidence on the police or an 
admission that the security agencies have failed in their constitutional 
responsibilities. In line with this view, Fourchard (2008) has argued that 
instead of seeing the emergence of vigilante groups as an attempt to fill the 
vacuum created by the failure of state security services to combat crime, 
we should rather see it as an attempt at establishing some form of com-
munal policing or an attempt at complementing the work of the regular 
police force. For this school of thought, the security agencies are not only 
overstretched but also cannot be everywhere at the same time. Moreover, 
most crimes are localized and are best detected by local security outfits like 
vigilante groups before the police can wade in.
Third, another school of thought believes that modern vigilante groups 
in present-day Nigeria emerged out of frustrations of some state  governors 
with the command structures of state security agencies, especially the 
Nigeria Police Force. According to Fourchard (2008), because the law 
disallows state governors to establish state police, some of them have 
resorted to creating state vigilante groups, which are under their control. 
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Although these governors by constitutional ascription are designated as 
their states’ chief security officers, they do not have control over the secu-
rity agencies in their states, especially the police. To worsen an already bad 
situation, agitations for the creation of state police have been met with 
resistance from the federal government. Therefore, some state govern-
ments decided to establish vigilante services to fill that vacuum the non- 
existence of state police has created.
In Abia State, for example, the Bakassi Boys which was established by 
traders in Aba was later formalized under the Abia State Vigilante Services 
Act. In August 2000, Anambra State followed suit by introducing a bill in 
the State House of Assembly aimed at formally instituting a vigilante 
group. After being passed into law and signed by the state governor in 
December of the same year, it became known as the Anambra State 
Vigilante Service (AVS) Act No. 9 of 2000 (Okeke 2013). In Imo State, 
there was also the Imo State Vigilante Services. In Lagos State, as earlier 
stated, the then governor, Bola Tinubu, made an announcement that he 
would invite the Oodua People’s Congress to help the state in combating 
criminality. In August 2001, a bill creating the Edo State Vigilante Service 
was tabled before the Edo State House of Assembly. In 2012, the gover-
nor of Gombe State, Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo, introduced the 
Youth Rehabilitation and Empowerment Programme (YREP), which 
recruited almost 1200 youths as marshals to assist in security, traffic and 
environmental management in the state (Umar and Bappi 2014).
This chapter does not intend to contest any of the positions above, as 
all are justified in their own rights. However, the fact remains that policing 
a heterogeneous society like Nigeria is not an easy task. Coupled with this 
problem is the fact that the regular Nigeria Police Force is grossly inade-
quate for the country. According to Ogbozor (2016, pp. 2–3):
There are about 377,000 policemen in Nigeria for 170 million people. 
Sadly, half of the entire Nigeria Police Force is serving the politicians… 
Some senior government personnel have about fifty policemen attached to 
him and his family. Rather than patrol local communities, police officers 
prefer to take on jobs where they can earn additional income, such as work-
ing for politicians, guarding security checkpoints, or working as guards at 
commercial banks. In Nigeria, the ratio of police to the population is low—
about 1 police officer for every 500 Nigerians. Compare these numbers with 
South Africa, where the ratio of police to the population is about 1 police 
officer per 250 people.
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As such, the importance of vigilante groups cannot be overemphasized. 
They have contributed immensely in internal security management in 
Nigeria. Some of the areas in which they have been useful in security- 
related matters include:
 (a) Information to security agencies/intelligence gathering: Many 
vigilante groups work as informants to the police. Since they know 
the local communities much more than the police, they are in a 
better position to have meaningful information about criminal 
activities in their areas of operation.
 (b) Providing security/arrest of criminals: Vigilante groups also help 
the police in securing the communities where they operate. Usually, 
they patrol the communities at night to ensure that night maraud-
ers and armed robbers are kept at bay. During the day also, they 
ensure that home breakers and such other criminals are appre-
hended and handed over to the police.
 (c) Fighting insurgency: The case of the civilian JTF in the northeast is 
a case in point. There have been several success stories of the con-
tributions of the civilian JTF in assisting the Nigerian military in 
fighting Boko Haram insurgents.
 (d) Securing public property: In most communities, vigilante groups 
also secure public properties such as electrical installations and gov-
ernment buildings.
 (e) Early warning alerts: This is part of the intelligence gathering func-
tion of vigilante groups. Issues that could easily degenerate to cha-
otic situations are quickly relayed to the security agencies for 
prompt action.
 (f) Settling disputes: Vigilante groups also contribute to the security 
of their communities by intervening and settling disputes that 
might escalate to the breakdown of law and order.
 (g) Prevent crime and the opportunities for crime and anti-social 
behaviour: The mere fact of the presence of vigilante groups in local 
communities deters crimes. Criminally minded individuals often 
jettison the idea of criminality because of the high possibility of 
being apprehended by vigilante groups.
The roles of vigilante groups in internal security management in Nigeria 
could also be classified according to their responsibilities to the different 
strata of the society. Thus, they are responsible to the communities that 
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established them, the police that they complement their jobs, and the 
community members that they provide security for. These roles, however, 
do overlap. They include the following.
Responsibility to the Local Authorities/Communities
 (a) Organizing and carrying out activities aimed at preventing crime 
and ensuring the safety of the community as regards conflicts that 
pose threats to life.
 (b) Defining how the community can respond to issues that threaten 
the peace and safety of the community.
 (c) Setting the rules and regulations that guide security as well as sug-
gesting other measures that can prevent crime and assisting mem-
bers in protecting themselves from the threat of crime.
 (d) Generating information about security and public safety issues 
affecting the community (Justice for All Programme n.d., p. 4).
Responsibility to the Police
 (a) Timely reporting of ongoing suspicious criminal activities.
 (b) Improving the synergy existing between communities and the 
police concerning enforcement of law.
 (c) Joining the police in patrolling the communities and supporting 
efforts aimed at preventing crime.
 (d) Contributing in the maintenance of peace in communities.
 (e) Providing the police with relevant information that will enhance 
their understanding of how to effectively police the community.
 (f) Assisting the police to carry out any other lawful activities in main-
taining law and order (Justice for All Programme n.d., pp. 4–5).
Responsibility to the Community Members
 (a) Protecting lives and property through the prevention of occur-
rence of crime and violence.
 (b) Contributing to the maintenance of peace in communities.
 (c) Encouraging peaceful and harmonious coexistence in communities.
 (d) Alerting and educating members of possible criminal threats and 
behaviours that stimulate crime.
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 (e) Raising the interest of community members to participate in pre-
venting crime.
 (f) Sharing information that enables governments to provide support 
and improvements that help in addressing community secu-
rity concerns.
 (g) Providing information that will enable the victims of crime to get 
justice in matters being determined by the police (Justice for All 
Programme n.d., p. 5).
As a result of these varieties of security-related functions they perform, 
in most communities, the vigilante groups are preferred to formal security 
agencies. According to Ogbozor (2016, p. 13), “in most communities, 
the informal security sector is preferred to the formal agencies. Perceptions 
of the informal security sector are based on three factors: availability, trust, 
and effectiveness.” First, the vigilante groups are always available and 
prompt when their services are needed, unlike the police. Second, resi-
dents repose more trust on them than the regular police, especially given 
the alleged penchant of police officers to collect bribes and subvert the 
cause of justice. Third, vigilante groups are more effective in dealing with 
security issues decisively unlike the police that is always slowed down with 
civil or public service red-tapism or bureaucratic bottlenecks. Ogbozor 
further noted that a respondent he interviewed told him that members of 
the regular police force are usually not available when there is a need for 
them in rural areas. In other words, a centralized police force that is 
detached from the communities they are policing cannot provide adequate 
security and protection to the members of the public.
Relationship with State Security Agencies
The relationship of vigilante groups with regular or state security agencies, 
especially the police, varies among the states of the federation. In states 
where vigilante groups are established by an act of parliament of the state, 
the relationship tends to be more cordial. For example, the relationship 
between the police and the youth marshals in Gombe State seems to be 
smooth principally because the group is recognized by the state govern-
ment. The Gombe State government attached most of the marshals under 
the watch of the police. The ward/security marshals are attached to the 
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police while traffic marshals are attached to the motor traffic division unit 
of the police (Umar and Bappi 2014). With this strategy, the possibility of 
having any clash between the group and the police in the course of dis-
charging their functions is very remote. Nevertheless, there are cases 
where even after being recognized by law, there is still a very frosty rela-
tionship between the police and vigilante groups. Chikwendu et al. (2016) 
have noted that in Anambra State, the vigilante group established by the 
state did not enjoy a warm relationship with the police force because the 
police felt that the establishment of the vigilante groups was not backed by 
law but most importantly that they were usurping the powers legally 
vested on the police by the constitution. This frosty relationship occurs 
despite the fact that the vigilante groups were established by an act of the 
parliament.
In other states where the vigilante groups have no legal backing, fric-
tions normally occur in their relationship with state security forces. This is 
because their operation and constitution are deemed illegal by the police, 
and as such, the police see them as part of the criminals they are to hunt 
down. In such cases, frequent clashes always occur between the two 
groups. Also, the crude means of crime detection used by these groups 
and the instant judgement meted out to their victims also pitch them 
against the police.
Sometimes, there have been instances of where the police and vigilante 
groups struggled for which group should take the glory regarding the 
arrest or apprehension of some criminals. Such cases usually surface when 
the police parades criminals and claim the glory of apprehending them 
when in fact, such criminals were arrested by the vigilante groups before 
handing them over to the police for investigation. The vigilante group 
that did the job, most times, is not even mentioned, appreciated or recog-
nized. There have been several cases of the bravado of the civilian JTF in 
the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast, where they have arrested 
members of the dreaded Islamist group but the soldiers entrusted with the 
duty of annihilating the insurgents would claim the honour. In such a situ-
ation, there is bound to be some clashes between the vigilante groups and 
state security agencies.
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factors MIlItatIng agaInst effectIVe operatIons 
of VIgIlante groups
Several factors have hindered the smooth operation of vigilante groups in 
the communities where they operate. Some of these factors include:
 1. Funding: Finance is a major constraint to the operations of vigilante 
groups. Ogbozor (2016), for instance, has noted that the federal 
government does not fund any vigilante group, so do most state 
governments. Thus, they are largely funded through communal 
contributions and these are not enough considering the nature of 
their service and the materials they need for the job. For these 
groups to function effectively, they need to be mobile (at least with 
motorcycles), to make patrolling the communities possible. Even if 
they do not carry arms, they need communication gadgets to 
enhance their intelligence gathering function. Most importantly, 
though it is in most cases a voluntary service, members need to be 
paid stipends once in a while as a form of encouragement. Only very 
few communities can provide their vigilante groups with all these 
incentives without government support.
 2. Non-recognition by the federal government: As noted earlier, the 
federal government has not accorded vigilante groups any form of 
recognition even though their activities are felt all over the country. 
The civilian JTF in particular has assisted the security forces tremen-
dously in the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast, yet it has 
not been accorded any official recognition. This creates a sort of 
demoralizing effect on the members of these groups. Conversely, 
recognition will serve as a morale booster.
 3. Perception: A major fall-out of the non-recognition of vigilante ser-
vices by the federal government is their perception by state security 
agencies and even some members of the public. The police in par-
ticular perceive them as illegal institutions and this partly explains 
the constant clashes they have.
 4. Mode of operation: There is no gainsaying the fact that some mem-
bers of vigilante groups, especially those that carry arms, use their 
positions to intimidate innocent citizens. This is why Nyiayaana 
(2015) has argued that the manner in which vigilante groups use 
weapons determines the extent to which the society accepts or 
rejects them. Some other scholars have also written on the tendency 
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of vigilante groups to infringe on the rights of citizens as well as 
their penchant to take laws into their hands (see Ojebode et  al., 
n.d.). In fact, on the Bakassi Boys, Inyang and Abraham noted that:
Despite the seemingly (sic) success, the pattern of administering justice 
by the Bakassi Boys was an issue of major concern to various human right 
groups who quickly called for the abolishment of the group. It was clear 
that the Bakassi Boys in their attempt to salvage the system from the 
hands of hoodlums, arrested suspected criminals arbitrarily, with little or 
no evidence, torture and summarily executed most of them in public. 
(Inyang and Abraham 2013, p. 56)
suMMary and conclusIon
This chapter examined the role of vigilante groups in internal security 
management in Nigeria. It attempted a conceptualization of the term ‘vig-
ilantism’ and discovered that there is yet no consensus among scholars on 
the meaning of vigilantism. While some scholars believe that vigilantism 
entails any mob or spontaneous illegal action taken to enforce jungle jus-
tice, others believe that they are a group of volunteers that have taken 
upon themselves the task of securing their communities, especially in the 
face of state failure to do so. The chapter also traced the origin of vigilante 
groups in Nigeria. It noted that it dates back to the precolonial times 
when hunters, age grades, and masquerades were used to enforce law and 
order as well as safeguard lives and property in their communities. Though 
some of them were banned by the British colonial administration, the 
practice of vigilantism has been continuing till the present day with nota-
ble ones being the Bakassi Boys, which operated in the southeastern part 
of the country; the Oodua People’s Congress, which still operates in the 
southwest; and the Hisba in the north. Several communities in almost all 
the states of the federation also have theirs.
The chapter also highlighted the roles of vigilante groups in internal 
security management. Some of this includes intelligence gathering and 
giving information to the police; prevention of crimes in their communi-
ties; dispute settlement; early warning alerts; securing public property; and 
helping to fight insurgency, especially the Civilian JTF in the northeast. 
The chapter also discussed the nature of the relationship existing between 
and among vigilante groups and state security agencies and noted that 
where the state government recognizes the vigilante group, especially if it 
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was established by an act of parliament, there seems to be a cordial rela-
tionship between the two agencies. But where there is no law backing the 
operations of vigilante groups, the relationship with state security agen-
cies, especially the police, is mostly hostile and confrontational. The chap-
ter also discussed the factors militating against the smooth operations of 
vigilante groups. These factors include lack of adequate funding, non- 
recognition by the federal government, perception by the state security 
agencies and some members of the public, as well as their mode of opera-
tion which has earned them severe criticisms particularly from human 
rights groups.
In conclusion, therefore, it is the position of this chapter that despite 
the fact that some members of vigilante groups abuse their positions by 
using them to intimidate innocent citizens, their services are very vital in 
internal security management in Nigeria. This is particularly so given the 
fact that the inability of the Nigerian state and its security agencies to pro-
vide adequate security for its citizens, especially in local communities, has 
created a serious security gap in the society. Therefore, the services of vigi-
lante groups are not only necessary but imperative.
recoMMendatIons
As a result of the foregoing analysis, and considering the positive roles 
vigilante groups have been playing in the internal security of the commu-
nities where they operate, there is a need to strengthen their capacity to 
achieve more. In line with this, this chapter therefore recommends the 
following.
 1. Given that many of these vigilante groups operate outside the scope 
of existing regulatory frameworks and laws which deal with security 
in Nigeria, relevant policies should be reviewed, and specific frame-
works developed in order to give their operations legal backing. 
Though some state and local governments have done this, others 
and the federal government should equally do the same.
 2. Since there have been complaints regarding the penchant of these 
groups to infringe on the rights of citizens, there should be elaborate 
training for them by experts on security matters in order for their 
members to imbibe the tenets of civil security. This should be done 
after they have registered with the relevant ministries and agencies.
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 3. Though it has been recommended in the literature that these vigi-
lante groups should not carry arms in order to stop or minimize 
their abuses (see, for instance, Inyang and Abraham 2013), it is 
obvious that Nigerians fear, respect and obey security agencies with 
instruments of coercion more than those that do not have them. 
Therefore, this chapter still recommends that they be allowed to 
bear arms but as minimal as possible to help them enforce laws and 
apprehend criminals. However, this should be regulated and moni-
tored by the appropriate authorities to minimize abuse.
 4. Funding has been identified as a major impediment to the effective 
operations of vigilante groups. Though they basically serve the com-
munities where they operate, their funding should not be left only 
to communities since this does not come regularly. Governments at 
all levels should, therefore, help in funding these groups since their 
services complement those of the police and other state secu-
rity agencies.
 5. Finally, as Nwaubani, Anyikwa, and Azuh (2014) have noted, public 
security is better achieved through properly sensitized individuals. 
Therefore, governments at all levels should help both the regular 
state security agencies and the vigilante groups by raising the secu-
rity consciousness of citizens. This could be done through mass 
media enlightenment and informal civic literacy programmes.
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CHAPTER 24




The provision of security—the freedom from danger, fear, deprivations 
and depredations—is key to a state’s existence. States like Nigeria endowed 
with enormous human and natural resources are expected to be capable of 
providing security within their territory and acting as bulwarks for sub- 
regional, regional and international security. Since independence, how-
ever, Nigeria has struggled to suppress internal contradictions within its 
territory in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.
In the last two decades, the manifestation of diverse threats has raised 
serious concerns over the capacity of the Nigerian state to promote 
national security. Nigeria has been battling a raft of violent conflicts and 
crimes—ethno-religious conflicts, herdsmen-farmers clashes, militancy, 
kidnapping, serial bombings, assassination, cross-border banditry, piracy, 
armed robbery and domestic terrorism, among others. Their scale, inten-
sity and frequency have called to question the ability of the Nigerian state 
F. C. Onuoha (*) 
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nsukka, Nigeria
550
to effectively respond to these threats to enhance the safety and wellbeing 
of individuals, groups,  communities and assets within its territory. More 
importantly, it has accentuated concern over the prospect of realising the 
Nigerian project.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter addresses four key ques-
tions. How is national security interpreted in national guidance docu-
ments in Nigeria, and how does it relate to the Nigerian project? What are 
the major national security threats that hinder the realisation of the 
Nigerian project? Why is the attainment of sustainable national security 
proving elusive in Nigeria? What is to be done to improve national security 
towards realising the Nigerian project? To address these concerns, this 
chapter relies on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to 
elicit and interpret data from documentary evidence of secondary sources.
This chapter consists of six sections. The second section, following this 
introduction, provides a clarification of the concept of national security as 
used in this discourse. The third section provides an epistemic interroga-
tion of the idea of the national project in relation to national security. In 
the fourth section, some of the threats to national security vis-à-vis their 
impact on the Nigerian project were discussed. The fifth section focuses 
on how the character of the Nigerian state inhibits the realisation of the 
Nigerian project. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
conceptual dIscourse
The concept of national security is central to this chapter, making it perti-
nent that we clarify its usage in the discourse. The notion of national security 
has long been conceptualised from a narrow, state-centric perspective, espe-
cially during the Cold War era. For Hartmann (1983, p. 13) national secu-
rity is “the sum total of the vital national interest of the state, and because a 
vital national interest is one for which a nation is willing to resort to force or 
war either immediately or ultimately, concepts of national security will vary 
from state to state in direct proportion to their individual willingness to risk 
either conflict or war at any given time”. From this perspective, the amassing 
of arms and weapons that increases a state’s military might was seen as criti-
cal to achieving national security. As a result, the nation-state dominated the 
thinking and framing of discourse on national security.
Although the state-centric or militaristic perspective was dominant dur-
ing the Cold War era, scholars have long canvassed for its reformulation to 
focus on people rather than the state. Hence, traditional state-centric 
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interpretation of national security was criticised by various scholars for 
failure to explain the emerging non-military sources of threat to security 
at the individual, societal, state, regional and international levels. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, threats such as disease, natural disasters, pov-
erty and terrorism gained tremendous attention and consequently altered 
the way security is defined. The state-centric conceptualisation of security 
was gradually being replaced with a more comprehensive definition that 
captures the multi-dimensional nature of security, taking into consider-
ation political, economic, environmental, cultural, technological and mili-
tary variables.
In this way, Omotola (2006, p. 3) defines national security as “the free-
dom from danger or absence of threats to the multidimensional elements 
that may affect the nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote 
its cherished values and national interests, as much as promote and boost 
the well-being of its peoples”. Similarly, Onuoha (2008, p. 105) contends 
that national security is the “capacity of a state to promote the pursuit and 
realisation of the fundamental needs and vital interests of man and society, 
and to protect them from threats which may be economic, social, environ-
mental, political, military or epidemiological in nature”.
Increasingly, security is now conceptualised from the human-centric 
perspective. The term human security was popularised by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human 
Development Report. The report highlighted two main aspects of human 
security: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repres-
sion, and protection from sudden disruptions in the pattern of daily life, 
whether in homes, jobs or communities. Threats to human security were 
categorised under seven key dimensions of security: community, eco-
nomic, environmental, food, health, personal and political (United 
Nations Development Programme – UNDP, 1994).
Thus, the understanding of security from the human security angle rep-
resents a fundamental shift from orthodox security thinking which gives 
priority attention to the protection of state power to one that emphasises 
the safety and welfare of human beings as the primary referents. This is 
anchored on the premise that “the security of all persons ought to be a 
moral goal of all governments and their citizens, not a narrowly conceived 
or poorly justified national security that protects state power or personal 
interests of privileged elite” (Nelles 2003, p. 1). This informed Hubert’s 
(2001, p.  162) contention that the security of the state should not be 
construed as an end in itself but essentially as a means of ensuring security 
of the people. Thus, state security and human security should be seen as 
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mutually reinforcing and supportive. The idea of state security suggests the 
protection and preservation of the integrity of the territory, assets and values 
of a state, which are central to people’s entitlement to, and realisation of, 
their right to self-preservation, self-extension and self-fulfilment.
Understood this way, national security has both qualitative and dynamic 
elements. The qualitative dimension reflects the unending quest by the 
state for improvement in the safety and wellbeing of citizens as well as the 
protection of lives, property and resources within its territory. The dynamic 
posture suggests that concern over security and wellbeing changes with 
the emergence of new threats or the transformation of old threats. Such 
threats may emerge from within or outside a state’s borders (Onuoha 
2008). Thus, the national security posture of a country changes as the 
economic, political, environmental, military, epidemiological and social 
causes of threats evolve (Okodolor 2004). A state is therefore secure to 
the extent that its rulers are able to recognise and effectively respond to 
the diverse threats, leveraging available national resources to promote the 
safety of life and property of the citizens, and ensure the integrity of its 
vital assets and values, both within and outside its territory. This is why 
national security is the first and most important obligation of the govern-
ment. In this way, the concern that arises is whether this broad under-
standing of national security is appreciated from a policy-guidance prism 
in Nigeria.
natIonal securIty and the nIgerIan project: 
an epIstemIc InterrogatIon
The question of national security as a desideratum for the realisation of the 
Nigerian project has assumed greater saliency in contemporary discourses 
on nation building and national development. The 1999 Constitution of 
Nigeria (as amended), stated in section 14, sub-section 2(b), that: “the 
security and welfare of the people shall be a primary purpose of govern-
ment” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p.  26). This provision is 
expected to guide every administration in Nigeria. Consequently, the 
Grand Strategy for National Security adopted by President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s administration provides that “Nigeria’s national security is 
meant to be the aggregate of the security interests of all the entities, indi-
viduals, communities, and ethnic groups that inhabit Nigeria” (Obasanjo 
2001, p. 2). This is to be achieved by strengthening “the Federal Republic 
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of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives, to contain instability, 
control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, prog-
ress and growth, and improve the welfare and well-being and quality of life 
of every citizen” (Obasanjo 2001, pp.  2–3). Likewise, the National 
Defence Policy views national security as “the preservation of the welfare 
and safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sov-
ereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets” (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 2006, p. 2).
These overarching documents clearly suggest that the safety and well-
being of the people, including protection from violence, crime and other 
threats, are central to national security. It does suggest that national secu-
rity in Nigeria focuses on the protection of the interests and values upon 
which the survival of the Nigerian state and its citizens depends. It covers 
the security of territory and assets and promotion of the wellbeing of citi-
zens to guarantee advancement in the quality of life of the people.
The quest to attain a stable environment that advances the quality of life 
of every Nigerian irrespective of religion, ethnicity, gender and class is criti-
cal to the idea of the Nigerian project. Thus, the “Nigerian project” is an 
idea that has figured in most national discourses since Nigeria’s indepen-
dence in 1960. Yet, it can mean different things to different people. From 
an epistemic point of view, the Nigerian project is about the vision of mak-
ing Nigeria a united, stable, strong, prosperous and influential state in the 
comity of nations, achieved through a robust process of socio- political and 
economic engineering that attenuates the disruptive, divisive and disinte-
grative forces engendered by ethnic, religious, communal, tribal, cultural 
and linguistic diversities. In a sense, therefore, it is the struggle of resolving 
the nagging crisis of nationhood confronting Nigeria since independence.
The Nigerian project is about the national effort to resolve contradic-
tions and contentions by social forces underpinned by the multi-ethnic 
nature of the post-colonial Nigerian state in order to forge a peaceful, 
united and prosperous Nigeria out of the divergent nationalities that were 
wielded into one political entity by accident of a common colonial experi-
ence. As captured in the Concept Note of a book project, the idea of the 
Nigerian project encapsulates an attempt to:
Initiate a sustainable journey toward the building and consolidation of a 
nation-state, where the priorities would be the deepening of democracy, 
sustainable economic growth, promotion of national integration, poverty 
reduction, and the advancement of security for its citizens. (Bankole and 
Omotola 2013, p. 1)
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The Nigerian project is the perennial demand for a holistic effort at 
addressing the dysfunction of a divided nation, whose greatness is stalled 
by centrifugal conflicts and the failure of imagination in organising 
consensus on the national question (Olukotun 2016). Therefore, the 
Nigerian project is intricately linked to, and underpinned by, the so-called 
national question. Concisely, the national question borders on to how to 
order the relations between the different ethnic, religious, communal, 
tribal, linguistic and cultural groupings in Nigeria so that they have the 
rights, privileges and access to power and equitable share of national 
resources in ways that promote justice, legitimacy, stability and development.
The Nigerian project is thus the inclusive political entity that is expected 
to emerge once the foundation of the national question is addressed. It 
has both internal and external dimensions. The internal aspect captures 
the quest to achieve a secure, stable and prosperous society where Nigerians 
can live and conduct lawful business in any part of the country without 
fear of deprivation, intimidation, harm or death inflicted on the basis of 
the person’s religion, ethnicity, language, tribe, sex, creed or state of ori-
gin. The external dimension entails the emergence of a strong, stable and 
vibrant Nigerian state that could leverage its unique human and natural 
resource endowments to engage in external relations that promote peace, 
stability and security at the regional, continental and international arena.
The irreducible minimum of the Nigerian project therefore is the emer-
gence of a secure and stable Nigeria. To this end, Nigeria’s first-ever 
National Security Strategy (2014, p. 1) captures as its overarching vision 
the desire to make “Nigeria a violence-free, safe, peaceful, self-reliant, 
prosperous and strong nation”. However, the desire to have a stable and 
secure Nigeria has remained elusive due to the emergence, intensification 
or transformation of several threats to national security.
some major natIonal securIty threats 
and the prospect of the nIgerIa project
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been confronted with diverse 
security challenges differing in intensity, geographic scope and magnitude. 
Such challenges include, among others, endemic corruption, violent 
crimes, worsening poverty, high unemployment, infrastructural decay and 
conflicts. The country’s return to democracy in May 1999, however, 
rekindled new hopes and expectations among the citizen that the new 
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political arrangement would provide the framework for the resolution of 
many challenges that have impinged on national security and indeed the 
Nigerian project.
After more than a decade of uninterrupted democratic rule, these chal-
lenges have remained or even assumed worrisome dimensions, further 
frustrating efforts at achieving a peaceful, stable and harmonious environ-
ment critical to the realisation of the Nigerian project. A brief overview of 
the trend and manifestation of both physical and structural violence in 
recent times would reveal the level of decline in peace and stability in the 
country. Suffice it to say that a few of these recent threats are discussed 
under the following thematic focus.
Threat of Violent Conflicts
Diversities in ethnic, culture, identity and religious values have been major 
sources of conflicts and violence in Nigeria since independence. The ability 
to manage conflicts underpinned by such diversity is crucial to the realisa-
tion of the Nigerian project. However, the outbreak of violent conflicts in 
Nigeria has taken diverse forms and nature, and the frequency and intensity 
of such conflicts have increased in recent times. Nigeria is reported to have 
recorded “over 300 violent ethno-religious, communal and political con-
flicts of varying intensity and magnitude” (Osuji 2013, p. 49).
Conflicts that have afflicted Nigeria in recent times are diverse in terms 
of actors, spread and nature. Beginning from the Maitatsine revolt in the 
1980s, Nigeria has been riven by cascading incidents of religious violence, 
including but not limited to those over the introduction of Sharia law in 
most northern states beginning in 2000. Others include the infamous 
“Miss World” riot in November 2002 and the February 2006 violence 
over the uncharitable representation of Prophet Mohammed in the Danish 
cartoon of Jyllands-Posten newspaper. Between 1999 and 2003, for 
instance, over 10,000 people were reportedly killed in religious violence in 
Nigeria (Isaac 2003). The level of deep animosity between different 
groups generated by religious crisis in the country has hindered the attain-
ment of the Nigerian project. If anything, the outbreak of religious crisis 
has been a major eraser of social capital and harmony between adherents 
of the two dominant religions in Nigeria.
Besides religious conflicts, the outbreak of communal conflicts further 
strains the viability of the Nigerian project. Such conflicts have often 
resulted from dispute over land, water formations, traditional stool and 
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location of amenities, among others. In Taraba State, for instance, about 
93 persons lost their lives in various communal clashes in 2013 (Akpeji 
and Ibrahim 2014). In January 2012, over 50 people were killed as a 
result of violent communal conflicts between Ezillo and Ezza, in Ebonyi 
State, over a land dispute. Communal conflicts over land and natural 
resources are common in Nigeria because the majority of rural residents 
are subsistence farmers living in communities with very weak traditional 
institutions for arbitrating disputes.
Furthermore, the frequency, intensity and geographic scope of violent 
confrontations between herdsmen and farmers or herdsmen and their host 
communities add to the problem of insecurity. There have been 389 
clashes involving herdsmen and farming communities between 1997 and 
2015 in Nigeria, with an estimated loss of about US$14 billion annually 
to these clashes (Amaza 2016). This form of conflict had been recurring 
in northern Nigeria but has over time spread to southern communities. 
Underpinning the escalation in frequency of herdsmen-farmer conflict in 
Nigeria is the confluence of demographic and environmental forces. A 
geometric increase in Nigeria’s population over the years has meant that 
farmers increasingly seek for more farmlands to engage in farming activi-
ties in order to generate more income. The quest for farmlands by local 
farmers creates situations propitious to conflicts, as many cattle routes 
which were established and demarcated many decades ago by the federal 
government for the usage of herdsmen are increasingly being encroached 
upon by farmers who plant crops on cattle routes (Aminu 2012).
The situation is further compounded by environmental factors such as 
urbanisation, climate change and desertification which have resulted in a 
significant reduction in the space available for agriculture. The effects of 
climate change are evidenced by the diminution of water formations 
(lakes), loss of arable land and drying up of grazing lands. For example, 
the drying up of Lake Chad and increasing desertification in northern 
Nigeria have made the seasonal movement of the Fulani cattle herdsmen 
to the southern part of the country relatively more frequent. Before, these 
pastoralists migrate to the southern part during the dry season and move 
back to the north during the rainy season. Because of the deteriorating 
situation in northern Nigeria, many of them are now settling down in 
some communities in the South such as, for example, Ubakala, Uzo- 
Uwani, Umuahia, Ogbomoso, Ilorin, Shaki and Oyo.
Underlying the escalation in intensity is the small arms and light weap-
ons (SALWs) proliferation in Nigeria. These long-distance migrants in the 
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past carried crude weapons such as daggers for personal protection and to 
assure their grazing, but they have increasingly turned to the use of more 
sophisticated weapons such as AK 47 for protection. Given that host com-
munities also have access to weapons, minor disagreements often degener-
ate into violent deadly clashes. While the Fulani herdsmen complain that 
their cattle are often harmed or stolen or are denied grazing rights by 
hostile communities, many host communities allege that grazing cattle 
not only devour their plants and harvested produce, they also defecate in 
their streams, thereby polluting their source of drinking water. This devel-
opment underpins the rising incident of violent clashes between herdsmen 
and their host communities, with the potential to assume an ethno- 
religious nature at times or trigger reprisal attacks.
Sometimes, such conflicts are further exacerbated by the “indigene- 
settler” phenomenon’. The issue of indigene-settler dichotomy is a long- 
standing challenge, often generating violent conflicts in different parts of 
Nigeria. Contest over access and exclusion to critical resources and the 
entitlement that being an indigene confers in this binary have often led to 
such conflicts (Adibe 2013). The indigene-settler problem is common 
across Nigeria, but it is particularly acute in some areas because of the 
confluence of this dichotomy with other identity markers such as ethnicity 
and religion. Nowhere has this manifested more violently than in Jos, 
Plateau State. Frequent outbreaks of conflicts along this line have com-
pounded the problem of disunity in Nigeria, thereby retarding the pros-
pects of the Nigerian project.
Threat of Militancy and Secessionist Agitations
The activities of ethnic militias constitute another threat to national security 
that significantly inhibits the realisation of the Nigerian project. With the 
return to democracy, Nigeria contended with the problem of upsurge in 
ethnic militias, which included groups such as the Arewa People’s Congress 
(APC), the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the 
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Egbesu Boys. Sometimes, 
violent confrontation is between these groups and people of other ethnic 
identities. At other times, it is mostly between the militia groups and the 
state forces. These militias whose goals are to protect the identities and inter-
ests of their ethnic groups in the Nigerian federation have unleashed varying 
degrees of violence against persons and state structures.
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Of particular concern is the resurgence of militancy in the oil-rich Niger 
Delta and separatist or secessionist agitations in the South-East. Since 
January 2016, several new militant groups have emerged in the region. 
These include the Adaka Boro Avengers (ABA), Asawana Deadly Force of 
Niger Delta, (ADFND), Concerned Militant Leaders (CML), Ekpeye 
Liberation Group (ELG), Joint Niger Delta Liberation Front (JNDLF), 
Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), Red 
Egbesu Water Lions (REWL), Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate 
(NDJM) and Ultimate Warriors of Niger Delta (UWND).
These groups have been attacking oil facilities in the region and threaten-
ing to cripple the oil industry unless the federal government meets their 
demands. Renewed attacks on critical oil facilities caused a major reduction 
in Nigeria’s oil production volume, from 2.2 million bpd to about 1.1 mil-
lion bpd in May 2016 (Alohan 2016). President Buhari’s administration 
initially adopted an aggressive military crackdown on the militants, which 
failed to stem the tide of explosive attacks on oil and gas facilities. In June 
2016, his administration began engaging the militants in talks to halt the 
spate of attacks on crude oil infrastructure in the region. His combination of 
the carrot and stick approach failed to resolve the problem.
Similarly, the South-East zone has witnessed the resurgence of separat-
ist and secessionist agitations spearheaded by groups such as the Indigenous 
People of Biafra (IPOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), later renamed 
as the Biafran Zionist Front (BZF), and MASSOB. These groups have 
been canvassing for the emergence of an independent state of Biafra. The 
agitation in the South-East is expected to persist, given the widespread 
support it has gained from many disenchanted youths from the region. 
The agitation is a product of long-standing and recent political and eco-
nomic grievances. The region, like many other parts of Nigeria, is bedev-
illed by insecurity and youth unemployment. This situation is compounded 
by official neglect in responding to collapsing infrastructure such as roads 
as well as worsening environmental challenges like soil erosion.
Political and Electoral Violence
Added to this is the problem of politically motivated violence, especially 
over elections. From “the first federal election of 1964 to the 2015 gen-
eral elections, the conduct of elections in Nigeria have been characterised 
by brigandage and violence” (Luqman 2008, p. 96). The 2011 general 
elections was a deadly expression of the known ugly trend and political 
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culture in Nigeria. Before the 2011 general elections, violence was 
recorded in most of the states but the post-presidential election violence 
was the climax of the violence during the 2011 general elections. Violent 
protests broke out in northern states, the day after the presidential elec-
tion, with supporters of General Mohammadu Buhari accusing the ruling 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of rigging the election in favour of 
President Goodluck Jonathan.
The post-election violence claimed the lives of over 1000 people, 
including an unspecified number of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) 
members, who the electoral body—Independent Electoral Commission 
(INEC)—had recruited as ad hoc staff to help in the conduct of the elec-
tions. About 75 civilians were injured, and 165 churches and 53 mosques, 
444 vehicles and 1442 houses were either burnt or destroyed. In addition, 
45 police properties, 16 government properties and 987 shops were burnt 
in Adamawa, Bauchi, Nasarawa, Niger, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina 
and Zamfara States (Awowole-Browne 2011). About 74,000 people were 
displaced. Perpetrators of electoral violence in Nigeria are mostly youths 
who are very susceptible to manipulation by overzealous politicians. In 
most of the states, the post-election violence took an ethno-religious 
nature. The 2011 election crisis brought to the fore the damage the vio-
lent struggle for political power could do to the Nigerian project, as evi-
denced by the deep animosity it generated along ethno-religious lines.
Threat of Organised Crimes
The emergence of new forms of organised crimes and the escalation in 
frequency and spread of old forms add another dimension to the issue of 
deterioration of national security in Nigeria. Organised crimes such as ille-
gal oil bunkering, sea banditry (piracy and sea robbery), kidnapping and 
human (including baby) trafficking, among others, have all assumed 
frightening dimensions.
Reliable data on the quantity or true financial value of oil lost to theft 
in Nigeria are difficult to ascertain. As a result, estimates by government 
or oil company officials often vary. On 16 June 2013, the then Minister of 
Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “estimated that 400,000 barrels of 
crude oil are being lost daily to oil theft, vandalism of infrastructure and 
halt in production” (Ameh 2013, p. 29). How the proceeds from oil theft 
are laundered and where they are invested should be a subject of serious 
concern for all patriotic Nigerians, because of the obvious implications of 
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such illicit wealth for security, stability and genuine democratic develop-
ment in the country. More importantly, it robs the nation of the sorely 
needed revenue to build and sustain a prosperous Nigeria. The inability of 
the government to aggressively combat the theft has raised questions over 
the complicity of state and transnational actors.
Oil theft is not the only security threat in Nigeria’s maritime domain; 
piracy and sea robbery constitute critical national security challenges. A 
recent study has shown that Nigeria recorded a total of 367 pirate attacks 
between 2000 and 2015, with the highest incident reported in 2007 
(Onuoha and Olufolahan, forthcoming). It is widely believed that over 70 
per cent of all piracy-related incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are directly 
related to attacks mostly originating from the Niger Delta region. Nigerian 
pirate gangs had successfully ventured as far as into the waters off Gabon, 
Ivory Coast and Togo, leading to the debasing conclusion that the piracy 
threat in the Gulf of Guinea is “overwhelmingly, a Nigerian problem” 
(Doyle 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-22956865). This is 
fascinating in two main senses. First, Nigeria records a majority of the 
incidents, and second, Nigerian pirates account for much of the attacks in 
the entire region. The impact on the Nigerian project is not difficult to 
fathom. It has created a situation where Nigeria is increasingly being 
viewed as the vector of insecurity in the region.
Related to the problem of sea banditry is the menace of kidnapping for 
ransom in Nigeria. Kidnapping is a long-standing problem but is now one 
of the fastest-growing criminal activities offshore and onshore in Nigeria. 
Kidnapping for ransom refers to “an unlawful act of seizing and transport-
ing a person or persons to an undisclosed place against the victim’s wish 
and threatened with harm in order that money or object of value can be 
extorted from either the victim or those associated with the victim—for 
example, friends, relatives, employers or government—in exchange for the 
safe release of the victim” (Onuoha 2011a, p. 158).
Although the growth of kidnapping for ransom has been traced to the 
upsurge in militancy in the Niger Delta beginning from 2006, it has spread 
to virtually all parts of the country. By 2012, Nigeria accounted for one- 
quarter of kidnap for ransom cases reported worldwide that year (Popoola 
2013). Kidnapping serves not only as a means of personal enrichment for 
members of criminal gangs but also as a veritable strategy of terrorism 
financing. For instance, the Jama’atu Ahlissunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad 
(aka Boko Haram) kidnapped seven members of a French community in 
Cameroon on 19 February 2013 and later freed them on 18 April 2013 
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after allegedly collecting US$3.15 million as ransom (Cocks 2013). One 
of such high-profile incidents in the Boko Haram insurgency was the 14 
April 2014 kidnapping of more than 250 schoolgirls from Chibok. Many 
girls have managed to escape or been freed since then, but more than 100 
are still missing. More than 20 of the kidnapped Chibok girls were released 
in October 2016 in a deal brokered by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, and in May 2017, the Nigerian government again exchanged 
82 of the girls for an undisclosed number of high-profile Boko Haram 
commanders (Onuah and Kingimi 2017).
Threat of Terrorism
The threat of domestic terrorism evident in the activities of groups such as 
Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) con-
stitutes the greatest national security challenge afflicting Nigeria. Since 
July 2009, when Boko Haram waged an anti-government uprising in 
northern Nigeria, the insurgency claimed more than 20,000 lives, dis-
placed more than 2.6 million people and created over 75,000 orphans. 
Violent attacks by the group have also caused about US$9 billion worth 
of damage since 2009 (Onuoha 2016). Its tactics include use of improvised 
explosive devices, targeted assassinations, ambush, drive-by shootings, 
arson, night raids and suicide bombings.
In 2014, Boko Haram expanded its regional reach, following the con-
duct of increasing cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
Later that year, it started seizing towns and communities in Nigeria’s 
northeast and declared a caliphate in August 2014. Given its growing 
murderous attacks, the group was ranked as the world’s deadliest terrorist 
organisation in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). In March 
2015, its leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh. 
The ISIS leader endorsed the alliance calling Boko Haram “our jihadi 
brothers” (ADF Staff 2015). Boko Haram thus emerged with the new 
name Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afrīqiyyah or the ISWAP. A crack in the 
leadership of ISWAP emerged in August 2016, when the ISIS named Abu 
Musab al-Barnawi as the new wali or leader of ISWAP.
As with Boko Haram, the emergence of the Jama’atu Ansarul 
Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) further complicates the terrorism 
landscape in Nigeria. Since its emergence in June 2013, the Ansaru has 
claimed responsibility for various high-profile attacks such as the November 
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2012 raid on a detention facility in Abuja; the December 2012 abduction 
of Francis Colump, a Frenchman working for Vergnet in Katsina State; the 
January 2013 attack on a convoy of Nigeria soldiers at Kogi State; and the 
February 2013 kidnapping of seven foreign expatriates in Bauchi State.
Various kinetic and non-kinetic measures by the Nigerian government 
have failed to defeat the scourge of terrorism. The fact that there are 
Nigerians who are able and willing to be recruited and radicalised into 
taking their own lives as suicide bombers alongside that of others has 
raised concerns on the future of the Nigerian project. The emergence and 
audacity of terrorist groups in Nigeria are clear indicators of how danger-
ously the Nigerian project has retrogressed.
Outbreak of Transnational Arms Trafficking Flows
The intensity of these diverse forms of physical violence has been com-
pounded by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). 
SALWs proliferation has become both a contributing factor and a conse-
quence of violent conflicts and criminality in the country. Nigeria is alleged 
to host over 350 million SALWs, which translate to about 70 per cent of 
an estimated 500 million weapons circulating in West Africa (Premium 
Times 2016). The high rate of SALWs proliferation in Nigeria is evident 
in the constant seizure of various caches of arms by security agents, the 
frequency of their use in violent conflicts and crimes and the level of 
human casualty and material devastation recorded in the aftermath of their 
use (Onuoha 2011b).
Weapons in circulation in Nigeria have been traced to local fabrication; 
thefts from government armouries; organised cross-border smuggling by 
criminal networks, ethnic militias and insurgents; illicit importation by dis-
honest government-accredited importers; and some multi-national oil 
corporations operating in the Niger Delta. SALWs proliferation in Nigeria 
is further exacerbated by Nigeria’s porous land, sea and air borders. It was 
reported that there exist over 1499 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) 
entry routes into Nigeria (Ojeme and Odiniya 2013). Criminal groups 
take advantage of these largely porous land and sea borders to smuggle 
SALWs into Nigeria. Cross-border trafficking has therefore increased in 
the wake of the Arab uprising or Arabellion. With the outbreak of the 
Libyan revolt, traffickers, mercenaries and terrorist groups acquired heavy 
weapons and transported them back to the Sahel region. Libyan arms first 
obtained by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been transferred 
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to non-state armed groups such as Boko Haram, which they have used to 
carry out audacious and devastating attacks. This has severely hampered 
the emergence of a safe, stable and prosperous society, and by extension 
stifled the Nigerian project.
Threat of Structural Disempowerment
The fact that Nigerians are now able and willing tools to be used to kill 
fellow Nigerians and undermine the Nigerian project is certainly not 
unconnected to the persistence of structural disempowerment in Nigeria. 
This manifests clearly in the increasing rate of poverty amidst enormous 
wealth, massive unemployment despite economic growth and widespread 
official malfeasances amidst a plethora of anti-corruption agencies. Such 
structural disempowerment basically underpinned by corruption accounts 
for afflictions in the face of affluence in Nigeria. The twin problems of 
unemployment and poverty are chiefly responsible for the disempower-
ment of most Nigerians, especially the youth. Nigeria’s unemployment 
rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 per cent until 2011, when it increased to an 
all-time high of 23.90 per cent in December 2011. In spite of favourable 
economic growth and performance recorded in Nigeria between 2003 
and 2010, poverty rate in Nigeria jumped from 54.7 per cent in 2004 to 
60.9 per cent in 2010 (Cited in Ojo 2013; Vanguard 2013). As a result, 
Nigeria witnessed what many described as “jobless” or “paper” growth.
The worst hit by these afflictions is the youth. In Nigeria, about 65 per 
cent of the population is under 25 years. As of 2013, youth unemployment 
was around 37 per cent. These high rates of unemployment and poverty 
often create a feeling of hopelessness and desperation, thereby making such 
persons very susceptible to manipulation by ambitious politicians, extremist 
ideologues and crime barons. They are mostly the ones available to be used 
for perpetrating ethnic, communal, religious, electoral and political violence. 
Their inability to secure employment or job  opportunities for a decent living 
is not so much about their non-possession of the skills needed to obtain a job 
(although some lack the requisite skills), but more as a result of dwindling 
opportunities for jobs occasioned by mismanagement of national wealth. 
According to the former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, “Nigerian leaders have stolen 
about $500 billion (N85 trillion) within the past forty years” (Cited in 
Sheyin 2007, p. 22). Rampant corruption and misappropriation of public 
funds in Nigeria have resulted in the collapse of industries, abandonment of 
critical projects and unjustifiable expenditure on frivolous engagements.
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Although Nigeria has earned huge amount of money from the sale of 
crude oil, it has suffered one of the worst levels of inequality in the world. 
About 80 per cent of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues is known to accrue to 
just 1 per cent of the country’s population, leaving the other 99 per cent 
of the population to survive on the remaining 20 per cent (Akwuole 2006, 
p. 15). The consequence has been the paradox of concentration of wealth 
among the very few privileged elite and concentration of poverty on the 
rest of the population. For instance, the Gini coefficient index, which is a 
measure of inequality in income distribution among individuals, reveals 
that the level of inequality has worsened over the last decade in Nigeria. 
The “coefficient increased from 42.9  in 2004 to 48.8  in 2010—where 
100 implies perfect inequality” (Okonjo-Iweala 2013, p. 123). Growing 
inequality has created a vicious circle in Nigeria, where wealth and power 
are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a very few privileged elite and 
their children, leaving a great majority of the population to struggle 
for survival.
Consequently, the pervasiveness of disempowerment has created (psy-
chological) ungoverned spaces in the hearts and minds of disillusioned or 
marginalised citizens. The lives of such citizens are characterised by pov-
erty, destitution and deprivation, leading them to harbour deep hatred 
against the Nigerian state. The inability of the Nigerian state to provide 
for these people means that many of them have been either recruited into 
criminal groups or manipulated into engaging in extremist violence.
As with the outbreak of violent conflicts and crime that has killed many 
people and displaced several thousands, the prevalence of structural dis-
empowerment resulting from pervasive poverty, unemployment and cor-
ruption has made Nigeria increasingly insecure than ever before. Huge 
disparity or inequality both in terms of income and in terms of access to 
opportunities engenders structural disempowerment that contributes to 
social tensions and violence in contemporary Nigerian society. The perti-
nent question then is why has the Nigerian state failed to address or miti-
gate these diverse and evolving security challenges that have hindered the 
Nigerian project.
the nIgerIan state and growIng InsecurIty
Nigeria was the creation of the (British) colonial state. Through its coer-
cive apparatus, the colonial state defined Nigeria territorially and forcefully 
integrated the various political forms and pre-capitalist modes at different 
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stages of development into the global capitalist system (Obi 2003). In this 
way, “the Nigerian colonial state served the interests of global accumula-
tion at the periphery through the local extraction and transfer of resources 
to the metropolis” (Obi 2003, p. 263).
In the post-independence era the emergent ruling class was interested 
neither in the restructuring of the Nigerian state nor in addressing the 
issue of the national question. Instead, it was “more interested in repro-
ducing the neo-colonial character of the state and the conditions for their 
domination, and continued the use of state power for primitive capital 
accumulation” (Ifesinachi 2006, p. 2). Since then the continued existence 
of the nation as a sovereign entity has proved to be a precarious balance 
between the dominant elements of the social structure, namely, institu-
tions, ethnicity, religion and class. This condition has consistently had 
unmitigated consequences for the promotion of security and pursuit of 
the general wellbeing of the people of Nigeria following the lack of ade-
quate capacity and political will by the inheritors of state powers after 
independence to restructure the colonial state that was alien, illegitimate 
and hostile to the people (Egharevba 2011).
Since the post-colonial period, the nature of social relationships among 
the people of Nigeria has been characterised by conflict arising from con-
tradictions in the process of social production and reward systems, where 
the various multi-ethnic groups have expressed their hue and cry about 
being marginalised in the pattern of resource or wealth distribution. This 
has underpinned stringent separatist agitations, resource control or own-
ership and the incessant demand for equitable share of the nation’s 
resources by various ethnic groups (Egharevba 2011).
As a result of this colonial experience, the privatisation of the state for 
primitive accumulation became a defining character of the Nigerian state. 
Those with access to the Nigerian state have leveraged it to promote and 
preserve their physical security and material wellbeing, while some others 
denied of access to the state have resorted to various illicit acts to pursue 
physical security and material wellbeing. As a result, the nature of the 
Nigerian state has equally created structural disempowerment that feeds 
into the cycle and outbreak of violent conflicts and criminality in the society.
Politics in particular became a means of accumulating wealth, and 
because the state is the object of political competition and medium for the 
allocation of resources, it has been effectively used to achieve the goal of 
primitive accumulation (Ake 2001). This has led to the privatisation of the 
Nigerian state by powerful individuals at all levels of governance (federal, 
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state and local). The consequence is that the state is used for the pursuit 
and realisation of individual, sectional and ethno-regional interests rather 
than for the pursuit and promotion of common interests or the public 
good (Oyovbaire 1980). Thus, instead of the Nigerian state appearing as 
the centre for the promotion, representation and repository of the general 
interests and welfare of the people, the state has become “privatised” to 
advance prebendal and rent-seeking interests of a vested few elite, thereby 
turning the state into a predatory or factional state that serves regional, 
ethnic, class and other interests rather than being a developmental state 
(Egharevba 2011).
Consequently, the Nigerian state never enjoyed legitimacy or trust from 
the various indigenous groups and nationalities. As a result, the Nigerian 
state suffers from capacity deficits in terms of setting generative frame-
works for effective resolution of social contradictions. The “effect is that 
its policies are enforced with difficulties where they are enacted at all, with 
deep-rooted legitimacy crisis to the bargain” (see Osaghae 1989, p. 33). 
Its institutions such as the security agencies became more of the protectors 
of the ruling class and their interests rather than guarantors of security of 
citizens and their welfare.
The consequence of these is that individual and social groups have lost 
confidence on most of the institutions, agencies and policies of the state, 
preferring to address differences and challenges through “self-help” 
approaches. Herein lies the basis of frequent eruption of violent conflicts 
in Nigeria. More so, the failure of the state to promote general wellbeing 
has underpinned some citizens’ pursuit of their individual wellbeing 
through criminal activities. As Ibrahim (1999, p. 94) has rightly noted:
The legitimacy of the modern state is linked to its capacity to present itself 
as a provider of public goods and, more important, a neutral arbiter that 
guarantees the security of all sections of the society. When the state is gener-
ally perceived as serving the particularistic interest of one group, it starts 
losing its legitimacy and indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear 
of the other rises and people resort to other levels of solidarity—religious, 
ethnic and regional—in search of security.
Insecurity in the form of ethno-religious crises, farmer-herder conflict, 
indigene-settler crisis, youth restiveness, communal clashes and kidnaping, 
among others, derives from the failure of the Nigerian state and the associ-
ated legitimacy crisis. More importantly is that the inability of the Nigerian 
 F. C. ONUOHA
567
state and its agencies to guarantee the safety of lives and property renders 
the credibility of the state questionable, thus “encouraging the flourishing 
of centres of competing loyalty in the polity which exacerbates fissiparous 
tendencies and retards the march toward nationhood” (Tyoden 
2005, p. 184).
Consequently, it is this legitimacy deficit or crisis that has created insta-
bility and insecurity in the nation’s political economy despite the enor-
mous natural and mineral resources in the land. This subsequently 
engenders a sense of division amongst the Nigerian people that continu-
ally threatens the viability of the Nigerian project (Odukoya 2006). In a 
sense, therefore, the character of the Nigerian state itself undermines not 
only the quest for national security but also the very basis of the 
Nigerian project.
conclusIon and polIcy optIon
The ability of a state to promote and preserve national security is a true 
test of its legitimacy and strength. Measured on this scale, the Nigerian 
state is overwhelmingly a very poor performer. The outbreak, persistence 
and indeed increasing eruption of threats to national security continue to 
undermine the whole idea and ideal of the Nigerian project. Several fac-
tors contribute to this unhealthy situation but at the heart of the problem 
is the failure of the Nigerian state. For the ideals of the Nigerian project to 
be realised, there is the need to overhaul the basis of the Nigerian state 
through a process of inclusive national dialogue that will restructure its 
character and posture. To this end, the restructuring of the nation in line 
with the recommendation of the 2014 National Conference offers a start-
ing point. However, a more durable solution will emerge from the con-
vening of a sovereign national conference (SNC). The convocation of an 
SNC is a categorical imperative that Nigeria cannot afford to continue 
procrastinating. Such will offer the people the opportunity to extensively 
debate and resolve nagging issues that border on the national question. It 
is through this means that a responsive Nigerian state could be recreated, 
capable of providing sustainable peace and security for the people. Failure 
to do this will only ensure a future where the Nigerian project will con-
tinue to falter and fail, and the attainment of sustainable national security 
very elusive.
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CHAPTER 25




One of the most pressing challenges currently facing Nigeria is insecurity. 
In recent times, the configuration of insecurity has expanded from such 
traditional sources as armed robbery attacks, the indigene-settler crisis, 
inter- and intra-ethnic violence, kidnapping, political violence and ethno- 
nationalist agitations for self-rule or independence to include vicious ter-
rorist attacks and pastoralist violence against farmers and their communities. 
The security challenges in Nigeria appear to be rooted in two interrelated 
factors: the high payoff of violence in the face of weak national security 
system and unresolved national questions, especially the aspects thereof 
that sustain the disconnect between the expectations of the citizens and 
government’s incapacity to bring them to realisation (Fayemi 2012; 
Channels Television 2013).
Nigeria has not been able to evolve a holistic strategy to tackle insecu-
rity. Mainly, its strategy is always reactive and consists of deploying a cor-
respondingly superior force to contain security threats, without paying 
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attention to early warning signals. The ineffectiveness of this strategy has 
spawned the ground for the efflorescence of insecurity and its spread 
across the length and breadth of Nigeria, the expansion in the budgetary 
allocation to the security sector and the breeding of corruption through 
the auspices of security vote. In 2012, out of the ₦4.75 trillion budgeted 
by the federal government for the fiscal year, the security sector gulped 
₦921.91 or 19.4% (Leadership 2011), prompting Horsfall (2013) to 
describe it as the largest amount to be deployed to the security sector by 
any government in Nigerian history.
With the use of secondary data evaluated in the tradition of the content 
analysis technique, this chapter examines Nigeria’s security architecture 
and links the seeming longitudinal ubiquity of insecurity to structural con-
tradictions and superior economic payoffs arising from the institutional 
incapacity of its security apparatuses. This chapter draws from the gamut 
of previously published works, especially government gazettes, interview 
reports of key government officials and security personnel, journals, books 
and other relevant internet-based documents, in evaluating the Nigerian 
security environment within the context of competing pressures on 
national security. It contends that the realist preoccupation of Nigeria’s 
security governance that tends to reify counter-aggression is patently inef-
fective in unknotting and resolving the security impasse. It emphasises the 
imperative of reorganising extant strategies by deemphasising counter- 
aggression and moving towards addressing the national question and 
reducing the army of unemployed that are veritable tools in deepening 
insecurity in the polity.
nIgerIa’s securIty envIronment: conceptual 
and HIsto-tHeoretIcal consIderatIons
Since its emergence as a state, Nigeria has contended with a myriad of 
security challenges with diverse sources. It is important not to confuse the 
sources of insecurity in Nigeria, that is, the causative factors of insecurity, 
with the manifestations or indicators of insecurity. Thus, the various 
threats to national security which manifested at different points in the 
evolution of the Nigerian state were indicators of insecurity. And these 
indicators of insecurity owed their causation to a combination of factors.
A pertinent task at this juncture will be to delineate the boundaries of 
security in order to properly situate it within the national environment. The 
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relevance of this task is to shear off the “intellectual uncertainty, analytical 
confusion, paradigmatic disorder and theoretical impotence” that character-
ise security, especially national security (Nnoli 2006, p. 5). Thus, the proper 
contextualisation of security will achieve three goals, namely eliminate frag-
mented reality and judgemental relativism which will contest existing 
notions of security and improve the policy and practice of security; provide 
some sort of guidance to the policies made by the government as well as 
guide public opinion about policies related to security; and underscore the 
bases for expenditure on security and spawn a rethink that could influence 
the distribution of money and power (Nnoli 2006; Rothschild 1995).
An attempt to define security is often characterised with certain com-
plexities. The first definitional complexity of the concept of security lies in 
its applicability to diverse spectra of fields, each with varied nuances that 
tend to diverge rather than converge to yield a unified meaning. The sec-
ond aspect of this complexity is the seemingly elastic applicability of secu-
rity within the ambit of threats to human existence which, in recent times, 
are posed by such factors as state fragility and failure, environmental pol-
lution resulting in climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, ecological disasters, deepening global disparities exemplified 
by food crisis and poverty, and population explosion (Nnoli 2006; Rice 
2003; UNDP 1994). However, Nnoli (2006, p. 16) has pointed out that 
while security connotes “freedom from threats, anxiety or danger”, it has 
objective and subjective components. The difference between the objec-
tive and subjective components of security is that while the former is 
anchored on the measurability of the indicators of security, the latter 
denotes the perception of individuals based on their values and expecta-
tions of the absence of threat, anxiety or danger (Nnoli 2006).
The third characteristic of the complexity of security is its broadness. 
Within the scope of this broadness, Spear and Harborne (2010) have 
identified security as encompassing physical and national security. While 
physical security encapsulates the protection of the individual from vio-
lence and abuse, national security is concerned with the protection of sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the state and the people. The 
preoccupation of the state with its own safety, over and above its other 
components, especially the people, underpinned the massive development 
and acquisition of nuclear capability with the unwitting evolvement of 
arms race and its potential threat to the entire international system. The 
state-centric, militaristic and strategic conceptualisation of security holds 
that the survival of the state is inexorably linked to the survival of the 
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people. In other words, the security of the people could only be  guaranteed 
if the state itself is safe. And here, the security of the state is synonymous 
with the security of the elite within the state as well as the regime in power 
(Nnoli 2006; Onuoha and Ezirim 2010).
A rethinking of security was advanced by the United Nations 
Development Programme in its Human Development Report of 1994. As 
the Report acknowledges:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as secu-
rity of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national inter-
ests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear 
holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The 
superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle—fighting a cold war all 
over the world. The developing nations, having won their independence 
only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile 
national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary peo-
ple who sought security in their daily lives. (UNDP 1994, p. 22)
The import of the Report was the imperativeness of a paradigmatic shift 
in the recognition of the citizens as part of the major preoccupations of 
security. Thus, instead of national security being preoccupied with the 
safety of the state and its institutions, its purview expanded to include 
human security. The whole essence of human security rests on a tripod: 
one, the improvement of the existential conditions of the people by guar-
anteeing them safety and providing them with opportunities for meaning-
ful and value-added existence; two, freedom to exercise choices; and lastly, 
an inbuilt confidence about continuity in the availability of opportunities 
(UNDP 1994; Onuoha and Ezirim 2010).
The nature of Nigeria’s security framework depicts inflexibility with the 
old order. While Nigeria has democratised, its security apparatus is still 
fixated in the state-centric, militaristic mode. It has not imbibed or, more 
appropriately, incorporated the human security aspect into its security 
architecture. UNDP (1994, pp. 23–24) delineates three tripods of human 
security, namely “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression”, sustainable human development and “protection from sud-
den and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life”.
Nigeria’s security challenges are diverse and varied. As has already been 
noted, a distinction between manifestation of insecurity and causal factors 
must be made. Thus, such vices as armed robberies, kidnapping, terrorist 
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and herders’ attacks, political violence and other such sundry aspects are 
manifestations of insecurity, the causes of which are outside these acts of 
insecurity. We now turn our attention to these sources of insecurity 
in Nigeria.
At the inception of Nigerian statehood, the first set of security chal-
lenges consisted of safeguarding its independence and preventing its rever-
sal into what Nkrumah called neo-colonialism (Nkrumah 1968). But the 
preoccupation of the emergent political elite for power to satisfy personal 
and group interests undermined any concerted efforts to contain neo- 
colonial pressures.
The second source of security challenge was the structural injustice that 
Nigeria’s skewed federalism represents. The fear of marginalisation which 
started during the colonial era and which led to the setting up of the 
Willink Commission on September 25, 1957, is still unresolved as many 
ethnic groups, including the major ones, allege marginalisation. A signifi-
cant proportion of contemporary insecurity is rooted in ethnic disconnect 
with the Nigerian dream.
The third source is ethnicity and problem of indigeneity. Historically, 
ethnicity as a social construct has been routinely deployed by politicians to 
achieve political ascendancy. Babawale (2007) has argued that ethnicity as 
a social construct is not intrinsically negative. Its negativity inheres from 
its manipulation and attendant negative outcomes which spawn divisive-
ness and tension in the polity. The nature of Nigerian amalgamation, the 
tendency of early Nigerian nationalists to see Nigeria as a “geographical 
expression”, or “the mistake of 1914”, and the dominance of the political 
space by three ethnic groups created disenchantment in the country, thus 
giving rise to allegations of marginalisation (Coleman 1986; Obianyo 2003).
Indeed, the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election 
deepened ethnic disenchantment as it was interpreted as a demonstration 
of political intolerance driven by ethnic considerations (Adams 2007). 
This act singularly spawned insecurity as calls for a sovereign national con-
ference to renegotiate Nigeria’s statehood became a mantra amidst all 
manners of self-help strategies. Adjunct to ethnicity is the citizenship crisis 
which is driven by discrimination and exclusion of citizens from state 
patronage based on the dichotomisation of citizens into natives and set-
tlers (Egwu 2005). This aboriginal argument has serious implications on 
access, or lack of it, to vital state resources and has remained a perennial 
source of insecurity in Nigeria. The effect of this dichotomisation and 
compartmentalisation is that:
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… millions of Nigerians who find themselves in “effective” residency in 
places other than where they can claim “indigeneity” or where they can be 
accepted as “indigenes” are labelled as “strangers and settlers”, and, there-
fore, excluded from access to citizenship which is the domain of social and 
political rights enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. (Egwu 2005, p. 102)
The fourth is the boundless ambition of politicians to remain in power 
even outside the precinct of popular mandate. The significance of political 
power in the accumulation process not only ensures the ubiquity of ten-
sion but also makes political competition vicious. Tension emanates from 
intra- and inter-elite rivalry resulting in the dichotomy of the polity into 
the out-group and in-group and attendant mutuality in the deployment of 
hostilities. With the personalisation of the state and appropriation of its 
power by successive regimes, their political survival was projected as, and 
elevated to, national interest. As Nnoli (2006) points out, the confusion 
of personal interest with national interest underpinned the arbitrariness in 
governance and the determination of leaders to survive at all costs regard-
less of the feelings of the people or their preferences.
Other sources of threats to national security include the Islamist chal-
lenge and sundry religious violence (Onuoha 2010; Lyman and Morrison 
2004). Violence emanating from religion has been a fixed causality of inse-
curity in Nigeria; economic crises, ranging from structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) to recession, have had the effect of eroding people’s 
means of livelihood and deepening their pauperisation (Nwozor 2006); 
the political struggle among the elites resulting in the arming of youths for 
political ascendancy; the contemporary fashionability and romanticisation 
of violence as exemplified by the emergence of cultist and other rogue 
groups, often along ethnic lines (Agbaje 2007).
The theoretical basis of security governance in Nigeria is essentially the 
deployment of a superior force as a countermeasure to insecurity. This 
strategy has been described as force theory (Nwozor 2013). The Nigerian 
state responds to uprisings or situations it considers threatening by deploy-
ing paramilitary and military expeditions to contain them and setting up 
joint task forces, which are patently ad hoc in nature. The force theory 




tHe natIonal QuestIon and InsecurIty: contendIng 
Issues In nIgerIan stateHood
The multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious nature of Nigeria 
motorises the centrifugal forces that give impetus to insecurity in its polity. 
Despite constitutional efforts at integration, through the federalist prin-
ciple, Nigeria is not yet united. Within the framework of afrocentric schol-
arship, there is the reductionist tradition of ascribing the malformation of 
Nigerian statehood to the nature of its emergence as a state, thus exoner-
ating the mindless brigandage of its elite (Alozieuwa 2012). The contem-
porary security challenges are squarely a product of the failure of leadership. 
The observation of Achebe (1983) to the effect that there is no problem 
with the Nigerian entity apart from the question of competent leadership 
is still relevant and captures the reality about the Nigerian state and its 
security challenges.
Notwithstanding the seeming arbitrariness surrounding the emergence 
of Nigerian statehood, the passage of time ought to have transformed it 
into a united state, but so far, that does not seem to be the case. Thus, the 
argument linking the artificiality of the Nigerian state to its myriad of cri-
ses, especially insecurity, is banally unsustainable and analytically unhelp-
ful. Apart from the rhetoric of unity bandied by the political elite, Nigeria 
appears to be more divided than united. There are fundamental questions, 
often framed as the “national question”, which must be accorded corre-
sponding national answers to fast-track national integration. The concept 
of the national question is ubiquitous in most multi-cultural settings and 
is pre-eminently concerned with “the problems of evolving a just arrange-
ment for the peaceful coexistence and integrated development of peoples 
of different, even if otherwise hostile nationalities within the same polity” 
(Igwe 2002, p. 284).
Within the context of Nigeria, its national question encompasses the 
persistent neglect by the state to resolve such feelings as exclusion, mar-
ginalisation, an unjust revenue-sharing formula and the general percep-
tion of injustice among the various ethnic groups. It also includes questions 
relating to national integration and citizenship rights as well as justice 
associated with the distribution of national wealth (Fayemi 2012). The 
security challenges plaguing Nigeria are located in the unsatisfactory reso-
lution of the subcategories of the national question. For instance, the con-
tinued currency of ethnicity as a rallying mantra among the elite is because 
the federalist principle which was adopted as a unifying mechanism to 
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smooth away the tensions of multi-ethnicity was distorted. And so far, it 
has failed to roll back the deluge of separatist agitations.
Akinyemi (2007, p. 37) characterises the Nigerian model of federalism 
as “pseudo-federal system” and contends that plural states with credible 
and functioning federal systems often have no security challenges. Added 
to this is structural imbalance arising from the creation of states and local 
government areas. Out of the present 36 states in Nigeria, 19 states are 
located in the North while 17 states are in the South. These constituent 
parts are the basis for revenue distribution from the federation account. 
Thus, the North extracts two portions more than the South from the 
Federation Account. In addition, the North has more local governments 
and through the Danjuma Revenue Allocation Commission, which 
introduced land mass and terrain as the basis for revenue allocation, its 
portion from the Federation Account also expanded (Mbanefoh and 
Egwaikhide 2003; Moveh 2012). It is important to note that the last 
factor is singularly advantageous to the North because of its enormous 
land mass but disadvantageous to the South which produces the bulk of 
national wealth through oil and value-added tax (VAT) contributions to 
the national treasury.
There are various aspects of marginalisation in the Nigerian context. 
The first is political exclusion and marginalisation, especially those of the 
minorities. Even some major ethnic groups, notably the Igbo, have also 
alleged marginalisation. A major part of the issue was Northern domi-
nance of the presidency during both the military and democratic eras. The 
annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election, which the late 
M.K.O. Abiola was presumed to have won, heightened ethnic tensions as 
it created the impression that the presidency was reserved for a certain 
ethnic group and forbidden to others. This impression subsequently 
fuelled ethnic-based agitations for the restructuring of Nigeria with deeper 
implications for national security.
The second aspect of marginalisation is the skewed revenue allocation 
formula. Nigeria’s revenue allocation formula has been continuously jug-
gled, like the magician’s ball, such that the allocation formula that oper-
ated when cash crops from agriculture were the country’s economic 
mainstay radically changed when crude oil replaced it. The armed insur-
rection by Niger Delta youths was a fallout of the disconnect between oil 
wealth and the prevalent poverty in that region interpreted as national 
conspiracy and injustice (Ibeanu 2008).
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Apart from marginalisation, there is also the question of citizenship 
discrimination on account of ethnic affiliation. The perennial conflicts in 
Plateau State mirror the crisis of citizenship. Underlining the connection 
between insecurity and ethnicisation of citizenship, Egwu (2005, 
p. 104) argues:
… [the] existing system of ethnic citizenship and the bifurcation of Nigerians 
into “settlers” and “indigenes” reifies ethnicity, increases its obscurantist 
role in the political process, strengthens the political stratagem of the ruling 
elites which frees them from norms of accountability, and deepens the pov-
erty and vulnerability of the poor and marginalised Nigerians in whose name 
ethnic justice is allegedly sought and promoted.
The national question essentially encapsulates the fundaments of the 
state system as well as the relationships within it. The feeling of being 
short changed within a state system that is presumably built on the plat-
form of equality, justice and fair play has been part of the underlying causes 
of insecurity in Nigeria. And the challenge that confronts Nigeria is how 
to create the platform to synthesise or harmonise the competing demands 
of various ethnic groups.
tHe maze of InsecurIty In nIgerIa and  
state responses
Insecurity denotes the absence or near absence of security. Insecurity is 
not necessarily, and may not be, an absolute state but a process that is cali-
brated in its degree of manifestation. The ordinary connotation of insecu-
rity has three strands, namely insecure conditions (the state of being unsafe 
or insecure), unsafe feelings (a state of mind characterised by self-doubt 
and vulnerability) and insecure phenomena (an instance or cause of being 
insecure) (Encarta Encyclopedic Dictionary 2009). A common thread in 
the various strands of the ordinary meaning of insecurity is vulnerability, 
that is, the absence of safety. It is in line with this that Nnoli (2006, p.16) 
renders national security as “a cherished value associated with the physical 
safety of individuals, groups or nation-states, together with a similar safety 
of their other most cherished values”.
Having conceived security in this manner, insecurity, therefore, ought 
to mean the presence of threats, anxiety or danger and lack of confidence 
in physical safety and other most cherished values. The dominant meaning 
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of insecurity among Nigerian leaders does not cover this ordinary meaning 
of the concept. Rather, insecurity is seen from the prism of threats to the 
cherished values of the state and the dominant class within it. Threats to 
the values of the masses are not factored into the permutation. The cores 
of these state-cherished values include the maintenance of the political 
status quo of the state, the continued docility of the people and unfettered 
access to state resources.
The approximation of national security to “cherished values of the 
state” as defined by the ruling elite underpins why insecurity has suddenly 
been elevated to the front burner of national concern and discourse in 
recent times. Prior to now, the victims of insecurity had been the masses 
with the elite being tangentially unaffected and therefore aloof and apa-
thetic (Nwozor 2013). This parochial, state-centric conceptualisation of 
security poses two serious problems to security governance: one, the nar-
row and restricted view of security by stakeholders, with the likelihood of 
ignoring the canons of early warning signals, and two, the likely confusion 
of the manifestations of insecurity and the adoption of ineffective security 
strategies.
As already noted, state response to insecurity in Nigeria has been 
patently reactive. Two paths of the reactive nature of state response to 
insecurity are discernible: the deployment of force and the purchase of 
peace. This is so because of the absence of a coherent blueprint on security 
craftsmanship. Essentially, the security apparatuses react variously to secu-
rity threats, often based on how directly they affect the state and the ruling 
elite. Thus, the determination of whether an extreme, medium or minor 
force will be applied to any given security scenario is dependent on the 
interpretation of the ruling elite. In other words, there is no standardised 
bouquet of security measures that could be routinely applied across given 
security threats.
The pattern of state response is that when counter-aggression does not 
seem to be productive enough to justify its continued employment, the 
state engages in negotiation with a view to purchasing peace. In recent 
times, the purchase of peace has been through the amnesty programme. It 
was first granted to Biafrans through the three Rs of reconciliation, recon-
struction and rehabilitation (Ukaogo 2010), and later to the Niger Delta 
militants. It was suggested for the Boko Haram sect but its rejection 




The major tool at the disposal of the Nigerian state in resolving security 
threats is the deployment of force or what Nwozor (2013, p. 23) calls 
“counter-aggression”. For instance, when armed robbery, drug trafficking 
and coup plotting became part of the major security threats to the coun-
try, the military regimes imposed the death penalty as a punishment for 
them. In the aftermath of the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presiden-
tial elections, various groups that antagonised the military regime of the 
late General Sani Abacha were hunted and hounded and many of them 
were either thrown into prison or assassinated. Again, the military expedi-
tions that levelled both Odi, a town in Bayelsa State, and Zaki Ibiam, a 
town in Benue State, symbolised the strategy of counter-aggression by the 
Nigerian state. These military expeditions, which separately recorded the 
death toll of more than 300 apiece, were in retaliation to the killing of 
security operatives sent there to restore law and order (Nwozor 2013).
The change in the nature and composition of insecurity in Nigeria 
could be traced to the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential elec-
tions. Before then, security threats were at the micro-level and not tar-
geted at the state or the then ruling military oligarchy despite the incapacity 
of the state to meet the basic needs of the people. All such manifestations 
of insecurity including armed robbery, kidnapping and ethno-religious 
violence targeted, to a large extent, the masses. The only internal security 
threat which the ruling class faced was military coup d’état. The annul-
ment of the presidential election changed the security topography: it pro-
vided the needed grounds for the emergence of various organisations. 
While some principally emerged in reaction to the annulment of the presi-
dential election, others used the opportunity to launch a campaign for 
public sympathy on the alleged marginalisation of their ethnic groups.
The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the Oodua 
People’s Congress (OPC) were in the forefront of the agitation for the 
revalidation of the annulled presidential election. In reaction to these 
groups, such groups as the Movement for the Actualisation of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Arewa People’s Congress 
(APC) emerged to canvass for narrow interests designed to confer advan-
tages on their ethnic constituencies (Anyanwu 2005). The hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and the continued negative effects of oil exploration and 
exploitation activities in the Niger Delta led to the formation of several 
militant groups that engaged in armed rebellion against the state in 
the region.
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Consistent with the force theory of the Nigerian state, the Niger Delta 
armed rebellion was met with counter-aggression through the instrumen-
tality of task forces comprising the anti-riot elite squad of the Nigeria 
Police, the army and the navy. The ineffectiveness of counter-aggression 
against the Niger Delta militants was evident in the gradual incapacity of 
Nigeria to meet its daily OPEC quota in oil production as a result of tar-
geted terror attacks on oil installations and personnel of oil companies. 
Thus, the then Nigerian president late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua initiated 
the amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants. As CBN (2009, 
p. 130) acknowledges, “the Federal Government’s amnesty programme 
brought relative peace to the Niger-Delta area in the second half of 2009. 
Consequently, production level rose from 1.75 mbd [million barrels per 
day] in January [2009] to 1.94 mbd in September [2009] and closed at 
the end of the year at 2.02mbd”. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former 
president (1999–2007), considered these groups enough security threats 
that he reportedly sent a bill to the National Assembly to outlaw them 
(Douglas and Ola 2007).
The two most violent groups that constitute serious threats to national 
security in contemporary Nigeria are the Boko Haram sect and the Fulani 
herdsmen, both of which have been categorised as terrorist groups. 
Although there are conflicting accounts in literature about the origin of 
the Boko Haram sect, there is a consensus that the sect transformed into a 
terrorist group in 2009  in reaction to the state-sponsored extra-judicial 
killing of its then leader Muhammed Yusuf (Alozieuwa 2012; Connell 
2012; Onuoha 2012; Uhrmacher and Sheridan 2016). In the pursuit of its 
terrorist agenda, the Boko Haram sect has carried out thousands of direct 
and indirect shootings and bombings, including suicide bombings, with 
fatalities among civilians running into tens of thousands. Current estimates 
of the total number of casualties in the eight years that Boko Haram had 
terrorised Nigeria (2009–2017) are quite intimidating. According to 
Kashim Shettima, the Governor of Borno State, Boko Haram terrorist 
attacks have not only led to the death of over 100,000 persons based on 
the estimates by community leaders but also to the displacement of over 
two million people. In the same vein, the cost of destruction perpetrated 
by Boko Haram in the North-East region of Nigeria, where it had its major 
operational base, was put at US$9 billion (Tukur 2017).
The transformation of Fulani herdsmen into militants complicated 
Nigeria’s security milieu. Several deadly attacks linked to Fulani herdsmen 
led to thousands of fatalities. The viciousness of their attacks and resultant 
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fatalities led to their inclusion in the Global Terrorist Index as well as com-
parison with such core terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Shabaab and the Taliban. Owing to the 
lethality of their attacks and the casualties therefrom, Fulani herdsmen 
were ranked fourth in the hierarchy of the most deadly terror groups in 
the world by the 2015 Global Terrorist Index. In the year under reference, 
Fulani herdsmen were directly responsible for 2000 deaths.1
In contemporary Nigeria, the maze of insecurity is complex, compris-
ing the dramatis personae (individuals and ethnic groups pursuing security- 
threatening agendas), the motive (what they envisage to achieve and for 
who), the strategies adopted in the pursuit of the motive, the weapons 
used to convert strategies into concrete actions and the support base 
(internal and external as well as obvious and surreptitious assistance). 
Paradoxically, while the maze of insecurity is complex, the response of the 
state is not correspondingly so and this underscores the disconnect in 
Nigeria’s security governance.
The future of Nigeria lies in the evolvement of an effective strategy or 
set of strategies to tackle insecurity. There is an urgent need for a paradig-
matic shift in the mainstream thinking of government. The Nigerian gov-
ernment is still thinking in military terms in relation to insecurity even 
with the enormous material resources expended so far and very little suc-
cess recorded in the deployment of military options. In an address at the 
graduation ceremony of the Nigeria Defence College (NDC) Course 21, 
the then President Jonathan tasked the Nigerian military to develop new 
techniques to tackle the country’s security challenges (Tsokar 2013). The 
implication of insecurity is that it could erode the corporate sanctity of the 
country, particularly with the ethnicisation of insecurity.
conclusIon
Nigeria’s security challenges have become complex and intractable. The 
seeming intractability is a product of three factors, namely the expansion 
in the dimension of national insecurity with the entry of terrorism in the 
matrix, the arsenal of weapons in circulation in the polity and the misap-
plication of strategies arising from the misdiagnosis of causalities of inse-
curity. The strategy of choice deployed by the Nigerian government to 
tackle insecurity, which is counter-aggression, has been ineffective.
There is a need for a paradigmatic shift in the re-evaluation of insecurity 
in Nigeria. The shift should devolve from increased penchant of the 
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Nigerian state to militarise the polity as demonstrated by the then President 
Jonathan’s charge to the military to be “agile and proactive, by enhancing 
their capacities to identify and disrupt, before execution, the plans and 
machinations of these faceless enemies, including their sources of fund, 
arsenal, training bases and recruitment efforts”, to thinking beyond the 
reactive military option by contextualising the national question and eco-
nomic injustice in the matrix of insecurity.
note
1. Global Terrorism Index 2015. Available at: http://economicsandpeace.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf 
[Accessed January 16, 2017]; Punch (February 12, 2016). Available at: 
http://punchng.com/reforming-the-cattle-industry/ [Accessed January 
18, 2017].
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CHAPTER 26




This chapter critically examines the twin issues of transparency and 
accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds for 
security management in Nigeria. It basically has seven sections. Section 
one is the introduction. The second section conceptualises terms that are 
embedded in the topic. The third section interrogates the necessity for 
security funding in the contemporary world. The fourth section exam-
ines if enormous security funding in contemporary Nigeria has meta-
morphosed into efficient security within the Nigeria state. The fifth 
section examines transparency and accountability in the allocation and 
utilisation of security funds in Nigeria. The sixth section, stemming from 
the position of the fifth section, examines the implications of lack of 
transparency and accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of 
security funds for internal security management in Nigeria. The seventh 
section concludes and makes recommendations. The chapter theorises 
that although more resources have been allocated for security in Nigeria, 
the country has not attained security commensurate to funds disbursed. 
S. B. Owonikoko (*) 
Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University  
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This is due largely to lack of transparency and accountability which is 
promoting fraud and corruption in the process of disbursement and util-
isation of security funds in Nigeria.
clarIfIcatIon of concepts
Three concepts are essentially important for this chapter. These are secu-
rity funding, accountability and internal security management. These con-
cepts and the framework of the relationship among them as far as this 
chapter is concerned are established in this section.
Security Funding
The term of “security funding” cannot be adequately conceptualised with-
out first understanding what security itself means and what funding stands 
for. Unfortunately, the concept of security is an essentially contested con-
cept (Dillon 1996). International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Fifth 
Edition defines security as the “ability of a nation to protect its national 
values from external threats” (p. 210). It adds that “security of the state 
meant the protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and 
values from external attack” (ibid., p. 210). The explanation of this defini-
tion is that security threats can only come from enemies outside the coun-
try. The valid question that stems from the definition is: do threats to 
values, assets, people and institutions of a state only come from outside? 
The answer is no. Threats can come from within the territory of a state. 
This is why scholars warned that military security that procures military 
hardware to safeguard the sovereign integrity of a state is no security. 
McNamara (1968) and Nwolise (1985) have sounded this note of warn-
ing frontally. McNamara had warned as far back as 1968 that:
Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not 
military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military 
activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without 
development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in 
fact develop simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its 
own citizenry cannot shield its human nature… that is what we do not 
always understand and what governments of modernizing nations do not 
always understand. Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military secu-
rity against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, 
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low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological 
 development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic prob-
lem of unemployment, has a false sense of security. (McNamara 1968, p. 149)
Nwolise (1985, p. 68) adds:
A country may have the best of armed forces in terms of training and equip-
ment, the most efficient police force; the most efficient customs men, the 
most active secret service agents, and the best quality prisons, and yet be the 
most insecure nation in the world, as a result of defence and security problems 
from within—bad government, alienated and suffering masses, ignorance, 
hunger, unemployment, or even activities of foreign residents or companies.
The pattern of threats to security of states in the contemporary period 
has shown that threats to security come mostly from within rather than 
outside. The 2014 armed conflict report of Uppsala University shows that 
40 armed conflicts were active in 27 locations worldwide. Out of these 
conflicts, only one involves a confrontation between two countries.1 The 
remaining 39 were fought within states although 13 of them were inter-
nationalised domestic conflicts, meaning that one or more states contrib-
uted troops to one or both sides in the conflict.2 These armed conflicts 
were responsible for over 100,000 fatalities in 2014 alone, the worst since 
1994 (Petterson and Wallesteen 2015). This points to the fact that threats 
to states come mostly from elements within the state rather than outside. 
Therefore, this definition linking security threats to external sources alone 
is grossly inadequate.
According to Manunta (1999), Security (S) is a function of the pres-
ence and interaction of Asset (A), Protector (P) and Threat (T) in a given 
Situation (Si). This, he expressed mathematically as S = f (A, P, T) Si. Asset 
here means something or someone of value. Protector on the other hand 
is someone or something that protects or guards. Threat is an imminent 
danger that can cause serious injury or death. What Manunta says here is 
that these three elements in a particular situation make up security. 
According to him:
…the absence of one of these core elements (A, P, or T) voids the concept of 
security of its significance: without an asset, there is nothing to protect; with-
out a threat, there is no reason to protect; without a protector, there is no 
one striving for security…These three elements are seen as the  components 
of an open system interacting with the environment. (Manunta 1999, p. 58)
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Nwolise (2012) observed that the discourse of security centres on safety 
and protection which are important for the survival and development of 
human communities. Without it, human beings cannot attain their full 
potentials. To quote him:
Security in its natural habitat connotes freedom from fear, danger, turmoil, 
hostility, war and violence, all of which generate uneasiness for humans. Out 
of all derivatives of security in its original habitat, the most outstanding is 
safety. In other words, whoever talks security talks safety, and whoever talks 
safety talks survival. (Nwolise 2012, p. 12)
For the purpose of this chapter security is defined as safety from vio-
lence, crimes, wars, armed conflict and any other threats from within or 
outside that can cause uneasiness for people within a country.
Funding on the other hand relates to the allocation and utilisation of 
resources defined essentially in monetary terms basically to attain a specific 
goal. Having conceptualised “security” and “funding”, security funding is 
defined within the framework of this study to mean allocation and utilisa-
tion of specific funds for the maintenance of defence and security of the 
state from violence, crimes, war, armed conflicts and any other threats 
from within or outside the country that may cause uneasiness for the peo-
ple within the country. Security funding is related to defence/military 
funding but is different. For instance, while defence or military funding is 
the allocation of financial resources to raise, maintain and run the services 
of armed forces for both internal and external security of the state, security 
funding is any resource (finance) budgeted for the safety of lives and prop-
erty within the state. Therefore, while defence/military funding is differ-
ent from security funding, it is an integral part of it. In this case, security 
funding is not only limited to resources earmarked for the police and other 
internal security agencies alone. It also includes resource allocated to the 
military for upkeep and maintenance and votes for members of the execu-
tive at the federal, state and local levels to maintain security of their domain.
Accountability
The concept of accountability is “a notoriously difficult concept to 
define” as Wright (n.d.) has pointed out. Attempt to conceptualise this 
concept begins from its etymology. The word “accountability” is derived 
from the Latin words accomptare (to account) or computare (to calcu-
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late)  (Mahmoud 1997; Plescia 2001). The concept therefore literally 
means to give account of or explain one’s action. However, contempo-
rary understanding of the concept of accountability has gone beyond 
mere account-taking or explanation for one’s action. This is why it is 
argued that accountability is “an ever-expanding concept” (Mulgan 
2000). The core essence of accountability is to promote transparency and 
trust and curb corruption. Accountability is antithetical to secrecy which 
has always shrouded the national security of states because secrecy pro-
motes corruption and abuse (Egbo et al. 2010).
Accountability is desirable within a political system for several rea-
sons  (Robert 1982; Seidman 2005; Reyes 2006). Firstly, accountability, 
when entrenched in a political system, usually promotes a sense of respon-
sibility and concern for public good and interests from political office hold-
ers and public/civil servants. This is because they know that they will have 
to explain their actions and inactions to a superior authority. Secondly, it is 
also a way by which the public controls political office holders. This is more 
noticeable in a democracy and it depends largely on the conduct of elec-
tions within such a democracy (Adsera et al. 2003). Where elections are 
free, fair, credible and regular, the threat of losing office in the next election 
often compels policymakers in government to be responsive to voters’ 
interests. Alternatively, the legislative body also has the power under their 
oversight functions to impeach, suspend or pass a vote of no confidence on 
any public office holder or civil servant found wanting. This does not only 
ensure effective control, it also promotes good governance and good gov-
ernance is not only about the elected but also the public/civil servants. 
Lastly, another advantage of accountability is that it promotes dialogue and 
communication between public office holders and the people.
Internal Security Management
Internal security has to do with the safety of lives and property within the 
territory of the state. Imobighe (1990) sees it as freedom or the absence 
of dangerous tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and 
corporate existence. To Osumah and Aghedo (2010), internal security 
includes peace of the mind, freedom from threats to life and property and 
core values as well as maintenance of public order for the people within a 
state. It is the ability of the state to maintain its institutions to further its 
core values and objectives and preserve the legitimate aspirations of its 
citizenry and other residents within the state. Internal security manage-
ment on the other hand is the organisation and administration of security 
26 SECURITY FUNDING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNAL SECURITY… 
592
apparatuses of a country for the purpose of ensuring protection and safety 
within the territory of a country. There are several agencies in charge of 
internal security of a state but the lead agency usually saddled with the 
responsibility of internal security management is the police.
Security agencies need funds to be able to perform their duties effec-
tively. However, they must not only demonstrate precision, professional-
ism, competence, excellence, diplomacy, skills, comradeship, leadership, 
teamwork, courage, respect, loyalty and dutifulness in the performance of 
their duties, they must also adhere to basic principles of security manage-
ment. Such principles include trust, incorruptibility, honesty, patriotism, 
reputation, efficiency and transparency in the use of security funds allo-
cated to them (Pyman 2008). It is noteworthy that where these are not 
promoted, the security sector and the entire security management of such 
a state are in jeopardy, even when a huge amount is dedicated to financing 
them to perform effectively. In extreme cases, lack of transparency and 
accountability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds may, in 
fact, result in insecurity. The point that is emphasised here is that in most 
situations security funds not accounted for or allocated and utilised in an 
opaque way may be a veritable source of internal insecurity rather than 
security. Therefore, transparency is not only desirable in the disbursement 
and utilisation of security funds, but it is also important for the promotion 
of internal security for which it is meant.
Is securIty fundIng stIll necessary 
In the contemporary World?
The newest thinking in security studies is that expenditure on defence and 
security of a state should be slashed and significant amount of it be diverted 
to sectors that will address the developmental needs which have a direct 
impact on citizens. These developmental needs of the people are what is 
today conceptualised as human security. The tenet of this concept is that 
until people within a country are protected from chronic threats such as 
hunger, disease and repression, among others, such a country will con-
tinue to experience violent crime and insecurity. Although the concept 
manifested in the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 
Human Development Report, the origin of the thought can be traced to 
the period shortly after the Cold War when intra-state conflicts engulfed 
the world. These conflicts were occasioned by human rights abuses, 
chronic hunger and disease, high rates of unemployment, poverty and 
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economic hardship as against inter-state wars that were caused by ideo-
logical opposition. Addressing the roots of these “new” threats meant 
addressing critical human development issues. Therefore, it was advocated 
that a greater chunk of funds for security and defence of the state should 
be cut and diverted to core human development needs that will help 
address the root of violence, crime and general insecurity in the state.
Furthermore, it has also been argued that too much of defence and 
security funds in a state often lead to over-securitisation and militarisation 
of the country and this, most times, usually promotes insecurity rather 
than security. The case of the United States’ increase of defence funding 
since the 9/11 attack has been used to justify this assertion. Since this 
attack, the United States has increased her defence funding by multiple 
folds to pursue the popular Global War Against Terrorism. This has rather 
promoted insecurity, especially in the Middle East.3 The corollary, there-
fore, is that more security funding brings more insecurity. However, in 
spite of the plausibility of arguments against (increasing) security funding, 
the security sector still remains an important part of the state and must be 
appropriately funded to perform effectively. Making it perform effectively 
means that all the necessary human and material resources needed to pro-
vide security must be made available because potential security threats may 
become reality. In fact, in some cases, the level of preparedness, weapons 
and availability of security personnel always help to prevent violence and 
crime from being committed. Another missing link in the argument 
against (increasing) security funding is that, in most cases, the level of 
security funding of a state is usually determined by the nature and extent 
of threat to security within the state. The more peaceful and secure a state 
is, the more likely that less funds will be allocated to security and vice 
versa. In fact, what often happens is that once threats to security increase 
within the territorial boundaries of a state, the state is bound to divert its 
resources to security to ensure that lives and properties are secured. This 
is because security is very significant to the attainment of the aspirations of 
people within the country and it is the duty of the state to provide it. The 
eminent professor of security and defence studies, Thomas Imobighe, but-
tressed this point more emphatically when he said:
While factors of resource constraint may from time to time influence the 
allocation of funds for [security], what ultimately determines the allocation 
of funds…is the nature and severity of the threat the country faces. If the 
nation is faced with an overwhelming imminent threat in which its survival 
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is at stake, it would do all it can to find the resources to respond to the 
threat, even if it means mortgaging future resources to do so. (Imobighe 
2014, p. 149)
Therefore, security fund is still very necessary given the increase in vio-
lence and criminality globally.
Nigeria has often increased her security funds in line with the severity 
and nature of threat to her security (Muraina 2014a, b). In one of his visits 
to the North-East as President of Nigeria, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan 
justified why more funds were allocated to security in his regime 
when he said:
“…No responsible government will spend his taxpayers’ money on JTF 
(Joint Task Force), but when the situation warrants, like in this case of Boko 
Haram, then we as government will not hesitate to spend our last kobo in 
order to bring peace and security.” (Agence France Presse 2013  cited in 
Owonikoko 2013: 9)
What the former president was saying here is that the enormity of the 
threat to security of lives and property posed by Boko Haram terrorism 
necessitated increased security funding. His action was justified by a sec-
tion of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended), Section 14 (2b), 
under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
which provides that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the 
primary purpose of government”. This therefore means that whenever the 
security of lives and properties of the people are threatened, the Nigerian 
state has the duty to do all it can to ensure security, including increasing 
funding to the security sector.
securIty fundIng and natIonal securIty In nIgerIa
Security in Nigeria has been funded in three basic ways. First is the alloca-
tion for the security agencies within the country that are saddled with the 
responsibility of maintaining internal security of the state. There are many 
security agencies involved in the management of internal security in 
Nigeria. However, the Nigeria Police Force is saddled with the lead role. 
Funding allocation to these institutions is necessary to make them func-
tion at the optimal level. Unfortunately inadequate funding always preoc-
cupies the complaints of these security agencies. During the defence of the 
budget of the Ministry of Police Affairs in 2014, the then supervising 
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Minister of the Ministry, Mrs Olajumoke Akinjide, lamented that poor 
budgetary allocation to the Nigeria Police was responsible for the poor 
performance of the force (Agbakwuru and Erunke 2014). There are at 
least two basic reasons for poor funding of the Nigeria Police Force. One 
of the reasons is that many other security agencies have been created either 
from within the force or outside it and are also competing for funding 
from the state. Secondly, the Nigeria Army is now more involved in inter-
nal security management than the police because the nature of violent 
conflicts that Nigeria is witnessing is far more than what the Nigeria Police 
Force can deal with. As a result, more funding for security goes to the 
army than the police.
Another way by which security is funded in Nigeria is through the allo-
cation of security votes. Security votes are the fund deliberately set aside for 
the executive at various levels of government, either president, governors 
or even local government chairmen, for the purpose of ensuring better 
security of lives and properties within their jurisdiction. This is different 
from other resources (in monetary terms) allocated to security outfits for 
their effective functioning. Because of the high premium placed on the 
national security of the Nigerian state, security votes are usually not 
accounted for and are usually without legislative approval. As Robert Clarke 
observed, “…it is being spent by Governors based on their whims and 
caprices without the authority of the Assembly whether in the states or at 
the federal level and without the knowledge of the people” (Vanguard News, 
December 29, 2016). Therefore, the spender is not obligated to be ques-
tioned on how, why and when the money is spent (Daniel 2010).
The third way through which security has been funded in Nigeria is 
through military/defence expenditure. Military/defence expenditure is 
money specially devoted for the maintenance of the military outfit of the 
state. A huge chunk of the national resources of the Nigerian state has 
been expended on the Nigeria Armed Forces, especially since the 1960s 
when Nigeria attained independence. Nwolise (1987) observed that 
between 1967 and 1977, Nigeria was ranked the second highest military 
spender in Africa after Egypt. Two factors were responsible for military 
expenditure of Nigeria during this period. The first was the Nigerian Civil 
War which the country was prosecuting against the then Eastern Nigeria 
which wanted secession as Biafra Republic and second was that the gov-
ernment of the day then was military and was interested in promoting 
military interests especially the modernisation of all aspects of military life 
including training, acquisition of equipment and weapons. However, 
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Nigeria transited to democracy in 1979 and this affected military expendi-
ture as spending started declining (Omitoogun 2003), except that in 
1983, military expenditure increased a bit due to the general elections of 
the year and the widespread Maitatsine sectarian violence which the coun-
try needed to deal with using a military approach. The major reasons for 
the downward trend in military expenditure during this time were decline 
in oil revenue accruable to the Nigerian economy and general economic 
devastation that ravaged the country after the military takeover. By 1990 
however, Nigeria again witnessed increased military expenditure. This was 
so because of the leader-motivator role that Nigeria played in the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group military operations 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Simbine 1997).
The transition of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 marked a significant 
watershed moment in military expenditure in Nigeria. The new civilian 
government of President Olusegun Obasanjo made several commitments 
to re-professionalise the armed forces and redirect their attention from 
politics to their professional role of defending the country. As a result, 
more financial provisions were made for training, retraining and mod-
ernising their equipment (Muraina 2014b). Apart from this, the country 
also witnessed a series of violent conflicts which military personnel were 
deployed to quell. A typical example and the most protracted during this 
period was militancy in the Niger Delta region. Even when the amnesty 
programme commenced in the region in 2009, the government contin-
ued to expend money on acquisition of military weapons to engage the 
unrepentant militants in psychological warfare (Volman 2009; Albert 
2015). However, as the challenge of militancy in the Niger Delta region 
began to dwindle, the problem of Boko Haram kickstarted in the 
 North- East region which warranted the government to spend more on 
military to be able to confront the challenge. As the terrorism of Boko 
Haram becomes more intense, the government also continues to fortify 
the armed forces with more funding to be able to meet up with the task of 
decimating the group.
According to Olufemi and Akinwumi’s (2015) review of security spend-
ing in Nigeria between 2011 and 2014, the Office of the National Security 
Adviser (NSA) and Ministries of Defence, Interior and Police Affairs 
received a total budgetary allocation of ₦3.69 trillion within four years. 
This constituted over 20% of Nigeria’s entire budget within the period. 
Table  26.1 shows the distribution of security spending between 
2011 and 2014.
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Forty per cent of the ₦3.69 trillion which amounts to ₦1.488 trillion 
was spent on arms purchase within the period. Unfortunately, the increased 
security funding did not translate to security of lives and property as more 
people died from crimes, violence and insecurity within the years. Data 
from Nigeria Watch show that 94,670 people died in the country between 
2006 and 2015. Out of this number, 66,625 died between 2011 and 
2015. Major causes of these deaths are related to Boko Haram activities, 
ethno-religious clashes, farmer-herders conflict, militancy in the Niger 
Delta and extra-judicial killings by security personnel among others. The 
summary of this is that increasing security funding in Nigeria does not 
translate to solid national security for the country (Fig. 26.1).
Fig. 26.1 Total number of violent deaths in Nigeria, 2006–2015. Source: 
Nigeria Watch Report, 2015
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transparency and accountabIlIty In allocatIon 
and utIlIsatIon of securIty funds In nIgerIa
Transparency and accountability are very important values in the alloca-
tion, management and utilisation of security funding in order to prevent 
the diversion of security funds to other areas or even private pockets. 
Unfortunately, transparency and accountability is lacking in the disburse-
ment of security funds in most African states. Ball (2002, p. 6) observes 
with regard to military spending in Africa that:
Fiscal discipline is weak in many African countries. While the military is by 
no means the only body responsible for the expansion of the resources enve-
lope in the course of the fiscal year, it frequently enjoys a privileged position. 
Government officials, military officers and head of state and government 
intervened in the resource allocation process with flagrant disregard for 
established procedures and predetermined spending priorities. Military offi-
cers have presented the treasury with invoices for expenses incurred outside 
the budget framework. Defence ministries have refused to share the details 
of defence spending with finance ministers and parliament.
Here, Ball was raising the issue of transparency and accountability with 
regard to military spending in African states. However, the problem of 
accountability and transparency does not only affect the military sector 
but the entire security and defence sector of African states.
In the analysis of Olufemi and Akinwumi (2015), the total amount 
spent on arms acquisition for security agencies between 2011 and 2014, if 
diverted to the developmental needs of the Nigerian state, would 
 contribute significantly to economic and infrastructural development of 
the country.4 Yet heads of the country’s security agencies continue to 
complain of inadequate funding to their security outfits. Former Chief of 
Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Alex Sabundu Badeh, lamented while he 
was retiring that he headed a military that lacked equipment and motiva-
tion to fight (Vanguard Newspaper, July 30, 2015). Here, Badeh was 
referring to inadequate funding of the military in spite of the fact that 
security sector enjoyed the highest funding during this period far beyond 
education and health sectors combined. The 36 state governors in Nigeria 
have also complained of inadequate security votes allocated to them to 
maintain security in their state. Speaking through their forum—Nigeria 
Governors’ Forum—they complained that “…state governments are cur-
rently overstretched in funding security and called for a special  intervention 
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fund from the Federal Government, especially to the States that are most 
affected” (Premium Times 2015). The main problem however is that the 
whole process of budgeting, allocation and utilisation of security funds is 
shrouded in secrecy in the name of national security. Thus, the leadership 
of security agencies and members of the executive that receive these funds 
often hide behind national security not to disclose the details of how secu-
rity funds allocated to them are utilised.
This is not a new phenomenon in the world as nations in the past have 
had to disguise their security expenditure. Ball (1984) pointed out that 
states have adopted basically four significant strategies to disguise their 
security expenditure from public knowledge. This may come in the form 
of keeping two sets of government budget accounts in which one is used 
as the basis of a published account and the other designed purely for inter-
nal government consumption. Another way is the creation of sources of 
funding within the country which do not appear in the national budget. 
This he called an extra-budgetary account. Others that he identified are 
disaggregate expenses in a way that it is not useful or understandable to 
the general public and finally incomplete disclosure and repatriation of 
foreign exchange earnings. Some of these strategies are no doubt being 
used actively in Nigeria, and their prevalence explains why it is difficult for 
the public to decipher the nature and amount allocated to security. This 
makes the whole process of allocation and utilisation of security funds a 
secret and gives the users the opportunity to divert the money into unin-
tended areas and even into private pockets. The point, therefore, is that 
secrecy in allocation and utilisation of security funds deprive it of transpar-
ency and accountability. Lack of transparency and accountability makes it 
easy for security funds to be easily diverted for other uses that are private 
or simply shared. This accounts for why security funds do not amount to 
the effectiveness of security personnel and safety of lives and property. 
Several cases of diversion of security funds to private pockets have been 
reported while so many are yet to be unravelled. For instance, Mr Tafa 
Balogun, former Inspector General of Police, was sacked and subsequently 
convicted for corrupt enrichment. Kenny Martins, former coordinator of 
police equipment funds, who was also said to be the in-law of former 
President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, was indicted for allegedly 
misappropriating over ₦13  billion meant to equip the police (Sahara 
Reporter 2009).
 S. B. OWONIKOKO
601
The diversion of the US$2.2 billion arms deal is the most recent quint-
essential example of how secrecy and lack of transparency and account-
ability in the process of allocation and utilisation of security funds in 
Nigeria are encouraging abuse and diversion of security funds within the 
country. An interim report from the presidential investigation committee 
on arms procurement revealed an extra-budgetary security spending to 
the tune of ₦643.8 billion and another inexplicable security expenditure to 
the tune of US$2.2 billion (Vanguard News, December 13, 2015a: 4). 
The US$2.2 billion, according to the preliminary report, was disbursed 
for the procurement of arms to fight Boko Haram terrorism in Northern 
Nigeria but was not spent for the purpose. It was rather diverted to spon-
sor re- election in 2015 (Thisday News, December 13, 2015: 7). The inves-
tigation also revealed that several ghost contracts were awarded between 
March 2012 and March 2015 and that funds disbursed for the purchase of 
12 helicopters, 4 alpha jets, bombs and other ammunitions were not uti-
lised for those purposes. The sum of ₦600 million meant for the procure-
ment of military boats for use in the fight against militancy was also 
diverted (Sahara Reporter May 16, 2016).
ImplIcatIons for Internal securIty management
The argument of this chapter from the preceding sections is that Nigeria 
has expended on security through three basic means: funding police and 
other security agencies in charge of internal/homeland security, distribu-
tion of security votes to executives at the federal, state and local govern-
ment levels, and upkeep of the armed forces. However, the allocation of 
these funds is usually shrouded in secrecy and this often hinders account-
ability and transparency in the utilisation of security funds. As a result, it is 
usually very easy to abuse the fund by either diverting it for other uses 
apart from security or simply embezzling it. There are basically three 
implications of lack of transparency in the disbursement and allocation of 
security funds for internal security management in the Nigerian state. 
Firstly, it promotes diversion which denies the security personnel the 
weapons and gadgets needed to ensure effective security of lives and prop-
erty in the country. A typical example again is the fight against Boko 
Haram in the North-East. As the security funds meant for arms procure-
ment were diverted, the soldiers in the war front were left with obsolete 
weapons to fight highly motivated and well-equipped insurgents.
26 SECURITY FUNDING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNAL SECURITY… 
602
This led to the overrunning of the soldiers and taking over of several 
local governments in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States by the insurgents. 
The continuous occurrence of overrunning soldiers by the insurgents as a 
result of lack of weapons led to killing of soldiers by Boko Haram insur-
gents. This later snowballed into military mutiny in which several junior 
military officers and soldiers protested against their leaders. Senator Femi 
Ojudu, a member of the Senate Committee on Defence, narrated what led 
to the mutiny of soldiers and officers of the Nigerian Army in which 
Brigadier General Enitan Ransome-Kuti was involved:
I first met Enitan many years ago in his dad’s house at 8, Imaria Street, 
Anthony Village. He was a 2nd Lieutenant in the army then. He came visit-
ing his dad who is my mentor. Enitan was introduced to me by Beko as, 
‘meet my son in the army’. Beko’s son in the Army? I asked myself in sur-
prise. It was at a time when Beko and his elder brother, Fela, were engaged 
in a battle with the military that made them come in and out of prison. ‘Are 
you surprised?’ Beko asked me…We both left the residential section of the 
twin duplex for his office which also doubled as a clinic where we talked 
more about Enitan, his relationship with him and his military career. I will 
not see Enitan again until the death of his dad and I think then he had 
become a full Colonel in the army…. Sometime in 2013, my committee of 
defence and army in the Senate was on oversight function to the Army 
Headquarters in Abuja. One of the officers introduced to the committee 
was Enitan who had risen to the rank of a Brigadier-General. I shook hands 
with him and introduced myself as Babafemi Ojudu, a friend and follower of 
his dad and Uncle Fela Anikulapo Kuti. We got talking and the General 
promised to call me afterwards. But no call came to me until early this year 
when I got a distress call from Lande his younger sister…that Enitan has 
been arrested. (CKN Nigeria 2015)
He explained further:
“What is the problem?” I asked. “It is over the Boko Haram saga,” she said. 
This was the reason I promptly called Femi Falana, a close associate of 
Enitan’s dad. Falana opened his high-wire contacts in the army and soon 
enough…we later got to know that he was sent to fight Boko Haram insur-
gents in Baga and things went bad for lack of requisite equipment and sup-
plies. The army, in its wisdom, still expected him to perform wonders. For 
failing to rout Boko Haram insurgents on that assignment he was recalled to 
the headquarters, arrested and facing trials with others. We know that even 
President Jonathan himself had come out to say that the army is not well- 
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equipped. They’re just looking for where to put their blame, you cannot tell 
people to go and fight and expect them to use their bare hands when they’re 
not equipped. (CKN Nigeria 2015)
Here, the effect of diversion of security funds as a result of lack of trans-
parency and accountability in the allocation and utilisation is obvious. In 
spite of the huge amount of money voted for defence, Nigeria still lacked 
in resources to fight terrorism. Much of the money spent on security 
fuelled corruption in the military and this led to an under-resourced mili-
tary, short of guns and ammunition. A CNN reporter, Robertson Nic, 
who interviewed Nigerian soldiers involved in the fight against Boko 
Haram in North-East, buttressed this fact. His interviews reveal:
The major problem the soldiers have is they don’t have the equipment to 
fight. Boko Haram has anti-aircraft guns which are accurate up to three- 
quarters of a mile. All the Nigerian military has are AK47 small machine 
guns, accurate up to a few hundred meters. Often the Nigerian soldiers are 
given only 60 bullets each, so they quickly run out. Boko Haram has large 
supplies of ammunition and more fighters. Although the Nigerian soldiers do 
win some fights, they are regularly forced to turn tail and run for their lives 
by the sheer volume of gunfire from Boko Haram fighters. (Robertson 2015)
He concluded that corruption is the root of the Nigerian military’s 
problem which brings down the morale of the troops. Similarly, the report 
of Vanguard on December 9, 2015b chronicled how the diversion of 
funds meant for the procurement of arms for Nigerian military to fight 
Boko Haram insurgents led to the overrunning of the Nigerian soldiers 
which eventually led to the taking over of some parts of Nigerian territory 
in the North East thus:
There have been some interesting revelations since the EFCC (Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission) first commenced its investigations. The 
crux of all these is that the majority of the accused person are suspected to 
have simply taken their share of the NSA’s (National Security Adviser) lar-
gesse and walked away without delivering what they were paid to deliver. No 
wonder our military most times performed no better than a platoon of boys 
scouts in their many encounters with the Boko Haram. They were randomly 
and comprehensively sacked from their bases and from one town to another 
by a group such as Boko Haram that in the main lacks the discipline of a 
professional force. (Vanguard News, December 9, 2015b)
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Secondly, lack of transparency in the allocation and utilisation of secu-
rity funds for national security management promotes corruption which 
often leads to distrust in the relationship between security agencies and 
the public, the end result of which is public engagement with self-help 
organisations. For instance, police corruption has caused distrust in the 
public image of security agencies (Agbigboa 2015); therefore, instead of 
people taking their cases to the police or any security agency, they simply 
engage in self-help or consult militia or vigilante groups who simply carry 
out jungle justice which further promotes insecurity (Owonikoko and 
Ifukor 2016). This has been attested to by Nigeria’s former Inspector 
General of Police, Ogbonna Onovo, when he said:
It is apparent that indiscipline, lack of professionalism and widespread cor-
ruption have been the bane of the Nigeria police over the years, a situation 
that has greatly hampered the quality of service delivery. Our image has 
been battered time and again leading to loss of confidence by members of 
the public. (Kingsley 2009)
Furthermore, the security funds go to the executive at various levels, 
either at the federal, state or local government levels, as security votes are 
usually used to foment violence and insecurity. While in some cases it is 
used to prosecute rigging of elections, in other cases, it is used to maintain 
an army of thugs that can easily be commandeered to unleash violence. 
The former Commissioner for Police in Lagos State, Alhaji Abubakar 
Tsav, during his interview with Nigeria Today, shared his experience on 
how politicians used security votes that are supposed to be used to 
 complement the security provided by the Nigeria Police and other agen-
cies to further worsen security. He explained thus:
The original intention of these funds (referring to security votes) which run 
into hundreds of millions of naira monthly is to be used by the governors to 
put in place, effective security system in their respective states, to comple-
ment the work of the police and other security outfits. But today, most state 
governors divert security votes into personal use. They use security votes to 
breed political thugs and hooligans. They use security votes to feed and train 
thugs to attack and harass their political opponents. This is one of the reasons 
behind worsening state of insecurity in the country. (Nigeria Today 2016)
Even the development of militancy in Niger Delta and Boko Haram in 
North-East Nigeria can be traced to the use of security votes by politicians 
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to keep the army of hooligans they could easily commandeer (see Albert 
and Danjibo 2004; Sofiri 2007; Owonikoko 2016; 2019).
conclusIon and recommendatIons
Security fund is supposed to contribute to and enhance national security 
of a state. However, in Nigeria, the opposite is the case. Security funding 
has proven to be antithetical to the national security of the state for the 
simple reason that allocation and utilisation of security funds are shrouded 
in secrecy which does not promote accountability and transparency in dis-
bursement and utilisation. Nigeria must review how security funds are 
channelled in the country. Similarly, the system of accountability that pro-
motes transparency in the use of security funding must also be instituted 
in Nigeria. A situation where receivers of security funds/votes are not 
obliged to explain how such funds are spent in the name of national secu-
rity is itself a grave security threat to the Nigerian state.
notes
1. This kind of conflict is called inter-state conflict. The recorded inter-state 
conflict for this year was the India-Pakistan conflict.
2. The internationalised intra-state conflicts were in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan 
(Nagorno-Karabakh), Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, 
Ukraine (Donetsk), Ukraine (Lugansk), Ukraine (Novorossiya), the United 
States (the conflict with Al-Qaida) and Yemen.
3. For instance, a documentary on the state of security in the Middle East since 
the United States commenced its Global War Against Terrorism in 2001 
showed on CNN revealed that between 2002 and 2014, death from terror-
ism increased by 5000%.
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CHAPTER 27




Internal security has begun to attract a wide range of attention from aca-
demicians to security practitioners and beyond world over as a result of 
factors such as the incessant loss of lives and properties and the number of 
delinquent and criminal activities within and outside the Nigerian borders. 
It must be stated that internal security is one of the yardsticks to measure 
a nation’s welfare, for which emphasis must be placed on both external 
factors and national security/defence. Thus, most strategic literature 
debates dwell more on national defence and give peripheral treatment to 
internal security discourse in most cases.
Historically the security of a nation has always been towards prepara-
tion and readiness for defence from neighbouring countries. And as it is 
most developing countries still spend more of their budget on armed 
forces rather than on their internal security agencies to combat anomalies 
within their borders. Nigeria, for instance, still follows the traditional ideal 
of empowering the military than the police even before the insurgencies 
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that bedevilled it in recent times. The long-time neglect of internal secu-
rity since 1960 when the country got her independence can no doubt be 
attributed to the current security challenges therein. Thus it becomes per-
tinent to highlight the need to focus on internal (in)security in Nigeria
This chapter examines some salient issues surrounding the concept of 
social (in)security and its impact on internal security management in 
Nigeria. Specifically emphasis is placed on the broader conceptualisation 
of social (in)security and necessary developmental implications in Nigeria. 
The chapter draws conclusion from the experiences of Nordic countries 
which have marshalled adequate social security and protection policies 
towards their development and internal security.
the concept of Internal SecurIty
The concept of internal security emphasises the fundamental policies and 
principles fostering the peaceful coexistence and management of the activi-
ties of people and institutions within the boundaries of the country. It is in 
this regard that scholars emphasised that internal security should be defined 
in terms of goals and philosophy (Amujiri and Agu 2012; Imobighe 1990, 
2002; Nweke 1985). For Imobighe (2002), the doctrine of internal secu-
rity should seek to answer not only the why and how of internal security 
management, but also the question of the basic nature of the internal secu-
rity goals desired. Like most African countries, Nigeria has been found 
wanting when it comes to a clearly defined national security policy over 
time (Amujiri and Agu 2012; Imobighe 1990, 2002; Nweke 1985). From 
the periodic reviews of Nigerian foreign policy, scholars and practitioners 
have agreed that the neglect of internal security by successive regimes (from 
the period of military dictatorship to the current democratic dispensation) 
has done more harm than good. And that what are generally available by 
way of doctrines of internal security are more or less principles meant for 
handling particular internal emergencies (Omoyibo and Akpomera 2013). 
Thus the state is overwhelmed at any point in time when there are new 
forms of security threats within. And that governments are left with no 
other option but to exercise their military might forcefully which in the 
long run are not only expensive but counterproductive with loss of lives 
and properties and increasing resistance to state (re)actions (Omoyibo and 
Akpomera 2013). Inasmuch as the security challenges in Nigeria are on the 
increase, it is not out of place that the country is faced with a number of 
economical and developmental issues ranging from corruption, inflation 
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and poverty to illiteracy, unemployment and political instability; thus so 
many component states are heavily indebted (Omoyibo and Akpomera 
2013; Ewetan and Urhie 2014). These events have contributed to the ris-
ing rate of criminality among youths, the rise in criminal networks within 
and across West African communities, drug abuse among unemployed 
youths, poor standards of living, poor health outcomes of which Nigeria is 
ranked among the leading nations in maternal and infant mortality index 
and a booming informal and underground economy which often over-
whelms security officials that are often ill-equipped. Similarly these realities 
have also become evident in the rural communities which hitherto were 
relatively peaceful; thus, insecurity in the rural enclaves has increased the 
rate of rural-urban migration of youth, for the purpose of employment and 
perceived safety in the cities. Understanding these developments, Alemika 
and Chukwuma (2005) and Ikuomola et al. (2016) noted that insecurity 
challenges will continue until the Nigerian government recognises these 
dynamics and trajectories between the rural and urban communities.
the need for SocIal SecurIty In nIgerIa
After independence in 1960, it was expected that Nigeria would be among 
the countries that got it right economically and socially, in terms of poli-
cies and developmental indices, as is the case in Malaysia, India and China, 
among others. However, the reverse is the case amidst its abundant natural 
and human resources. To move out of these quagmires, Nigeria needs to 
surmount the security challenges to enable speedy economic and social 
development; it is achievable if first the nation seeks policies that are inter-
nally friendly to ensure the peaceful coexistence of its citizenry and institu-
tions. This will ensure that citizens’ sense of belongingness and pride to be 
members of the state called Nigeria become paramount. There is a need 
for adequate social security measures which must be well defined to upturn 
the high levels of underdevelopment, malnutrition, unemployment, illit-
eracy and unsatisfactory access to the basic services and infrastructure 
needed to sustain basic human capacities (Onyeonoru 2003; Church 
2000; Ngubane 2004; Human Right Watch 2015).
Social security needs to be simplified from the wider concept of security 
as embedded in social protection. Arguably, social protection emphasises 
on social support systems which presuppose that the society/state should 
cater to its weak(er) members (the poor) to become a welfare state (Von 
Maydell 1997; Stan 2004). Instances abound where social protection has 
27 SOCIAL (IN)SECURITY AND INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT… 
614
been used interchangeably as economic protection or safety net or 
 programmes to alleviate poverty, unemployment, disease and squalor. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the definition or analysis, the International 
Labour Organization (1984) propagates the inclusion of preventative, 
reparative and compensatory measures in the concept of social security. 
For Norton et al. (2001), the aim of social security should be on how best 
a state can comprehensively and sophisticatedly insure and provide assis-
tance to its citizenry, continuously in times of need, as evident in the devel-
oped clime but elusive in the developing countries, with poor financial and 
institutional strength. Thus Nigeria like most developing economies tends 
to focus on temporary and at best short-term measures of giving assistance 
to its citizens whenever the need arises, most especially when there is an 
emergency or outbreak of a catastrophe. This is well captured in the more 
recent terminology ‘safety net’, which is simply the giving of assistance 
(a limited range of assistance, often now administered through social 
funds). Irrespective of the various crises in Nigeria, the welfare of people is 
still very much held in high esteem, at least as specified in the constitution 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Nevertheless, it is quite clear that 
among a number of insecurity challenges which have crisscrossed the north 
and southern states of the country, the issue of insurgency has become 
paramount as well as capturing the attention of international communities.
The rate of insecurity in the northern part of the country is worrisome 
as shown by the incessant attacks by Fulani herdsmen and Islamic militants 
as well as the activities of separatist movements in the south-south and 
southeast. These events have further worsened the social security indices 
of Nigeria, but also the inability of the Nigerian government to provide 
adequately for its subjects. As security budgets are often beyond what the 
state can handle, it becomes glaring as to why most times international 
support is needed.
Igbuzor (2011) clearly linked government failure over the years to 
provide basic social and economic needs to its subject as a major catalyst 
to the current situation that has piled up. The reality is that in the north-
ern states, there are a number of children roaming the streets, begging, as 
well as a pool of frustrated youth, who either ought to be in school or 
gainfully employed; as they are not economically active, they seek cover 
under various religious sects for their daily bread and safety, from which 
many get indoctrinated and become violent. Thus the popular saying that 
an idle mind will readily be available to embrace delinquents’ opportuni-
ties for survival takes meaning in Nigeria (Cloward 1959). Going by the 
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numerous challenges therein, alongside the economic downturn since 
2015 when the country went into recession, poverty and economic fluc-
tuations have been the order of the day. The gap between the rich and the 
poor keeps widening. The poverty rate is placed at 43.8 (Gini coefficient), 
which has doubled since 2005, of which about 75 million people (54 per 
cent of the population) live within the poverty threshold (Holmes et al. 
2011; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014; UNICEF 2016).
Currently, the government has realised the need to engage with devel-
opment partners within and out the country to develop social protection 
policy instruments to mitigate the economic and social crises (Holmes 
et al. 2011; UNICEF 2016). However, as an innovative idea and welcome 
development, the UNICEF (2016) report revealed that it is only a tempo-
rary measure which is not sustainable, as no nation survives by continu-
ously giving handouts to the poor rather than economically engaging them.
an overvIew of SocIal SecurIty In nIgerIa
The amount of money budgeted and spent by the Nigerian government 
has often been at variance with books, and it is eventually regarded as 
minimal to alleviate the insecurity challenges and poverty compared with 
other countries in the developed climes. For instance, Nigeria spends only 
12 per cent on education and 7 per cent on health (Hagen-Zanker and 
Tavakoli 2011). In the agricultural sector, which is the domain of most 
peasants and masses, what are meant for farmers often fail to get to them 
as a result of the corrupt practices within the three tiers of government 
(federal, state and local authorities) and the various channels of distribu-
tion, through which incentives and aids are meant to get to the grassroots. 
The federal government is expected to design and implement policies, but 
they are often circumvented by the state and local authorities, and the 
masses are left at their mercies. Thus, budget regimes differ from real 
expenditure patterns as a result of bureaucracy and corruption. Depending 
on the level of corruption and bureaucratic bottlenecks in every state and 
local community, the size and resources, poverty and inequality vary.
A number of socio-demographic factors such as age and gender have 
greatly affected and influenced the level of poverty, and the instability of 
economic opportunities continuously breeds inequality, of which ethnicity, 
nepotism and corruption become a tool for survival to the detriment of the 
poor. These are evident in the spate of crises in the country, when the poor 
become more vulnerable in times of financial, food and fuel crises, for the 
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simple reason that they constitute the majority of the workforce in the 
agricultural sector (over 60 per cent of the population) and demographi-
cally speaking the age of the population is skewed disproportionately 
towards poor households (Ojowu et  al. 2007). The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development gender equality index ranked 
Nigeria low in the rate at which men and women participate equally in 
economic, political and human capital development programmes and 
activities. Specifically, the effect is reflected in the rate of mortality (both 
maternal and infant), where Nigeria is ranked 18 out of the 193 countries 
surveyed (87 deaths per 1000 children). These are significant obstacles 
accounting for the lack of participation in economic transformation by 
women in the country. Similarly women and child trafficking are negative 
issues, affecting the contribution of women to societal transformation. 
These have also been linked to the high rate of mortality and the HIV/
AIDS pandemic in Nigeria, with over 3.3 million affected.
The statistics and indicators of insecurity problems are overwhelming, 
and hence the Nigerian government has taken steps to prioritise pro-poor 
agendas through several negotiations with the Paris Club and other interna-
tional financial institutions for economic assistance to alleviate poverty in the 
short and long term. These negotiations and developments have brought 
about conditionalities to the Nigerian state to ensure that financing of the 
social sector must incorporate first and foremost the poor to tackle the issue 
of poverty as hitherto stated in both the Millennium Development Goals 
and the current Sustainable Development Goals. Resources cum policy sug-
gestions to the state include cash transfer programmes that are capable of 
enhancing health, water and sanitation, education and economic productiv-
ity. Since 2005, research has however shown the ineptitude of the Nigerian 
government to either politicise or relatively neglect these conditionalities at 
best. For instance 14 per cent of the annual budget instead of the recom-
mended 26 per cent is still being consistently expended on education, rep-
resenting only 5 per cent of the  internationally  agreed fund meant to 
contribute to the social protection agenda (Hagen-Zanker and Tavakoli 
2011), in turn representing only 5 per cent of the debt relief gain (DRG) 
from the World Bank, a largess meant for poverty alleviation and develop-
mental purposes (Dijkstra et al. 2011).
The politicking of the social protection policy of 2004 brought about a 
national planning commission which was supported by the international 
community, and a new social protection strategy was introduced. One was 
the National Social Insurance Trust Fund and the National Policy 
Implementation Plan—‘the Vision 20: 2020’. These new ideas were 
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meant to approach social protection without discriminatory practices that 
seclude women as well as discourage traditional harmful practices affecting 
the life cycle of women in the poverty matrix. The focal concern of this 
new programme was to ensure that four main assistances were rendered, 
that is, labour market security, child protection, social assistance and social 
insurance. As with past development plans, only limited assistance was 
provided, most notably the expansion of national health insurance to the 
informal sector and the setting up of labour-intensive programmes. The 
lack of political will by the federal government was a major constraint for 
state and local governments to implement and benefit from the implemen-
tation plan of social protection for the poor. In reality ad hoc committees 
were set up and saddled with the responsibility of implementing condi-
tional cash transfer programmes with little or less inter-sectoral coordina-
tion between the state and the federal government.
The general idea of the present social protection scenario in the country 
reveals that there are noteworthy individuals and agencies acting or willing 
to act towards implementing governmental action plans and those from 
international organisations in the forms of aids and donations. Specifically, 
the Nigerian government has three broad categories of social protection 
programmes which include the following.
 1. Cash transfer: The cash transfer programme targets mostly children 
of school age and female-headed households and people who are 
generally vulnerable such as the sick, (persons with HIV/AIDS), the 
aged and the physically challenged.
 2. Health fee waivers for women: This programme is targeted at preg-
nant women and mothers with babies under the age of five.
 3. Community-based health-care insurance: This scheme works in 
conjunction with the basic primary health-care facilities in rural 
communities. It is an improvement on the existing primary health- 
care service in the country to tackle common illnesses such as malaria 
and typhoid.
Support programmes are generally funded by international agencies to 
complement the meagre amount set aside by the state and federal govern-
ment. At the level of implementation it is usually on an ad hoc basis and 
via subtypes. These subtypes come in the form of conditional cash transfer 
programmes for the girl child (in some selected states), disability grants, 
health waivers and educational support (free meals and uniforms, exercise 
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and textbooks). These are nevertheless subcomponents of general nutri-
tion, health and educational support programmes. Similarly there are 
labour market programmes to empower youths through skills’ acquisition 
programmes and capacity-building strategies and seminars at all tiers of 
the government. There is particular emphasis on agricultural training 
which invariably targets the bulk of the rural populace (Ojowu et  al. 
2007). Despite the fact that Nigeria has ratified a number of key social 
equity legislation acts which propagate transformative social protection 
agendas with international communities, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights Covenant, implementation is still 
very weak due to the insincerity of successive governments.
SocIal (In)SecurIty: developmental ImplIcatIonS 
In nIgerIa
The rising wave of terrorism or terrorist activities has compounded the 
insecurity problems in Nigeria (Ali 2013). The snowballing effect on the 
socio-economic environment through business and investment from 
within and outside the country continues to be negative, hindering other 
spheres of life. It is in this regard that Omoyibo and Akpomera (2013) 
noted that the government has failed in ensuring the security and welfare 
of the people, which has further threatened the coexistence of the diverse 
ethnic groups living together as a nation, a situation they narrated as con-
tradictory to what is stipulated in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Similarly, regarding the level of criminal 
activities, the government has not fared well; lives and properties are no 
longer safe. A confirmation of this is evident in Ewetan and Urhie’s (2014) 
submission that criminal activities have also contributed to the low rank-
ing of Nigeria in the Global Peace Index in 2012 and onwards.
This is not to say that the Nigerian government has not attempted 
security in the territory. The problem is that several attempts seem unsuc-
cessful. The international community and multinational organisations 
have often wielded in on request or as a result of the observable lapses. 
More often than not countries such as the United States and those in 
Europe, as well as security intelligence from Israel, are consulted (Ewetan 
and Urhie 2014) to confront the daunting insecurity challenges which 
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have seriously affected the nation’s development. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics, the wave of terrorist activities has not only 
affected investments but also contributed to the 23.9 per cent increase in 
unemployment rate since 2011—with a youthful population of over 
80 million (over 60 per cent of the total population), with a growth rate 
of 2.6 per cent every year. The youths have been described as willing to 
work amidst the lack of employment opportunities due to low investments 
in an insecure environment. Thus, the nation has also failed in channelling 
its abundant human resources productively.
In a situation such as this where able-bodied men and women are will-
ing to work, but are not gainfully or meaningfully employed, the question 
thus arises—how will they survive? How will their needs be met? Answers 
to these pertinent questions no doubt will reveal that a high number of 
persons will likely be forced into taking delinquent opportunities and 
criminal careers for survival, and thus this will swell not only the number 
of deviants and criminality in country, but also government expenditures 
in combating criminality (Ikuomola 2017). The implications on the sur-
vival of children and youths and family security and social amenities are 
obvious in statistics. Losses resulting from these insecurity challenges have 
also been linked with poor health management in the country, due to 
which women and children are greatly affected. The United Nations 
Children’s Fund (2016) report shows that Nigeria is the second largest 
contributor to the death of children/infants (2300 under five years old) 
and women of child-bearing age (145 deaths per 1000) annually in the 
world. Poor health outcomes are noticeable also in the way public health- 
care centres are managed, access to potable drinking water has become 
elusive in many communities, electricity supply is either not available or 
expensive to avail and quality education has become a mirage. Put together 
realising the key components of Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria 
becomes impossible, just like the case of the successive set targets in the 
hitherto Millennium Development Goals (Ewetan and Urhie 2014; 
Ikuomola et al. 2016; National Bureau of Statistics 2017).
unemployment menace In nIgerIa
The inability to gain employment opportunities in Nigeria has led to eco-
nomic waste, and the corollary effect on insecurity is worrisome. Apart 
from the fact that it brings about human suffering, Adebayo and 
Ogunrinola (2006) also attribute it to the low level of development, as the 
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country has failed to harness the abundant human resources available for 
development. Similarly Isamah and Okunola (1997) opined that unem-
ployment is a correlate of several mishaps in the country, some of which 
are poverty, frustration, gang formation and deviant survival strategies and 
youth involvement in criminal activities. While Akintoye (2006), identi-
fied the nation’s educational system and the over-reliance of modern 
industries on technology, failure of the government to diversify from an 
economy that is solely dependent on crude oil over agriculture is another 
reason. Agriculture he described as having the highest potential of engag-
ing majority of the unemployed (literate and illiterate, skilled and unskilled 
population) at ago; as well as having the capacity to make the country self-
reliant and less dependent on foreign countries for its subsistence. For 
Ademu (2006), unemployment has brought about low productivity and 
poor standard of living. Odusola (2001) has earlier noted that most 
African countries are trapped with unemployment problems which con-
tinuously hinder development and foster socio-economic challenges. 
Transparency International (2005, 2008) has recognised that with the dis-
covery of oil in Nigeria and the accentuation of corruption by successive 
governments, unemployment problems have become endemic. Similarly 
the country has not only failed to recover from it lost glory of economic 
boom but has gradually grown into an economic and politically weak 
state, which is at its peak of weakness with the emergence of insurgencies 
and agitations by several separatist movements; thus, there are weakened 
institutions across states to fight the menace that has ravaged the country 
(Fund for Peace 2005, 2009; Global Peace Index 2012).
Some effortS made at combatIng 
unemployment In nIgerIa
Nigeria, like all developing countries, has been mired by substantial 
unemployment figures. In the last quarter of 2016, the country’s unem-
ployment rate increased to 14.2 per cent from 10.4 per cent a year earlier. 
This is a figure regarded as the highest since 2009 (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). Research, opinion polls as well as policy speeches indi-
cate that unemployment is considered to be a major problem (Oshiomole 
2009; Ikuomola et  al. 2016; National Bureau of Statistics 2017). The 
issue has always been important in different administrations’ economic 
development efforts and policies. This is one of the ways of stemming the 
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tide of restiveness and insecurity in the nation. Realising this, the govern-
ment has been trying to establish structures and programmes to ensure 
that the country is conducive for youths (most especially for job seekers) 
to be gainfully engaged by creating jobs as well as doling out other 
poverty- alleviating measures for citizens. Some of these notable efforts 
are explained below.
the eStablIShment of natIonal dIrectorate 
of employment
As far back as November 22, 1986, the Nigerian government foresaw the 
need to establish the National Directorate of Employment, to wedge the 
envisaged problem of future unemployment problems with the growing 
population. This was a novel and welcoming idea, meant to intensify 
developmental programmes for youth employment; capacity-building in 
the agricultural and agro-allied industries; and vocational skill develop-
ment programmes for skilled and semi-skilled youths; emphasis was also 
placed on training opportunities for graduate farmers and small-scale 
entrepreneurs.
The focal concern on agricultural was to promote youth employment 
and industrialise the country as quickly as possible, with the help of agri-
cultural professionals in the various state ministries of agriculture, basically 
to enforce and equip university degree holders and artisans as well as sec-
ondary school certificate holders and able-bodied adults to be self- 
employed and relevant in the economy, be it for production at the farm or 
agro-allied industries or for the marketing of farm produce. These initia-
tives as well as implementation and monitoring were well appraised and 
documented in several gazettes (see Akintoye 2008; National Bureau of 
Statistics 2017), showing that at a point in time the Nigerian state was on 
the right track towards development and security of its citizens. However 
the tale of inadequate funding and neglect in favour of petrochemical 
industries impaired the capacity and ability of the National Directorate of 
Employment to function effectively and became moribund. Thus, for 
about two decades, from 1986, the country struggled and a new initiative 
was developed called the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategies (NEEDS) to make amends to the lapses observed 
in the National Directorate of Employment scheme as well as to comple-
ment its efforts.
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natIonal economIc employment and 
development Strategy
In March 2004, the Nigerian government established another programme 
called the National Economic Employment and Development Strategy as 
one of the several macroeconomic adjustment strategies to alleviate pov-
erty and specifically ameliorate the suffering of the teeming unemployed 
youths in the country. Adebayo and Ogunrinola, (2006) noted that the 
target was to generate employment for women and youths and enhance 
growth and development. Thus, the NEEDS strategic plan was to incor-
porate the private sector alongside governmental agencies to engineer 
speedy employment generation and maximise the potential of every citi-
zen in order to be reckoned with in the international community as one of 
the strongest economic forces in Africa. However, like past schemes and 
programmes, the NEEDS initiative had no long-term plan; at best it was 
described as a medium-term scheme which also was not well funded and 
politicised like others before it. Still the level of unemployment soared like 
its counterparts in other developing climes (Akintoye 2008; Patterson 
et al. 2006).
Unlike in the United States, India, Israel and China, where such 
schemes have been found to be effective, where about 70 per cent of the 
total population are found in one employment programme or the other, 
22.3 per cent in China, 80 per cent in India and 50 per cent in Israel, 
Eroke (2011) submitted that the failure arose from the neglect of the 
informal sector, where the bulk of the population is concentrated as a 
result of the low capacity of the formal sector to accommodate the pool of 
the unemployed. The foregoing thus means that if the informal sector was 
well involved and engaged the scheme would have achieved some level of 
successes in combating the unemployment rate facing the country since 
the 1990s (Ademu 2006; Khandker 1998). In addition, the informal sec-
tor, as a key sector to improving the unemployment problems in Nigeria, 
is faced with lack of capital, as many individuals are unable to avail loans 
and financial incentives to kickstart their business plan (Ademu 2006). 
Microfinance institutions are also faced with the problem of inadequate 
finance in reaching out to people, as many are faced with the problem of 
having to bring collateral before financial aid or loans can be given; the 
issue of needing a guarantor is also another setback for an individual 
(Akintoye 2008).
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Thus, microfinance institutions were saddled with the tasks of ensuring 
the following.
 1. Credit facilities are readily available and easily obtained via softer 
lending for repayments of loans.
 2. There are less bureaucratic bottlenecks in accessing loans in the long 
and short term.
 3. More youths are given credit facilities to venture into farming and 
agro-allied enterprises.
 4. There exist transparency and competitiveness in the recruitment of 
beneficiaries as well as staff of the institutions.
 5. There are viable educative and instructive training programmes and 
proper monitoring of beneficiaries.
penSIon SchemeS aS a SocIal SecurIty InItIatIve
The introduction of the pension scheme in Nigeria is dated as far back as 
the regime of the colonial masters (the British), drawing a clue from events 
that incapacitated a number of military personnel during the First and the 
Second World War, due to injuries that were permanent and benefits that 
had to be paid to their dependents. After independence in 1960, Nigeria 
kickstarted its own pension scheme with a limited number of workforce 
and by implication a limited number of programmes. With time there 
arose the need to reform the public sector to adequately provide a viable 
pension scheme through the public welfare system (Oluwo 2001).
The first attempt was made to ensure that employees were protected 
against contingencies that may create a vacuum that will hinder them from 
being productive after disengagement from the service; thus the Civil 
Service Pension Scheme and Employers’ Liability Scheme were first, 
amongst others, established (Onyeonoru 2002; Oluwo 2001). It all began 
as a non-contributory scheme by both the federal and state government 
ministries where the pension and benefits were paid by the Civil Service 
Pension Board. In no time there was a need for reformation in the scheme 
as the workforce of the civil service increased in numbers as well as the 
number of aged retiring annually. And it became clear that the non- 
contributory scheme was no longer feasible and financially unsustainable. 
There was a shortfall, deficit and reduction in the annual budget allocated 
for pensioners (Chand and Jaege 1996; Mackenzie et al. 1997, Ogumbameru 
and Adesina 2000; Onyeonoru 2002; Oluwo 2001).
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Thus in 2004, the Nigeria Pension Scheme had to be reformed, creat-
ing a shift from the hitherto existing non-contributory scheme inherited 
from the colonial government, and was commonly adopted by most devel-
oping countries in Africa after independence at that time. However, as the 
wind of globalisation and neoliberal policies started blowing, it was evi-
dent that the centre could not hold, and contributory pension scheme was 
gradually introduced alongside the incorporation of the private sector into 
the nation’s pension scheme (Onyeonoru 2009). The 2004 pension 
reforms were firm and well focused on the civil services (state and federal) 
and the private sector as shown in its stated objectives:
 1. to ascertain that employees are guaranteed of their pension immedi-
ately after they proceed for retirement (be it voluntary or compul-
sory retirement);
 2. to ensure that there are investment programmes in place prior to 
retirement, to enable pensioners tackle and adjust to life after 
retirement; and
 3. to put in place a uniform bureaucratic process of administering the 
new pension scheme in all states of the federation including the 
Federal Capital Territory and private sector (Onyeonoru 2009).
As stipulated in Section 9, subsection 1 of the Pension Act 2004, the 
following were extracted:
 (a) in the case of the Public Service of the Federation and Federal 
Capital Territory
 (i) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employer and
 (ii) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employee.
 (b) in the case of the military
 (i) a minimum of 12.5 per cent by the employer and
 (ii) a minimum of 2.5 per cent by the employee.
 (c) in other cases
 (i) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employer and
 (ii) a minimum of 7.5 per cent by the employee.
The above section no doubt clearly shows a neoliberal framework which 
often emphasises the need for the private sector to be active in the pension 
scheme, with the popular concept of the ‘pay as you go’ system, which 
simply means that people should be compensated based on the number of 
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years they have put in service. This system was highly welcomed but 
marred with compliance issues, most especially from the private sector, 
and corruption from the public pension commission, leading to large eva-
sions and hence the inability to meet the objectives for which it was estab-
lished; thus, there was a need to subsequently repeal the 2004 Pension 
Reform Act.
A decade after (precisely on July 1, 2014), the president at that time in 
the person of Goodluck Jonathan finally assented to the bill of a reform to 
the Pension Act of 2004. Like the former, it was also geared towards 
enhancing the speedy payment of pension to pensioners as at when due, 
most especially to alleviate suffering pensioners and contributors catego-
ries as spendthrift in order to secure their livelihood thereafter disengage-
ment or if able they can become productive by employing their pension 
into any small-scale business. The 2014 Act was highly commended, 
though some of the amendments introduced were said to have been too 
hasty; thus, several lacunae were evident, as a number of items were not 
well spelt out in principle and in practice. Excerpts from the 2014 Act 
reveal the following ambiguities.
 1. Multiple interpretations of exemptions from tax. It is clearly stated 
that any income in the form of profits or interests from investments 
from the contributory fund should not be taxed. However, in the 
event warranting the pensioner to withdraw from the fund, it is 
expected not to be subjected to tax still, with the caveat that it must 
be a withdrawal made within five years of pension. Issues on the 
amount of withdrawal were not well spelt out as well as the implica-
tions it may have on the general fund if withdrawal goes uncontrolled.
 2. The division of the pension fund into retirement savings and deposit 
accounts. From the above there is also the issue of where withdrawal 
should be made—is it from the deposit or savings accounts? This is in 
spite of the fact that employees who are disengaged before they attain 
the compulsory age of retirement (often 65 years or 35 years in ser-
vice) are allowed to withdraw (an amount not more than 25 per cent 
of the entire savings) from their account(s) insofar as they are unable 
to secure employment four months after disengagement.
 3. Options of selecting any Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) by the 
employee. The Act empowered employees to enjoy the free will to 
choose any PFA of their choice. The problem this freedom brought 
was that in a single ministry the employer was exposed to many 
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PFAs; thus, difficulties and excuses arose of how to disburse funds 
to the plethora of PFAs, as well as the cost involved in dealing with 
too many of them unlike in the past where it was the employer who 
stipulated the PFA for the employees.
 4. Right to investment pension funds. The 2014 Act also empowers 
the PFA to operate and administer pension funds as an investment 
with other financial institutions. Thus the pension scheme is seen as 
an avenue to make profit. The ultimate question is profit for whom? 
Little wonder the number of PFA scouting for employees as well as 
customers have since multiplied.
 5. Stipulated penalties for defaulters. The new Act clearly states a ten- 
year- imprisonment and a fine of triple the amount that was misman-
aged or misappropriated, as well as the forfeiture of assets and 
properties traced to the unlawful use of the pension fund. Where the 
PFA is found wanting to use the pension fund to meet the compa-
ny’s financial obligations, the Act stipulates a ten million naira fine 
upon conviction, a five million naira fine for personal use by a direc-
tor in the company or a term of five years or both in prison.
 6. Creation of a pension protection fund (PPF). This is an annual 1 per 
cent subvention on the monthly wage bill payable to employees in 
the public sector and safeguards contributors in an event of deficit in 
the investment of the pension fund. There is free will enjoyed by the 
pension commission to determine the 1 per cent intermittently.
 7. Internal wrangling, conflict and dispute resolution. The settlement 
of disputes or grievances and other internal wrangling was compulso-
rily left to be handled by the hitherto Arbitration and the Investment 
and Securities Tribunal; however, in the 2014 ACT, the employer of 
PFA is free to seek redress beyond the Tribunal (Oyedele 2014.
Notwithstanding the changes brought into the 2014 Pension Act, it 
has been affected by the following loopholes.
 a. The 2014 Pension Act was marked with delay in commencement. 
The delay in signing it into law also meant that there was little or no 
time to adequately test run and transit from the 2004 Act. In reality, 
employers were unable to speedily adjust to the scheme.
 b. The inclusion of the private sector into the Nigerian pension 
scheme was welcomed in all ramifications; however, the modifica-
tion of terms and conditions in the 2014 Act meant that only 
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employers with 15 or more employees will be allowed to partici-
pate. Participation in the previous Act was pegged at employers 
with five or more employees. By implication, this resulted in fewer 
employer and employee registration with the pension commission 
and PFA thereafter in scope and in coverage.
 c. One of the loopholes was the 2014 Act stipulating that contribu-
tions by employers should be based on employees’ monthly wages 
without a clear-cut breakdown of the allowance component of 
wages (e.g. housing and medical allowances). By implication a num-
ber of employers are to contribute heavily to the PFA, if these 
deductions are not made. It took a long period for employers to 
eventually settle on an agreed formula to determine what is to be 
contributed.
 d. It was eventually agreed that both employers and employees are to 
contribute 7.5 per cent each from their basic salary, housing and 
transport allowance components. On the part of employers, it was 
discovered that initially many were not in favour of 7.5 per cent, 
considering it on the higher side. For those who could not afford it, 
they were left with no option other than to rationalise the staff 
strength of their workforce (Oyedele 2014). Thus, again most 
employers could not effectively participate.
From the above challenges and teething problems in the formal 
industry, regarding pension and old-age security for workers, Nigeria is 
still left with over 95 per cent of its workers socially insured after retire-
ment. Of the 60  million Nigerians of working age, there are only 
2.4 million employees that are captured in the pension scheme in 2014 
(Oyedele 2014). To alleviate some of these problems the federal gov-
ernment in 2016 launched new job creation and empowerment initia-
tives and a social welfare programme to ease the suffering of the ‘poorest 
of the poor’, where 500,000 graduate teachers were employed to teach 
in primary schools across Nigeria and others in various ministries as sup-
porting staff. The programme is still very much in its embryonic stage 
and difficult to assess. This is one of the laudable programmes of the 
Muhammadu Buhari- led administration called the N-Power  programme. 
In the long run it is meant to empower young university and polytech-
nic graduates to be self- employed and be a solution provider in any 
community they find themselves in.
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a clue from the nordIc countrIeS
There is no doubt as research has shown that the Nordic countries of 
Finland, Norway. Denmark and Sweden have been leading examples when 
it comes to pension reforms and social security policies; though a reference 
to these models has a socialist outlook, it is one which Nigeria can take a 
clue from, incorporating and investing pension funds for national develop-
ment. In Finland, for example, the pension fund was made available after 
a severe civil war that almost crippled the nation, to boost the economy 
industrially. Kangas (2008) noted that the nationally funded pension pro-
gramme of 1937 was used to provide the country with electricity. Similarly 
in 1961, the scheme also served to industrialise the rural end of Finland, 
and the 1966 municipal pension fund was utilised in providing housing. 
In no time Finland was transformed from being rural to being industrial 
in every aspect. These were also replicated in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark with similar outcomes. It is suggested that the Nigerian govern-
ment can embrace these strategies as adopted in the Nordic countries. If 
wholeheartedly adopted, there is no doubt that the snowballing effect will 
contribute in no small measures to the security of lives and properties as 
well as guarantee employment, rural-urban transformation and the gen-
eral well-being of people in Nigeria.
concluSIon
An overview of the security situation in Nigeria shows that there are a lot 
more problems to be tackled beyond the current insurgency threats and 
sectarian violence. As highlighted, issues of unemployment, corruption 
and inconsistencies in economic and social policies have impacted nega-
tively on lives and properties, contributing to the high level of insecurity 
since independence. Thus, socio-economic development has been hin-
dered vis- à- vis the social institutions to tackle the menace; often the coun-
try is left at the mercies of foreign agencies and government for assistance. 
Foreign investments to create and alleviate poverty are on the decline and 
the corollary effect is unpleasant. It is expected that Nigeria as a nation 
should incorporate social policies that are not only realistic, but also of 
benefit to all Nigerians irrespective of the divide, demographic and loca-
tion. Be it rural or urban, religious affiliation and formal or informal sec-
tors, everybody within the geographical space should be targeted for good. 
If the welfare of everyone is captured, there will be a strong commitment 
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to the Nigerian project of ensuring adequate security that will foster a true 
sense of a nation state.
In conclusion, the issue is not just ‘social (in)security or social policy for 
development’ but developing and implementing social security policies 
within which measures are coherently embedded. That is to say policies on 
the basics of life, agriculture, health, education, employment, housing and 
security, among others, should complement and enhance one another. 
This will no doubt have a snowballing effect on the incessant insecurity 
being witnessed in Nigeria. A clue from the Nordic countries will no 
doubt be of help in realising this goal, in both the short and long run. The 
foregoing discussion on the social (in)security and the challenges of inter-
nal security management in Nigeria leads one to the submission that polit-
ically, institutionally and in terms of peace and security, the country as a 
state and as a people is in a flux. Nigerian security challenges are inter-
twined and complex, as evident in most of the happenings, changes and 
threats that are destabilising policies and effective governance, which can-
not be addressed in isolation. Therefore, multiple and institutional efforts 
are deemed necessary.
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CHAPTER 28




Contemporary security concerns have become dominant in the interna-
tional arena. This phenomenon has been attributed to the obvious diversi-
ties in relations, which have influenced states’ and citizens’ relationships. 
On 29 May 1999, democratic government was inaugurated in Nigeria. 
Considering the nasty experiences of the previous military regimes in the 
country, the inauguration of democratic government resuscitated the bat-
tered hope for drastic changes in the polity and political stability of the 
country. Nigeria’s national security was at the brink of collapse before the 
inauguration of democratic government that was led by former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. Immediately, Nigeria began to experience increasing 
violence across states, local areas and communities. These crises were com-
munal, religious and political in nature, which have threatened national 
security and cohesion. Security agencies in the country, especially the 
Nigerian Police which is the lead security agency handling internal security, 
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have shown to be overwhelmed by these threats. This is the reason why the 
military is involved in internal security operations in many  locations across 
the country. In carrying out their operational responsibilities, these security 
operatives and agencies have been alleged to have violated or being involved 
in human rights abuses. Gender rights and issues are of priority in security 
operations anywhere in the world. Security is not just for the strong, but it 
is also for the weak or vulnerable in the society, which the management of 
internal security in Nigeria cannot avoid.
This chapter extends the perception of security beyond the conven-
tional understanding of security to examine dynamics of gender in internal 
security management. In this context, gender is not primarily about women 
only, but about men and women in terms of the diverse roles, characteris-
tics and behaviours that are expected by the society (Scott 1986; UNSSR 
2012). There are numerous and critical gender issues that can contribute 
to the process of identifying strands of crimes and criminality that could 
possibly be committed by women, girls, men and boys. These crime indi-
cators are normally measured through elements like age, disability, gender, 
ethnicity and class, which are crucial to the understanding of security 
(Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). In this regard, giving prime consideration 
to gender issues in internal security management is crucial to efficient and 
sustainable national security.
conceptualIzIng Internal SecurIty ManageMent, 
gender and theoretIcal InSIghtS
There are two major discourses which straddle around internal security 
management and gender. The eventual termination of Cold War and 
the succeeding world order of multipolarism that reconfigured inter-
national relations appear to have enlarged the domain of international 
security. Transformation in world order and the enthronement of diverse 
power centres and players drastically altered the narrow understanding 
of security (Olusola 2016). Multipolar security challenges have been 
broadened to encompass factors which straddle around diverse secu-
rity concerns. Feminism is about the theorization of women’s plight 
in the society. It believes that the realist approach to national security, 
with emphasis on protection of sovereignty of the state and territory, 
appears to deprioritize or undermine other layers of violence and inse-
curity (Enloe 1980).
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Gender roles are often associated with conflict that culminate to nega-
tive consequences for women and men. This explains why it is imperative 
for gender-oriented scholars to investigate the intersections between gen-
der and conflict or crime in the society (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). A 
rapporteur of gender scholars posits that issues around security and con-
flict management are the centre point of gender. This explains why 
Hoogensen and Stuvoy (2006) narrate that war fighting is a decision 
because the question of who, how and where war must be fought and 
victims of war are all within the domain of security and conflict manage-
ment (cited in Romaniuk 2009).
The concept of security threat is a bone of contention among schol-
ars, which they argue is hazy and amorphous. This argument was fur-
ther strengthened by the analysis that what constitutes security threat is 
fluid and dynamic, that what constitutes threats in communities varies 
in time and space. Discussions on security were formally restricted to 
the domain of war and peace, but other forms of threats like cyber-
attacks were not really captured by this conception. State’s capability 
entails the mobilization of resources (soft and hard powers) to defend 
the territorial enclave of the state against any form of insurrections and 
aggression targeting the existence of the state (Baldwin 1997; Wolfers 
1952; Buzan 1984, 1992; Sheehan 2005). The major conception was 
threat of violence and the capacity to successfully deploy the machinery 
of state forces against the enemy to stop any form of aggression (Rourke 
2005). Within the purview of internal security, law-enforcement agen-
cies are mandated to provide requisite security guarantee to the state. 
The unfolding international security challenges, especially characterized 
by insurgency and terrorism, have shown that relying entirely on the 
security approach utilized in the old order that was characterized by two 
blocs of West and East may not be appropriate in contemporary security 
issues where states have become more vulnerable than ever. Multipolar 
order has altered the former security threat conundrum which has been 
broadened to encompass other elements like human rights, the environ-
ment, drug trafficking, epidemics, crime or social injustice. Other vices 
include underdevelopment, inequality, lack of political accountability 
and good governance.
Security is not just the capacity and capability of a state to defend itself 
from external aggression, but the ability to tame myriad of threats within 
its domain (Pogoson 2013). This type of security connotes that there is 
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need for the involvement of other components of security which include 
economic, political and environmental, as well as food, to provide the 
required effect (Buzan and Hansen 2009).
According to Hettne (2010), the domain of security is very complex 
and diverse, which to a large extent interferes with precision due to exist-
ing social relations from rural to the international stage. In rural commu-
nities, security concern encompasses the involvement of citizens in 
contributing to the conditions leading to precise estimation of security 
outcomes (Katsina 2012). In other words, the enthronement of a favour-
able socio-economic condition is vital to regulating behaviours of citizens 
and enhancing security.
Gender security and conflict management are central to the entire 
security architecture, with much focus on inclusion and protection of the 
vulnerable in the society. This is important because, in places where inclu-
sion is demanded by vulnerable and excluded groups, response to such 
demands in some societies in the developing world could be brutal 
through the use of force to injure and kill victims (Mobekk 2010). The 
major concern of gender security is about addressing known and emerg-
ing security threats to women and girls who are mostly vulnerable in a 
violent and conflict environment. This explains why the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (2012) note that in any violent environ-
ment, the level of security threats differs from each other; therefore, the 
kind of security threats that confronts women and girls are quite different 
from men and boys. In this sense, women and girls must be included in 
the security architecture to participate in planning and implementation to 
ensure adequate security satisfaction to each group. For instance, the 
Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) stipulates in Chapter 2, 
Section 14 subsections (2) (b) that the protection of lives and property 
shall be the primary responsibility of government. This section of the 
constitution identified security as the essence of government and gover-
nance because nothing in terms of development can take place in any 
environment that is volatile and unsafe for human interactions. The con-
cerns are about ensuring that gender equality perspectives are incorpo-
rated into all norm, policy and standard-setting initiatives, including in 
the areas of safety and security. However, as much as it is about the secu-
rity of human population, the cry of the people is often neglected or not 
valued by leaders (Puri 2015).
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SecurItIzatIon theory
According to Buzan et al. (1998), the international security architecture 
got transformed significantly due to the termination of Cold War which 
hitherto defined security relations among states in the international  system. 
This transformation evokes new threats that are diverse and complex, 
which the old order was no longer adequate to deal with effectively. This 
explains why the Copenhagen thought on security was taken further to 
encompass other issues that sustain security threats which were not con-
sidered as relevant to security discourse. These issues have the capacity to 
disrupt logical analysis on security (Sulovic 2010). As Weaver (2000) 
noted earlier, these issues have great influence on security; therefore, it 
should be given adequate attention if security challenges must be addressed 
from a broader perspective. However, security threats evoke concern and 
also raise questions if force or military strategy is adequate and should be 
deployed to all security threats when discovered (Buzan et al. 1998).
FeMInISt peace and conFlIct theory
The twenty-first century heralded pacifist movements and gender advo-
cacy, which propelled feminists to relate issues that characterize wars to 
gender abuse. They interrogated earlier position that gender dynamics in 
relation to war are interrelated which was evident in different conflicts and 
revolutions that the world has witnessed in human history (Wollstonecraft 
1792). Women suffer exclusion in different ways, especially in denial of 
citizenship status, which confers rights and privileges; this is the bane of 
women’s agitations and protest in different climes. This explains the issue 
of women’s rights and would continue to agitate the minds of people 
because conflict and war are seen as the continuation of man’s penchant to 
dominate and control women in all spheres (Bertha 1990). In this sense, 
violence against women at the home front or domestic level is nothing but 
the continuation of the differences that exist between men and women. In 
accordance to the doctrine of pacifism, innocent persons who suffered 
from violence and wars provide the needed moral compass for the mobili-
zation of the entire community to demand for change and other vices that 
led to the war.
In this context, it is noted that the innocent and vulnerable groups, 
which are mostly women and children, could be the target of the enemy if 
it becomes difficult to hit opposing combatants. This approach to war has 
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caused severe pain and destruction to many communities that have wit-
nessed war where vulnerable members of their families and communities 
have been killed and taken as prisoners of war where they are abused sexu-
ally and exploited.
According to Tickner (2001), women are not mostly combatants in 
war, which explains why the nature and character of the effects of conflict 
and war on women are significantly different from men. Women suffer 
more psychological effect of war than men. Further explanation indicates 
that about 90% of the victims of conflicts and wars are women and chil-
dren (Blanchard 2003).
As observed by Puri (2015), it is important to have a clear articulation 
of all the gender-related issues that might encompass security; have a clear 
articulation of all security regulations and decisions that might compro-
mise the adequate and specific needs of women; and discuss its manifesta-
tions at physical and psychological levels of insecurity for women—where 
and why are women insecure? Where and why do women have a percep-
tion of insecurity? How can security forces address this? What creates fear 
and intimidation and erosion of trust and constructive relations? What are 
the warning signs and how may they be addressed, specifically for women? 
How do country’s settings impact how the security system responds to the 
security challenges? These entire questions cannot be adequately addressed 
by conventional security architecture of a state, therefore, requiring a mul-
tipronged approach which is encompassing and holistic in nature.
overvIew oF nIgerIa’S Internal SecurIty SItuatIonS
Internal security situation of nations is of major concern to the interna-
tional community as well as domestic security discourses (Obi 1997; 
Tyoden 2005). Irrespective of the regime type in control of governmental 
powers within a state and the power configuration in the global arena, the 
preoccupation of national or internal security has not diminished in impor-
tance since the emergence of the state system. Within the nation state 
framework, whether it is military authoritarian regimes or democratic gov-
ernments, considerations surrounding national security are at the apogee of 
the hierarchy of states’ national interest. At the core of these considerations 
are the twin issues of regime survival and the preservation of the territorial 
integrity of the state system. In Nigeria, as similar to post- colonial states, it 
is a complex web of many groups which encompass ethnic, cultural and 
religious, therefore, polarizing the country along these lines of differences. 
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Violent conflict threatens internal security of the country, and, to a large 
extent, these threats are sustained by parochial interest of individuals and 
groups within and outside the country (Otite 2004; Fayeye 2012).
Nigeria’s internal security architecture is overstretched due to the ava-
lanche of security threats from different parts of the country where secu-
rity personnel are required for urgent deployment to prevent escalation. 
According to Onuoha (2012), there are many violent groups in Nigeria 
that threaten internal security across the country, which include Arewa 
Peoples Congress (APC), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) and Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC), and Boko Haram as 
well as the emerging group in eastern Nigeria known as the Indigenous 
People of Biafra. Security situation in the country is still fragile and calls 
for serious concern (Dambazau 2014).
Beginning from 1999, when Nigeria transited from military to civilian 
government, evolving developments suggest that the country’s national 
security has been facing considerable internal security threats which is sup-
ported by spate of violence and killings recorded across the country 
(Dambazau 2014). In addition, other security challenges or issues cause 
violence such as the Fulani herdsmen and farmers’ conflict across the 
country. Attempts by security agencies to contain these challenges do not 
appear to be effective. These security challenges also have gender implica-
tions. Indeed, the distinct security concerns of women tend to be margin-
alized and, in some cases, exacerbated. Conflict-related atrocities are 
inflicted upon non-combatants who are largely women and children and 
those who are categorized as ‘innocent’ in the conflict-constructed con-
texts of rationality and irrationality who have served as pawns in the war-
fare process through systematic rape, forced prostitution and intimidation 
as well as disappearances and attacks on the enemy carried out through 
attacks on their women. All these have become horrifyingly common, 
even expectedly, in front-line accounts of armed conflicts (Nordstrom 
1997 and Leahy 1997 cited in Zotto 2002). Gender is concerned with 
social inclusion, which encompasses how men and women interrelate with 
each other on a daily basis even in situation of violence (Scott 1986).
According to Enemou (1999), gender evokes certain characteristics 
and expectations in terms of how women and men should behave and 
respond to issues. These behaviours are acquired through learning process 
that are supported by culture and norms. Contrary behaviour to accept-
able behaviours and norms could be interpreted as insubordination, espe-
cially if the person is a woman (UNDP 1986). In the South-West, armed 
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robbers are on the rampage, while in the North, cross-border bandits and 
terrorists operate. Further, in other parts of the country like the South- 
South and South-Eastern Nigeria, kidnapping is on the rise where even 
the aged people, women and children are not spared. Violence and 
 criminality in Nigeria have manifested in different forms across the coun-
try (Onuoha 2012). Insecurity takes various forms in different parts of the 
country with great gender implications. Gender is inseparable from con-
flict in which women often found themselves alone, left to care for their 
children, relatives, friends and even strangers.
gender conSIderatIonS In Internal SecurIty 
SItuatIonS In nIgerIa
Internal security management and operations entail security operations 
which are designed and implemented by security operatives within a coun-
try to safeguard security from identified security threats. Such security 
operatives could involve Police, Immigration, Civil Defence and other 
paramilitary operatives in the country. Some threats manifest in the form 
of riots, violent killings and others (Azinge 2013). Maintenance of law and 
order is the core function of Police, which is clearly stated in Section 4 of 
the Police Act. Religious and ethnic conflicts as well as insurgency and ter-
rorism have combined to overwhelm the police, thereby requiring the 
need to engage the military in internal security operations across the coun-
try (Zainab-Brown 2014).
The Nigerian military is presently deployed to address internal security 
problems across the country. Whilst the police are constitutionally man-
dated as the leading security agency to attend to internal security prob-
lems, the military is brought in to stabilize the situation and thereafter 
retreat to focus on other national threats, especially external aggression. 
According to Nigeria’s Constitution 1999, the Section 217 stipulates 
responsibility of the military. It empowers the President of the country to 
deploy the military with the ratification of legislature to any location that 
is threatened by insecurity (Azinge 2013).
According to Zainab-Brown (2014), beyond the core function of the 
military which is to defend the country against external aggression, it can 
still provide internal security to the country, especially when security 
threats overwhelm the police and other security operatives. This explains 
why Okoli and Orinya (2013) posit that the security threats in the country 
are enormous and overwhelming for the police alone to handle. The need 
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to draft the military to quell threats and killings in the country is very 
important. The increasing deployment of the military to not less than 28 
states in the country was criticized by the speaker, House of Representatives, 
describing it as unacceptable (Premium Times 2017).
The gender considerations of these operations are, in most cases, not 
properly considered before operations are launched. This explains why the 
issue of human rights violations and abuse of women and children are not 
typically perceived as a challenge in internal security management in 
Nigeria. Women and girls are assaulted and raped by security personnel 
with impunity (Ihayere et al. 2014). In the political realm, electoral poli-
tics in Nigeria is not free from violence, and women face significant 
gender- based vulnerabilities. In the year prior to the elections, Nigeria 
experienced more political violence than it had during its previous election 
cycle in 2011, when over 1000 fatalities were reported.
During the presidential election, an attack by Boko Haram killed 41 
people, including a legislator and two voters, and scared hundreds away 
from the polls (The Huffington Post 2015). Additionally, 66 cases of vio-
lence during elections were recorded by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission. However, violence against women in politics and 
in elections often goes unreported and unmonitored, but it remains a 
troubling issue with far-reaching implications for democracy, human 
rights, gender equality and security.
gender IMplIcatIonS oF nIgerIa’S Internal 
SecurIty ManageMent
Internal security management and security challenges are collectively 
undertaken by security agencies towards the restoration of law and order in 
the society. Some of these activities undertaken by security agencies include 
crowd dispersal, guarding vulnerable points, guarding important persons, 
taking over and controlling areas, road blocks, setting up control points, 
domination of rooftops, patrolling, sweeps, cordon and search, picketing, 
ambushes, tracking, curfew, counter-insurgency and counterterrorism.
While this operational activity by security agencies has gender implica-
tions, most violence and crises are triggered by men due to irreconcilable 
differences between them. When security operations of this nature are 
launched, women and children suffer more due to their vulnerability in a 
crisis situation. Women may lose their husbands, sons and daughters, busi-
nesses and other forms of economic activities during times of violence. 
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For instance, when a curfew is imposed on any community, women and 
children suffer most; restriction of movement hampers the women from 
going to the market and farms to get food items and other things for the 
family. To expatiate further, case studies of the synergy between internal 
security situations and gender in Nigeria are examined below.
gender and Internal SecurIty SItuatIonS In nIgerIa: 
SoMe caSe StudIeS
The Niger Delta: Niger Delta women perform a lot of tasks, especially 
those in farming and fishing as well as other economic activities to support 
their families. Therefore, women are largely affected directly by any 
unpleasant situation in the region. Nonetheless, women have been active 
in the struggle against repression of which many of them have paid 
Supreme price for rights agitations with their lives. Women are indiscrimi-
nately assaulted and terrorized by security personnel for challenging what 
appears not to be right. In this sense, there are increasing cases of widow-
hood and rape which have been alleged to be perpetrated by members of 
security personnel operating in the Niger Delta. According to Ogunniran 
(2007) and Ihayere et al. (2014) noted that due to harsh conditions con-
fronting the people of the Niger Delta, husbands have significantly abdi-
cated their matrimonial responsibilities to their wives which have added 
more burden to the women.
The Odi Invasion: Several days of military operations in Odi were very 
brutal, leading to destruction of some notable infrastructures such as 
church buildings and sacred halls as well as medical outfits in the area 
(Dode 2012). At the end of combat operations, the military embarked on 
mop-up operations to clear the remnants of perceived militants in the 
community. Several years later, no independent and open inquiry has been 
instituted to investigate the killings of civilians and unarmed individuals 
who were victims of military operations in the area. Even after many years 
of Odi community invasion by the military, that community is still in ruins 
(Dode 2012). It was noted that about 375 persons in Odi lost their lives 
during the operation and the majority of the victims were women and 
children. Besides the spate of killings which characterized the operations 
in Odi, it was also alleged that there was an increase in the raping of 
women and young girls by security personnel in the area and was later sup-
ported and sustained by increase in prostitution by young girls to survive 
as they had lost their means of income to the invasion. Some security 
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 personnel employed by the oil companies as well as national security per-
sonnel operating in the region were involved in the act of sex for money 
which exploited the vulnerability of women in the region. In some 
instances, women were taken as hostages from their homes at night.
zakI-BIaM InvaSIon By the MIlItary
More people have been displaced in Benue State not just as a result of 
recent crises, but because there have been a series of crisis in the state for 
a long time. For instance, Zaki-Biam is one of the towns in Benue state 
which was invaded by Nigeria’s military on the allegation that the town 
harbours militant groups rampaging communities and threatening national 
security. Military operation in this area was noted to be very brutal with 
many civilians and unarmed individuals killed in that operation and where 
a large number of victims were alleged to be women and children who 
were mostly vulnerable during conflicts and violence.
Boko haraM InSurgency and terrorISM In nIgerIa’S 
north-eaSt
The entire North-Eastern part of Nigeria has been under siege of insur-
gency and terrorism orchestrated by the terror group popularly referred 
to as Boko Haram since 2009. Thousands have been killed by the terror 
group due to guerrilla tactics (Alfred 2015). This deadly group has severely 
threatened Nigeria’s security by their violent activities which include killing 
of civilians using improvised explosive devices, kidnapping especially young 
schoolgirls and so on. This reaffirms the earlier claims in terms of a num-
ber of girls kidnapped and taken captive by the group and demanding for 
ransom from the government before release (Human Rights Watch 2016).
FulanI herdSMen-FarMerS conFlIct In nIgerIa
The Nigeria Watch project, domiciled at the French Institute for 
Research in Africa (IFRA), Ibadan, with rich and extensive database on 
violent conflicts in Nigeria as of 2014, attributed over 615 violent 
deaths out of over 61,214 violence-related fatalities to cattle grazing 
alone (Olayoku 2014). This may be the reason why the Nigerian mili-
tary described the violent Fulani herdsmen as Boko Haram collabora-
tors (McGregor 2014). Fulani herdsmen are on rampage across the 
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country killing, maiming and raping young girls and women in many 
communities where violence perpetrated by herdsmen was recorded in 
the country.
concluSIon
Nigeria’s internal security has been quite challenging. Internal security 
management is fundamental because it could determine to a large extent 
the preservation of the state and the survival of the government. Decisions 
on the management or deployment of state security apparatuses to differ-
ent locations where threats are noticed or reported, in most cases, were 
not holistic and inclusive. Women and children suffer most in any vio-
lence, yet decisions on security issues may not consider their opinion or 
plights. Violence against women continues unabated in many homes and 
communities across the country, which violates the human rights of 
women as well as the manifestations of gender inequality and discrimina-
tion. Globally, 35% of women have been subjected to some form of physi-
cal or sexual abuse in their lifetime. This is one of those issues that affect 
all women, regardless of their culture, religion, nationality, education, 
income level and position at work or in society. This happens at home, at 
work, in public spaces and even through technology in cyberspace (Puri 
2015). The impact of violence against women is multiple in nature, which 
makes violence one of the biggest threats to women’s existence.
Also, many human rights abuses are perpetrated by security personnel 
with impunity. Abuses such as assault and rape are commonly reported by 
the public against security personnel where justice to victims is rare. Some 
security measures such as curfew, cordon and search, ambushes, patrols 
and sweeps are carried out without considering the impact of these mea-
sures on gender. Women in crises situation are more concerned and active 
than men in terms of providing for their children and family; curfew and 
other measures restrict women’s movements to markets and farms, thereby 
leaving them and their families in more pain and agony.
The management of internal security can no longer be understood 
from a linear perspective; it has to be broad and encompassing to ade-
quately deal with new and emerging threats to national security, especially 
as it concerns women. Evidently, when it comes to security issues, women 
have a different set of needs and concerns than men. These concerns must 
be given adequate attention in decision-making if security in all ramifica-
tions is to effectively and adequately provided to all in the society.
 A. I. POGOSON AND M. U. SALEH
645
reFerenceS
Alfred, C. (2015). How Boko Haram uses female suicide bombers to terror-
ize Nigeria. The World Post, February 28. Retrieved July 24, 2017, from 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/28/boko-haram-female-
suicidebombers_n_6763386.html.
Associated Press. (2015). Boko Haram kills dozens during Nigeria election. The 
Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 28 March. Web. 16 April.
Azinge, E. (2013). Military in internal security operations: Challenges and pros-
pects. A paper presented at the Nigerian Bar Association 53rd Annual General 
Conference on the 28th August, Tinapa, Calabar.
Baldwin, D. (1997). The concept of security. Review of International 
Studies, 23, 2–3.
Bertha, V. S. (1990). Die waffen neider (Lay down your arms). Knaur.
Blanchard, E. M. (2003). International Relations and the development of feminist 
security theory. Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(4), 5–6.
Buzan, B. (1984). Peace, power and security: Contending concepts in the study of 
International Relations. Journal of Peace Research, 21, 109–125.
Buzan, B. (1992). People, states & fear. New York: Harvest Wheat-sheaf Press.
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). The evolution of international security studies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, B., Weaver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security – A new framework for 
analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Renner Publishers.
Dambazau, A. A. (2014). Africa, Central Africa, economics, human rights, per-
spectives. Harvard International Review, 35(4), 1–5.
Dode, R.  O. (2012). Nigerian security forces and the management of internal 
conflict in the Niger Delta: Challenges of human security and development. 
European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1(3), 409–418.
Enemou, C. F. (1999). Gender and women empowerment. In R. Anifowoshe & 
C. F. Enemou (Eds.), Elements of politics. Lagos: Malthouse Press.
Enloe, C. (1980). Ethnic soldiers: State security in divided societies. London: 
Penguin Books.
Fayeye, J. O. (2012). The role of security sector in management of conflicts and 
promotion of democratic governance in Nigeria. Current Research Journal of 
Social Sciences, 4(3), 3.
Hettne, B. (2010). Development and security: Origins and future. Security 
Dialogue, 41(1), 3–4.
Hoogensen, G., & Stuvoy, K. (2006). Gender, resistance and human security. 
Security Dialogue, 37(2), 207–228.
Human Rights Watch. (2016). Extreme measures abuses against children detained 
as national security threats. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from https://www.
hrw.org/report/2016/07/28/extreme-measures/abuses-against-children-
detained-national-security-threats.
28 GENDER AND NIGERIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
646
Ihayere, C., Ogeleka, D. F., & Ataine, T. I. (2014). The effects of the Niger Delta 
oil crisis on women folks. Journal of African Studies and Development, 
6(1), 14–21.
Katsina, A. M. (2012). Nigeria’s security challenges and the crisis of development: 
Towards a new framework for analysis. International Journal of Developing 
Societies, 1(3), 1–3.
Leahy, M. (1997). Conflict through a gendered lens. A paper presented at the 1st 
Annual Symposium on International Relations, Institute for Conflict Resolution, 
Brussels.
McGregor, A. (2014). Alleged Connection between Boko Haram and Nigeria’s 
Fulani Herdsmen Could Spark a Nigerian Civil War. Terrorism Monitor, 
12(10), 8–10.
Mobekk, E. (2010). International Peacekeeping, 17(2).
Nordstrom, C. (1997). Girls and warzones troubling questions. Uppsala: Life and 
Peace Institute.
Obi, C. (1997). Oil, environmental conflict and national security in Nigeria: 
Ramifications of the ecology – security nexus for sub-regional peace. ACDIS 
Occasional Paper.
Ogunniran, S.T. (2007). Nigeria women’s burdens demand socialist action, 
pp. 1–5. Retrieved October 20, 2017, from http://www.socialistnigeria.org/
page.php?article=1222.
Okoli, A., & Orinya, S. (2013). Evaluating the strategic efficacy of military involve-
ment in internal security operations (ISOPs) in Nigeria. IOSR Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 9(6), 20–27.
Olayoku, P. A. (2014). Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in 
Nigeria (2006–2014). IFRA Nigeria. Retrieved November 28, 2017, from 
http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/cattle-grazing-rural-violence-
nigeria.pdf.
Olusola, K. O. (2016). Engendering security sector reforms in Africa: A policy appraisal 
and institutional capacity study of the Nigeria Police Force. Journal of Emerging 
Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS), 7(5), 285–290.
Onuoha, F.  C. (2012). Boko Haram: Evolving tactics and state’s responses. A 
paper presented at the citizenship initiative on Northern Nigerian. The dynam-
ics of the social and political conflict. Tampa, Florida, 13–15 November.
Otite, O. (2004). On conflicts, their resolution transformation and management. 
In O. Otite & I. O. Albert (Eds.), Community conflicts in Nigeria: Management, 
resolution, and transformation. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
Pogoson, A. I. (2013). Nigeria’s National security in an age of terrorism. Ibadan: 
Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
Premium Times. (2017). Dogara questions deployment of military in ‘over 28 
states. Reported by Nassir Ayitogo. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from https://
www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/235771-dogara-questions-
deployment-military-28-states.htm.
 A. I. POGOSON AND M. U. SALEH
647
Puri, L. (2015). Gender consideration in security management. Retrieved March 
10, 2017, from http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/01/gender- 
consideration-in-security-management-a-speech-by-lakshmi-puri.
Romaniuk, S. (2009). Engaging gender (in) security. Gender and Media Diversity 
Journal (5), 143–152.
Rourke, J. T. (2005). International politics on the world stage (10th ed.). New York: 
McGraw Hill.
Scott, J. (1986). Gender: A useful category of historical analysis. American 
Historical Review, 91(5), 1–5.
Sheehan, M. (2005). International security: An analytical survey. London: Lynne 
Reiner Publishers.
Sulovic, V. (2010). Meaning of security and theory of securitization. Belgrade 
Centre for Security Policy.
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Tickner, J. A. (2001). Gendering world politics: Issues and approaches in the post- 
cold war era. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Tyoden, S. G. (2005). State and security in Nigeria’s fourth republic. In A. T. 
Gana & Y.  B. Omelle (Eds.), Democratic rebirth in Nigeria (Vol. 1). 
Abuja: AFRIGOV.
UNDP. (1986). Extract from the report of the governing council of the United 
Nations Development Program on its organisational meeting for 1986 and on 
its thirty-third session. Distribution.
UNSSR. (2012). Security sector reform integrated technical guidance notes. 
New York: UNSSR.
Weaver, D.  B. (2000). The exploratory war-distorted destination life cycle. 
International Journal of Tourism Research, 2, 151–161.
Wolfers, A. (1952). National security as an ambiguous symbol. Political Science 
Quarterly, 67, 481–502.
Wollstonecraft, M. (1792–1975). A vindication of the rights of woman. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Classic.
Zainab-Brown, P. (2014). The military and internal security in Nigeria: Challenges 
and prospects. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(27), 1301–1307.
Zotto, A.  C. (2002). Weeping women, wringing hands: How the mainstream, 
media stereotyped women’s experiences in Kosovo. Journal of Gender Studies, 
11(2), 141–150.
28 GENDER AND NIGERIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
649© The Author(s) 2019
O. O. Oshita et al. (eds.), Internal Security Management in Nigeria, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_29
CHAPTER 29





One of the major banes of Nigeria’s development is the problem of inse-
curity and youth restiveness that spans across the length and breadth of 
the country (Ewetan and Urhie 2014). The problem of insecurity includes 
the menace of ethnic militias across the country, militancy in the Niger 
Delta, insurgency in the north, kidnapping, herdsmen menace, armed 
robbery and cultism, which is prevalent in almost all parts of the country. 
However, it is imperative to note that the government and other partners 
of national development architecture recognise that national security is a 
precondition for sustaining the survival, growth and development of a 
state. Another important fact that is worthy of note is that the army of 
unemployed and idle youth population around the country have been easy 
recruits and perpetrators of insecurity across the country (Duruji 2008). 
The government believes that these challenges of insecurity need to be 
tackled as panacea to the socio-economic development of the country.
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It is believed that when the idle youth population are engaged in mean-
ingful economic activities, then the incentive to engage in crime and 
 criminality will be reduced, thereby creating an atmosphere of peace 
(Koripamo-Agary 2010). Arising from this, this study examined whether 
the empowerment programmes such as Amnesty Programme, YouWin 
and N-Power, among others, have provided adequate economic opportu-
nities for the youth and the militias in the region. This chapter analyses the 
challenges that have hindered the effectiveness of the programmes. Lastly, 
the chapter investigates whether the youth empowerment programmes 
have reduced security challenges in Nigeria. Data for the analysis were 
sourced largely from documentary materials and analysed descriptively.
the concept of Youth
Like other concepts in the Social Sciences, there are a myriad of meanings 
attached to or given to the concept “youth”. However, despite the diversi-
ties, they all reflect some common features such as people falling within a 
particular age group, a state of mind, the quality of being young, a time or 
era of transiting from childhood to adulthood (Ikelegbe 1998, 2006; 
Maududi 1989). Nugent (2005, p.  2) defines youth as all the people 
between ages 10 and 24. This covers a wide range of experiences and tran-
sitions that include an early phase (between ages 10 and 14), a middle 
phase (between 15 and 20), and a later phase (between 21 and 24). Still 
using similar pattern of introducing numerical figures to the definition, 
the United Nations, for statistical purposes, defines those persons between 
the ages of 15 and 24 as youth without prejudice to other definitions by 
Member States. According to Hornby, youth stage of life occurs when a 
person is young, especially the time before a child becomes an adult. 
Similarly, Ikelegbe (2006, p. 24) posits that “youth ordinarily is a category 
of early adulthood, emerging in activity and involvement in society but 
somewhat limited by societal values and some levels of dependency and 
perhaps agency”.
Adepoju (2012) and Chukuezi (2009) aver that youth are the breakers 
and makers of societies. This view is collaborated by Honwana and De 
Boeck (2005) who argued that the youth are makers of any society and 
sources of resilience and resistance as well as a potent political force. Adding 
to this positive dimension of the roles the youth play in the society, De 
Boeck (1999) posits that youth are bearers of ingenious politics of identity 
and via inventive forms of self-realisation mechanisms make themselves and 
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the society they live in. Discussing the negative impacts this social group has 
on the society, Adepoju (2012) argues that they  constitute a significant 
ratio of societal deviants that break social norms, rules and conventions, 
destroy infrastructure and kill. According to Chukuezi (2009), there are 
two-dimensional statuses of youth in the society. In the first place, they 
(youth) can constitute a reservoir of energy and dynamism for any national 
struggle or campaign if they are correctly guided, mobilised and fully inte-
grated into the social fabric of the nation. Second, they may also constitute 
a threat to national survival and stability if they are allowed to drift, are 
unemployed, undisciplined and morally bankrupt (cited in Adepoju 2012).
the SecurItY SItuatIon In nIgerIa
The problem of insecurity in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era when 
there were sporadic outbursts of crisis in some parts of the country, notably 
the Jos riots of 1945 and the Kano riot of 1953, which erupted following 
disagreement and misunderstanding among politicians who were at the 
forefront of the independence movement in the country (Adinlofu 2009).
Also, the activities of pirates in the high seas in the Niger Delta contrib-
uted to the insecurity that bedevilled the country at that time. Likewise, 
intermittent outbreaks of religious uprising, particularly in the northern 
part of the country, have become perennial, prominent among them was 
the Maitatsine riots and the Sharia crisis in Kaduna State (Adinlofu 2009).
After independence, other challenges of insecurity ravaging the country 
include the activities of militants and youth restiveness in the Niger Delta 
that occasionally cripple the flow of crude oil from the region. The spate 
of kidnapping across the country has also become worrisome for the gov-
ernment. There are also spates of communal strife and tensions across the 
country, leading to sacking of communities and displacement. The most 
recent phenomenon is the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast region 
and the menace of Fulani herdsmen invading farming communities in the 
middle belt and southern parts of the country (Ogunbiyi 2016).
the concept of Internal SecurItY ManageMent
Internal security of a nation state centres on ensuring peace and order 
within its territorial boundaries. It is a situation where institutions of the 
state such as police or at extreme times the military are able to uphold the 
laws of such state and, by so doing, create an environment for civil order, 
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thus enabling governmental and civil activities to be carried out smoothly 
(Jennings et al. 2006). In most countries, the responsibility of managing 
internal security is usually handled by the police, which act to prevent or 
contain civil disorder, violent riots or even armed insurgency. National 
internal security can also be said to be threatened when there is prevalence 
of crime (petty or organised), unrest (political or industrial) and domestic 
terrorism (Francis et al. 2015).
Though individuals of other ages could be found engaging in these acts 
that compromise internal security, there is a consensus in literature that 
youth population largely dominate the age bracket who engage in 
these acts.
There are many ways of managing internal security, including the use of 
coercive instruments or through the use of empowerment strategies. The 
coercive perspective to internal security management focuses on the use of 
appropriate force to either prevent a threat to internal security or restore 
order where disruption has occurred. The show of force would deter devi-
ants’ behaviours that may plunge nation states into internal security chal-
lenges (Mireanu 2014). These perspectives also involve the use of the 
youth as informants of security operatives, to build intelligence that can be 
used to nip threats in the bud (Mireanu 2014). The formation of vigilante 
groups, mostly managed by the youth of threatened communities, also fits 
into this perspective.
The other perspective to internal security management is to focus on 
the empowerment of the youth as a way of creating disincentives for 
actions that threaten the security and peace of the society. In Nigeria, 
there are a good number of these empowerment programmes aimed at 
lifting youth out of poverty, thereby reducing the number that can be 
recruited into crime.
the StrategY of Youth eMpowerMent 
In the ManageMent of Internal SecurItY In nIgerIa
Empowerment is a process of upliftment instituted to enable individuals 
to acquire the capacity to take care of their needs. According to Page and 
Czuba (1999), it is a social process that helps people gain control over 
their own lives. Page and Czuba (1999) further argue that empowerment 
is a process that fosters power or capacity in people, to control the own 
lives, communities and society, to enable them independently decide on 
issues of their lives. From the perspective of Page and Czuba (1999), 
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empowerment is multidimensional in the sense that it occurs within socio-
logical, psychological and economic, among others. They equally posit 
that empowerment is a social process that occurs at various levels, such as 
individual, group and community. This explains the concepts of youth 
empowerment, which are programmes tailored towards developing the 
young adults in the society to acquire the power or capacity that gives 
them control over their lives. Thus, youth empowerment could be seen as 
a situation whereby youth gain the skills to impact their own lives and lives 
of other individuals, organisations and communities (YES 2017).
According to Small and Memmo (2004), there have been shifts over 
the past decades in the efforts to support healthy development and inte-
gration of the youth into the community. As part of the strategies of man-
aging internal security, nation states and governments have devised means 
of keeping the youth off the streets. At first, efforts were tailored towards 
risk-based preventive approaches, which included the fostering of healthy 
youth development and capacity building that involved active community 
participants but contemporary efforts have focused on youth empower-
ment (Small and Memmo 2004). Empowerment under this context rep-
resents a multilevel construct of practical approaches and applications, 
social action processes, and individual and collective actions. In other 
words, individuals, families, organisations and communities gain control 
and mastery within the social, economic and political context of their lives 
in other to improve equity and quality of life (Rappaport 1987; 
Zimmerman 2000).
ModelS of Youth eMpowerMent
There are different models of youth empowerment that have been devel-
oped in the literature, under which policies and programmes can be 
mapped out to empower the youth as strategies of internal security man-
agement. One such model is the Adolescent Empowerment Cycle (AEC), 
which aims to prevent a sense of rolelessness and enhancement of self- 
esteem. Chinman and Linney (1998) describe AEC as a development pro-
cess of social bonding that is aimed at achieving skill development and 
reinforcement, thereby helping to prevent youth from engaging in nega-
tive social activities that threaten the security of the society.
Another model of youth empowerment is the Youth Development and 
Empowerment (YD&E) developed to bring about programmes that pre-
vent risky behaviours such as substance abuse. Kim et al. (1998) posits that 
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YD&E process is designed to enhance positive social bonding that pre-
pares the youth for participation in the socio-economic and public affairs 
of their community. A typical YD&E platform recognises the youth as 
assets and resource for the social affairs and advancement of their com-
munity. In YD&E, youth are made to engage with representatives of social 
agencies and organisations in a community-based task force programmes. 
The roles of the task force include provision of leadership, expertise and 
resources to youth teams participating in community service projects. The 
teams in YD&E programmes are divided in pairs and then trained to 
acquire core skills, in team building, communication, problem-solving 
and interpersonal social skills. In turn, the youth-adult pair are to dupli-
cate what they acquired in other youth teams as they work together to 
produce team-determined service projects. The YD&E projects, accord-
ing to Kim et al. (1998), must have career-building potential, designed to 
address local social concerns. These YD&E processes reinforce shared 
responsibilities among the team members who engage in regular presenta-
tions to the task forces, thus creating values to their communities.
The third model is the Transactional Partnering Model which involves 
a situation where adult practitioners assist youth participants in assessing 
their own quality of life through initiatives that generates solutions (Cargo 
et al. 2003). This model lays emphasis on interrelatedness of individual- 
and community-level empowerment outcome. Transactional Partnering 
Model aims at the youth taking control of their lives by emphasising youth 
responsibility and voicing out their opinion, as well as making decisions 
and taking action to achieve their goal. The essence is to expose the youth 
to possibilities and problems that are within safe and supportive environ-
ment. The expectation being that engagement and reflection would lead 
to learning and empowerment.
Empowerment Education Model is another model of youth empower-
ment that emphasises the development of skills and knowledge that sup-
port youth effort towards social action and change which links individual 
empowerment to community organising. It is believed that this process 
will culminate in increased self-collective and political efficacy that result 
in self-protective individual behaviours and other protective socially 
responsible behaviours and group efforts for social change.
The model of empowerment most suitable for Nigeria is the 
Empowerment Education Model and the Youth Development and 
Empowerment Model. Most of the programmes conceived and adopted 
by the various governments of the years fit into these categories.
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Youth MIlItancY and InSecurItY In nIgerIa
Militancy refers to aggressive or combative engagement or activism in 
struggles for recognised reasons. For Inokoba and Imbua (2010, p. 102), 
militancy is “… an aggressive and active behaviour geared towards the 
defence and support of a cause (mainly political), often to the point of 
extremism”. Inokoba and Imbua (2010) identify three types of militancy: 
intellectual militancy in which causes are ideologically pursued via peaceful 
means such as dialogue; violent militancy which believes that power lies in 
the power of the use of coercive instruments to achieve an objective; and, 
lastly, mobilisation of militancy which embraces the conscientisation and 
enlightenment of people to advance a cause.
Youth militancy can be described as the engagement in which the youth 
antagonise the state or society due to socio-infrastructural inadequacies, 
frustration, anger and resentment that result from the diverse issues, 
awareness of the disavowal of their rights, marginalisation, exclusion from 
socio-political processes in their society (Sulaiman 2012). In addition to 
the above, youth militancy refers to the youth being in the front line of the 
conflicts. They define the methods, strategies and tactics in the fight 
against the state and other constituted authorities and describe the vitality, 
momentum, diction and vocalisation of the conflicts. Thus, in this chapter, 
youth militancy refers to a social movement spearheaded by youth for the 
pursuit of outlined objectives which are mainly saturated within social jus-
tice, human rights defences and developmental issues and conditions.
In Nigeria, militancy orchestrated by the youth has been rampant, par-
ticularly in the Niger Delta region of the country which hosts most of the 
oil companies that lays the golden egg for the country.
Youth militancy in the Niger Delta has taken various forms over time 
which has been transformed over the years. It has taken the form of intel-
lectual militancy from the beginning to mobilisation of militancy and cur-
rently at the violent stage. However, Osaghae et al. (2007) situated the 
meaning of insurgency within the Niger Delta crisis. They stated that mili-
tancy in the Niger Delta refers to “gunmen who make political demands, 
including the release of imprisoned leaders, cash reparations for communi-
ties, change of electoral candidates and a greater share of oil revenues, 
among other issues”.
Insecurity crept into the Niger Delta region shortly after independence 
of the country when the Niger Delta liberation group led by Adaka Boro 
declared a Niger Delta Republic in 1966 (Duruji and Azuh 2016). 
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However, Ken Saro Wiwa, a writer, was able to organise his Ogoni kins-
men in the 1990s to challenge the Nigerian state over environmental deg-
radation of Ogoniland and deprivation of Ogoni people of their resources 
(Isumoha 2004). The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) which he founded articulated Ogoni demands in a document 
called the Ogoni Bill of Rights. That document was signed by 30 tradi-
tional rulers and eminent persons of Ogoniland on behalf of Ogoni people 
and presented to the government and people of Nigeria in November 
1990 (Duruji and Azuh 2016).
The Ogoni struggle and the organisational prowess of Ken Saro Wiwa 
was not only able to raise the consciousness of the entire populace of the 
Niger Delta to the neglect and destruction oil exploration has brought to 
the region but also the internationalisation of the plight of the Niger Delta 
peoples. The advent of the phenomenon of mass protests in Nigerian poli-
tics which was marked by the rise of MOSOP came not only in the pas-
sionate demand for justice in the distribution of national resources but 
also in the wake of demand for a fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian 
state. Central to the quest for political restructuring are issues of changing 
those who control oil power and the establishment of an equitable basis 
for distributing oil revenue (Obi 2000).
The Ogoni revolt not only internationalised the environmental degra-
dation of the Niger Delta region but also succeeded in forcing the multi-
national giant, Shell, to suspend operations in Ogoniland for many years 
(Duruji and Azuh 2016). Though Ken Saro Wiwa paid the supreme price 
in 1995 when he was hanged by the military administration of General 
Sani Abacha on charges of the murder of four prominent Ogoni chiefs, the 
flame of agitations and activism in the Niger Delta which the Ogoni strug-
gle sparked instead of abating intensified across the region.
Drawing from the Ogoni, the Ijaws, under the auspices of Ijaw Youth 
Council, launched the Kaiama Declaration; the Oron came out with Oron 
Bill Of Rights; the Urhobo proclaimed the Urhobo Economic Charter; 
and the Ikwerres in Rivers State came out with Ikwerre Charter of 
Demands and the Akalaka Declaration among several others. The primary 
focus in all these documents was demands for resource control, self- 
determination, true federalism, environmental and economic justice and 
reparation for damages that have been inflicted on the people by several 
decades of oil exploration (Ojakorotu and Dodd 2000; Ojakorotu 2009).
Among all the groups in the Niger Delta, the Ijaw, the largest ethnic 
group in the region, took the struggle to another level beyond where the 
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Ogonis left it. The Kaiama Declaration on December 11, 1998, changed 
the texture of the struggle in the region (Duruji and Azuh 2016). The 
declaration had called for the immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land of all 
military forces of occupation and repression posted by the Nigerian state. 
It warned oil companies not to employ services of Nigerian Armed Forces 
to protect its operation. Otherwise, they would be viewed as enemy of the 
Ijaw people. It was also demanded in the document that oil companies 
should stop all exploration and exploitation activities in the Ijaw area 
because of gas flaring, oil spillages and blowouts, among others, that result 
from their operations. Staff and contractors of oil companies were advised 
to withdraw from Ijaw territory by December 30, 1998, whereas Ijaw 
youth in all communities in the Niger Delta were admonished to com-
mence the implementation of the Declaration by December 30, 1998. It 
was this that laid the foundation for the militant struggle that pervaded 
the Niger Delta region in the turn of the century, giving rise to emergence 
of various militant groups, including the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF) led by Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDA) 
led by Ateke Tom and, the most dangerous of them all, the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which operated formlessly 
with independent leaders such as Charles Okah, John Togo, Government 
Ekpemupolo, Godwill Tamuno, Soboma George, Britus Ebipade, 
Tubotamuno Angplia and Ebikabowei Victor-Ben. All these leaders had 
their own camps and spheres of control in the creeks of the Niger Delta. 
The activities of MEND crumbled the country’s economy for many years, 
forcing the government to adopt a negotiated settlement that rewarded 
the militants with the Amnesty Programme. However, militancy re- 
emerged again in the Niger Delta, following the defeat of the People’s 
Democratic Party—that instituted the Amnesty Programme—by the All 
Progressive Congress in 2015, when the new ruling party attempted to 
halt the programme and declaring some of the militant leaders as crimi-
nals. The emergence of Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), that made a ten- 
point demand on the government before they started bombing pipelines 
in February 2016, opened the gate for myriad militant groups to spring up 
again in the Niger Delta region. The effect of these on the economy com-
pelled the government to abandon the strategy of use of force to that of 
dialogue and negotiation with stakeholders in the region. The outcome 
was to continue the empowerment programmes targeted at the militants 
of the Niger Delta region as a way of securing peaceful business environ-
ment for oil exploration.




Amnesty as a state strategy or policy for addressing youth militancy in the 
region began in 1967 when late Isaac Adaka Boro and some of his core 
Niger Delta Volunteer Force leaders who were sentenced to death because 
of their engagement and drives in the insurgency of February 1966 were 
pardoned. In October 2004, Olusegun Obasanjo, the then President of 
Nigeria also signed a peace accord with the youth militia groups in the 
Niger Delta led by Asari’s NDPVF and the NDV. One of the terms of the 
accord was that general pardon would be granted to all the youth who 
took up arms against the state. Thus, it included disarmament, demobili-
sation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Furthermore, there was the 
promise of about 4000 jobs for the youth (Hazen and Horner 2007). The 
Amnesty Programme was able to demilitarise the regions a bit. Over 3000 
weapons were collected via the demobilisation programme within eight 
months specifically from October 2004 to June 2005 (Enoh 2009). Apart 
from the collection of arms, Gilbert (2010) posits that there was decline 
in youth militancy during that period. Contrary to the agreement, there 
were no jobs provided for the reintegration of the youth, but this shows 
that the government was only interested in the collection of arms and not 
addressing the causes of the conflict (Gilbert 2010). In fact, Asari Dokubo 
was arrested in September 2005.
It was against this lack of sincerity and mistrust of government stem-
ming from the manner Obasanjo administration handled the Niger Delta 
militancy that President Yar’Adua in a broadcast proclaimed amnesty for 
militant Delta youth in June 2009 that was met with doubt and distrust by 
most people. The Amnesty Programme was projected as a means of realis-
ing enhanced development-induced alliance between the people in the 
oil-producing communities and the government. There was reassurance 
from Timi Alaibe, honorary special adviser to President Umaru Yar’Adua 
on Niger Delta, and other prominent Niger Delta indigenes of govern-
ment’s sincerity and commitment. President Musa Yar’Adua had argued:
This administration understands the challenges of the Niger Delta region 
and the challenges people are facing and that is why from the beginning I 
made Niger Delta a top priority in our seven-point agenda. I want to say 
that the amnesty is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It is a means 
to peacefully and lovingly with brotherly understanding bring to an end all 
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insurrection and misunderstanding between brothers. It is a means to bring-
ing stable peace and security to the Niger Delta region. It is a means of 
making the two of us work together to ensure that our youths do not take 
up arms again. (Cited in Ogbuenyi 2009, p. 20)
The presidential Amnesty Programme promised to give the repentant 
militants that drop their weapons and enter into the rehabilitation pro-
gramme N65,000 (US$450) stipend per month. A total of 15,000 mili-
tants embraced the amnesty and turned in their ammunitions (Strouse 
2009). Key militants who embraced the amnesty included Henry Okah, 
supposedly the leader of MEND; Victor Ebikabowei, commonly known as 
General Boyloaf, and other militant youth leaders from Bayelsa State; 
Soboma George of Outlaws cult group; and other 20 militants surrendered 
in Rivers State. Ateke Tom of NDV and Fara Dagogo of Niger Delta Strike 
Force, Government Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo or GOC), a notable mili-
tant of MEND, all surrendered in Delta State (Gilbert 2010; Amaize et al. 
2009). The Amnesty Programme started on August 6, 2009, and lasted till 
October 4, 2009 (Onuorah 2009). The rehabilitation and empowerment 
programmes slated for their reintegration into normal societal life also 
enabled the repentant militants to become self-employed or employable in 
the oil firms. Some government institutions like the National Directorate of 
Employment, Petroleum Trust Development Fund, National Poverty 
Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and the Ministry of Niger Delta were 
involved in the rehabilitation of the militants (Ike et al. 2009).
State governments in collaboration with the oil companies have also 
responded to the Niger Delta crisis. On the eve of MOSOP’s protest 
against oil production in Ogoni, the Rivers State government created a 
paramilitary force called the Internal Security Force. Operation Flush and 
Operation Salvage were also created by Rivers and Bayelsa States, respec-
tively, to protect oil installations in their domain (Ojakorotu 2009). Apart 
from the use of force, state governments also implemented several pro-
grammes in place to address the militancy. For instance, Bayelsa State 
implemented reorientation, skills acquisition and employment pro-
grammes or schemes while Rivers State government introduced the “3E 
approach”, which means engagement, education and empowerment.
The success of the amnesty strategy helped in the restoration of extrac-
tive business activities in the oil sector. The approach has been replicated 
at state levels as states such as Imo, Ondo and Rivers have engaged gangs 
causing insecurity in their states to embrace such initiatives in exchange for 
a government-sponsored rehabilitation programme.
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Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin)
YouWin is a private and public initiative established by the administration 
of Goodluck Jonathan and Woma Mccann to empower Nigerian youth 
with bright business plans. The idea of the initiative was aimed at financing 
outstanding business plans of aspiring youth entrepreneurs in Nigeria 
(CEI 2017). Four ministries of the Federal government were involved in 
the scheme. They included Ministries of Finance, Communication and 
Technology, Youth Development, and Women Affairs. At the launch of 
the programme, in 2011, the government targeted at 3600 entrepreneur-
ship that would be enhanced to create hundreds of thousands of employ-
ment for the teeming unemployed youth population of the country 
(Ihenetu 2015).
The programme, at inception, went through three phases of selecting 
beneficiaries who were in turn given funds to develop their business ideas 
through Nigerian banks. Before anyone could qualify to participate, the 
person needed to be a Nigerian youth with a business name registered in 
Nigeria and needed to present a business plan that would go through a 
competitive selection process. The first edition which was tagged YouWin 
I was aimed at sensitising Nigerian youth entrepreneurs on job creation 
through the funding of their business ideas. YouWin II, which rewarded 
1200 youth, was a mono-gender version that focused on women who 
were below the age of 45, whereas YouWin III reverted to the poly- gender 
at the end of which 2500 were selected. (Ihenetu 2015)
However, the inconsistencies that characterise government programmes 
in Nigeria caught up with the programme with the advent of a new admin-
istration at the federal level in 2015, thus slowing down the momentum. 
Though the Buhari administration says it is continuing with the pro-
gramme, it expresses willingness at restructuring the programme. Another 
challenge that bedevilled the programme was the delay in disbursement of 
funds to the beneficiaries which led to protests by the awardees who com-
plain of lukewarm attitude of the handlers of the programme (Akpedji 2015).
the n-power ScheMe
The N-Power scheme was introduced in June 2016 by the Mohammadu 
Buhari administration to engage Nigerian youth who were both graduates 
and undergraduates so as to equip them with relevant skills for career 
development which would in turn transform the Nigerian economy into a 
 M. M. DURUJI ET AL.
661
knowledge-based one. A key component of the N-Power scheme was 
what was called the volunteer corps that aimed to provide jobs for the 
teeming Nigerian youth. This facet of the N-Power programme is the only 
part that has fully kick-started (Uche 2017). With the commencement of 
the programme, it is reported that about 500,000 previously unemployed 
graduates shall be engaged in the scheme. The government claims that 
200,000 youth have already been engaged as teachers, agricultural exten-
sion officers and public health officials, whereas the other 300,000 shall be 
engaged before the end of 2018 (Nigerian Tribune n.d.).
The N-Power scheme, as one of the strategies of the government to 
engage the youth, was greeted with wide publicity and acceptance, and this 
was responsible for the enthusiasm and high subscription it generated 
amongst Nigerian youth. However, the programme has been facing numer-
ous challenges. One of the problems that marred the scheme was the crash 
of the website after a few minutes of accepting applications, thereby frus-
trating many enlistments on the programme by potential beneficiaries. It is 
also reported that many of the lucky volunteers who managed to be 
enrolled into the scheme were not given the “super helpful tab” that the 
designers of the scheme instituted to help them execute their assignments. 
Furthermore, most of the participants did not get their stipends on time 
(Uche 2017). There is also the problem of poor monitoring of the enlisted 
volunteers, some of whom do not turn up for duties and others are said to 
be combining the programme with other jobs, thereby defeating the pur-
pose of the scheme. Though the government has identified the gaps, very 
little has been done to prosecute culprits in cases of abuse, so as to serve as 
deterrence to those who abuse the programme (Uche 2017).
concluSIon
There is no doubt that the socio-economic development in Nigeria has 
been marred to a large extent by a series of insecurity challenges plaguing 
the country. What is also not in doubt is that most perpetrators of the 
 various forms of insecurity in the country are the youth population who 
are driven into such activities due to prolonged economic crisis and huge 
youth unemployment in the country.
The idea of solving the problem of insecurity takes two different dimen-
sions—coercion and empowerment. The coercive dimension is more 
expensive and not sustainable, Consequently, the focus of governments 
over the years has centred on programmes that aim at empowering the 
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youth. Some of the bold programmes included the Ibrahim Babangida’s 
initiative of National Directorate of Employment which has a special pro-
gramme on youth empowerment. Even the programmes Olusegun 
Obasanjo instituted shortly after the transition to civil rule such as Poverty 
Alleviation Programme and NAPEP were aimed at empowering the vul-
nerable populace—mostly the youth.
However, the specific programmes of the government that targeted the 
youth were the Amnesty Programme initiated by Umaru Yar’Adua which 
succeeded in reducing militancy in the Niger Delta region, thus allowing 
crude oil production to continue in the region. The YouWin initiative of 
the Jonathan administration targeted a very tiny segment of the youth but 
with the aim that the businesses supported would in turn employ huge 
youth population when they succeed. The policy inconsistency that has 
marred various administrations in Nigeria did not allow the programme to 
endure. Even the N-Power conceived by the Muhammadu Buhari admin-
istration has very little impact on the majority of Nigerian youth.
The implication of this is that insecurity thrives in Nigeria with no hope 
of abetting. The country is still neck deep in insecurity in spite of the vari-
ous responses of the government including the option of law enforce-
ment. Even the strategy of youth empowerment has not provided the 
panacea to peace due to the lackadaisical manner in which the government 
has managed most of the well-conceived initiatives.
The state of insecurity will indeed persist in Nigeria until a sincere atti-
tude of the men in power changes towards taking responsibility of why 
they are in power which is not the case in Nigeria today despite the huge 
potential of the country in achieving greatness.
The chapter recommends a broadening of these empowerment pro-
grammes to cover more youth across the country, while prudent adminis-
tration of the programmes devoid of corruption and partisanship is 
imperative.
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CHAPTER 30




This book has shown that internal security management in Nigeria has 
faced serious challenges since the end of the civil war in 1970. However, 
the problem has been exacerbated in the past two decades due to the per-
sistent threats posed by militancy in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram 
insurgency in the North-East, escalating conflicts between farmers and 
herdsmen, communal violence, kidnapping and separatist agitations, 
among others. The return to democracy in 1999 witnessed an upsurge in 
the level of violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta, perpetrated by 
diverse militia groups largely made up of youth who were protesting the 
exploitative and lopsided character of the distribution of oil wealth. The 
immediate response of the Nigerian state was excessive militarisation of 
O. O. Oshita (*)
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria
I. M. Alumona 
Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University, 
Igbariam, Nigeria 
F. C. Onuoha 
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nsukka, Nigeria
668
the region, and when this failed, government resorted to the granting of 
presidential amnesty to militants. Although the latter has resulted in the 
return of relative peace in the region, it has failed to bring about sustain-
able peace in the region, as insecurity occasioned by sea banditry still per-
sists in the waterways of the region in the post-amnesty era.
The decline in the level of insecurity in the region coincided, however, 
with the rise of extremist violence in Nigeria’s North-East, waged by the 
Boko Haram insurgent group. The resilience and resurgence of the group 
have been the main source of concern to the leadership of Nigeria’s mili-
tary, security, intelligence and law enforcement institutions. Yet, insecurity 
has continued to persist in other parts of the country due to the escalation 
of violent clashes between armed herdsmen and farmers. One of the nota-
ble implications of the rising violent clashes is rising food insecurity. In no 
place is this more evident than in the North, especially the Middle Belt 
where ethnic cleavages and religious divides have engendered deep mis-
trust among the people that often results in spiralling violence (ICG 2018).
Attention on the problems of Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insur-
gency and escalating violence between herdsmen and farmers has tended to 
diminish the challenges posed by other security threats such as kidnapping 
for ransom, illegal revenue collection in urban areas, cybercrimes, human 
trafficking, illegal migration and arms smuggling. There are equally the 
dimensions and manifestations of spiritual threats to human and national 
security in contemporary Nigeria such as ritual rape, ritual murder, yahoo-
plus, curses, dream manipulations, violent ghosts and familiar spirits, among 
others. Underpinning much of the security challenges are the post-colonial 
character of the Nigerian state, dominance of a rapacious elite class, wide-
spread corruption, weak institutions, rising poverty and high rates of youth 
unemployment. The porous nature of Nigerian borders has added to these 
problems, enabling diverse criminal groups to engage in or facilitate human 
trafficking, cross-border smuggling of illicit small arms and light weapons 
(SALWs) and irregular migration (Mbachu and Bature 2013). Weak insti-
tutional capacity of the Nigerian state not only accounts for the absence of 
robust fight against these crimes, but it is also implicated in exacerbation of 
the impact of environmental challenges that threaten internal security such 
as flooding, pollution, deforestation and desertification.
Notable measures to address these security challenges have included 
the registration of mobile phone users and enactment of legislations pro-
hibiting acts such as cybercrimes and kidnapping. Others include height-
ening of physical security measures around vulnerable targets, strengthening 
of security agencies through the provision of security facilities and 
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 increasing deployment of military forces in Internal Security Operations 
(ISOs). The use of the coercive instruments and institutions of the state to 
manage internal security challenges has been the most preferred option by 
successive Nigerian governments.
In this light, this study also examined the diverse security institutions 
(both formal and informal) that are charged with the responsibilities of 
managing these security threats. The first security agency that is constitu-
tionally empowered to manage internal security in Nigeria is the Nigeria 
Police Force. Although the police have performed well in the past, recent 
events within the Nigerian security matrix have exposed the police as a 
corrupt and ill-equipped security institution. The failure of the police 
force has created a considerable mistrust among the citizens in Nigeria and 
has resulted in the deployment of the military in internal security matters.
The military is primarily charged with the responsibility of protecting 
the Nigerian state from external aggression. However, the liberalisation of 
the political space since May 29, 1999, as well as poor funding of the 
police has seen a dramatic increase in military deployment for ISOs. The 
role of the military in internal security matters has largely sustained the 
unity of Nigeria. However, their heavy deployment in ISOs has exposed 
their shortcomings, including being implicated in human rights abuses.
The inadequacies of the police and military in the management of inter-
nal security have given impetus for the establishment of Joint Task Force 
(JTF) usually involving the army, the Navy, the Air Force, the police and 
other security agencies (Peterside 2014). Over time, the Nigerian govern-
ment has been accustomed to activating special task force, involving the 
military and other security agencies in addressing its internal security con-
cerns. This is evident in the deployment of such security management 
posture in the fight against militancy in the Niger Delta in the South- 
South, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, herdsmen-farmers 
clashes in the North-Central, armed banditry in the North-West, separat-
ist agitations in South-East, and oil theft in the South-West. In fact, there 
is no part of Nigeria that has not played host to such special military 
operations.
Another paramilitary agency that assists the police in internal security 
management in Nigeria is the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC). The institution is expected to assist the other state security 
institutions, especially the police in the management of threats to internal 
security in the country. Despite making enormous contribution in safe-
guarding lives and property, it also faces the problems of corruption, 
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recruitment and training deficit. The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) 
equally engages in internal security management. The agency is constitu-
tionally responsible for monitoring, documenting and regulating trans- 
border migration. The institutional weakness that is prevalent in Nigeria 
has also affected the functionality of NIS. The result is that Nigeria has 
become vulnerable to trans-border crimes such as terrorism, human traf-
ficking, SALW proliferation and many others.
The last among the formal security agencies examined is the Nigeria 
Prison Service. The prison service ensures that all imprisoned persons are 
rehabilitated before rejoining the society. However, the situation in 
Nigeria is such that those imprisoned come out becoming more hardened 
criminals than they were before their incarceration. This problem is impli-
cated on the condition of Nigerian prisons, which are overcrowded, 
underfunded and punitive-oriented. The result is that the prison in Nigeria 
has further hardened rather than reformed the inmates.
Beyond the formal security institutions that are crucial to the manage-
ment of internal security, informal security organisations that are involved 
in the management of internal security which this study examined were 
the private security companies and the vigilante groups. Private security 
companies in Nigeria have grown in scale due in part to the rising level of 
insecurity in the country and the failure of state security institutions in 
security provisioning. These companies are involved in such internal secu-
rity tasks like asset protection, guard duties for a host of clientele such as 
government establishments and corporate business organisations (e.g. 
banks). While corporate bodies have augmented their security and protec-
tion needs with services provided by private security companies, the inabil-
ity of the state to meet up with internal security requirements has forced 
members of the local communities to improve their own security arrange-
ment through the formation of vigilante groups. Some of these groups are 
recognised and empowered by some state governments, while many oth-
ers survive and operate on contributions of community members and phil-
anthropic individuals. In many communities in Nigeria, these groups serve 
as community police and are involved, sometimes, in performing judicial 
functions such as settlement of disputes. Although the existence of vigi-
lante groups has been used to gauge the failure of the police and other 
security agencies in Nigeria, it has equally proven to serve as a tool for 
complementing the efforts of the formal security organisations.
Notwithstanding the existence of these agencies, internal security man-
agement in Nigeria continues to face stiffer challenges. These range from 
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the failure of the state to resolve the contradictions that underscore 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic nature and post-colonial character, to lack of fund-
ing to the security agencies as a result of lack of transparency and account-
ability in the disbursement and utilisation of security funds. Others include 
lack of social security, owing to development deficit, lack of sustainable 
youth empowerment programmes and the growing interconnectedness of 
the world through globalisation.
As the various analytical chapters in this book demonstrate, the upsurge 
and persistence of security challenges, coupled with the inability of both 
the formal and informal security institutions to contain them, have under-
mined the safety of persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the Nigerian state. Despite the avalanche of both formal and informal 
institutions available to successive Nigerian governments in security provi-
sioning, responses to evolving internal security challenges leveraging this 
motley of institutions have proven grossly inadequate (Nwagboso 2016). 
The reasons for this situation have been attributed to a mix of historical, 
structural and contextual factors that underpin weak capacity of state insti-
tutions to anticipate, respond and manage the prevalence of multiple secu-
rity challenges. One key fact that has emerged from the chapters in this 
book is that the approach of the Nigerian state in managing internal secu-
rity challenges has been predominantly reactive, coercive and repressive 
rather than proactive, preventive and inclusive. This situation has under-
mined the prospect of peace and stability critical for national development.
Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm shift and thorough rethinking 
of the architecture and posture of internal security management in Nigeria. 
Rethinking the framework of internal security management in Nigeria will 
require comprehensive reforms in the area of policy and practice. In this 
respect, the articulation and adoption of a national security strategy to 
articulate what constitutes national security in Nigeria and streamline the 
desperate and conflict responsibilities of a myriad of ineffective security 
institutions and agencies in Nigeria are fundamental imperatives. Such a 
national security policy is critical in ensuring that security priorities accu-
rately reflect citizens’ needs, limited resources are effectively allocated 
across agencies and agencies cooperate professionally in the discharge of 
assigned responsibilities (Adam Smith International 2016). The failure to 
effectively manage security challenges confronting the nation is more of a 
lack of synergy among extant state security institutions than the dearth of 
such critical institutions. Thus, a national security policy will serve as a 
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critical enabler for the much-needed cooperation, collaboration and syn-
ergy to optimise security delivery.
Furthermore, the diversity of Nigeria and the complexity of the security 
environment require a shift from a highly centralised structure of internal 
security management to a decentralised framework (Arase 2013). In particu-
lar, the decentralisation of policing functions in two principal forms is highly 
needed. First is the devolution of more policing powers and responsibilities 
to states and local communities to optimise local knowledge of the people’s 
culture, terrain and language in ensuring effective community policing. 
Second is divesting the federal police of all traffic responsibilities, orderly and 
guard duties and transferring same to Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) 
and NSCDC. Achieving this reform will require constitutional amendment.
For too long, Nigeria’s internal security management posture has been 
predominantly reactive and ineffective. This is not unconnected with the 
weakness of intelligence gathering—a situation made worse by the absence 
of a credible and reliable national identification system and the limited 
application of high-tech gadgets in intelligence gathering. The plethora of 
identification systems that exist in Nigeria are not harmonised and exist 
mainly as isolated platforms to serve some vested interests in different sec-
tors of the economy. To meet the security challenges of the twenty-first 
century and beyond, there is the need for the harmonisation of the coun-
try’s diverse national identification frameworks as a prerequisite for 
national security and development. This is important because a reliable 
national identification system is critical to evolving a robust crime database 
as well as intelligence gathering for managing diverse security needs of the 
state. Poor intelligence gathering has impacted on the ability of the state 
to effectively anticipate and respond to security threats. To overcome this 
challenge, the Nigerian government should properly resource its agencies 
with the acquisition of modern equipment and technological gadgets to 
enhance their ability to combat security threats. The creation of an 
Intelligence Fusion Centre that builds up proper records of information 
with a system of easy retrieval by the various security agencies is critical in 
enhancing internal security management in the country.
There is also the need to modernise the security agencies with training, 
intelligence sharing, advanced technology, logistics, motivation and 
change of orientation. This effort will enhance the operational capabilities 
of the Nigerian security agencies by identifying avenues that would enable 
them to respond appropriately to internal security challenges and other 
threats. Government must avoid the nepoticisation and politicisation of 
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the recruitment process of security personnel to avoid further polarisation 
of national security institutions which often have adverse consequences for 
diligence, loyalty and commitment to service as well as invest on capacity 
building of security personnel to meet the global best practice and standard.
There is equally the need to review and refocus Nigeria’s conflict man-
agement approach. The growing reliance on the military to deal with 
security challenges ranging from law and order maintenance to combating 
organised crime has serious implications for the professionalism of the 
military as an organisation for external defence and the police as the first 
line of response to internal insecurity. The political leadership should de- 
emphasise militarisation and prioritise the capacitation of the police and 
other security and law enforcement agencies to proactively combat crimes 
and timely douse tension before they assume more dangerous dimensions.
To more effectively address the challenges of internal security manage-
ment, there is the need for the enthronement of good governance in 
Nigeria through the conduct of credible elections, vigorous campaign 
against corruption and equitable distribution of resources. Good gover-
nance is key to reducing poverty, unemployment and economic marginali-
sation that underpin much of the violent security threats that plague 
Nigeria. The underlying principle of good governance is the focus on 
human development as key to achieving sustainable security in the society.
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